Hop- by- Hop Message Authentication and Wormhole Detection Mechanism in Wireless Sensor Network

International Journal of Computer Applications Technology and Research
Volume 3– Issue 11, 693 - 696, 2014
Hop- by- Hop Message Authentication and Wormhole Detection
Mechanism in Wireless Sensor Network
S.Subha
Computer Science and Engineering
V.S.B Engineering College
Karur, India
U.Gowri Sankar
Computer Science And Engineering
V.S.B Engineering College
Karur, India
Abstract: One of the most effective way to prevent unauthorized and corrupted message from being forward in wireless sensor
network. So to restrict these problems many authentication schemes have been developed based on symmetric key cryptosystem. But
there is high computational and communication overhead in addition to lack of scalability and resilience to node compromise attacks.
So to address these isuues polynomial based scheme[1] was introduced. But in these methods it having the threshold problem that
means to send the limited message only because to send larger number of message means the attacker can fully recover. So in my
existing system a scalable message authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. This scheme allows any node to
transmit an unlimited number of messages without suffering the threshold problem. But these method only detect the black hole and
grey hole attacks are dected but does not detect the worm hole attack. In my proposed system to detect the worm hole attack. Worm
hole attack is one of the harmful attack to which degrade the network performance. So, in the proposed system, one innovative
technique is introduced which is called an efficient wormhole detection mechanism in the wireless sensor networks. In this method,
considers the RTT between two successive nodes and those nodes‟ neighbor number which is needed to compare those values of other
successive nodes. The identification of wormhole attacks is based on the two faces. The first consideration is that the transmission time
between two wormhole attack affected nodes is considerable higher than that between two normal neighbor nodes. The second
detection mechanism is based on the fact that by introducing new links into the network, the adversary increases the number of
neighbors of the nodes within its radius. An experimental result shows that the proposed method achieves high network performance..
Keywords: Hop-by-hop authentication, public-key cryptosystem, source privacy, Modified ELGamal signature, Round Trip Time.
1. INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network is a self-configuring network of
small sensor nodes communicating among themselves using
radio signals, and deployed in quantity to sense, monitor and
understand the physical world.A sensor network consists of
multiple detection stations called sensor nodes, each of which
is small, lightweight and portable. Every sensor node is
equipped with a transducer, microcomputer, transceiver and
power source. The transducer generates electrical signals
based on sensed physical effects and phenomena. The
microcomputer processes and stores the sensor output. The
transceiver, which can be hard-wired or wireless, receives
commands from a central computer and transmits data to that
computer. The power for each sensor node is derived from the
electric utility or from a battery.
2. PREVIOUS WORK
A message authentication code [11] is a short piece of
information used to authenticate a message and to provide
integrity and authenticity assurances on the message. So in
wireless communication the message will be hacked by the
attacker can modify message. So to avoid the attacker so
many methods are introduced in wireless sensor networks.
Many message authentication scheme have been developed. It
have the limitation of high computational and communication
overhead in addition to lack of scalability to node
compromised attack. So to avoid this problem we introduce
polynomial based scheme was introduce. But this algorithms
also having some problem. While enabling intermediate node
authentication[2]. When the number of message transmitted is
lager then the threshold , the attacker can fully recover the
polynomial. So to avoid this problem in my existing system
to introduce Modified Elgamal Signature[4] scheme was
developed this is used for signature verification process. Then
another method was also implemented that is SAMA on
elliptic curve these is used in verification process. This
scheme allows any node to transmit an unlimited number of
message without suffering the threshold problem. This
method also detect the block hole and gray hole attack.
DRAWBACK OF EXISTING SYSTEM
1. This method does not detect the wormhole attack.
2. Degrade the network performance.
3. It does not have computational and communication
overhead.
4. It have less efficiency.
3. TERMINOLOGY AND
PRELIMINORY
3.1 Model And Assumption
Security is an important concern in the wireless sensor
networks. Message authentication plays a key role in
thwarting unauthorized and corrupted messages from being
forwarded in networks to save the precious sensor energy. In
addition to that, in the wireless sensor networks, wormhole
attacks can cause severe damage to the route discovery
mechanism used in many routing protocols. In a wormhole
attack, the malicious nodes will tunnel the eavesdropped
packets to a remote position in the network and retransmit
them to generate fake neighbor connections, thus spoiling the
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Volume 3– Issue 11, 693 - 696, 2014
routing protocols and weakening some security
enhancements.
3.2 Terminology
i. Modified ElGamal Signature Scheme
The modified elgamal signature [5] scheme consist of three
algorithms:
Key generation algorithm. Let p be a large prime and g be
a generator of ZZ : Both p and g are made public. For a random
private key p
x 2 ZZp , the public key y is computed
from y ¼ gx mod p.
Signature algorithm. The MES can also have many
variants. For the purpose of efficiency, we will describe the
variant, called optimal scheme. To sign a message m, one
chooses a random K€Z*p-1,then computes the exponentiation
r=gk mod p.
Verification algorithm. The verifier checks whether the
signature equation gs ¼ ryrhðm;rÞ mod p: If the equality
holds true, then the verifier Accepts the signature, and
rejects otherwise.
4. PROPOSED WORK
In my existing system to detect the black hole and gray hole
attack. But does not detect the wormhole attack[9]. So one
innovative techniques is used in my proposed work which is
called on efficient wormhole detection mechanism in wireless
sensor network.
Definition: In this section, to detect the wormhole attack
which is based on the RTT of the message between successive
nodes and their neighbor numbers.So we finding wormhole
attack by using two mechnisums:
1. Route Finding: At that phase, the source node is
responsible to construct the hierarchical routing tree to other
nodes in the sensor field. The node sends the route request
(RREQ) message to the neighbor node and save the time of its
RREQ sending TREQ. The intermediate node also forward the
RREQ message and save TREQ of its sending time. When the
RREQ message reach to the destination node, it reply route
reply message (RREP) with the reserved path. When the
intermediate node receives the RREP message, it saves the time
of receiving of RREP TREP. Our assumption is based on the
RTT of the route request and reply. The RTT can be
calculated as
RTT = TREP-TREQ
All intermediate nodes save this information and then send it
also to the base station.
2.Construction of neighbor list: In this first phase, each
node broadcast the neighbor request (NREQ) message. The
NREQ receiving node responds to the neighbor reply (NREP)
message. The requesting node constructs the neighbor lists
based on the received of NREP messages and counts its
neighbor number (nn). After that the source node starts the
route construction phase.
ADVANTAGE OF PROPOSED WORK
1. To detect the wormhole detection
2. It give high network performance
3. This method having high efficiency
4. It give high message source privacy.
5. RELATED WORK
In my existing system secret polynomial-based message
authentication scheme was introduced. This sharing scheme,
where the number of message transmition is below the
threshold means system will be secure and the enables the
intermediate to node to verify the authenticity of message. But
the message is large than the threshold means the system
should be compromised by the attacker, then system should
be completely broken. Then to avoid these threshold problem
to introduce Modified ELGamal[5] Signature scheme which is
used in my existing system. While enabling intermediate node
authentication allows any node to transmit unlimited number
of message without suffering the threshold problem. Then the
system should be in very secure and attacker does not
compromise the nodes. Then these type of MES schemes also
to find the block hole and gray hole attack. But this method
does not detect worm hole attack because worm hole attack is
one harm full attack which degrade the network performance.
So in my proposed system to find the wormhole attack by
using the RTT between two successive nodes. Then worm
hole attack is a malicious node tunnels message received in
one part of the network over a low latency link and replay
them in a different part. Due to the nature of wireless
transmission, the attacker can create a wormhole even for
packets not addressed to itself, since it can overhear them in
wireless transmission and tunnel them to the colluding
attacker at the opposite end of the wormhole.
6. PROPOSED WORMHOLE
DETECTION MECHANISUM
In this section we present our wormhole detection[9]
mechanism. Our detection is based on the RTT of the message
between nodes.
System modules: These wormhole detection mechanism
using some method to detect the attacker that‟s are:
1. Route Finding
2. Construction of neighbor list
3. Wormhole Attack Detection
4. Calculation of RTT
5.
Phase1: Route Finding
At that phase, the source node is responsible to construct the
hierarchical routing tree to other nodes in the sensor field.
The node sends the route request (RREQ) message to the
neighbor node and save the time of its RREQ sending TREQ.
The intermediate node also forward the RREQ message and
save TREQ of its sending time. When the RREQ message reach
to the destination node, it reply route reply message (RREP)
with the reserved path. When the intermediate node receives
the RREP message, it saves the time of receiving of RREP TREP.
Our assumption is based on the RTT of the route request and
reply. The RTT can be calculated as
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Volume 3– Issue 11, 693 - 696, 2014
RTT = TREP-TREQ
All intermediate nodes save this information and then send it
also to the base station.
Phase2: Construction of neighbor list
In this first phase, each node broadcast the neighbor request
[11] (NREQ) message. The NREQ receiving node responds to the
neighbor reply (NREP) message.The requesting node
constructs the neighbor lists based on the received of NREP
messages and counts its neighbor number (nn). After that the
source node starts the route construction phase.
Phase3: Wormhole Attack Detection
In this phase, the source node calculates the RTT [9] of all
intermediate nodes and also it and destination. It calculates the
RTT of successive nodes and compares the value to check
whether the wormhole attack can be there or not. If there is no
attack, the values of them are nearly the same. If the RTT
value is higher than other successive nodes, it can be
suspected as wormhole attack between this link. The
nextdetection mechanism is based on the fact that by
introducing new links into the network graph, the adversary
increases the number of neighbors of the nodes within its
radius. So it needs to check the nn of these two nodes which
find in section 4.2. Equation (2) is adopted form [5] to
estimate average number of neighbors d. It is approximated as
d = (N-1) π r2 /A
where A is the area of the region, N is the number of nodes in
that region and r is the common transmission radius. For
example, if the RTT value between A to B is considerably
greater than for other links, it needs to check the value of nn
for A and B. If also the nn value for A and B is higher than
the average neighbor number d, there is a suspect that a
wormhole link is between nodes A and B. In this way the
mechanism can pin point the location of the wormhole attack.
Phase 4: Calculation of RTT
In this subsection, the detailed calculation of the RTT is
discussed. The value of RTT is considered the time difference
between a node receives RREP from a destination to it send
RREQ to the destination. During route setup procedure, the
time of sending RREQ and receiving RREP is described in
Figure 1. In this case, every node will save the time they
forward RREQ and the time they receive RREP from the
destination to calculate the RTT. Given all RTT values
between nodes in the route and the destination, RTT between
two successive nodes, say A and B, can be calculated as
follows:
RTTA,B = RTTA – RTTB
Where RTTA is the RTT between node A and the destination,
RTTB is the RTT between node B and the destination. For
example, the route from source (S) to destination (D) pass
through node A, and B so which routing path includes:
S → A → B → D
whereas T(S)., T(A)REQ, T(B)REQ , T(D)REQ is the time the
node S, A, B, D forward RREQ and T(S)REP, T(A)REP, T(B)REP,
T(D)REP is the time the node S, A, B, D forward REP. Then
the RTT between S, A, B and D will be calculated based on
equation as follows:
RTTS = T(S)REP – T(S)REQ
RTTA = T(A)REP – T(A)REQ
RTTB = T(B)REP – T(B)REQ
RTTD = T(D)REP – T(D)REQ
And the RTT values between two successive nodes along the
path will be calculated based on equation :
RTTS ,A = RTTS – RTTA
RTTA, B = RTTA – RTTB
RTTB, D = RTTB – RTTD
Under normal circumstances, RTTS,A, RTTA,B, RTTB,D are
similar value in range. If there is a wormhole line between
two nodes, the RTT value may considerably higher than other
successive RTT values and suspected that there may be a
wormhole link between these two nodes.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first proposed a novel and efficient worm
hole detection based on RTT. While ensuring message sender
privacy. RTT can be applied to any message to provide
message content authenticity and then node compromised
attack. To provide hop by hop message authentication without
the weakness of the build in block hole attack. We proposed
hop by hop message authentication scheme based on RTT.
When applied to the wireless sensor network with fixed
number of sink nodes, we also discussed in possible
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Volume 3– Issue 11, 693 - 696, 2014
techniques for compromised node identification. We compare
our proposed scheme with MES scheme through simulation
using NS-2 simulator. The simulation results show that our
system has acceptable range of performance and applicability.
Both theoretical and simulation result shows that, in
comparable scenario, our proposed scheme is more efficient
then the MES scheme in terms of computational overhead,
energy consumption, message delay and memory
consumption.
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