1
MAGPI: Advanced Services
IPv6, Multicast, DNSSEC
Shumon Huque
MAGPI GigaPoP & Univ. of Pennsylvania
MAGPI Technical Meeting
April 19th 2006, Philadelphia, PA
2
Outline
• A description of advanced services that
we offer or are in the process of offering
– IPv4 Multicast
– IPv6
– IPv6 Multicast
– DNS Security
– Jumbo Frames (time permitting)
3
Multicast in MAGPI
• Native Multicast routing (PIM-SM)
• Local Rendezvous Point
• External peerings with:
– Abilene (Internet2 backbone network)
– ~ dozen MAGPI customers
• Looking for opportunities to peer with
commercial ISPs
4
IPv4 Multicast
• Protocols:
– M-BGP (Multi-protocol BGP)
– MSDP (Multicast Source Discovery Protocol)
– PIM-SM (Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode)
• Consider Bootstrap or anycast for RP redundancy
– IGMP v2
– IGMP v3 (for source specific multicast)
• Recommendations:
– Deploy within your network first and test
– Arrange for inter-domain peering with us
– Establish debugging methodology (you’ll need it!)
– Attend an Internet2 IP Multicast workshop
5
IPv4 Multicast debugging
• Establish a debugging methodology!
– Lots of new control protocols
– Lack of practice
– Inverted paradigm
– Receiver driven communication model
– Symptom may be far from problem
– Same symptom can have may different causes, at
different places in the path
– Not many good debugging tools
6
IPv4 Multicast debugging
• Establish direction
• Establish group address(es)
• Have on path:
– Constantly active source
– Constantly active receiver
• Know how to examine multicast routing state
on your equipment
• Have contacts at peer networks (for
debugging interdomain operation)
7
Multicast Addressing
• RFC 3171
• http://www.iana.org/assignments/multicast-addresses
• Categories
– 224.0.0.0/24 - Local network control (not forwarded)
– 224.0.1.0/24 - Internetwork control block
– 232.0.0.0/8 - SSM
– 239.0.0.0/8 - Administratively scoped
– 233.x.y.0/24 - GLOP (x.y encodes the AS#)
– 224.2.0.0/16 - SDR/SAP Block
8
Multicast: useful tools
• NLANR Multicast beacon
– http://dast.nlanr.net/projects/Beacon/
• Asmping/ssmping
– http://www.venaas.no/multicast/ssmping/
• Abilene router node proxy
– http://ratt.uits.iu.edu/routerproxy/abilene/
• Iperf
– http://dast.nlanr.net/projects/iperf/
• Mtrace
– ftp://ftp.parc.xerox.com/pub/net-research/ipmulti/mtrace-
5.2.tar.gz
9
Multicast: useful tools
• Internet2 Multicast Working Group:
– http://multicast.internet2.edu/
• Multicast debugging handbook
– http://imj.ucsb.edu/mdh/index.php
• Debugging Multicast using Abilene looking glass
• http://www.accessgrid.org/agdp/guide/looking_glass.html
10
IPv6
• Next generation Internet Protocol
• Over a decade old!
• Not much deployment in the US (yet)
– Research & Education networks
• Abilene and various GigaPoPs, some universities
• vBNS, ESNet, DREN
– Very few commercial ISPs
• NTT-Verio, Level-3
11
IPv6 benefits
• 128 bit addresses
• Scalable routing
• Fix inequities in address allocation
• Built-in security?
– IPSEC implementation mandatory
• No NAT
– Restore e2e architectural model of the Internet
• Neighbor discovery / Router solicitation
• Autoconfiguration
12
IPv6 Issues
• Multi-homing
– Multi6, shim6, pi addresses
• Mobility
• Deployment incentives
– Perhaps OMB or interop with Asia-Pacific
– Or a killer app
• Some folks feel:
– No significant architectural progress
– Needed locator/identifier split (8+8/GSE etc)
13
IPv6 in MAGPI
• Native IPv6 routing deployed
• External v6 peering with Abilene
• External peerings with 2 connectors:
– University of Penn & Princeton University
• Routing protocols:
– Intra-domain: IS-IS
– Inter-domain: M-BGP
• A few test services in MAGPI:
– Web, traceroute, ping server, NTP
14
IPv6 in MAGPI
• Our (provider allocated) block:
– 2001:0468:1800::/40
• Customer delegations are /48 sized
– Enough to number 65,536 /64 subnets
• Current allocations:
– 2001:468:1800::/48 MAGPI Infrastructure
– 2001:468:1802::/48 University of Pennsylvania
– 2001:468:1804::/48 Princeton University
• Native IPv6 peerings only
• DNS answers over IPv4 today
– IPv6 transport for DNS planned for near future
15
IPv6 Resources
• Internet2 IPv6 Working Group
– http://ipv6.internet2.edu/
16
IPv6 Multicast
• PIM-SM (with v6 support)
• MLD (Multicast Listener Discovery) v2
• MBGP
• For Interdomain ASM:
– Static RP-group mapping
– Embedded RP (RFC 3956)
– No MSDP!
– BGMP?
17
IPv6 Multicast
• Multicast addresses:
– FF00::/8
• Further details:
– http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-multicast-
addresses
– RFC 4291: IPv6 Addressing Architecture
– RFC 3306: Unicast prefix based multicast
addresses
– RFC 3956: Embedded RP
18
IPv6 Multicast in MAGPI
• Coming soon :-)
• We deployed an IPv6 Multicast network for
the Fall 2005 Internet2 member meeting
– Using static RP at Renatar (France)
– Streaming video demos between Philly, New York
and Norway
• Upcoming research project with a major cable
provider in the area
19
DNSSEC
• The problem:
– DNS data published by the registry is being
replaced on it’s path between the server and the
client
– Bogus data is being inserted into caching
resolvers (cache poisoning)
– This can happen in multiple places in the DNS
architecture
• Some places more vulnerable to attack than others
• Vulnerable software often makes it easier
20
DNSSEC
• Goals
– Verify authenticity of DNS “data”
• Operation:
– Registry signs data and publishes it
securely on authoritative name servers
– DNS clients (remote caching resolvers and
possibly stub resolvers) validate any
queried data
21
DNSSEC
• Additional potential benefits:
– Secure public key exchange:
• SSHFP, IPSECKEY, CERT resource records
22
DNSSEC
• Object security, not channel security
– Authenticate the DNS data itself
• Registry cryptographically signs the data
• Security-aware resolvers verify the signature
• Transaction/channel security:
– TSIG, SIG(0), IPSEC etc
– This may or may not be important depending on
how the endpoint obtains the DNS responses
• DNSSEC doesn’t provide:
– Confidentiality or Authorization
23
DNSSEC setup tasks
• Setup zones
• Create keys:
– ZSK: zone signing key pairs
– KSK: key signing key pairs
• Sign entire zones with ZSK
• Sign ZSK with KSK
• Safeguard private keys
• Secure zone transfers between authority servers
• Arrange secure delegation with parent and children
zones
• Establish key maintenance/rollover procedures
24
DNS Deployment issues
• DNS software support
• Additional processing requirements
• New technology: chicken and egg
• Automated key rollover and distribution
• Zone enumeration possibility
• Universal vs Islands Of Trust
– Trust anchor maintenance costs
• How to get root and TLDs signed?
– Should we use DLV registries to start?
25
A MAGPI DNSSEC record
• [live demo here]
• New resource records
– DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, DS
– NSEC3 (coming)
26
MAGPI DNSSEC plans
• Sign all MAGPI DNS data
– (a few zones have already been signed)
• Trust anchor distribution:
– Publish on secure web page
– Publish in DLV registry (which one?)
– Exchange with other I2 institutions directly?
• Work with Internet2 pilot on
– Getting .edu TLD signed
– What about ARIN (in-addr.arpa) and Verisign
(.net)
27
Internet2 DNSSEC Pilot
• Coming soon ..
28
DNSSEC Resources
• A good general website:
– http://www.dnssec.net/
• Internet2 workshop:
– http://dnssec-nm.secret-wg.org
• Protocol specifications:
– RFC’s 4033, 4034, 4035
• Threat analysis of DNS:
– RFC 3833
29
Questions or comments?
• Shumon Huque
– shuque -@- isc.upenn.edu

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MAGPI: Advanced Services: IPv6, Multicast, DNSSEC

  • 1. 1 MAGPI: Advanced Services IPv6, Multicast, DNSSEC Shumon Huque MAGPI GigaPoP & Univ. of Pennsylvania MAGPI Technical Meeting April 19th 2006, Philadelphia, PA
  • 2. 2 Outline • A description of advanced services that we offer or are in the process of offering – IPv4 Multicast – IPv6 – IPv6 Multicast – DNS Security – Jumbo Frames (time permitting)
  • 3. 3 Multicast in MAGPI • Native Multicast routing (PIM-SM) • Local Rendezvous Point • External peerings with: – Abilene (Internet2 backbone network) – ~ dozen MAGPI customers • Looking for opportunities to peer with commercial ISPs
  • 4. 4 IPv4 Multicast • Protocols: – M-BGP (Multi-protocol BGP) – MSDP (Multicast Source Discovery Protocol) – PIM-SM (Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode) • Consider Bootstrap or anycast for RP redundancy – IGMP v2 – IGMP v3 (for source specific multicast) • Recommendations: – Deploy within your network first and test – Arrange for inter-domain peering with us – Establish debugging methodology (you’ll need it!) – Attend an Internet2 IP Multicast workshop
  • 5. 5 IPv4 Multicast debugging • Establish a debugging methodology! – Lots of new control protocols – Lack of practice – Inverted paradigm – Receiver driven communication model – Symptom may be far from problem – Same symptom can have may different causes, at different places in the path – Not many good debugging tools
  • 6. 6 IPv4 Multicast debugging • Establish direction • Establish group address(es) • Have on path: – Constantly active source – Constantly active receiver • Know how to examine multicast routing state on your equipment • Have contacts at peer networks (for debugging interdomain operation)
  • 7. 7 Multicast Addressing • RFC 3171 • http://www.iana.org/assignments/multicast-addresses • Categories – 224.0.0.0/24 - Local network control (not forwarded) – 224.0.1.0/24 - Internetwork control block – 232.0.0.0/8 - SSM – 239.0.0.0/8 - Administratively scoped – 233.x.y.0/24 - GLOP (x.y encodes the AS#) – 224.2.0.0/16 - SDR/SAP Block
  • 8. 8 Multicast: useful tools • NLANR Multicast beacon – http://dast.nlanr.net/projects/Beacon/ • Asmping/ssmping – http://www.venaas.no/multicast/ssmping/ • Abilene router node proxy – http://ratt.uits.iu.edu/routerproxy/abilene/ • Iperf – http://dast.nlanr.net/projects/iperf/ • Mtrace – ftp://ftp.parc.xerox.com/pub/net-research/ipmulti/mtrace- 5.2.tar.gz
  • 9. 9 Multicast: useful tools • Internet2 Multicast Working Group: – http://multicast.internet2.edu/ • Multicast debugging handbook – http://imj.ucsb.edu/mdh/index.php • Debugging Multicast using Abilene looking glass • http://www.accessgrid.org/agdp/guide/looking_glass.html
  • 10. 10 IPv6 • Next generation Internet Protocol • Over a decade old! • Not much deployment in the US (yet) – Research & Education networks • Abilene and various GigaPoPs, some universities • vBNS, ESNet, DREN – Very few commercial ISPs • NTT-Verio, Level-3
  • 11. 11 IPv6 benefits • 128 bit addresses • Scalable routing • Fix inequities in address allocation • Built-in security? – IPSEC implementation mandatory • No NAT – Restore e2e architectural model of the Internet • Neighbor discovery / Router solicitation • Autoconfiguration
  • 12. 12 IPv6 Issues • Multi-homing – Multi6, shim6, pi addresses • Mobility • Deployment incentives – Perhaps OMB or interop with Asia-Pacific – Or a killer app • Some folks feel: – No significant architectural progress – Needed locator/identifier split (8+8/GSE etc)
  • 13. 13 IPv6 in MAGPI • Native IPv6 routing deployed • External v6 peering with Abilene • External peerings with 2 connectors: – University of Penn & Princeton University • Routing protocols: – Intra-domain: IS-IS – Inter-domain: M-BGP • A few test services in MAGPI: – Web, traceroute, ping server, NTP
  • 14. 14 IPv6 in MAGPI • Our (provider allocated) block: – 2001:0468:1800::/40 • Customer delegations are /48 sized – Enough to number 65,536 /64 subnets • Current allocations: – 2001:468:1800::/48 MAGPI Infrastructure – 2001:468:1802::/48 University of Pennsylvania – 2001:468:1804::/48 Princeton University • Native IPv6 peerings only • DNS answers over IPv4 today – IPv6 transport for DNS planned for near future
  • 15. 15 IPv6 Resources • Internet2 IPv6 Working Group – http://ipv6.internet2.edu/
  • 16. 16 IPv6 Multicast • PIM-SM (with v6 support) • MLD (Multicast Listener Discovery) v2 • MBGP • For Interdomain ASM: – Static RP-group mapping – Embedded RP (RFC 3956) – No MSDP! – BGMP?
  • 17. 17 IPv6 Multicast • Multicast addresses: – FF00::/8 • Further details: – http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-multicast- addresses – RFC 4291: IPv6 Addressing Architecture – RFC 3306: Unicast prefix based multicast addresses – RFC 3956: Embedded RP
  • 18. 18 IPv6 Multicast in MAGPI • Coming soon :-) • We deployed an IPv6 Multicast network for the Fall 2005 Internet2 member meeting – Using static RP at Renatar (France) – Streaming video demos between Philly, New York and Norway • Upcoming research project with a major cable provider in the area
  • 19. 19 DNSSEC • The problem: – DNS data published by the registry is being replaced on it’s path between the server and the client – Bogus data is being inserted into caching resolvers (cache poisoning) – This can happen in multiple places in the DNS architecture • Some places more vulnerable to attack than others • Vulnerable software often makes it easier
  • 20. 20 DNSSEC • Goals – Verify authenticity of DNS “data” • Operation: – Registry signs data and publishes it securely on authoritative name servers – DNS clients (remote caching resolvers and possibly stub resolvers) validate any queried data
  • 21. 21 DNSSEC • Additional potential benefits: – Secure public key exchange: • SSHFP, IPSECKEY, CERT resource records
  • 22. 22 DNSSEC • Object security, not channel security – Authenticate the DNS data itself • Registry cryptographically signs the data • Security-aware resolvers verify the signature • Transaction/channel security: – TSIG, SIG(0), IPSEC etc – This may or may not be important depending on how the endpoint obtains the DNS responses • DNSSEC doesn’t provide: – Confidentiality or Authorization
  • 23. 23 DNSSEC setup tasks • Setup zones • Create keys: – ZSK: zone signing key pairs – KSK: key signing key pairs • Sign entire zones with ZSK • Sign ZSK with KSK • Safeguard private keys • Secure zone transfers between authority servers • Arrange secure delegation with parent and children zones • Establish key maintenance/rollover procedures
  • 24. 24 DNS Deployment issues • DNS software support • Additional processing requirements • New technology: chicken and egg • Automated key rollover and distribution • Zone enumeration possibility • Universal vs Islands Of Trust – Trust anchor maintenance costs • How to get root and TLDs signed? – Should we use DLV registries to start?
  • 25. 25 A MAGPI DNSSEC record • [live demo here] • New resource records – DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, DS – NSEC3 (coming)
  • 26. 26 MAGPI DNSSEC plans • Sign all MAGPI DNS data – (a few zones have already been signed) • Trust anchor distribution: – Publish on secure web page – Publish in DLV registry (which one?) – Exchange with other I2 institutions directly? • Work with Internet2 pilot on – Getting .edu TLD signed – What about ARIN (in-addr.arpa) and Verisign (.net)
  • 28. 28 DNSSEC Resources • A good general website: – http://www.dnssec.net/ • Internet2 workshop: – http://dnssec-nm.secret-wg.org • Protocol specifications: – RFC’s 4033, 4034, 4035 • Threat analysis of DNS: – RFC 3833
  • 29. 29 Questions or comments? • Shumon Huque – shuque -@- isc.upenn.edu