Chapter 19Chapter 19
Macroeconomic Policy and CoordinationMacroeconomic Policy and Coordination
Under Floating Exchange RatesUnder Floating Exchange Rates
Prepared by Iordanis Petsas
To Accompany
International Economics: Theory and PolicyInternational Economics: Theory and Policy, Sixth Edition
by Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld
Chapter Organization
 The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
 The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
 Macroeconomic Interdependence Under a Floating Rate
 What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Are Fixed Exchange Rates Even and Option for Most
Countries?
 Directions for Reform
 Summary
 Appendix: International Policy Coordination Failures
Introduction
 The floating exchange rate system, in place since
1973, was not well planned before its inception.
 By the mid-1980s, economists and policymakers had
become more skeptical about the benefits of an
international monetary system based on floating rates.
 Why has the performance of floating rates been so
disappointing?
 What direction should reform of the current system
take?
 This chapter compares the macroeconomic policy
problems of different exchange rate regimes.
The Case for
Floating Exchange Rates
 There are three arguments in favor of floating
exchange rates:
• Monetary policy autonomy
• Symmetry
• Exchange rates as automatic stabilizers
 Monetary Policy Autonomy
• Floating exchange rates:
– Restore monetary control to central banks
– Allow each country to choose its own desired long-run
inflation rate
The Case for
Floating Exchange Rates
 Symmetry
• Floating exchange rates remove two main asymmetries
of the Bretton Woods system and allow:
– Central banks abroad to be able to determine their own
domestic money supplies
– The U.S. to have the same opportunity as other
countries to influence its exchange rate against foreign
currencies
The Case for
Floating Exchange Rates
 Exchange Rates as Automatic Stabilizers
• Floating exchange rates quickly eliminate the
“fundamental disequilibriums” that had led to parity
changes and speculative attacks under fixed rates.
– Figure 19-1 shows that a temporary fall in a country’s
export demand reduces that country’s output more
under a fixed rate than a floating rate.
The Case for
Floating Exchange Rates
AA1
DD1
Figure 19-1: Effects of a Fall in Export Demand
AA2
DD2
AA1
DD2
DD1
E2
2
Y2
Y2
Output, Y
Exchange rate, E
(a) Floating
exchange rate
Output, Y
Exchange rate, E
(b) Fixed
exchange rate
Y1
E1 1
Y1
E1
1
Y3
3
The Case for
Floating Exchange Rates
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
 There are five arguments against floating rates:
• Discipline
• Destabilizing speculation and money market
disturbances
• Injury to international trade and investment
• Uncoordinated economic policies
• The illusion of greater autonomy
 Discipline
• Floating exchange rates do not provide discipline for
central banks.
– Central banks might embark on inflationary policies
(e.g., the German hyperinflation of the 1920s).
• The pro-floaters’ response was that a floating exchange
rate would bottle up inflationary disturbances within
the country whose government was misbehaving.
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
 Destabilizing Speculation and Money Market
Disturbances
• Floating exchange rates allow destabilizing
speculation.
– Countries can be caught in a “vicious circle” of
depreciation and inflation.
• Advocates of floating rates point out that destabilizing
speculators ultimately lose money.
• Floating exchange rates make a country more
vulnerable to money market disturbances.
– Figure 19-2 illustrates this point.
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
AA1
DD
Output, Y
Exchange
rate, E
E1
Y1
1
Figure 19-2: A Rise in Money Demand Under a Floating Exchange Rate
AA2
E2
Y2
2
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
 Injury to International Trade and Investment
• Floating rates hurt international trade and investment
because they make relative international prices more
unpredictable:
– Exporters and importers face greater exchange risk.
– International investments face greater uncertainty about
their payoffs.
• Supporters of floating exchange rates argue that
forward markets can be used to protect traders against
foreign exchange risk.
– The skeptics replied to this argument by pointing out
that forward exchange markets would be expensive.
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
 Uncoordinated Economic Policies
• Floating exchange rates leave countries free to engage
in competitive currency depreciations.
– Countries might adopt policies without considering their
possible beggar-thy-neighbor aspects.
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
 The Illusion of Greater Autonomy
• Floating exchange rates increase the uncertainty in the
economy without really giving macroeconomic policy
greater freedom.
– A currency depreciation raises domestic inflation due to
higher wage settlements.
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
Table 19-1: Inflation Rates in Major Industrialized Countries, 1973-
980 (percent per year)
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
Figure 19-3: Nominal and Real Effective Dollar Exchange Rates Indexes,
1975-2000
The Case Against
Floating Exchange Rates
Macroeconomic Interdependence
Under a Floating Rate
 Assume that there are two large countries, Home and
Foreign.
 Macroeconomic interdependence between Home and
Foreign:
• Effect of a permanent monetary expansion by Home
– Home output rises, Home’s currency depreciates, and
Foreign output may rise or fall.
• Effect of a permanent fiscal expansion by Home
– Home output rises, Home’s currency appreciates, and
Foreign output rises.
Macroeconomic Interdependence
Under a Floating Rate
Table 19-2: Unemployment Rates in Major Industrialized Countries,
1978-2000 (percent of civilian labor force)
Macroeconomic Interdependence
Under a Floating Rate
Table 19-3: Inflation Rates in Major Industrialized Countries
1981-2000, and 1961-1971 Average (percent per year)
Macroeconomic Interdependence
Under a Floating Rate
Figure 19-4: Exchange Rate Changes Since the Louvre Accord
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Monetary Policy Autonomy
• Floating exchange rates allowed a much larger
international divergence in inflation rates.
• High-inflation countries have tended to have weaker
currencies than their low-inflation neighbors.
• In the short run, the effects of monetary and fiscal
changes are transmitted across national borders under
floating rates.
Figure 19-5: Exchange Rate Trends and Inflation Differentials,
1973-2000
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
• After 1973 central banks intervened repeatedly in the
foreign exchange market to alter currency values.
• Why did central banks continue to intervene even in
the absence of any formal obligation to do so?
– To stabilize output and the price level when certain
disturbances occur
– To prevent sharp changes in the international
competitiveness of tradable goods sectors
• Monetary changes had a much greater short-run effect
on the real exchange rate under a floating nominal
exchange rate than under a fixed one.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Symmetry
• The international monetary system did not become
symmetric until after 1973.
– Central banks continued to hold dollar reserves and
intervene.
• The current floating-rate system is similar in some
ways to the asymmetric reserve currency system
underlying the Bretton Woods arrangements
(McKinnon).
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 The Exchange Rate as an Automatic Stabilizer
• Experience with the two oil shocks favors floating
exchange rates.
• The effects of the U.S. fiscal expansion after 1981
provide mixed evidence on the success of floating
exchange rates.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Discipline
• Inflation rates accelerated after 1973 and remained
high through the second oil shock.
• The system placed fewer obvious restraints on
unbalanced fiscal policies.
– Example: The high U.S. government budget deficits of
the 1980s.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Destabilizing Speculation
• Floating exchange rates have exhibited much more
day-to-day volatility.
– The question of whether exchange rate volatility has
been excessive is controversial.
• In the longer term, exchange rates have roughly
reflected fundamental changes in monetary and fiscal
policies and not destabilizing speculation.
• Experience with floating exchange rates contradicts
the idea that arbitrary exchange rate movements can
lead to “vicious circles” of inflation and depreciation.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 International Trade and Investment
• International financial intermediation expanded
strongly after 1973 as countries lowered barriers to
capital movement.
• For most countries, the extent of their international
trade shows a rising trend after the move to floating.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
 Policy Coordination
• Floating exchange rates have not promoted
international policy coordination.
• Critics of floating have not made a strong case that the
problem of beggar-thy-neighbor policies would
disappear under an alternative currency regime.
What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
Are Fixed Exchange Rates
Even an Option for Most Countries?
 Maintaining fixed exchange rates in the long-run
requires strict controls over capital movements.
• Attempts to fix exchange rates will necessarily lack
credibility and be relatively short-lived.
– Fixed rates will not deliver the benefits promised by
their proponents.
Directions for Reform
 The experience of floating does not fully support
either the early advocates of that exchange rate
system or its critics.
 One unambiguous lesson of experience is that no
exchange rate system functions well when
international economic cooperation breaks down.
 Severe limits on exchange rate flexibility are unlikely
to be reinstated in the near future.
 Increased consultation among policymakers in the
industrial countries should improve the performance
of floating rates.
Summary
 The weaknesses of the Bretton Woods system led
many economists to advocate floating exchange rates
before 1973 based on three arguments:
• Floating rates would give countries greater autonomy
in managing their economies.
• Floating rates would remove the asymmetries of the
Bretton Woods system.
• Floating rates would quickly eliminate the
“fundamental disequilibriums.”
Summary
 Critics of floating rates advanced several
counterarguments:
• Floating would encourage monetary and fiscal
excesses and beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
• Floating rates would be subject to destabilizing
speculation and retard international trade and
investment.
Summary
 Between 1973 and 1980 floating rates seemed on the
whole to function well.
 A sharp turn toward slower monetary growth in the
U.S. contributed to massive dollar appreciation
between 1980 and early 1985.
 The experience of floating does not fully support
either the early advocates of that exchange rates
system or its critics.
Appendix: International
Policy Coordination Failures
ForeignForeign
HomeHome
VeryVery
restrictiverestrictive
VeryVery
restrictiverestrictive
SomewhatSomewhat
restrictiverestrictive
SomewhatSomewhat
restrictiverestrictive
∆π* = -1%
∆U* = 1%
∆π = -1%
∆U = 1%
Figure 19A-1: Hypothetical Effects of Different Monetary Policy
Combinations on Inflation and Unemployment
∆π* = 0%
∆U* = 0.5%
∆π = -2%
∆U = 1.75%
∆π* = -2%
∆U* = 1.75%
∆π = 0%
∆U = 0.5%
∆π* = -1.25%
∆U* = 1.5%
∆π = -1.25%
∆U = 1.5%
ForeignForeign
HomeHome
11
11
5/65/6
5/65/6
8/78/7
00
8/78/7
00
Appendix: International
Policy Coordination Failures
Figure 19A-2: Payoff Matrix for Different Monetary Policy Moves
VeryVery
restrictiverestrictive
VeryVery
restrictiverestrictive
SomewhatSomewhat
restrictiverestrictive
SomewhatSomewhat
restrictiverestrictive

International economic ch19

  • 1.
    Chapter 19Chapter 19 MacroeconomicPolicy and CoordinationMacroeconomic Policy and Coordination Under Floating Exchange RatesUnder Floating Exchange Rates Prepared by Iordanis Petsas To Accompany International Economics: Theory and PolicyInternational Economics: Theory and Policy, Sixth Edition by Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld
  • 2.
    Chapter Organization  TheCase for Floating Exchange Rates  The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates  Macroeconomic Interdependence Under a Floating Rate  What Has Been Learned Since 1973?  Are Fixed Exchange Rates Even and Option for Most Countries?  Directions for Reform  Summary  Appendix: International Policy Coordination Failures
  • 3.
    Introduction  The floatingexchange rate system, in place since 1973, was not well planned before its inception.  By the mid-1980s, economists and policymakers had become more skeptical about the benefits of an international monetary system based on floating rates.  Why has the performance of floating rates been so disappointing?  What direction should reform of the current system take?  This chapter compares the macroeconomic policy problems of different exchange rate regimes.
  • 4.
    The Case for FloatingExchange Rates  There are three arguments in favor of floating exchange rates: • Monetary policy autonomy • Symmetry • Exchange rates as automatic stabilizers
  • 5.
     Monetary PolicyAutonomy • Floating exchange rates: – Restore monetary control to central banks – Allow each country to choose its own desired long-run inflation rate The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
  • 6.
     Symmetry • Floatingexchange rates remove two main asymmetries of the Bretton Woods system and allow: – Central banks abroad to be able to determine their own domestic money supplies – The U.S. to have the same opportunity as other countries to influence its exchange rate against foreign currencies The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
  • 7.
     Exchange Ratesas Automatic Stabilizers • Floating exchange rates quickly eliminate the “fundamental disequilibriums” that had led to parity changes and speculative attacks under fixed rates. – Figure 19-1 shows that a temporary fall in a country’s export demand reduces that country’s output more under a fixed rate than a floating rate. The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
  • 8.
    AA1 DD1 Figure 19-1: Effectsof a Fall in Export Demand AA2 DD2 AA1 DD2 DD1 E2 2 Y2 Y2 Output, Y Exchange rate, E (a) Floating exchange rate Output, Y Exchange rate, E (b) Fixed exchange rate Y1 E1 1 Y1 E1 1 Y3 3 The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
  • 9.
    The Case Against FloatingExchange Rates  There are five arguments against floating rates: • Discipline • Destabilizing speculation and money market disturbances • Injury to international trade and investment • Uncoordinated economic policies • The illusion of greater autonomy
  • 10.
     Discipline • Floatingexchange rates do not provide discipline for central banks. – Central banks might embark on inflationary policies (e.g., the German hyperinflation of the 1920s). • The pro-floaters’ response was that a floating exchange rate would bottle up inflationary disturbances within the country whose government was misbehaving. The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 11.
     Destabilizing Speculationand Money Market Disturbances • Floating exchange rates allow destabilizing speculation. – Countries can be caught in a “vicious circle” of depreciation and inflation. • Advocates of floating rates point out that destabilizing speculators ultimately lose money. • Floating exchange rates make a country more vulnerable to money market disturbances. – Figure 19-2 illustrates this point. The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 12.
    AA1 DD Output, Y Exchange rate, E E1 Y1 1 Figure19-2: A Rise in Money Demand Under a Floating Exchange Rate AA2 E2 Y2 2 The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 13.
     Injury toInternational Trade and Investment • Floating rates hurt international trade and investment because they make relative international prices more unpredictable: – Exporters and importers face greater exchange risk. – International investments face greater uncertainty about their payoffs. • Supporters of floating exchange rates argue that forward markets can be used to protect traders against foreign exchange risk. – The skeptics replied to this argument by pointing out that forward exchange markets would be expensive. The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 14.
     Uncoordinated EconomicPolicies • Floating exchange rates leave countries free to engage in competitive currency depreciations. – Countries might adopt policies without considering their possible beggar-thy-neighbor aspects. The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 15.
     The Illusionof Greater Autonomy • Floating exchange rates increase the uncertainty in the economy without really giving macroeconomic policy greater freedom. – A currency depreciation raises domestic inflation due to higher wage settlements. The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 16.
    Table 19-1: InflationRates in Major Industrialized Countries, 1973- 980 (percent per year) The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 17.
    Figure 19-3: Nominaland Real Effective Dollar Exchange Rates Indexes, 1975-2000 The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates
  • 18.
    Macroeconomic Interdependence Under aFloating Rate  Assume that there are two large countries, Home and Foreign.  Macroeconomic interdependence between Home and Foreign: • Effect of a permanent monetary expansion by Home – Home output rises, Home’s currency depreciates, and Foreign output may rise or fall. • Effect of a permanent fiscal expansion by Home – Home output rises, Home’s currency appreciates, and Foreign output rises.
  • 19.
    Macroeconomic Interdependence Under aFloating Rate Table 19-2: Unemployment Rates in Major Industrialized Countries, 1978-2000 (percent of civilian labor force)
  • 20.
    Macroeconomic Interdependence Under aFloating Rate Table 19-3: Inflation Rates in Major Industrialized Countries 1981-2000, and 1961-1971 Average (percent per year)
  • 21.
    Macroeconomic Interdependence Under aFloating Rate Figure 19-4: Exchange Rate Changes Since the Louvre Accord
  • 22.
    What Has BeenLearned Since 1973?  Monetary Policy Autonomy • Floating exchange rates allowed a much larger international divergence in inflation rates. • High-inflation countries have tended to have weaker currencies than their low-inflation neighbors. • In the short run, the effects of monetary and fiscal changes are transmitted across national borders under floating rates.
  • 23.
    Figure 19-5: ExchangeRate Trends and Inflation Differentials, 1973-2000 What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 24.
    • After 1973central banks intervened repeatedly in the foreign exchange market to alter currency values. • Why did central banks continue to intervene even in the absence of any formal obligation to do so? – To stabilize output and the price level when certain disturbances occur – To prevent sharp changes in the international competitiveness of tradable goods sectors • Monetary changes had a much greater short-run effect on the real exchange rate under a floating nominal exchange rate than under a fixed one. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 25.
     Symmetry • Theinternational monetary system did not become symmetric until after 1973. – Central banks continued to hold dollar reserves and intervene. • The current floating-rate system is similar in some ways to the asymmetric reserve currency system underlying the Bretton Woods arrangements (McKinnon). What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 26.
     The ExchangeRate as an Automatic Stabilizer • Experience with the two oil shocks favors floating exchange rates. • The effects of the U.S. fiscal expansion after 1981 provide mixed evidence on the success of floating exchange rates. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 27.
     Discipline • Inflationrates accelerated after 1973 and remained high through the second oil shock. • The system placed fewer obvious restraints on unbalanced fiscal policies. – Example: The high U.S. government budget deficits of the 1980s. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 28.
     Destabilizing Speculation •Floating exchange rates have exhibited much more day-to-day volatility. – The question of whether exchange rate volatility has been excessive is controversial. • In the longer term, exchange rates have roughly reflected fundamental changes in monetary and fiscal policies and not destabilizing speculation. • Experience with floating exchange rates contradicts the idea that arbitrary exchange rate movements can lead to “vicious circles” of inflation and depreciation. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 29.
     International Tradeand Investment • International financial intermediation expanded strongly after 1973 as countries lowered barriers to capital movement. • For most countries, the extent of their international trade shows a rising trend after the move to floating. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 30.
     Policy Coordination •Floating exchange rates have not promoted international policy coordination. • Critics of floating have not made a strong case that the problem of beggar-thy-neighbor policies would disappear under an alternative currency regime. What Has Been Learned Since 1973?
  • 31.
    Are Fixed ExchangeRates Even an Option for Most Countries?  Maintaining fixed exchange rates in the long-run requires strict controls over capital movements. • Attempts to fix exchange rates will necessarily lack credibility and be relatively short-lived. – Fixed rates will not deliver the benefits promised by their proponents.
  • 32.
    Directions for Reform The experience of floating does not fully support either the early advocates of that exchange rate system or its critics.  One unambiguous lesson of experience is that no exchange rate system functions well when international economic cooperation breaks down.  Severe limits on exchange rate flexibility are unlikely to be reinstated in the near future.  Increased consultation among policymakers in the industrial countries should improve the performance of floating rates.
  • 33.
    Summary  The weaknessesof the Bretton Woods system led many economists to advocate floating exchange rates before 1973 based on three arguments: • Floating rates would give countries greater autonomy in managing their economies. • Floating rates would remove the asymmetries of the Bretton Woods system. • Floating rates would quickly eliminate the “fundamental disequilibriums.”
  • 34.
    Summary  Critics offloating rates advanced several counterarguments: • Floating would encourage monetary and fiscal excesses and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. • Floating rates would be subject to destabilizing speculation and retard international trade and investment.
  • 35.
    Summary  Between 1973and 1980 floating rates seemed on the whole to function well.  A sharp turn toward slower monetary growth in the U.S. contributed to massive dollar appreciation between 1980 and early 1985.  The experience of floating does not fully support either the early advocates of that exchange rates system or its critics.
  • 36.
    Appendix: International Policy CoordinationFailures ForeignForeign HomeHome VeryVery restrictiverestrictive VeryVery restrictiverestrictive SomewhatSomewhat restrictiverestrictive SomewhatSomewhat restrictiverestrictive ∆π* = -1% ∆U* = 1% ∆π = -1% ∆U = 1% Figure 19A-1: Hypothetical Effects of Different Monetary Policy Combinations on Inflation and Unemployment ∆π* = 0% ∆U* = 0.5% ∆π = -2% ∆U = 1.75% ∆π* = -2% ∆U* = 1.75% ∆π = 0% ∆U = 0.5% ∆π* = -1.25% ∆U* = 1.5% ∆π = -1.25% ∆U = 1.5%
  • 37.
    ForeignForeign HomeHome 11 11 5/65/6 5/65/6 8/78/7 00 8/78/7 00 Appendix: International Policy CoordinationFailures Figure 19A-2: Payoff Matrix for Different Monetary Policy Moves VeryVery restrictiverestrictive VeryVery restrictiverestrictive SomewhatSomewhat restrictiverestrictive SomewhatSomewhat restrictiverestrictive