Metaethics
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The document is a slide presentation on philosophical ethics and metaethics. It begins with defining key terms like normative ethics, metaethics, cognitivism, and non-cognitivism. It then outlines some of the major questions in metaethics, such as whether moral claims can be true or false, and if there are moral facts. The presentation contrasts moral realism/cognitivism with moral anti-realism/non-cognitivism on these questions. It provides an overview of several metaethical positions like naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, and error theory. The overall purpose is to distinguish different kinds of metaethical accounts and clarify the nature and status
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Metaethics
- 1. (“What about Everything”, Carbon Leaf)
- 2. Please only use the “play” button to advance the slide show or you’ll miss animated content & movies
- 3. Glossary Φ : “philosophy” or “philosophical” NB : nota bene (Latin) for “Please Note” cf. : “compare” e.g. : exempli gratiā (Latin) for “for example” etc. : et cetera (Latin) for “and so forth” ∀ : “Universal” or “for all” ∃ : “there exists” or “for (at least) some” : “Necessary” or “necessity” : “Possible” or “possibility” ~x : “not x” ∴ : “Therefore”
- 4. Agenda Ethics & Philosophy Metaphysics Epistemology Logic Normative Ethics vs. Metaethics Cf. Applied Ethics Our Metaethical Question: Are there – or could there be – moral facts?
- 5. Upshot To be able to distinguish moral accounts that are subtly different in kind, specifically Moral Relativism “Subjectivism” Getting on to the same page Despite the diversity of the rest of class Each moral position differs (mainly) not even on what’s morally so, but why it is so and not otherwise
- 6. Previously, we “brainstormed” what one might think – pre-theoretically – ethics is all about:
- 7. Pre-theoretical Considerations “Right” & “wrong”? “Good” & “bad”? “Evil”? “Ought”? “Should”? Actions? Constraints? Principles? Some guide or guidance? Character? Virtues & Vices ? Values? Origin? Culture? Society? Family? God? Religion? Conscience? A “feeling”? Responsibility? Agency? Evaluation & judgment? Praise & blame? Justification, excuse, & mitigation Etc.
- 9. Philosophy (Φ) Itself a philosophical question Traditionally, not distinct from science By analogy with artist, “scientist” coined in 1834 by the Rev. William Whewell (1794–1866) Previously, “natural philosopher”; cf. “moral philosophy” Latter included all of modern Φ sub-disciplines (see below)
- 10. Philosophy (Φ) Many overly simplistic answers, including: φιλοσοφία; “love of wisdom” “Thinking about thinking” “The study of Big questions” or “of general and fundamental problems” Etc. I prefer: the systematic study of the nature of the world (widely construed, meaning all possible, in addition to actual, reality) in all the ways that it is immune to empirical study
- 11. Philosophy
- 13. E.g. Ontology What is it to be? What is it to be a thing (∃x) at all? As opposed to nothing (~∃x)? Is there a difference between a possible (x) but not real thing (~∃x)and something that is impossible (~x)? and could never be (~x)? (~x ?)
- 14. Consider … Swiss Cheese What – exactly – are you counting when you count the “eyes” in a piece of Swiss Cheese?
- 16. “Known knowns, …” US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld White House Briefing, February 12, 2002
- 19. Normative Ethics Study of particular moral accounts. Each, roughly … Argues for its own ethical norms. (hence the adjective ‘normative’) A particular understanding of terms such as “right” & “wrong”, “good” & “bad”, etc (Perhaps?) action-guiding – i.e. that by which we ought to live
- 20. Normative Ethics Substantive moral principles we ought to follow? Norms as values? But maybe most importantly, each argues why ethics must have its structure and not some other. NB, the vast bulk of this course
- 21. Possibility of Disagreement NB that the mere possibility of disagreement between or amongst normative accounts does not by itself suggest that there isn’t a single correct moral account! Disagreement ≠ ~∃ moral facts! (Epistemology vs. ontology/metaphysics)
- 22. Cf. Applied Ethics Application of one or a variety of normative accounts to specific problems, disciplines, endeavors, or cases. Unusual features of a particularly troubling moral problem E.g. abortion; genetic engineering
- 23. Cf. Applied Ethics Special concerns and anxieties of a profession E.g. Medical or bioethics; business ethics Unconcerned with which moral account is right Or why it is right Or how each account is distinct from the other Or how their (observed) convergence or consensus or moral conclusions affects these particular areas of concern
- 25. Metaethics Again, roughly, … Kinds of normative accounts there even could be Exploring the logical space of morality The & structures and features of such accounts Why each account is so and not otherwise And how we could know this
- 26. Metaethics How purported moral properties or terms must work Theory independent E.g. What do (or could) terms like “good”, “right”, “ought”, or “obligation” mean in general? When specifically moral? What is the epistemic status of moral claims? Are moral judgments different from other kinds of judgments? If so, how? Etc. NB, all adequate normative accounts will have their own metaethical answers to such questions But, one might still do metaethics independently of normative ethics
- 27. Consider “ought” Moral ought You ought to x, even – perhaps especially – when you don’t want to. Prudential ought You ought to y because it’s in your best interest E.g., “if you want to pass this class, you ought to participate early an often.” Expectational ought According to the schedule, the bus ought to be here in 5 minutes.
- 28. Consider “ought” Not always clear which we mean: “Given the inclement and dangerous weather, UML ought to close by 2pm today.”
- 29. Normative vs. Metaethics Normative Metaethics “what is right, what is wrong, and why?” Particular moral claims Particular moral judgments re moral truths “what could we mean by ‘right’, what could we mean by ‘wrong’, and what could be a proper kind of answer to the question, ‘why is that right?’” What is the metaphysical status of moral claims? What could they mean? What is their ultimate nature? Are there moral truths? What makes something a moral truth? How would we know moral truths?
- 30. Our Metaethical Question Are there – or could there be – moral facts?
- 31. – or – Can Moral Claim be True or False?
- 32. Are there Moral Facts? Can Moral Claim be True or False? Yes No Cognitivism Moral Realism Natrualism vs. Non- naturalism Vast bulk of our class NB Relativism Non-cognitivism Moral Anti-realism Subjectivism Moral Skepticism Error-Theory Emotivism & Prescriptivism
- 33. Are there Moral Facts? Can Moral Claims be True or False? Naturalism Yes No Are there Moral Facts? Can Moral Claims be True or False? Are moral claims fact-type claims? Do moral claims at least seem like they could be true Cognitivism (a.k.a. Moral Realism; Objective Moral Theories) What kind of moral facts? Non-Naturalism Non-Cognitivism (a.k.a. Moral Anti-Realism; “Subjective” Moral Theories) No Social Contract (?) Kant Moral Skepticism Further, we ‘ought’ to (but in what sense?!) eschew moral language… Moral Nihilism Simple “Subjectivism” Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson) Prescriptivism (Norm-Expressivism) (Hare) Language is more than informative – ethical “talk” expresses something: Cultural Relativism Culture determines Moral Truths Error-Theory (Projectivism; quasi-realism (?)) Yes Individuals determine Moral Truths Existentialism (individualism) Ethics is “Queer” i.e., incoherent Yes, but really “about” attitudes, not norms Naturalistic Fallacy? (Is/Ought? Fact/Value??) DCT (?); Natural Law, Plato, Aristotle, Utilitarianism (?)
- 34. Naturalism Yes No Are there Moral Facts? Can Moral Claims be True or False? Are moral claims fact-type claims? Do moral claims at least seem like they could be true Cognitivism (a.k.a. Moral Realism; Objective Moral Theories) What kind of moral facts? Non-Naturalism Non-Cognitivism (a.k.a. Moral Anti-Realism; “Subjective” Moral Theories) No Social Contract (?) Kant Moral Skepticism Further, we ‘ought’ to (but in what sense?!) eschew moral language… Moral Nihilism Simple “Subjectivism” Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson) Prescriptivism (Norm-Expressivism) (Hare) Language is more than informative – ethical “talk” expresses something: Cultural Relativism Culture determines Moral Truths Error-Theory (Projectivism; quasi-realism (?)) Yes Individuals determine Moral Truths Existentialism (individualism) Ethics is “Queer” i.e., incoherent Yes, but really “about” attitudes, not norms Naturalistic Fallacy? (Is/Ought? Fact/Value??) DCT (?); Natural Law, Plato, Aristotle, Utilitarianism (?)
- 35. Read: • Bernard Williams “Amoralist, Subjectivist, Relativist” Review: • Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” (Denis, 119-125) • Rachels Chs.3 & 2 • Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism” (Blackboard link)
Editor's Notes
- #33: Strictly, these are two rather different questions, something we see when we begin to look at the so-called “queerness” objections. Former is ontological; later epistemic?