The IANA Stewardship Transition Overview & Background

The IANA Stewardship Transition Overview & Background

• 1.
  Issue Date: Revision: IANA StewardshipTransition discussions December 2014 Prepared by Craig Ng, General Counsel 16 December 2014 1
• 2.
  Outline • Source ofUS Government’s oversight role • Current contractual relationship between US Government and ICANN • The transition process – what’s happening at ICANN • CRISP • Proposals from other RIRs • Discussions 2
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  Source of USGovernment’s claim 3 U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ARPAnet (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network)
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  Source of USGovernment’s claim 4 U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Contract for development work Dr. Jon Postel Maintain list of host names and addresses; Maintain list of RFCs Maintain list of assigned Internet numbers and names Publish list of technical parameters by protocol developers These functions became known as Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
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  In the 1990’s,pressure was building … • Dissatisfaction with absence of competition in domain name registration • Conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders • Commercial interests calling for more formal and robust management structure • Increasing percentage of Internet users outside of U.S., who want to participate in Internet coordination • Need for more formal, accountable ways to add new TLDs • Became less appropriate for U.S. research agencies to direct and fund these functions 5 NTIA published Green Paper in February 1998: “A Proposal to Improve the Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses” in response to President Bill Clinton’s instructions to Department of Commerce (DOC) to “privatize the management of the domain name system” After receiving comments … NTIA issued White Paper in June 1998: “Management of Internet Names and Numbers”
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  In the 1990’s,pressure was building … 6
• 7.
  The White Paper– “Management of Internet Names and Addresses” Principles for a New System: • Stability – “The U.S. Government should end its role in the Internet number and name address system in a manner that ensures the stability of the Internet” • Competition • Private, bottom-up coordination – “ … private-sector action is preferable to government control” • Representation – “The new corporation should operate as a private entity for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole” 7 June 1998
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  The White Paper– “Management of Internet Names and Addresses” Purpose: • Set policy for and direct allocation of IP number blocks to RIRs • Oversee operation of authoritative Internet root server system • Oversee policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs are added to the root system; and • Coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet 8 June 1998
• 9.
  Current contractual arrangement Affirmationof Commitments IANA Functions Contract National Telecommunications and Information Administration Department of Commerce
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  Current contractual arrangement Mutualaffirmation of key commitments by US Government (Department of Commerce) and ICANN: • Ensure decisions are made in the public interest and accountable and transparent • Preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS • Promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace • Facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination Affirmation of Commitments
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  Current contractual arrangement USGovernment (Department of Commerce) commits to multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination, that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. ICANN commits to: • transparent and accountable budget processes • fact-based development • cross-community deliberations • responsive consultation procedures (including basis for decision, how comments have influenced consideration) • publish each year, ICANN’s progress against by-laws, responsibilities, strategic and operating plans • remain a not for profit corporation, headquartered in USA with offices around the world Affirmation of Commitments
• 12.
  Current contractual arrangement ICANN’sspecific commitments: • Accountability and transparency: – continually assessing and improving board governance; board performance, board selection process, whether it meets ICANN’s needs now and in the future, appeal mechanism for board decision – assessing and improving role and effectiveness of GAC – assessing and improving public input processes to ICANN – assessing extent to which ICANN decisions are embraced, supported and accepted – assessing the PDP for enhanced cross community deliberations • Preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS • Promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace • Facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination Affirmation of Commitments
• 13.
  Current contractual arrangement ICANN’sspecific commitments: • Accountability and transparency: – continually assessing and improving board governance; board performance, board selection process, whether it meets ICANN’s needs now and in the future, appeal mechanism for board decision – assessing and improving role and effectiveness of GAC – assessing and improving public input processes to ICANN – assessing extent to which ICANN decisions are embraced, supported and accepted – assessing the PDP for enhanced cross community deliberations • Preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS • Promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace • Facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination Affirmation of Commitments * ATRT = Accountability and Transparency Review Team
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  National Telecommunications and Information Administration Department ofCommerce Current contractual arrangement Affirmation of Commitments IANA Functions Contract National Telecommunications and Information Administration
• 15.
  Current contractual arrangement Overview: •The IANA Functions Contract include three parts: – An “Award” issued by NTIA (65 pages long, specifies the statement of work, price/costs, deliverables, and other legal and administrative information) – dated 2 July 2012 – ICANN proposal to NTIA’s request for proposals (550 pages long, incorporated by reference to the main contract) – Amendments made in October 2012 and April 2013 • “IANA Functions” include: – coordination of the assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters – administration of certain responsibilities associated with the Internet DNS root zone management – allocation of Internet numbering resources – other services related to the management of the ARPA and INT top level domains • Main requirements of work are specified in sections C.1 to C.8 IANA Functions Contract
• 16.
  Current contractual arrangement PartC – Contractor Requirements: • C.1 – Background • C.2 – Contractor requirements – develop performance standards – IANA functions (more in next slide) – coordinate assignment of technical protocol parameters including management of ARPA TLD – perform administrative functions associated with root zone management – root zone file change request management – root zone “WHOIS” change request and database management – delegation and redelegation of a ccTLD; gTLD – root zone automation – root DNSSEC key management – allocate Internet numbering resources (C.2.9.3) • C.3 – Security requirements • C.4 – Performance metric requirements • C.5 – Audit requirements • C.6 – Conflict of interest requirements • C.7 – Continuity of operations • C.8 – Performance exclusions IANA Functions Contract
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  Current contractual arrangement IANA Functions Contract *Source: SSAC Report on the IANA Functions Contract SAC068
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  National Telecommunications and Information Administration Department ofCommerce Affirmation of Commitments IANA Functions Contract IANA transition process
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  National Telecommunications and Information Administration IANA transitionprocess
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  20 CRISP APNIC Dr Govind Izumi Okutani CraigNg (Staff) AFRINIC Alan P. Barrett Mwenda Kivuva Ernest Byaruhanga (Staff) ARIN Bill Woodcock John Sweeting Michael Abejuala (Staff) LACNIC Esteban Lescano Nico Scheper Andres Piazza (Staff) RIPE Nurani Nimpuno Andrei Robachevsky Paul Rendek (Staff)
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  Proposals from otherRIRs
• 22.
  22 This document isuncontrolled when printed. Before use, check the APNIC electronic master document to verify that this is the current version. APNIC IANA Functions Contract (SLA) Affirmation of Commitments (MOU) LACNIC IANA Functions Contract (SLA) Affirmation of Commitments (MOU) Multistakeholder Oversight Numbers Council (MONC) RIPE IANA Functions Contract (SLA) ARIN (Survey results) 59% - ICANN has historically managed number resources well 57% - ICANN should continue to manage number resources 58% - There is a need for external IANA oversight 64% - Oversight mechanism should make RIRs accountable 70% - RIRs should be able to terminate IANA functions contract 38% - IANA transition should go ahead regardless of enhanced accountability process AFRINIC (Survey results) 70% - Should be minimal operational change 93% - New oversight should incorporate existing RIR PDP 88% - RIR communities ultimately accountable for management of IANA functions 63% - ICANN has historically managed number resources well 84% - IANA functions operator should be accountable to communities it serves 55% - IANA functions should be maintained as a “bundle”