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1
Copyright © 2018 Pearson Education, Inc.
Making the Team, 6e (Thompson)
Chapter 6 Team Communication and Collective Intelligence
1 Multiple Choice Questions
1) The common information effect is best described as the tendency for groups to:
A) spend too long attempting to reach consensus on a problem.
B) consider and implement solutions that other groups have used rather than experiment with
novel solutions.
C) want to delay making important decisions, even when they have all of the relevant
information necessary to make a decision.
D) discuss and consider information that they all have in common more than unique information
(that only one person in the group may be aware of).
Answer: D
Page Ref: 150-151
Diff: Easy
Skill: Concept
AACSB: Interpersonal relations and teamwork
2) A team with a high adaptive capacity brings what capability to their organization?
A) Knowledge capacity
B) Ability to change or shift their strategy in the face of upheaval
C) Team's capacity to assimilate new knowledge
D) Team's capacity to apply new information and knowledge
Answer: B
Page Ref: 137
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Application
3) In regards to the common information effect, what is the main problem with an uneven
distribution of information?
A) Some team members are willing to share information with others, but some are not.
B) Certain pieces of information get more time, attention, and emphasis than alternative pieces of
information.
C) The collective intelligence between the partners can be unbalanced.
D) Certain group members can be uninterested in the discussion and not want to participate.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 150-151
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

2
4) An intervention that might exacerbate the common information effect is:
A) approaching the task as a problem to be solved, not a judgment to be made.
B) ranking rather than choosing.
C) suspending initial judgment.
D) prediscussion polling.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 154
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
5) An effective way to remedy the common information effect is to:
A) consider the decision alternatives one at a time.
B) increase the time needed for discussion.
C) increase the size of the team.
D) engage in prediscussion polling.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 156
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
6) A team mental model is a common understanding that members of a team share about how
something works. For example, a team might have a common understanding of how to assemble
a transistor radio. All of the following are true about team mental models EXCEPT:
A) they may be assessed in terms of how accurate they are.
B) they may be assessed in terms of how much correspondence (agreement) there is among team
members' mental models.
C) they are developed instantly, naturally, and are immediately compatible.
D) teams may have mental models about physical systems as well as social systems (such as how
their group works).
Answer: C
Page Ref: 138-140
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

3
7) A transactive memory system, or TMS, is a shared system for attending to, encoding, storing,
processing, and retrieving information. In one investigation, teams were asked to assemble radios
without written instructions. The most effective group was given what type of training
experience before "group test day"?
A) Members received their training individually.
B) Members received team training, but were re-assembled into different groups for test day.
C) Members received team training and were assigned to work with same team on test day.
D) Members received their training individually, and also underwent a trust-building workshop
as a team prior to test day.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 145
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Concept
8) A study at an R&D organization, where teams worked together for more than five years,
revealed what?
A) The performance of the groups increased over time, but only up to a point; after five years of
working together, performance declined steeply.
B) The performance of the groups decreased steadily over time.
C) The performance of the groups remained steady over time, but declined sharply after five
years of working together.
D) The performance of the groups increased over time in a steady, consistent fashion.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 160-161
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
9) Which of the following strategies for reducing the common information effect has been found
to be most effective?
A) Increase the amount of discussion
B) Put the team leader in the position of information manager.
C) Increase the size of the team
D) Increase information load
Answer: B
Page Ref: 154-155
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

4
10) Key indicators of involvement in an experienced community of practice (the person's level of
engagement with the given practice community) are a shared vocabulary, recall of previous
lessons, learning from one another, and:
A) beliefs leading to different scanning orientations.
B) performance under pressure.
C) open communication.
D) diversity of knowledge.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 136
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
11) A situational example of a team putting knowledge to practice through knowledge adaptation
is:
A) a manager discovers, by lots of personal research, that his department has created a new type
of adhesive that is not sticky when wet but very sticky when dry. The manager challenges
himself and his employees to improvise fixes to an employee's broken bicycle with this product.
B) a manager challenges the use of a newly developed fixture at her departmental status meeting.
This manager pushes the fixture design department to keep refining the design with new
parameters in mind.
C) in order to shorten his team's R&D phase, a manager visits the company archives and
researches past formulas that led to unsuccessful results.
D) a manager finds out that their newest product is not doing well in the market. He pushes the
team to take a new look at their product research, and make changes to the product based on the
team expanding their knowledge of marketplace trends.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 137
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Critical thinking
12) When a team consists of members who come from different functional areas, with different
areas of expertise, different information, different priorities, and different perceptions of
problems and opportunities, the ________ is exacerbated.
A) saying is believing effect
B) information dependence problem
C) uneven communication problem
D) indirect speech acts effect
Answer: B
Page Ref: 149
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

5
13) Regarding information dependence issues, which of the following examples best illustrates
the concept of a hidden profile?
A) Mary, Talia, and Sue have researched where the company retreat should be held this year, and
they seem to agree on the location. However, Talia has found out some information that she
hasn't yet shared with the group; a motorcycle convention at the same time and location as their
retreat, which, if shared, will probably contradict the team's common choice.
B) Kelly, Bob and Dan have separately researched options for next year's company retreat. Each
team member has unique information regarding the choices for the event location. No one
location seems to be the best choice for the retreat.
C) Carl, David, and Jean are considering six pieces of information regarding the decision about
the location of their company retreat. Even though each piece of decision criteria seems to be of
equal importance, Dan and Carl have been overemphasizing the importance of access to nature
trails. Mary feels pressured to overweigh this individual decision point at the expense of other
criteria.
D) Ted, Paul, and Laurel together have done their research about the choices for the location of
the company retreat. Each person knows the same information, both good and bad, as the other
group members.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 151
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Application
14) What is one of the best ways for improving the quality of pooled information collected
during a collaborative problem-solving session?
A) Allow the group to have an unstructured method for gathering and sharing information.
B) The group shares ideas in the moment they occur to them.
C) Allow individual group members the time to internally recall and record details or
observations to be shared later with the group.
D) Have teams pair off, and create collaborative observations to be shared later with the group as
a whole.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 134
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

6
15) A team mental model is a common understanding, shared by members of a team, about how
something works. Mental models most efficiently develop through the process of:
A) trust exercises.
B) team members sharing information regarding their specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities.
C) hiring an outside consultant to teach the team how something works.
D) watching others outside of the group figure out how something works.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 138
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
16) The greater the overlap, or commonality of experience, or among team members' mental
models, the greater the likelihood that team members will:
A) be able to avoid interpersonal conflict.
B) engage in healthy conflict.
C) be able to cope with unexpected demands.
D) create new innovation for old problems.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 140
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
17) A truism for optimizing the knowledge resources of a team, is that teams perform better
when their members know who is good at what. Two advantages of this shared knowledge
amongst team members are that unexpected problems can be solved more quickly and:
A) team members can match problems with the people most likely to solve them.
B) communication between team members becomes more contentious.
C) managers are assigned less blame for team project failure.
D) team members don't need to learn new skills.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 142
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

7
18) In a longitudinal study of teams that worked together for over 5 years, a series of behavioral
changes took place in these aging groups. Each of the following occurred EXCEPT:
A) behavioral stability.
B) selective exposure.
C) role assimilation.
D) group homogeneity.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 160-161
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
19) Transactive Memory Systems are the ways in which teams encode, store, process and
retrieve critical information necessary for doing their work. Of the following, select the best
situational example of a Transactive Memory System.
A) Molly keeps track of all her own work files by an elaborate cross-referencing system.
B) Tom secretly stashes away all of the new business leads, so that he can follow up with them
himself.
C) Karen keeps records on customer satisfaction reviews, and Kari keeps records on product
reliability, but neither are aware of this.
D) Julia has considerable experience in product engineering and Nathan has a background in
product parts sourcing, and they are able to remember more about a new client because each
knows the other's skill set.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 141-142
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
AACSB: Analytical thinking
20) Functionally diverse teams are composed of people who have different information,
knowledge, and expertise and must share and integrate it. ________ problem-solving is the art
and science of sharing and using knowledge, and making inferences that no individual group
member could have inferred.
A) Collaborative
B) Tactical
C) Strategic
D) Transactive
Answer: A
Page Ref: 134
Diff: Easy
Skill: Concept

8
21) Several factors can threaten the ability of teams to accurately share and use knowledge. One
of these problems, the uneven communication problem, is best illustrated in which of the
following situational examples?
A) In a brainstorming meeting with 6 team members, 3 of the team members did 70% of the
talking, while the other team members barely had a chance to voice their opinions and concerns.
B) Fern and Sybil have the same manager, but Fern sits next to her manager and so has many
opportunities to discuss project progress, but Sybil sits in an office on a different floor and only
gets to see her manager during staff meetings.
C) Pete keeps records on customer orders, and Ross keeps records on product recalls, but neither
are aware of this.
D) Julia is helping Kari bake a cake for a client, so she prepares the kitchen by getting out Kari's
preferred tools and rescheduling a vendor appointment because Julia knows Kari hates to be
interrupted when she is working.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 134
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
22) A team that has a large ________ has inconsistent views about the definition of the team's
problem or task, such that team members have different mental models about the task.
A) organizational context
B) team culture
C) representational gap
D) goal contagion
Answer: C
Page Ref: 138
Diff: Easy
Skill: Concept
23) A team that has a large representational gap has:
A) success in enticing other team members to adopt their position.
B) a majority of members who privately agree with the minority.
C) disagreements about how to approach a task and who should do what.
D) inconsistent views and mental models about the definitions of the team's problem or task.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 138
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

9
24) ________ coordination is the synchronization of members' actions based on assumptions
about what others on the team are likely to do and members' attempts to coordinate work in this
way begins prior to actual team interaction.
A) Strategic
B) Orienting
C) Gatekeeping
D) Tacit
Answer: D
Page Ref: 143
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
25) Regarding routine versus nonroutine tasks, what team factor is the best indicator that a
process will go quickly, smoothly, and minimize errors?
A) How long the team members have been in their area of expertise.
B) The number of times the team has worked together as a team on similar tasks.
C) How much training each individual person has acquired throughout their career.
D) The age of the technology and techniques the team is using to accomplish their task.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 143
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
26) Accountability refers to the extent to which people and teams feel responsible for their
actions and decisions and teams that are accountable are less likely to focus on unshared
information. When groups are made to be accountable for their ________, rather than ________,
they are more likely to repeat unshared information and make better decisions.
A) time spent on the task; quota of tasks completed
B) leadership decisions; team decisions
C) process; their outcome
D) monetary gains; productivity gains
Answer: C
Page Ref: 154
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept

10
27) Each of the following are effective interventions to defeat the common information effect,
EXCEPT:
A) leaders asking questions and repeat unshared/shared information.
B) prediscussion polling.
C) approach the task as a problem to be solved, rather than a judgment to be made.
D) build trust and familiarity among team members.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 154
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
2 True/False Questions
1) In an investigation of several teams working on a complex skill task over a 2-week training
protocol, both mental model accuracy and mental model correspondence were tested. Mental
model correspondence was the stronger predictor of team performance.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 141
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
2) A transactive memory system is a combination of two things: the knowledge possessed by
particular team members and metaknowledge, or the awareness of who knows what on the team.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 141
Diff: Easy
Skill: Concept
3) Training is one of the most effective ways of ensuring that groups quickly and accurately
develop a transactive memory system and thereby protect team effectiveness.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 144
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
AACSB: Written and oral communication
4) Regarding the team reaction to free-riders, teams with an integrated TMS suffer more negative
socioemotional interactions, lower cohesion, and greater conflict than do teams with a
differentiated TMS.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 144
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Concept

11
5) A TMS and an emphasis on team training are most relevant to problem-solving teams as
opposed to tactical or creative teams.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 146
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Concept
AACSB: Application of knowledge
6) Even when teams are explicitly told to spend more time discussing information about a topic
or decision, they often still fall prey to the common information effect.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 153
Diff: Moderate
Skill: Concept
3 Essay Questions
1) Regarding training for teams, a fundamental question that companies face is whether to train
individuals independently or as part of a team. What recommendations does the chapter give on
this question and what are some of the benefits of this type of training team to the larger
organization and to the team?
Page Ref: 145
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Synthesis
2) How could the common information effect and the information dependence problem affect 3
different candidates for a job interview?
Page Ref: 148-150, Ex. 6-4
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Application
3) How is team performance affected when its members have direct experience with a task
versus task experience acquired vicariously from others and how does increasing feedback
specificity affect knowledge transfer?
Page Ref: 159
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Application

12
4) For much of the work that organizations do, routinization is a good thing; however, for a large
part of what organizations do, innovation is desirable and necessary to meet the competitive
challenges of the marketplace. How can a well-defined TMS affect a team's ability to be adaptive
and what are the effects of team longevity on the project performance and intercompany
performance of the team?
Page Ref: 159
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Application
5) A distinction of transactive memory systems (TMS) is differentiated TMS and integrated
TMS. What are the differences between differentiated knowledge structures and integrated
knowledge structures specifically detailing how different items of information are stored, shared,
and located?
Page Ref: 142-143
Diff: Challenging
Skill: Application

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DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?
KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the
areas from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the
strong activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great
obstacles in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the
action, and similar reasons. I do not remember any details.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you the
leader of the German delegation which signed the capitulation with
which the war in Europe was terminated?
KEITEL: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that
take place?
KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from
8 to 9 May 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full
powers which would authorize you to negotiate about the
capitulation?
KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had
been signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of State
and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few
words that he had authorized and ordered me to conduct the
negotiations and to sign the capitulation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers
examined and acknowledged by the Allies?
KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to
present the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several
hours later they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the
Red Army who said that I had to show them again when signing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again?
KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of
capitulation and handed them over to become part of the record.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant
Jodl): Witness, during your testimony you have explained the
organization of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. This

organization was based on a decree of the Führer and Reich
Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW was
designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now,
the Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is
that correct?
KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was
the Chief of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the
departmental chiefs of the Armed Forces High Command as I have
already stated, although the first among equals.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral co-
ordinated offices?
KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion
between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February
1938. Do you remember that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this
conversation has been submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present
at this conference?
KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived
from the conference which I described before and which I held with
him and Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain
military preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg
conference; it is therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a
result of the description made to him.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the
German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten
question, the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you
ever give an order to the department Abwehr II
(Counterintelligence) under Canaris, to stage such an incident in
Czechoslovakia or on the border?
KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr,
anyway, not by myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field
Marshal, the then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this

position and was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief
of an artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at
that time Colonel Warlimont.
DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl
was not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?
KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed
Forces and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his
representative but successor in Jodl’s position.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the
occasion of that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—
Warlimont was present as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl
to do with that conference?
KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer
and commander in Vienna.
DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff?
KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from
1935 to 1938. My opinion was that I could not find a better man for
that position.
DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once
his command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended?
KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become
commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about
it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get
such a command?
KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and I remember that during the summer of
1939, I wrote him that his wish to become the commander of a

mountain division in Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—
would come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it
up to the OKH?
KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and he had made the decision.
DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself
notified Jodl?
KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make
him very happy.
DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond
regularly with Jodl?
KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to
him during that year.
DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the
OKW. He knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of
the future so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a
rather important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One
should think that then he would not only receive a private letter
once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.
KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to
my personal opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active
service is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any
longer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything
which would make us happy. It could be that somebody received the
official order for instance, to keep this gentleman informed.
KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it
happened, but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody
tried to do it.
DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and
Brünn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order
to get information?

KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I
believe it is very unlikely because if such were the case he would
have visited me.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say,
that when he came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war,
in response to a telegram, he first had to be informed as to what
was going on?
KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and
myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember,
perhaps, the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery
after the Simovic Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?
KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.
DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of
the wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there
nobody at that conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have
suggested that instead of attacking immediately, it would be better
to march to the borders of a state whose attitude was completely
uncertain and then clarify the situation by an ultimatum?
KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent
conditions in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge,
brought that point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send
an ultimatum; that is about the way it was.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the
East in October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to
Army Group North; is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane
to Army Group North in order to get information for the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of
Army Group North?
KEITEL: Yes, he was.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries
which he had at that time?
KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von
Leeb where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question
of the population of Leningrad, played an important role, which
worried him very much at that time because there were certain
indications that the population was streaming out of the city and
infiltrating into his area. I remember that at that time he asked me
to make the suggestion to the Führer that, as he could not take over
and feed 1 million civilians within the area of his army group, a
sluice, so to speak, should be made towards the east, that is, the
Russian zone, so that the population could flow out in that direction.
I reported that to the Führer at that time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other
direction?
KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests.
According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population
to get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?
KEITEL: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since
it has been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the
Führer and Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18
October 1942, that is Document Number 498-PS which has been
submitted here. It had been announced publicly beforehand that an
order of that kind would be issued. Do you know that?
KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the
daily communiqués of the Wehrmacht.
DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht
communiqué of 7 October 1942, which, below the usual report,
states with reference to what has happened, “The High Command of
the Armed Forces therefore considers itself obliged to issue the
following orders.” The first item is of no interest here, and then, at
the second item appears the following sentence:

“In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the
British and their accomplices who do not behave like
soldiers, but rather like bandits, will be treated as such by
the German troops and will be killed in combat without
mercy wherever they appear.”
Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?
KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated
and corrected it.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point
which was last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about
Commandos, Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this
order on Commandos, under Number VI, Hitler threatened that all
commanders would be court-martialed if they did not carry out this
order. Do you know what considerations prompted Hitler to include
this particular passage in the order?
KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that
the purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order
should actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by
the generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave
order; and for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the
threat of punishment.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions
concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff
and the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General
Staff?
KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who
are especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long
time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of
the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically
and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court
to declare as criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance
any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying

to show by asking him now about what he understands by the
General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I
intended to connect this question with another one; and, by the
answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the
alleged group, a group has been accused under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong
name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has
already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you
put your second question.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are
considered collectively to form one group which is designated as
General Staff and OKW, do you consider this designation to be
correct or misleading?
KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this
designation is misleading, because to us the General Staff always
means a body of assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and
army groups and the commanding generals represent the leadership
corps.
DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed
sufficiently in this Trial. I want to know only the following from you:
Was the relation of these echelons to each other that of military
superiors and subordinates or did there exist an additional
organization involving these ranks which went beyond purely
professional military duties?
KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff
officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their
uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves
had no relation to each other through any interoffice channels or
through any other organizations of any kind.
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst
Halder was put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence
of that affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General

Staff and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the
statement in that sentence correct or incorrect?
KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that
those few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones
who did the real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest
of the far more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had
nothing to do with these matters. That is what I think he wanted to
say, a small group which was concerned with these problems.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler
ever consulted a military leader on a political matter?
KEITEL: No, that did not happen.
DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the
conferences with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you
tell me anything about protests made, with or without success, by
any commanders who had come from the front and who happened
to be present?
KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were
silent listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and
afterwards, according to circumstances, such commanders used to
make a special report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then
there was also an opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned
by Kesselring, to discuss these things personally and to advance
opinions. But otherwise nobody had anything to say in these
matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when
particularly emphatic objections were raised, by any commander, to
Hitler?
KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?
DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have
been.
KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which
Hitler had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do
not know of any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases
which played a role in this war, namely the opposition of the

generals in the West, before the beginning of the war, and I
understood your question to mean whether I knew of any cases
beyond that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more
that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the
limit of anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the
General Staff of the Army?
KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a
prejudice against the General Staff and thought the General Staff
was arrogant. I believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than
once.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this
witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this
particular witness has not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about
it.
DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this
point and would have crossed off this question already if one of my
colleagues had put it before.
[To the defendant.] Would Hitler, in case an application for
resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have
been willing to take back an order which he had once given...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has
come and given evidence to this Court has spoken about that
subject, certainly many of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the
question I have put now?
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been
examined in this Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That
is what you are asking about, isn’t it?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I
can assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to
prove, as true.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether
they accept its truth or not, is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something
also to this question. I do not believe that it can be considered
cumulative, since as has already been pointed out by my colleague,
Dr. Dix, the same question when put to two different witnesses is in
each case a different question, because the subjective answer of the
individual witness to this particular point is desired. But I will forego
that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions.
[Turning to the defendant.] Witness, to what extent was the
headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the
war?
KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and
also I believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security
measures had been taken with every kind of safety device such as
fences, obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured
against any surprise attack.
DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?
KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and
several areas which were fenced in separately.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the
commanders of the army groups and armies in the East did not have
any authority outside their area of operation. Was there a tendency
to keep that operational area as small as possible, or as large as
possible?
KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large
areas of operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom
of movement in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer

was the first who, by drastic means, caused the limitation of these
zones to make them as small as possible.
DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons?
KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from
administrative measures and get them out of the extended space
they had sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into
narrowly limited areas.
DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units
of the Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational,
that is, for combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting
that point clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some
confusion. Did the forces of the SD have anything to do with the
units of the Waffen-SS which were subordinated to army units for
the purpose of operational assignments?
KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions
were incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do
with anything else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.
DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an
SS man for any offense?
KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no
commander would have hesitated; but apart from that, the last
resort for disciplinary measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer
Himmler, and not the commander of the army.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of
the SD have to report to the commanders of the armies upon what
they did on Himmler’s orders?
KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail
by the witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the
connections which existed between the commanders and the
Einsatzgruppen and commands. I was not involved and took no part
in it.
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the
Einsatzgruppen of the SD, according to your knowledge of the

regulations, were obliged to report to the military commanders in
whose rear areas they operated.
KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which
were in force in this respect; I have not seen them.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military
commanders at any time were informed of the intention of Hitler or
Himmler to kill the Jews?
KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I
personally was not informed either.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the
subject of the prisoners of war. It had already become known during
the war that the conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet
Russian prisoners of war during the first period of the eastern
campaign were miserable. What was the reason for these conditions
which prevailed during that first period?
KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army said during the situation report
conferences. As I recall, he repeatedly reported that it was clearly a
problem of large masses which required extraordinary efforts of
organization to provide food supply, housing, and security.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt
actually chaotic during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a
particular reason which existed, and in order to refresh your
memory, Witness, I would like to mention the following:
The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the
future prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that
these prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of
these preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was
stopped by a sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer
of these Russian prisoners into the homeland.
KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a
certain period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian
prisoners of war into the Reich was prohibited and only after that

the transfer into the home camps was made possible in order to
utilize the manpower.
DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during
this first period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal
of the troops?
KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only
the OKH, which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the
position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
When was that position set up?
KEITEL: I believe in 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that
position?
KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.
DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the
same as the position of a commander of a division?
KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the
commander of a brigade or a division, a section chief.
DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the
OKW?
KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of
estimate I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two,
three or four sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or
35 section chiefs.
DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff was one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?
KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had
among the department chiefs so-called department group chiefs,
who combined several small sections. That was about his position.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with
that position?
KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work
of that part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was

attached to the Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that
work in accordance with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff responsible for the strategic planning to a
particularly high degree, as is maintained by the Prosecution?
KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this
capacity, but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of
high ranking and outstanding general staff officers who were
concerned with these things, as Halder has pointed out.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore,
the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff, not equal in importance to the other positions which are
included in this group or alleged group of the General Staff and the
OKW?
KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed
Forces Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those
who had to deal with operational and strategical questions, but
subordinate to General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in
the Arbeitsstab.
DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question
which I have put to you was not completely answered. I have asked
you whether the importance of that position was equal to or even
approached equality with that of the other offices which are included
in the group of the general staff and the OKW.
KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General
Staff and the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the
supreme commanders, and the chiefs of the general staff. He
certainly did not belong to those.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said
in your Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war,
became the champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest

and force. In order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like
to clarify the following: What did you mean by SS in this case?
KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my
counsel was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read
the latter you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To
state it in a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership
under Himmler and under those functionaries within his sphere of
command, police and SS, who appeared and were active in the
occupied territories. The concept of the so-called general SS in the
homeland had nothing to do with that. I hope that makes it clear.
HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann):
Witness, the Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the
Defendant Bormann also with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm.
In that connection, I would like to put a few questions to you.
Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the
Volkssturm as it was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October
1944?
KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann
refused to give the military authorities any advice, any co-operation,
and any information on the Volkssturm.
DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all
informed of the purpose of the Volkssturm?
KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend
their own homesteads.
DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the
Wehrmacht, the Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive
purpose?
KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which
encountered the Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated
them or sent them home.
DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted
to say that that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of
Bormann’s brain or did it originate with Hitler?

KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.
DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?
KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar
things, but military authorities had nothing to do with it.
DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters
to the Führer besides the odd things about the Volkssturm?
KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of
things; I can conclude that only from what I was told, and assume
that it originated with Bormann. I do not know it.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop,
after his return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the
changed foreign political situation—the guarantee pact between
England and Poland had been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the
military measures which had been set in motion?
KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given
to me by Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and
his foreign minister. I was not present at that conversation.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other
ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the
strategic plans?
KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do it and
that we never did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed
about such questions, that information could have come only from
Hitler himself. I doubt that he made an exception here.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April
1940, concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway
which you sent to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you
informed the Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and
requested him to take the necessary political steps. Had you already
instructed Von Ribbentrop before that date about the intended
occupation of Norway and Denmark?

KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that,
according to the way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter
was an unusual method of giving information about this, by the
Führer’s order, to the Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing
about these things. I was ordered to write it to him.
DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General
Lahousen, I want to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish
campaign, was there a directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate
the Jews in the Polish Ukraine?
KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that during
the occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the problem
of the Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also put a
question once to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that that
area was well suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know or
remember anything else.
DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any
plan to instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the
Poles?
KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard
such things said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember
anything about it.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you
were Chief of the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, that
is, Prisoners of War Organization. Did you ever issue orders or have
orders issued on the basis of which members of the SA or units of
the SA were detailed to guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war
camps, or were to be used for that purpose?
KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been
issued by the OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case.
HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you
that any such guard duty was performed?
KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that
some units of the army in some particular place may have used SA

men temporarily to assist in guard duty, which I would not know.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10
minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow
morning at 10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary
applications for witnesses and documents, and after that at a
quarter to 1 it will adjourn into a closed session.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me
exactly when you received your first commission as an officer?
KEITEL: On 18 August 1902.
GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive?
KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting
as a simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private
first class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training.
KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost 6
years regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery
commander, and then after the spring of 1915 I served on the
general staff.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct
translation. Did you pass the Staff College or any other college, that
is to say, did you receive preliminary training?
KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated
in so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant and in
the summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General Staff and
returned to my regiment later when the war broke out in 1914.
GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did
Hitler possess?
KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself
that after the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a

Bavarian infantry regiment. During the war he was a private, then
private first class and maybe corporal during the last period.
GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you,
with your thorough military training and great experience, could
have had an opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, in
solving questions of a strategic and military nature, as well as other
matters pertaining to the Armed Forces?
KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree
which is almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional
officer, Hitler had studied general staff publications, military
literature, essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he
had a knowledge in the military fields which can only be called
amazing. May I give an example of that which can be confirmed by
the other officers of the Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed
concerning organization, armament, leadership, and equipment of all
armies, and what is more remarkable, of all navies of the globe, that
it was impossible to prove any error on his part; and I have to add
that also during the war, while I was at his headquarters and in his
close proximity, Hitler studied at night all the big general staff books
by Moltke, Schlieffen, and Clausewitz and from them acquired his
vast knowledge by himself. Therefore we had the impression: Only a
genius can do that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your
military training and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a
number of highly important matters?
KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I heard
a lot from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question of my
counsel that even in the simple, every-day questions concerning
organization and equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must admit openly
that I was the pupil and not the master.
GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your co-
operation with Hitler began?
KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that
position, 4 February 1938.

GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with Hitler
during the entire period of preparation for and realization of
aggressive warfare?
KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations
as to how, after I entered my new position in the beginning of
February, events followed in quick succession, often in a very
surprising manner.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders
of the OKW and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister?
KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three
commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and
among these the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich
Marshal Göring, was also Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I
received, as I said yesterday, the rank but not the authority and title
of a minister.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military
collaborators of the OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with
Hitler and the other Reich Ministers?
KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, there
was the method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich Chancellor
and the Ministers immediately involved, and, finally of the Chief of
the Reich Chancellery. This did not hold good for the military sector,
for according to the traditions of the German Army and the
Wehrmacht the signatures were given by the principal experts who
had worked on the matter, by the Chief of Staff, or by whoever had
given or at least drafted the order, and an initial was added on the
margin.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such
decrees together with other Ministers of the Reich.
KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also
gave the reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was not
Reich Minister and did not receive the function of a minister in office.
GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of
the War Ministry from February 1938 on?

KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of
February, it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg.
Beginning with 4 February there was neither a Minister for War nor a
War Ministry.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what
government organization had replaced the War Ministry and
exercised its function, since I knew that this Ministry did not exist.
KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff of
the War Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and
distributed it, as I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred
all command functions to the commanders-in-chief of the branches
of the Wehrmacht. But this was not an order of mine but an order of
Hitler’s.
GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to the
Tribunal it would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating,
and supreme military authority of the Reich and that it was directly
under Hitler’s control. Would this conclusion be correct?
KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the
drafting of military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically to
the plans for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium,
Holland, France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.
KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely,
saying that the operational and strategic planning, after an order
had been given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to Hitler
by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; that
is to say, for the Army, by the High Command of the Army and the
General Staff of the Army, and then further decisions were made
with respect to it.
GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to ask
you the following question: Do you admit that a directive issued
under your signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, is
per se a document of great political and international importance,
providing for the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state?

KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree
by the Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested
and concerned. I did not have any personal or political influence
whatsoever in these questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature?
KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a
complete explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and
what their significance is.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about it,
and I shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. I
should now like to determine with greater precision your own
position in the question of Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, with
the direct participation of the OKW, organized acts of provocation in
order to find a reason for aggression against Yugoslavia and a
justification for this aggression in the eyes of the world?
KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel
of other defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate in
any preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish either that
any military offices should ever participate in the discussion,
preparation, deliberation, or the execution of incidents. I use
“incident” here in the sense of provocation.
GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take to
insure the arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland?
KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which
Free Corps you refer.
GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland.
KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office did
any gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. I have
no knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was not given,
or at any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot remember
that.
GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order
issued to occupy Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German troops,

on 14 March 1939, in the afternoon, while President Hacha was still
on the way to Berlin for negotiations with Hitler?
KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by the
Führer. There had been preparations to occupy by a coup de main
that area where the well-known big and modern steel works were
located near Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name now—
before the date of the march into Czechoslovakia as originally set. As
a justification for that decision, Hitler had told me that it was done in
order to prevent the Poles from making a surprise attack from the
north, and thereby perhaps taking possession of the most modern
rolling mill in the world. This he gave as a reason, and the operation,
that is, the occupation, actually took place in the late hours of 14
March.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President
Hacha was on the way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler?
KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery!
KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to
the facts. It is true that the occupation was carried out on that
evening. I have given the reasons, and President Hacha learned
about it only after he arrived in Berlin.
Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in
connection with the aggression against the Soviet Union. You
testified to the Tribunal yesterday on the subject. You explained your
position, with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union. But you
informed the Tribunal that the orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa
were given at the beginning of December 1940. Is that right?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this?
KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific
order by the High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the
drawing up of this plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. I
explained yesterday, however, that some order had been issued,

probably in September, concerning transport and railway facilities
and similar matters. I cannot recall whether I signed that order, but
yesterday I mentioned such a preparatory order to improve transport
conditions from the West to the East.
GEN. RUDENKO: In September?
KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I
cannot commit myself as to the exact time.
GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time.
KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained at
a later stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during the
course of his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the
following briefly: Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack the
Soviet Union in the summer of 1940?
KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which is
mentioned in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring to,
you mean the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not present at
this obviously very casual and brief conversation and did not hear it.
My recollections concerning that period also justify my belief that I
was not present, because I was on the move almost every day by
airplane and was not present at the discussions of the situation at
that time.
GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with
Ribbentrop take place?
KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; I
believe, it was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give the
exact date any more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that I did not
return to Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote the
memorandum which I mentioned yesterday at a later date.
GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first
heard about Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the
conversation with Ribbentrop?
KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden
for about two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, I

returned to headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one of the
subsequent days, probably during the middle of August, I heard for
the first time ideas of that kind from Hitler. That was the basis for
my deliberation and my memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly
in asking whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the summer of
1940?
KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer.
GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble
about that. Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence of
the witness Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, on 11
February of this year. Paulus, as you will remember, informed the
Tribunal that when he entered the OKH on 3 September 1940, he
found among other plans an unfinished preliminary operational draft
of a plan for attacking the Soviet Union, known under the name of
Barbarossa. Do you remember that part of Paulus’ testimony?
KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was a
study or a draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document on
the occasion of his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff of the
Army. This is not known to me, and it could not be known to me
because the documents, files, and other reports of the General Staff
of the Army were never at my disposal; and I never had an
opportunity to look at them.
GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that
the OKH, in September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection
with Plan Barbarossa?
KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, then
I could not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether it
actually was true. I can neither deny nor affirm it.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that you
were opposed to the war with the Soviet Union.
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with
the suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the

Soviet Union. Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan and
not to wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the content of
my memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would like
to ask you now about a conference, evidently known to you, which
was held 3 weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the
conference of 16 July 1941. Do you remember that conference,
which dealt with the tasks for the conduct of the war against the
Soviet Union?
KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. I do
not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to
you at this particular minute. You may remember that I submitted it
to the Defendant Göring, when the question of the dismemberment
and of the annexation of the Soviet Union arose. Do you remember?
KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked
on top “BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified it
as a memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct.
KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified that
I was called in only during the second part of the conference and
that I had not been present during the first part of it. I also testified
that it was not the minutes but a free summary made by Reichsleiter
Bormann, dictated by him.
GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on 16
July, the question was already being advanced about the annexation
by Germany of the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of the
Volga, the Ukraine, Bielorussia and other territories?
KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the
conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on
where questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain
personalities who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have

seen the document here for the first time and did not know of it
before; and did not attend the first half of the conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently:
What were the final aims pursued by Hitler and his entourage at that
time, against the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given
me, I saw the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that he
was convinced that a war would break out some way or other within
the next years between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism and
the German Reich of National Socialism. The reasons which were
given to me were something like this: If I believe or rather if I am
convinced that such a conflict between these two nations will take
place, then it would be better now than later. That is how I can put
it. But I do not remember, at least not at the moment, the questions
which are in this document about the dismemberment of several
areas. Perhaps they were constructions of fantasy.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that you
did not know of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the
territories of the Soviet Union?
KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true
that I believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents
of the Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer
connection from the point of view of food supply or economy, but
concrete plans for conquest are not known to me and if they were
ever touched upon I never considered them to be serious problems.
That is the way I looked at it at that time. I must not explain how I
see it today, but only how I saw it at that time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July
Hitler announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to the
ground?
KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have
read that document here again. That it is contained in the document
I cannot remember now. But I have had this document here in my
hands; I have read it in the presence of the American Prosecutor;
and if it is stated therein, then the question of whether or not I have

heard it depends entirely on the moment at which I was called to
that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document
now, because it has already been submitted several times. But in the
minutes previously quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them
himself, it is said, “The Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. The
Führer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then cede it to
the Finns.”
KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from
what moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said
before that moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if I
am given the document or if one reads the record of my preliminary
interrogation. That is what I told the interrogating officer at that
time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of the
conference of 16 July immediately. While the passages required are
being found, I shall ask you a few more questions, and by that time
the passages will have been found.
With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know
about it from other documents?
KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian
Delegation and the general who is present here in this courtroom.
He has called my attention to a document.
GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation,
that is quite right.
KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from
an admiral, as well as a second document which contained a short
directive, I believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I
have been interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can
state only that neither through artillery operations during the siege,
nor by operations of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction be
compared with that of other places we know about. It did not
materialize, we did not carry it out. It never came to a systematic
shelling of Leningrad, as far as I know. Consequently, only that can

be stated which I said at that time under oath to the gentlemen of
the Soviet Delegation.
GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad
never shelled?
KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area,
but it never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes of
destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come to an
attack on Leningrad.
GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask
you a few supplementary questions. [The document was submitted
to the defendant.]
KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment
after this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator at
the time that I just heard the discussion about the appointment of
Gauleiter Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks I
did not hear.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those
minutes of the report on the conference of 16 July that deal with
Leningrad?
KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered.
GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the
minutes of the meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they
had finished talking about Leningrad?
KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about
the qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable
for an administrative office. These were the first words which I
heard. A debate was going on about that subject just when I
entered.
GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of
Leningrad to the ground.”
KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here.
GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not?
KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you
mean the order of the Navy, the order which was found with the

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