Interblockchain Communication for Blockchain Interoperability
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This document discusses inter-blockchain communication (IBC) designed by Cosmos, detailing its goals, implementation, and use cases, particularly in connecting Ethereum and Zcash. IBC serves as a protocol for transferring data packets across heterogeneous blockchains, enabling features like token transfers, contract execution, and conditional logic while ensuring security through various methods including light client verification. Key aspects include the lifecycle of connections, strict message ordering, and the potential for privacy and seamless upgrades in blockchain technology without needing new assets.
Interblockchain Communication for Blockchain Interoperability
- 1. Christopher Goes, Cosmos IBC & public-private blockchain interoperation
- 2. About this talk ● Explain IBC design goals ● Demystify implementation ○ IBC is a protocol! ○ How to do it yourself (rapid version) ● Walk through example ○ Using IBC to connect Ethereum & Zcash ○ Shielded ERC20 transactions: privately send your existing ERC20 tokens
- 3. What - “Inter-blockchain communication” ● Mechanism for relaying data packets between chain A & chain B ● Off-chain relayers responsible for watching chain A & committing transactions to chain B ○ Relayers are not permissioned, anyone can relay ● Opaque payload: IBC protocol defines causal ordering semantics, any application logic can be implemented on top
- 4. What - Authenticated message passing ● Rules on chain B which define a subset of accepted packets ○ If packet has been received on B, know something about state of A ● Chain B verifies proof that packet has been sent on chain A ● Various methods of doing so, with different security properties ○ Chain B acts as a Bitcoin-style light client of chain A (Merkle proofs) ○ Intermediary “peg zone” with finality and accountable validator set ● Must trust - consensus algorithms and light client verification
- 5. What - Use cases ● Basics ○ Transfer tokens (fungible/non-fungible) across chains ○ Conditionalize contract execution or output locking on state of another chain ● Sharding-esque ○ Split & parallelize contract logic across multiple chains with compatible VMs ■ IBC exposes a channel-like primitive ○ Compose hybrid EVM-Cosmos-Zcash state machines ○ Delegated security - validators for one chain slashable over IBC on another ● Key point - heterogenous chains ○ Various combinations of IBC primitives can be implemented on each chain ○ Sovereign chains can have custom features (zkSNARKs!)
- 6. How - Security model ● Goal - allow preservation of “contract invariants” across chains ○ Burn asset T on chain A, redeem “T vouchers” on chain B ○ Burn T vouchers on chain B, redeem T on chain A ○ (which is really the voucher? No canonical chain!) ● State machine of B must verify that state machine of A burned T ○ Can encapsulate some of this verification in the known components of Alpha/Beta state machines prior to creating IBC connection ■ Or prove it directly if code is stored in state and VMs are compatible ○ After A burns T, writes some data to a provable store ■ Then B can just verify light client proof of written data ■ Data couldn’t have been written if T hadn’t been burned
- 7. How - Connection lifecycle ● Connection - data necessary to verify packets between two chains ● Opening a connection ○ Root-of-trust - genesis block, initial validator set added “at connection creation” ■ When smart contract is deployed ■ When governance implements upgrade ○ Any connection user can check the root-of-trust ● Updating trusted headers ○ Verify update from H1 to H2 ■ Tendermint - Track validator set, check signed by previous validator set ■ Nakamoto consensus - continues previous chain, most work seen ○ Headers allow packet proof verification ● Closing a connection ○ In exceptional cases - fork, safety violation ○ Can be done by permissioned entity (governance) or some on-chain proof-of-fraud
- 8. How - Strictly ordered message passing ● IBC implements a vector clock for two processes (blockchains) ○ A, B chains of interest ○ i packet counter ○ x, y events (other transactions) ○ -> before, => implies ○ Asend:i -> Breceive:i ○ Breceive:i -> Areceipt:i ○ Asend:i -> Asend:i+1 ○ x -> Asend:i => x -> Breceive:i ○ y -> Breceive:i => y -> Areceipt:i ● Consensus provides single canonical ordering on a chain ● IBC provides single canonical ordering across chains ● Easily generalized to an n-process vector clock for multi-chain ordering ○ a on chain A before b on chain B before c on chain C
- 9. How - Ordering guarantees ● Ordering guarantee can be used to reason about the combined state of both chains as a whole ○ Example: fungible token total supply ■ If packet i is sent on A, burn tokens ■ If packet i is received on B, mint vouchers ● Tokens must have previously been burned on A ● Total supply conserved ■ Counters prevent replay on the same chain ■ Metadata prevents replay on other chains
- 10. How - Channels ● Channel: abstraction providing ordering guarantee ○ Set of four queues, two per chain ■ On chain A ● Outgoing A-B ● Incoming B-A receipts ■ On chain B ● Outgoing B-A ● Incoming A-B receipts ○ Each queue keeps a counter ○ Packets can only be sent & received in order ■ If counters mismatch, reject
- 11. How - Packets ● Packet - Individual datagram with opaque payload & metadata ○ Five-tuple - (type, sequence, source, destination, data) ■ Type - multiplexing (one connection, many applications) ■ Sequence - ordering guarantee (prevent replay) ■ Source - source chain (prevent replay masquerading from another chain) ■ Destination - destination chain (prevent replay on another chain) ■ Data - opaque application-specific payload ○ Packets are committed once, in order, from only one chain to only one chain
- 12. How - Receipt, acknowledgement, timeout ● IBC receipt - IBC packet back to the source chain ○ Proves original packet was received & acted upon ■ Relevant application-specific action was taken ○ Data for proof can then be deleted from Merkle tree ● IBC timeout on source chain ○ Each packet additionally contains timeout t relative to destination chain state ○ Destination chain rejects packets past t ○ t can be height or timestamp, must be proved back to A for asset release ■ Via same proof as IBC packets (Merkle path) ■ Provides safety if packet isn’t committed on destination chain ■ Assets can be un-escrowed, released to original sender
- 13. Why - One asset, many chains ● Assets can be freely transferred ○ Send your BTC from Bitcoin, to Ethereum, to Cosmos, to Zcash, then back ○ Always the “same” BTC - can be redeemed back through that path to vanilla BTC ● Multi-hop routing reduces implementation cost ○ Assets can be sent along any path of individually-connected chains ● Permissionless ○ Set up another chain, implement IBC with an existing asset, add new features
- 14. Why - New features, old security ● When you need privacy, send your BTC to Zcash ○ Usually keep it on the Bitcoin chain for security ○ (but be careful about linkability!) ● No trusted setup risk ○ IBC contract on Bitcoin (or peg) can track total supply in/out ○ If trusted setup was compromised: ■ BTC on Zcash chain is at risk ■ BTC on Bitcoin chain is at no risk - IBC contract will cap inflation ○ Risk is always opt-in! ● Generalizable: supply for fungible tokens, uniqueness for NFTs, etc.
- 15. Why - Opt-in upgrades ● Add new features to a chain, no governance required ○ Copy the chain, add the features, create an IBC connection back to the old chain ○ Anyone can elect to move their existing assets to the new chain ■ Could allow moving back to the old chain - or not ○ Security? ■ Naive (simple) PoS - less secure initially, more secure as staking token moves ■ Delegated security - New chain validators slashable on old chain over IBC ● No need for a new asset ● Both chains can peacefully coexist
- 16. Aside - Consensus requirements ● State finality ○ IBC safety requires finality, otherwise coins could be double-spent ○ Consensus landscape ■ Tendermint/PBFT - Instant finality ■ Casper FFG - Fast finality ■ Nakamoto consensus (PoW, Tezos/Ouroboros Praos PoS) ● Probabilistic finality, must pick a threshold ● Could vary threshold based on transfer amount (~risk) ● Proof verification ○ With smart contracts or custom state machine - natively ○ Without smart contracts - separate “peg chain” to bridge
- 17. Aside - Bridged “Peg-zone” ● Accountable federated peg ○ Cosmos Bonded PoS (and similar) have configurable slashing conditions ○ Assets controlled by weighted (or k-of-m) multi-signature on pegged chain ■ e.g. Bitcoin, Zcash, Monero ■ Future alternative - multiparty ECDSA ○ Second Tendermint chain with validator set of multi-signature ■ Transactions committed to the bridge chain must be signed by multi-sig, then can be relayed to main chain ■ Any transactions signed but not committed to bridge chain are slashable! ● Also slashable - failure to update multi-sig if validator set is changed ■ Received transactions on main chain can be relayed back to bridge chain for ease-of-verification ■ Configurable finality threshold (n confirmations) ○ Main (pegged) chain needs no additional features
- 18. Example - Ethereum ERC20 ⇔ Zcash UIT ● Zcash UITs (User-issued tokens) ○ https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues/830 ○ Bitcoin-style “colored coins” on Zcash ○ Not in Sapling but maybe soon? (see discussion on the issue) ○ Alternatives: Zcash-fork per ERC20 token, or ZEC-as-ERC20 ● Associate each ERC20 token contract with a unique UIT identifier ○ “ibc/ethereum/{contract address}” ○ Identifiers can be created lazily on demand (and also for new tokens) ● ERC20 token vouchers can be shielded on the Zcash chain ● Can remain so indefinitely and be shielded-transferred as usual ● Once unshielded, can be transferred back to the original ERC20
- 19. ERC20 ⇔ UIT - Components ● Dedicated smart contract on Ethereum ○ Holds ERC20 tokens in escrow ○ Provide proof that x of token y has been escrowed ○ Verify proof that UIT has been burned and release escrowed ERC20 tokens ○ (channel ordering semantics are optional since transfers are commutative) ● Zcash multisignature (or multiparty ECDSA) peg chain ○ Multisignature (unshielded) account on Zcash chain ○ Signer set of multisignature account runs Tendermint consensus on peg chain ○ Peg chain ■ Verifies proofs of ERC20 token escrow on Ethereum ■ Provides proofs of UITs burned to Ethereum smart contract ■ Slashes multisignature members if they commit a fault
- 20. ERC20 ⇔ UIT - Step I (Ethereum) ● User has some ERC20 token T, on the Ethereum chain ● User calls ERC20 transfer to send token to IBC smart contract ■ IBC contract escrows ERC20 token ■ IBC contract logs the escrow event in the Patricia trie ● Includes: sender, token, amount, desired destination address
- 21. ERC20 ⇔ UIT - Step II (Zcash peg chain) ● IBC packet sent from Ethereum to Zcash peg chain ○ IBC relayer (user or third-party) constructs IBC packet ■ Packet references escrow event on Ethereum chain ○ IBC relayer commits packet in a transaction to Zcash peg chain ■ Zcash peg chain state machine verifies proof of event
- 22. ERC20 ⇔ UIT - Step III (Zcash) ● Zcash peg chain validators sign UIT-mint transaction ○ UIT-mint transaction mints the associated UIT denomination in the amount proved by the Ethereum event on the peg chain, to the user-specified destination address ○ Peg chain validators or user commit mint transaction to Zcash chain ● User can then transact as normal with a Zcash UIT ○ Shield to a z-address, spend privately, unshield/shield again as desired ○ Privacy equivalent: ERC20-side is “unshielded pool” ■ Be careful about pattern-matching linkability! ● UIT can be sent back to Ethereum in reverse ○ Provably burn the UIT on Zcash, submit proof to Zcash peg chain ○ IBC relayer submits packet to Ethereum smart contract which unescrows the tokens
- 23. ERC20 ⇔ UIT - Properties ● Permissionless & opt-in ○ Anyone can implement for any token ○ Which chain to keep on, when to move up to the asset holder ○ No risk for existing ERC20 token holders of inflation ■ IBC contract can track total supply in/out ● Full Zcash-level privacy when shielded ○ Same level of linkability as transparent addresses / unshielded pool ● Scalable implementation ○ Same logic (and one peg chain) can handle all ERC20 contracts & associated UITs
- 24. Future Research - higher-assurance proofs ● IBC security dependent on correct light client proofs ● Various degrees of light-client assurance ○ Bitcoin - relatively low ■ No state transition verification ■ Long forks do seem to be unlikely in practice... ○ Cosmos/Tendermint - medium ■ No state transition verification ■ But - lying to light client always a slashable offense ● IBC packet data is public, so it would definitely be caught! ■ Security dependent on value-at-stake (hence the Cosmos hub-spoke model) ○ Coda Protocol / recursive SNARKs - high ■ Can verify full state transition history! ■ Still need to disincentivize forks
- 25. Future Research - Byzantine recovery ● What if consensus breaks? ○ No valid chain, n valid chains (valid for IBC = can provide light client proofs) ○ Wide space of possibilities ■ n valid chains: can spot duplicate headers when published ■ 0 valid chains: no progress without intervention (but timeouts protect assets) ● What if one chain’s state machine has a bug? ○ No protection right now - if you hold assets on the chain, you accept the risk ○ Could implement fraud proofs ■ Complex requirements on state machines (on both chains) ○ Where applicable, governance on one chain could “fix” - credit the original tokens at parity with balances on the other chain before the bug was exploited ■ Not an ideal solution, irregular state change ● Ideal case - asset security (invariant set) as long as 1-of-n chains are correct & live
- 26. Questions? ● Cosmos will implement IBC for our stack, but the protocol is open! ○ Alternative implementations, contributions, ideas welcome ● Spec - github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/tree/develop/docs/spec/ibc ● Email - [email protected] ● Check-out the break-out! ○ Rob Habermeier leading on zero-knowledge state transitions in blockchains, 15:40 in Breakout 2