OECD Report : Risks that matter

Risks that Matter
Main Findings from the
2018 OECD Risks that Matter Survey

3
Contents
Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Reconnecting policy and people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Introduction and overview . . . . . . . . . . 7
1 . Risks, worries and concerns . . . . . . 11
Many people worry about falling ill,
struggling to make ends meet and
getting by in old age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Worries vary across social groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 . Satisfaction and fairness . . . . . . . . . 21
Too many people feel social protection
is not working for them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
There is a widespread sense of injustice
in social benefit receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness
differ across social and economic groups . . . . 28
People are generally more satisfied in
countries with generous social policies . . . . . . . . 30
3 . Wants, needs and preferences . . . . . 37
Most people want the government to provide
more in the way of social policy – and a fair
number are willing to pay for it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Economic conditions affect policy
preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
List of tables available online . . . . . . . 48
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4 Risks that Matter © OECD 2019
Editorial
Reconnecting people with
policy
Social policy is crucial for achieving inclusive
economic growth that benefits everyone .
Globalisation, digitalisation, and demographic
and climate change are transforming the
way economies and societies work . These
transformations provide new opportunities
for growth, but they also raise the risk of
deepening inequalities .
Against this backdrop, the OECD has launched
a new cross-national survey called Risks That
Matter . The survey aims to put the principle
of “listening to people” into practice, in order
to better understand people’s worries and
concerns, to capture their views on current
social policies, and to learn what they expect
from social policy in the future . The survey
asked over 22 000 people in 21 OECD countries
in 2018 about their social and economic risks
and how well they think their government
tackles these risks .
A clear sense of dissatisfaction and
injustice
Many of the findings from Risks That Matter
are deeply worrying . OECD countries are
among the wealthiest in the world . They
spend, on average, more than 20% of GDP on
social policies, or the equivalent of roughly
USD 8 000 per person per year . The evidence
shows that these policies often work – on
average, people are living safer, healthier,
and longer lives, and are better educated than
ever before . Yet, the Risks That Matter survey
reveals that many people do not see it that
way .
There is clear dissatisfaction with existing
social policy . Across the surveyed countries,
many respondents believe public services and
benefits are inadequate and hard to reach .
Only a minority are satisfied with access to
services like health care, housing, and long-
term care, and the majority believe that the
government would not be able to provide
a proper safety net should they lose their
income due to job loss, illness or old age .
Particularly worrying is that more than half
of the respondents think they would not be
able to easily access public benefits if they
needed them . This is a wake-up call for policy
makers .
Public perceptions of fairness should also
raise concerns . More than half of respondents
say they do not receive their fair share of
benefits given the taxes they pay, and
two-thirds believe many others get more than
they deserve . Making matters worse, people
feel they have little influence over policies:
about 60% say that the government does not
incorporate the views of people like them
when designing social policy .
These beliefs are not limited just to those
deemed “left behind”, i .e . those who have not
been able to benefit from economic growth
and have been trapped at the lower rungs
of the income ladder . Young people, those
with high levels of education, and those with
high incomes all express strong feelings of
unfairness and injustice too .
Governments need to do better at restoring
trust and confidence in social protection
systems .
Women and older people are
unhappier than others
Results from the survey show that, overall,
women tend to be less satisfied with social
policy than men . This may reflect the fact
that women often face a higher poverty risk
than men and that women are more often
single parents with primary responsibility for
children . Older people also tend to express
stronger feelings of dissatisfaction and
disillusionment than younger age groups,
even though young people are facing greater

Risks that Matter © OECD 2019 5
Editorial
uncertainty now in most countries . Income
itself does not seem to play much of a role
for satisfaction; in many cases, low-income
respondents are just as satisfied with social
policy as those on high incomes . However,
feelings of dissatisfaction are particularly
strong among people who believe their
economic situation has deteriorated in recent
months . One of the key objectives of social
policy is sheltering people from the negative
impact of income shocks, but the survey
shows that many of those suffering from an
income decline do not believe social policy
is meeting this objective .
Social spending matters for people’s
satisfaction . Respondents in countries that
provide more generous social policies are
often among the most satisfied . By contrast,
respondents in less prosperous, more unequal
countries that spend less on social policies are
usually among the least satisfied . However,
some degree of caution is needed when
interpreting these cross-country differences,
since a number of other factors (including
cultural norms and the political setting)
can also shape attitudes and expectations
towards government and social policies .
People want more support from
government
Overall, people are calling for more help from
government . In all but two countries, Denmark
and France, more than half of respondents
say they want government to do more for
their economic and social security . This is
especially the case for older respondents
and those with low incomes . But, perhaps
surprisingly, about two-thirds of those with
high incomes also want more public support .
For many, health care and pensions are
the priorities . On average, about half of
respondents choose better health care
or improved pensions as one of their top-
three priorities, and almost 40% would be
willing to pay an extra 2% of their income
in taxes in return . But there are differences
across groups . Young people are most likely
to prioritise better housing supports, for
instance, and parents more likely than others
to favour better education services . Those
in less prosperous countries often just want
more help finding a job .
Future-proofing social policy
The Risks That Matter survey should serve as a
call to action . The results of the survey shed
new light on how people feel about social risks
and social policy, as the survey complements
and adds to information from traditional
hard data sources, like household and labour
force surveys . While data on perceptions
like these may of course be influenced by
many factors, including cultural values and
general economic and social conditions, these
results remain important for informing policy,
offering insights on individual economic,
social and political choices .
This OECD survey shows that listening to
people matters . Implementation matters .
Policies cannot reach their full potential if
people feel they cannot fully access benefits
and services when needed . Better efforts
are needed to understand what drives these
perceptions, to map where and why people
feel they are struggling, and to listen to their
suggestions in the formulation and evaluation
of benefits and services . This will contribute
to making social protection more effective
and efficient, restoring trust and confidence
in government and policies, and promoting
equality of opportunity .
Stefano Scarpetta
Director of Employment, Labour and
Social Affairs, OECD

7
Around the world, there is growing
concern about how well public
services and benefits address
people’s concerns and expectations,
and whether governments deliver
what matters most to citizens . At
the same time, all countries are
in the process of modernising and
adapting their social protection
systems in the face of global mega-
trends such as population ageing,
rising inequalities and the changing
nature of work . Governments and
policy makers are being asked to
adapt to major changes and reform
their social protection systems for
the future .
It is in this challenging economic
and political climate that the OECD
has carried out the first Risks That
Matter survey, which looks at
people’s perceptions of social and
economic risks and their public
policy preferences . Nationally-
representative surveys were
conducted in 21 countries around
the world in spring and autumn
of 2018, capturing the cultural,
geographic, and economic diversity
of the OECD .
The survey provides valuable
insights into people’s short- and
long-term concerns as well as their
opinions on how well government
social policies are responding to
their needs and expectations .
Falling ill and making
ends meet are the biggest
short-term concerns
This report outlines key results
from the 2018 Risks That Matter
survey . It starts by asking which
social and economic risks people
fear most and where they feel most
vulnerable . Results reveal that, in
the short-term (over the next year
or two), falling ill and not being able
to make ends meet are at the top of
the list . Not surprisingly, concerns
around illness and disability
increase with age and are greatest
among older respondents . Making
ends meet is a particular worry for
those with low incomes and people
in countries that were hit hard by
the financial crisis .
When thinking about the longer
term (beyond the next decade),
most people list financial security
in old age as one of their top
concerns . Understandably, this
is most frequent among older
respondents, but many younger
people also pick this as a top
concern . The survey also picks
up feelings of uncertainty about
the future . Parents are frequently
concerned about their children
reaching levels of status and
comfort similar to their own, while
younger respondents often worry
about their own futures .
Many people are dissatisfied
and disillusioned with social
policy
Section 2 of the report explores
satisfaction with current social
policies . Overall, results point
towards widespread dissatisfaction .
Across countries, large numbers
of respondents believe that public
benefits and services are hard
Introduction and overview

to reach and many lack confidence in the
government’s ability to provide adequate
support should they lose their income . Many
respondents also express strong feelings of
injustice in benefit receipt . They believe they
are not receiving the benefits they should
get relative to the taxes they pay, and that
many others are picking up more than they
deserve .
There are differences, of course, across both
groups and countries . Women tend to be less
satisfied than men, older people less satisfied
than the young, and those self-reporting
as working class less satisfied than those
reporting as middle class or above . Income
level itself does not play too much of a role,
but respondents who say their economic
situation has worsened over the past year
are more likely than others to express
dissatisfaction with what they currently
receive . Satisfaction also appears higher in
countries that provide more generous social
policies and that have stronger and more
equal economies, though some caution is
needed when interpreting these findings as
other factors, including the political setting,
also likely play a role .
People want more from government,
with health care and pensions the
priorities
The final section concentrates on people’s
preferences, asking what they want from
social policy and in which areas they would
like increased support . Unsurprisingly, given
low levels of satisfaction, most people say
they want more support . Better public health
care and pensions are the top priorities,
reflecting their rankings as top concerns .
Almost 40% of respondents, on average, say
they would be willing to pay more in taxes
for access to improved public health services
and better pensions . In some countries (Chile,
Greece, Ireland and Portugal in the case of
health care, and Chile, Israel and Lithuania
for pensions) this share rises to around
one-half .
Policy priorities differ across groups . As
might be expected, parents are much more
likely than others to favour improvements in
education services, and younger respondents
are more likely to prioritise affordable
housing . Older respondents overwhelmingly
support improvements to public pensions,
health care, and long-term care services .
Looking across countries, respondents in
countries with lower GDP per capita are
more likely than others to prioritise labour
market supports, such as improved job-
search services and help with funds to start
a business, while those in highly unequal
countries are especially likely to pick out
better education services . Respondents in
richer countries are more likely to prioritise
affordable housing supports .
Perceptions matter
The feelings of insecurity and dissatisfaction
expressed by respondents to the Risks That
Matter survey are important . Risks like
unemployment, poverty and poor health carry
large and well-known social and economic
costs, but in addition even the prospect of
events like job loss or falling into poverty can
have damaging effects on society . Feelings of
financial strain and insecurity, for example,
have multiple harmful effects, including
physical and mental health, independent
of actual income level (Ferrie et al ., 2005[1]
;
Georgiades et al ., 2009[2]
; Arber, Fenn and
Meadows, 2014[3]
; Niedzwiedz, Pell and
Mitchell, 2015[4]
; Weinstein and Stone, 2018[5]
) .
Job insecurity and the risk of unemployment
negatively affects the well-being even of
those still in work (Luechinger, Meier and
Stutzer, 2010[6]
; Helliwell and Huang, 2014[7]
;
Hijzen and Menyhert, 2016[8]
) .
Greater efforts are needed to understand
what drives these perceptions and why so
many feel like social policies are not meeting
their needs . OECD governments are exploring
many promising new ways of delivering
social policy, such as the potential for new
technologies to help identify vulnerable

The OECD Risks That Matter survey is a cross-
national survey that examines people’s
perceptions of social and economic risks and
how well they think government addresses
those risks . The survey, conducted for the first
time in two waves in the spring and autumn
of 2018, draws on a representative sample of
22 000 people aged 18 to 70 years old in 21 OECD
countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia and the United States . Respondents are
asked about their social and economic concerns,
how well they think government responds to
their needs and expectations, and what policies
they would like to see in the future .
The aim of the survey is to understand better
what citizens want and need from social policy .
Standard data sources, such as government
administrative records and household and
labour force surveys, provide traditional
data on issues such as where and how much
people work, how much they earn, their health
status, whether or not they are in education or
have decided to re-train – even, in the case of
time-use surveys, how much they sleep and
how they choose to spend their free time . These
traditional surveys have proved invaluable
for social policy researchers and have helped
shape and improve social policies for decades .
Yet, as highlighted in recent work hosted by
the OECD (Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Durand, 2018[9]
),
these traditional data sources rarely illuminate
people’s concerns, perceived vulnerabilities
and preferences, especially with regard to
government policy . Existing cross-national
surveys in this area (such as certain rounds
of the International Social Survey Programme
or the European Commission’s Eurobarometer
survey) are conducted infrequently and/or only
in specific regions . The OECD Risks That Matter
survey fills this gap – it complements existing
data sources by providing comparable OECD-
wide information on people’s opinions about
social risks and social policies .
The survey questionnaire was developed in
consultation with OECD member countries .
It consists of three main parts covering: risk
perceptions and the social and economic
challenges facing respondents and their
families; satisfaction with social protection and
government, or how well government performs
in providing public services and benefits; and
desired policies, or preferences for social
protection going forward . Most questions are
fixed-response, taking the form of either binary-
response or scale-response . The questionnaire
is conducted in national languages .
The survey is implemented online by Respondi
Limited using samples recruited via the internet
and over the phone . Sampling is based on a
modified form of quota sampling with sex, age
group, education level*
, income level, and worker
status used as the sampling criteria . Survey
weights are used to correct for any under- or over-
representation based on these five criteria . The
target and weighted sample is 1 000 respondents
per country .
Support for the survey is provided by OECD
member countries’ voluntary contributions and
by a grant from the Open Society Foundations .
* Education is not used as one of the sampling criteria
in Chile and Mexico due to issues around attracting
sufficient numbers of respondents with lower levels
of educational attainment .
people and improve the delivery of public
supports . However, the human factor should
not be forgotten . Social policy that fully meets
people’s needs and expectations can only be
delivered if governments properly engage
with the public . This means listening to
people, finding out where they are struggling
and what support they need most . As the
Risks That Matter survey makes clear, for
many people, OECD governments could do
much more in this area .
The OECD Risks That Matter survey

11
1. Risks, worries and concerns
“If I were to lose
my job, I would
lose everything
except my car.
I have no savings
due to a divorce,
no retirement set
aside for the future,
and massive credit
card debt.”
–44-year-oldrespondent
to the OECD Risks That
Matter survey from the
United States
This section looks at which social and
economic risks worry people most . Setting
aside what existing data say about exposure
to risks, it asks what people feel are the
greatest threats to themselves and their
families . Questions focus on both the short
and the longer term, covering various kinds
of risks, from falling ill or becoming disabled
to job loss, financial security in old age, and
fear of crime or violence .
Results show short-term concerns often centre
around falling ill and making ends meet,
with the latter especially common among
those with lower incomes and in countries
that were hit hardest by the global financial
crisis . In some countries, especially Mexico,
personal security is also a major concern .
Worries about becoming ill or disabled grow
with age and is most often a top short-term
concern for older respondents . Younger
people, on the other hand, are frequently
worried about securing affordable housing .
In the longer term, worries about pensions
and finances in old age tend to feature
most heavily . Again, unsurprisingly, older
respondents are most likely to pick finances
in old age as one of their greatest worries,
but many younger people are also concerned
about their pensions . In other areas, parents
often express concerns about their children’s
future prospects, as do respondents on higher
incomes . Younger respondents are concerned
about their future prospects for a good life .

1 . Risks, worries and concerns
In the short term, people are most
concerned with falling ill and with
struggling to make ends meet
On average across the 21 OECD countries
surveyed, just over half of all respondents
list “becoming ill or disabled” as one of
the top-three social or economic risks
facing them or their immediate family in
the next year or two (Figure 1 .1) . This is
the most common concern in 14 of the 21
countries, including some countries with
highly developed social protection systems,
such as Belgium, Finland and France . The
largest shares listing illness or disability as a
top-three risk are in Portugal (63%), Poland
(64%) and Finland (65%) (Table A1 .1 .1) .
Somewhat surprisingly, health concerns are
also prevalent in younger generations . On
average across the 21 countries, roughly 40%
of respondents aged 20 to 29 list “becoming
ill or disabled” as one of their top-three
risks . This share increases steadily with age;
about 70% of 60 to 70 year olds list illness or
disability as one of their top-three concerns
(Figure 1 .2; see also Tables A1 .3 .1 and A1 .9 .1) .
Figure 1.1. People are most concerned with falling ill and struggling to make
ends meet
Percent of respondents identifying each risk as one of the top-three greatest short-term (over the next year or
two) risks to themselves or their immediate family, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to identify the three greatest risks to themselves or their immediate family from a list of seven risks. Respondents had the
option of selecting zero, one, two, or three risks.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018).
Many people worry about falling ill, struggling to make ends
meet and getting by in old age
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
% Becoming ill or disabled Losing a job Adequate housing
Struggling to meet all expenses Accessing childcare or education Accessing long-term care
Crime or violence None of these

In five countries, making ends meet – or
struggling to meet daily expenses despite
working – is the most commonly listed
short-term concern (Figure 1 .1) . Rates are
especially high in countries that were hit
hard by the global financial crisis, like
Greece (70% list it as a top-three risk) and
Italy (56%) .
Personal security – or fear of crime and
violence – is a serious concern in places like
Mexico and Italy . 62% of Mexicans list it as a
top-three risk . It is also a common worry in
Germany and Austria, where nearly half of
respondents list crime or violence as a top-
three risk to themselves or their immediate
family (Figure 1 .1) . With the exception of
Mexico, men tend to be more concerned
about crime and violence than women in
countries where there is a significant gender
difference in risk perceptions (Tables A1 .2 .1
and A1 .9 .1) .
In the longer term – beyond the next
decade – people are by far most
worried about their pension
Looking beyond the next ten years, financial
security in old age is the most common
concern (Figure 1 .3) . On average across
countries, about 72% of all respondents list it
as one of the top-three long-term concerns
facing them or their family, with the rate
rising above 80% in Estonia, Lithuania and
Slovenia (Table A1 .1 .3) .
Figure 1.2. Fear of illness and disability increase with age
Percent of respondents identifying “becoming ill or disabled” as one of the top-three greatest short-term (over
the next year or two) risks to themselves or their immediate family, by age group, unweighted cross-country
average, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to identify the three greatest risks to themselves or their immediate family from a list of seven risks.
Respondents had the option of selecting zero, one, two, or three risks.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-70
%
Age group (years)

All age groups are concerned about finances
in old age . In most countries, more than
half of young respondents (18 to 29
year olds) list it as one of their top-three
long-term concerns, suggesting that younger
generations are well aware of the need
to save for retirement and the financial
pressures caused by population ageing . Not
surprisingly, though, older respondents are
most worried . On average, roughly 82% of
respondents aged 55 to 70 list finances in
old age among their top-three long-term
concerns (Table A1 .3 .3) .
Interestingly, the other sub-group
differences in worries about finances in old-
age are relatively small . After controlling
for other factors, women, those who believe
their economic situation has deteriorated in
the past year, and, notably, respondents with
high levels of educational attainment are
all more likely than others to list “financial
security in old age” as a top-three concern .
However, while statistically significant,
these differences are generally small
(Table A1 .9 .3) .
Figure 1.3. In the long run, many people are worried about their pensions
Percent of respondents identifying each risk as one of the top three greatest long term (beyond the next
decade) risks to themselves or their immediate family, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to identify the three greatest risks to themselves or their immediate family from a list of five risks. Respondents had the option
of selecting zero, one, two, or three risks.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Not attaining status & comfort (self) Not attaining status & comfort (children)
Financial security in old age Adequate housing
Ensuring long-term care of family members None of these

Worries vary across social groups
Different groups have different concerns .
While some risks, such as the risk of
falling ill and financial security in old
age, are frequent concerns across much
of the population (see above), others are
more specific to certain demographic and
socio-economic groups .
Older people are more concerned
about illness and crime, while
younger people worry more about
housing and their future prospects
Age is a common dividing line, with older
respondents tending to focus on different
risks than younger people . As could be
expected, concerns around illness or
disability and pensions increase with age
(see Section 1) . In most countries, older
people are also more likely than others to
identify long-term care of family members
as some of the top risks facing them or their
family . Crime and violence is also more
likely to be a top concern for this group
(Tables A1 .3 .1 A1 .3 .3 and A1 .9 .1-1 .9 .3) .
Reflecting the difficulties many young
people face in today’s labour market (OECD,
2016[10]
), younger respondents are more
likely than others to have strong concerns
about their future prospects . On average
across the 21 surveyed countries, well over
half of 18- to 29-year-old respondents list
attaining the level of status and comfort
their parents had as one of their top-three
long-term concerns . In several countries,
including Finland, Greece, Israel, Poland
and Portugal, this share reaches two-thirds
or more (Tables A1 .3 .3 and A1 .9 .3) .
Younger generations are also more likely to
express concerns about affording housing
(Figure 1 .4) . In many OECD countries, home-
ownership rates are falling among young
adults (McKee, 2012[11]
; Lennartz, Arundel
and Ronald, 2016[12]
; Arundel and Doling,
2017[13]
), while escalating rents and house
prices mean that young people are often
more likely to be overburdened with housing
costs than older people (Eurostat, 2018[14]
) . On
average, around one-third of respondents
aged between 20 and 34 pick securing or
maintaining adequate housing as one of
their top-three short-term concerns, with
the share peaking at 40% among 25 to 29
year olds . Housing is a particular concern
for young people in the Baltic countries – in
both Estonia and Lithuania, well over half
of all 18- to 29-year-old respondents choose
housing as a top-three short-term concern
(Tables A1 .3 .1 and A1 .9 .1-A1 .9 .3) .
Parents frequently worry about their
children’s prospects
Many parents are concerned about their
children’s future prospects . On average
across the 21 surveyed countries, 60% of
parents (those with a child of their own
living in the same household) list the
risk that their children will not achieve
the level of status and comfort that they
have themselves as one of their top-three
long-term concerns . This is the second most
common concern for parents, after their
own financial security in old age (73%) . In
contrast, only 40% of parents (and 44% of
people without children) list attaining the
same level of status and comfort that their
own parents have or had as one of their
top long-term concerns (Tables A1 .4 .3 and
A1 .9 .3) .
Respondents without dependent children
also have family concerns . Across the
sample as a whole, respondents without
children in the household are more likely
than those with children to list “ensuring
long-term care of elderly or disabled
family members” as a top-three concern

Figure 1.4. Housing is a concern for younger generations
Percent of respondents identifying “securing or maintaining adequate housing” as one of the top-three greatest
short-term (over the next year or two) risks to themselves or their immediate family, by age group, unweighted
cross-country average, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to identify the three greatest risks to themselves or their immediate family from a list of seven risks. Respondents had the
option of selecting zero, one, two, or three risks.
in both the short and long term, even after
controlling for other relevant factors like
age . Respondents without children are most
concerned about long-term care for family
members in Estonia, where 52% list it as a
top-three long-term concern (Tables A1 .4 .3
and A1 .9 .1-A1 .9 .3) .
Lower-income respondents worry
more about housing and making
ends meet, while higher-income
respondents are concerned about
child care and long-term care for
relatives
Results also confirm that low income
groups worry about different issues than
higher-income households . Respondents
with low incomes (measured here as
those in households in the bottom three
deciles in each country) worry more about
affording housing and about making ends
meet . On average, more than half of low-
income respondents list “struggling to meet
all expenses” as one of their top-three
short-term concerns, compared to about
one third of high-income respondents . After
controlling for other factors, respondents
with moderate incomes (those in the middle
four income deciles) are slightly more likely
than others to worry about losing their job,
while those with high incomes (the top
three income deciles) are more concerned
about affording child care and education
and long-term care for elderly or disabled
relatives . This might be due to the fact that
higher income groups participate more in
the labour market and therefore are more
likely to need child and elder care services
(Tables A1 .8 .1-A1 .8 .3 and A1 .9 .1-A1 .9 .3) .
High-income respondents are also more
likely to worry about their children’s future
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-70
%
Age group (years)

Figure 1.5. Respondents from high-income households are more likely to list
their children’s future status and comfort as one of their top long-term concerns
Percent of respondents identifying “that my children will not achieve the level of status and comfort that I
have” as one of the top-three greatest long-term (beyond the next ten years) risks to themselves or their
immediate family, by household income level, 2018
Note: Respondents from “low income” households are those in households with disposable (unequivalised) incomes in the bottom three deciles of the national
disposable income distribution (latest year available), and respondents from “high income” households those in the top three deciles of the national disposable
income distribution. In countries marked with an *, the difference between respondents from low- and high-income households is statistically significant at
p<0.05.
Respondents with low incomes [ ... ] worry more about
affording housing and about making ends meet. On
average, more than half of low-income respondents list
“struggling to meet all expenses” as one of their top-three
short-term concerns.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
% Low income High income

Figure 1.6. Workers in non-standard jobs are concerned about job loss
Percent of respondents identifying “losing a job or self-employment income” as one of the top three
greatest short term (over the next year or two) risks to themselves or their immediate family, among employed
respondents, by worker type, 2018
Note: “Permanent employees” are defined as respondents who are employed as an employee on a permanent contract. “Non standard workers” are defined as
respondents who are employed either as an employee on a temporary contract or without a contract, or are self employed. In countries marked with an *, the
difference between permanent employees and non-standard workers is statistically significant at p<0.05.
prospects, even after controlling for current
parent status and other variables .
On average across the 21 surveyed countries,
48% of high-income respondents list the
risk that “my children will not achieve the
level of status and comfort that I have”
among their top-three long-term concerns,
compared to 37% of low-income respondents
(Figure 1 .5) . While there is considerable
evidence to suggest that the children of
wealthy parents are disproportionately
likely to become wealthy themselves –
the so-called “sticky ceiling” effect (OECD,
2018[15]
) – results here suggest that higher-
income parents nevertheless worry about
downward social mobility (Tables A1 .8 .3
and A1 .9 .1) .
Workers in non-standard jobs are
more likely to worry about job loss
The OECD Risks That Matter survey confirms
the intuition that self-employed workers
and workers on temporary job contracts
are often more worried about the risk of
job loss than their peers on more standard
work contracts (Figure 1 .6) . In 13 of the
21 surveyed countries, there is a significant
difference in the fear of job loss between
workers on standard and non-standard
job contracts . On average across the
21 countries, 47% of self-employed and
fixed term contract workers say “losing a
job or self-employment income” is one of
their top concerns for the next year or two –
compared to 39% of workers in open-ended,
dependent employment contracts (Tables
A1 .7 .1 and A1 .9 .1) .
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
% Permanent employees Non-standard workers (self-employed and temporary employees)

21
2. Satisfaction and fairness
“We can never get
a mortgage and
cannot get on the
social housing
list … We have no
security.”
– 51-year-old respondent
Matter survey from
Ireland
OECD countries have some of the most
comprehensive social protection systems
in the world . They spend, on average, more
than 20% of GDP on social policies, delivering
public health, housing and family services,
old-age supports like public pensions, and
income supports for people in need, such
as those experiencing job loss . Evidence on
redistribution and poverty suggests that, in
many cases, these social policies are effective .
Yet, policies are not reaching all groups in the
same way and may not always correspond
to people’s needs and expectations .
This section examines public satisfaction with
social policy . It looks at how happy people
are with their and other people’s access to
public benefits and services . Results reveal
a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with
social policy . Across the surveyed countries,
there is a feeling among many that public
benefits and services are both insufficient
and difficult to access . Many respondents
report that good quality and affordable public
services are out of reach, and believe that
government is unlikely to provide adequate
income support if they happen to lose
their income . Moreover, a large share also
express strong feelings of injustice in social
benefit receipt, feel that benefits are going
to the “wrong” people, and believe they are
being ignored in the policy debate . In short,
many people believe current social policy is
inadequate, unfair and unjust .
Of course, there are differences in satisfaction
across groups and across countries . Overall,

2 . Satisfaction and fairness
older people tend to be less satisfied than
the young, women less satisfied than men,
and respondents who self-report as working
class less satisfied than those who identify as
middle class or above . Perhaps surprisingly,
respondents on lower incomes seem no less
satisfied with the benefits and services they
receive than respondents from high-income
households, but those who believe their
household finances have deteriorated in
recent months are more likely than others
to feel disgruntled .
Looking across countries, the numbers
reporting dissatisfaction and feelings of
injustice are often smaller in countries
that provide more generous social policies .
However, there are exceptions – confidence
in government old-age income support is not
any greater in countries with more generous
public pensions, for example . Cross-country
associations like these should be interpreted
with some degree of caution, since several
other factors, including the economic
environment, are also likely to play a role
in shaping satisfaction .
Too many people feel social protection is not working for them
Only a minority believe they could
easily access public benefits if
needed
The ability to access support in times of
need is central to effective social protection .
Risks and vulnerabilities often appear
suddenly and timely support is crucial to
avoid poverty .
Yet, results from Risks That Matter suggest
only a minority feel that public benefits
are within easy reach . On average across
the 21 countries surveyed, only 20% of
respondents think they could easily receive
public benefits if needed, with well over
50% disagreeing that access would be easy
(Figure 2 .1) . People are most confident
in their ability to access public benefits
in Canada (34% agree or strongly agree
with the statement “I think I could easily
receive public benefits if I needed them”),
the Netherlands (38%), Norway (35%), and
the United States (33%), and least likely to
be confident in Estonia (7%), Greece (6%),
Israel (9%) and Slovenia (5%) (Table A2 .1 .1) .
Good-quality and affordable
education feels relatively
accessible, but long term care and
housing do not
Opinions on public service accessibility
vary by policy area . Education, for example,
tends to fare relatively well: on average,
51% of respondents (strongly) agree that
they and their family have access to
good-quality and affordable public education
services . Indeed, in almost all the surveyed
countries, good-quality public education
appears as the most accessible service .
Still, the result remains a cause for concern .
OECD countries spend large amounts on
public education (4 .2% of GDP, on average,
on services from primary to tertiary level)
and all provide compulsory education until
at least age 14 (OECD, 2018[16]
) . The fact that
roughly half of respondents do not agree
(and 28% actively disagree) that they and
their family have access to good quality
and affordable public education services
might be a sign of dissatisfaction largely
with the quality of education, but in some
cases also with access (Table A2 .1 .2) .
Satisfaction with access is generally lower
in other policy areas . Less than half of
respondents, on average, agree that they

have access to good-quality and affordable
public health care services, falling to around
one-quarter or less in Chile, Greece and
Poland . Even fewer people, only one-third
of respondents, agree they have access to
good-quality public housing services (with
rates around or lower than 20% in Austria,
Greece, Italy and Germany) . Less than 30%
agree they have access to good quality
employment services (reaching as low as
8% in Greece) (Table A2 .1 .2) .
People are least satisfied with service access
in the area of long-term care (LTC) . On
average, 50% of respondents disagree (or
strongly disagree) that they have access to
“good quality and affordable public services
in the area of long term care for the elderly,”
and 45% feel this way about long term care
for disabled people . Dissatisfaction with the
accessibility of good quality and affordable
LTC for the elderly reaches over 60% in Chile,
Greece, Poland and Portugal, confirming that
the provision of LTC is one of the biggest
policy challenges for OECD countries in light
of population ageing (OECD, 2011[17]
; OECD,
2018[18]
) (Table A2 .1 .2) .
Relatively few people have confi-
dence in the government’s ability to
provide a proper income safety net
Many people also lack confidence in the
government’s ability to provide adequate
income support in case of unemployment,
illness or disability, becoming a parent, or
old age (Figure 2 .2) . On average across the
21 countries, only about 25% of respondents
(strongly) agree that the government “would
(or does) provide my family and me with
adequate income support in the case of
income loss due to” unemployment or
becoming a parent, and just 20% or less
in case of income loss due to illness or
disability or old age . Most striking is the lack
of confidence many respondents have in
Figure 2.1. Few believe they could easily access public benefits if they needed
them
Distribution of responses to the statement “I think I could easily receive public benefits if I needed them”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think I could easily receive public benefits if I needed
them”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
% Disagree or strongly disagree Undecided Agree or strongly agree

the government’s ability to provide income
support in case of income loss due to old
age . Currently, OECD countries spend on
average roughly 9% of GDP on public old-
age benefits (OECD, 2018[19]
) . Yet, an average
of 61% of respondents actively disagree (or
strongly disagree) that the government
would provide adequate income support
if they lost their income due to old age,
rising to roughly 80% in Chile, Greece, Israel,
Lithuania and Poland (Table A2 .1 .3) .
There is a widespread sense of injustice in social benefit
receipt
Many people believe they do not get
their fair share of benefits…
Dissatisfaction with social policy runs
deep . Many respondents to the OECD Risks
That Matter survey report strong feelings of
injustice in benefit receipt; they believe that
they are not getting what they deserve or
are entitled to, and that others are receiving
more than they should .
Respondents were asked the extent to
which they agree or disagree with the
statement “I feel that I receive a fair share
of public benefits, given the taxes and social
contributions I pay .” The most common
response in all countries surveyed, except
in Denmark and Norway, was “disagree”
or “strongly disagree” (59% on average)
(Figure 2 .3) . This sense of not getting
what you deserve is particularly strong
in countries like Chile, Greece, Israel and
Mexico, where three quarters or more
disagree that they get their fair share given
the taxes they pay (Table A2 .1 .4) .
At the same time, there is a strong sense
that others are taking more than they
should . On average across the 21 countries,
two-thirds of respondents (strongly)
agree with the statement “Many people
receive public benefits without deserving
them” . Only in Estonia does the share fall
below 50% (Figure 2 .4) . These feelings are
widespread across all major social groups
with shares of 50% or higher among both
men and women, among younger (18-29)
and older (55-70) respondents, among the
employed and those not employed, among
people with low, medium, and high levels
of education, and among respondents from
low-, medium- and high-income households
(Tables A2 .1 .5-A2 .8 .5) .
…and that government does not
listen to people like them
Underlying this sense of injustice is a
commonly-held belief that government is
not working for, or listening to, the people .
In all but four of the surveyed countries
(Canada, Denmark, Norway and the
Netherlands), a majority of respondents to
the OECD Risks That Matter survey actively
disagree with the statement “I feel the
government incorporates the views of
people like me when designing or reforming
public benefits” (Figure 2 .5) . In countries like
France, Greece, Israel, Lithuania, Portugal
and Slovenia, this share rises as high as
70% or more . These feelings spread across
most social groups, and are not limited
just to those deemed “left behind” . In fact,
after controlling for other factors, the share
feeling ignored actually seems to increase
with education and income (see the Box
“Who feels ignored?”) . Notably, despite the
common perception that young people
are among the most disillusioned with
government, respondents aged 18-29 are
much less likely than others to feel that
their voice is being ignored in the policy
debate (Table A2 .3 .6) .

Figure 2.2. Few people believe that government would provide sufficient
replacement income in case of unemployment, illness, parenthood or old-age
Distribution of responses to the statement “I think that the government would (or does) provide my family and
me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to…” by risk area, unweighted cross-country
average, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think that the government would (or does) provide
my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to…” for four different risk areas: income loss due to unemployment, due
to illness/disability, due to becoming a parent, or due to old age. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and
“strongly agree”.
Figure 2.3. Many people feel they are not receiving the benefits they should,
given the taxes they pay
Distribution of responses to the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits, given the taxes
and social contributions I pay”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits,
given the taxes and social contributions I pay”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Becoming a parent
Unemployment
Illness/disability
Old age
Disagree or strongly disagree Undecided Agree or strongly agree
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Figure 2.4. Most people believe others receive benefits without deserving them
Distribution of responses to the statement “Many people receive public benefits without deserving them”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “Many people receive public benefits without deser-
ving them”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”.
Figure 2.5. In most countries, many respondents feel the government does not
properly take account of the views of people like them when formulating social
benefits
Distribution of responses to the statement “I feel the government incorporates the views of people like me
when designing or reforming public benefits”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I feel the government incorporates the views of people
like me when designing or reforming public benefits”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Before being able to listen to those who
feel ignored, governments need to work
out who exactly these people are . The
popular narrative is that disillusionment
is most widespread among those “left
behind” – often characterised as older
working-class men with lower levels of
education, often unemployed or working
in low-paying jobs, who are typically
affected by de-industrialisation and an
associated loss of job security and social
status .
Results from the OECD Risks That Matter
survey suggest this image is only partly
correct . True enough, the share of
respondents who feel government does
not incorporate their views does tend to
be larger among older respondents, among
those who believe their economic situation
has deteriorated in recent months, and
among the self-identified working class .
However, after accounting for these
factors, the perception that government
does not listen actually seems to increase
(not decrease) with education and income,
and is greater among women than among
men . In other words, controlling for
other factors, women, highly-educated
respondents, and respondents from
high-income households are more likely to
feel that government does not incorporate
the views of people like them when
designing or reforming public benefits
(Table A2 .10 .6) .
Figure 2.6. Respondents overwhelmingly favour taxing the rich more to support
the poor
Distribution of responses to the statement “Should the government tax the rich more than they currently do
in order to support the poor”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “Should the government tax the rich more than they
currently do in order to support the poor”. Possible response options were “definitely not”, “no”, “undecided”, “yes” and “definitely yes”.
Who feels ignored?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
% No or definitely no Undecided Yes or definitely yes

The general sense of injustice
should not be mistaken for a lack
of compassion or support for
redistribution
Despite the widespread sense of injustice
and disillusionment, respondents to the
OECD Risks That Matter survey continue
to express compassion and support for
pro-poor redistributive policies . For example,
when asked to explain why people live in
poverty, the most common answer in 17 of
the 21 surveyed countries was “injustice
in society”: 71% of Portuguese and 68% of
Mexicans pointed to injustice as the root
cause of poverty, as did more than two-
thirds of French, German and Slovenian
respondents . At the same time, most
respondents back increasing taxation on
high-earners to help fund improved support
for the poor . In every country surveyed,
more than half of respondents picked “yes”
or “definitely yes” when asked, “Should the
government tax the rich more than they
currently do, in order to support the poor?”
In Greece, Germany, Portugal and Slovenia,
the share rises to 75% or more (Figure 2 .6,
Table A2 .1 .7-8) .
Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness differ across social
and economic groups
Older respondents, women, and
those with financial difficulties
express greater dissatisfaction with
social policy
Experiences with social policy and public
benefits differ from person to person . What
people need from government varies with
circumstances and changes at different
points across the life course (OECD, 2017[20]
) .
And while for some social protection
represents a distant safety net to be used
only in case of hard times, for others, benefit
receipt is a regular or recurrent feature of
their lives .
With this in mind, it is not surprising
that dissatisfaction differs across groups .
Older people, for instance, are generally
far more likely than younger people to
believe they could not easily access public
benefits and services if they needed them
(Figure 2 .7) . They are also less likely to believe
that government would provide adequate
income support if they lost their income
due to unemployment, illness or disability,
or old age . Women tend to be less satisfied
with access to public services and income
support than men – which is not surprising,
given that women often face higher poverty
risks (OECD, 2018[21]
) – as do respondents
who self-report as lower or working class,
even after controlling for income (Tables
A2 .3 .1-A2 .3 .3 and A2 .10 .1-A2 .10 .3) .
Income and economic insecurity also
play a role – though one that is less
straightforward . As might be expected,
people going through hard times financially
(as measured by the respondent’s perceived
economic situation compared to 12 months
before) tend to be less satisfied than others
with government support (Figure 2 .8, Table
A2 .9 .3) . At the same time, however, after
controlling for other factors, respondents
from low-income households are sometimes
actually slightly less likely than others to
report dissatisfaction with government
benefits and services . Having low income
does not seem to lead to dissatisfaction
with benefits and services, but a worsening
economic situation plays at least some
role (Tables A2 .10 .1-A2 .10 .3) . This result
echoes findings from several studies on
the effects of economic shocks on attitudes
towards redistribution and welfare policy
(Blekesaune, 2013[22]
; Margalit, 2013[23]
;
Hacker, Rehm and Schlesinger, 2013[24]
) .

Figure 2.7. Older respondents are more likely to believe they could not easily
access benefits if they needed them
Percentage of respondents who disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statement “I think I could easily receive
public benefits if I needed them”, by age group, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think I could easily receive public benefits if I
needed them”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”. Countries are ranked according to
the percentage of respondents aged 18-29 responding “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. In countries marked with an *, the gap is statistically significant at
p<0.05.
Figure 2.8. Respondents who feel their economic situation has deteriorated are
less likely to believe the government would provide adequate income support in
case of unemployment
Percentage of respondents who disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statement “I think that the government
would (or does) provide my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to
unemployment”, by beliefs around own economic situation, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think that the government would (or does) provide
my family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to unemployment”. Possible response options were “strongly disagree”, “disa-
gree”, “undecided”, “agree” and “strongly agree”. Beliefs around own economic situation reflect responses to the question “Do you think that your economic
situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?”. Respondents could also choose “don’t know” as a response option. In countries
marked with an *, the gap is statistically significant at p<0.05.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
% 18-29 55-70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Economic situation is the same or better than it was 12 months ago (or don't know)
Economic situation is worse than it was 12 months ago

People who feel their own
economic situation has worsened
are less likely to believe they receive
their fair share of benefits
Perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt
differ in similar ways . Women and older
respondents are less likely than men and
younger people to feel that they receive their
fair share of benefits, as are respondents
who self-report as lower or working class .
Women and older respondents are also more
likely to believe that many others receive
public benefits without deserving them, all
else equal (Tables A2 .10 .4-5) .
But again, the role of income and economic
insecurity is slightly more complicated . On
the one hand, respondents experiencing
financial difficulties are more likely than
others to believe they themselves do not
get the benefits they should; on average,
71% of respondents who feel their economic
situation has deteriorated over the past 12
months also disagree with the statement “I
feelthatIreceiveafairshareofpublicbenefits,
given the taxes and social contributions I
pay”, compared to 54% among others . On the
other hand, once other factors are controlled
for, respondents who believe their economic
situation has improved in the past year are
more likely to believe that others receive
more than they deserve . Respondents from
high-income households, meanwhile, are
actually more likely to believe both that
they do not get their fair share of benefits,
and that many other people receive more
than they should (Tables A2 .10 .4-A2 .10 .5
and A2 .9 .4-5) . Feelings of unfairness and
injustice are not limited just to those falling
behind .
People are generally more satisfied in countries with
generous social policies
Satisfaction is often higher in coun-
tries with more generous social poli-
cies, but not for public pensions
Social policies differ considerably across
OECD countries, both in scope and design,
which is also reflected in large variation
in social spending across countries (OECD,
2018[19]
) . The OECD Risks That Matter survey
cannot provide causal evidence of the effects
of these differences on public satisfaction,
andthenumberofcountriescovered(21)does
not allow for the sophisticated statistical
techniques needed to control for other
possible influences, such as the economic
environment (see later in this section) and
the political setting . Nonetheless, results
suggest that satisfaction with social policy
often correlates with country-level provision
of public services and benefits . In other
words, people tend to be more satisfied in
countries where services and benefits are
more generous .
Take satisfaction with public long-term care
services, for example (Figure 2 .9) . While not
perfect, satisfaction with access to high-
quality and affordable long-term care
(LTC) services tends to correlate strongly
with the generosity of public LTC systems .
Countries that spend more on public long-
term care, like Denmark, Norway and
the Netherlands, have smaller numbers
reporting unhappiness with access to
public services for both the elderly and for
people with disabilities (Figure 2 .9) . Those
that spend less, on the other hand, have
higher shares of respondents expressing
dissatisfaction .
The same is true in many other social policy
areas . Countries that have health systems
dominated by public or compulsory spending
often have fewer respondents reporting
dissatisfaction with access to public health
services, and those that spend more public
money on incapacity-related benefits
often have fewer respondents lacking

Across OECD countries, non-standard work
is now forming an increasingly important
part of the labour market . Technological
change and digitalisation, alongside
globalisation and demographic change,
are helping create many new non-standard
jobs . Today, on average across the OECD,
one-in-six workers are self-employed and
one-in-eight employees are on a temporary
contract (OECD, 2018[25]
) . The number
in online platform work is smaller, but
growing . These new forms of work provide
new opportunities but also come with
challenges . Chief among these is the need
to adapt current social protection systems
which, in many countries, were built
with the traditional full-time permanent
employee in mind and may not always
properly cover workers in non-standard
jobs (OECD, 2018[25]
) .
Interestingly, despite concerns around
coverage gaps, results from the OECD
Risks That Matter survey provide no strong
evidence to suggest that non-standard
workers feel any less well-supported by
government than others . Just like the
overall population, many non-standard
workers (defined as the self-employed and
those working as employees on temporary
contracts) are dissatisfied with current
social policy; across countries, many feel
they could not easily access public benefits
if they needed them and like they don’t get
their fair share of public benefits . Yet, the
shares of non-standard workers expressing
dissatisfaction are often no higher than
among other types of respondents . In fact,
after controlling for other factors, non-
standard workers are actually slightly more
likely than permanent employees to believe
the government would provide adequate
income support in case of income loss due
to illness or old age . They are also less likely
than permanent employees to believe they
do not receive their fair share of public
benefits, and are more likely to believe that
government takes account of the views of
people like them when designing benefits
(Tables A2 .7 .1-4 and A2 .10 .3-4) .
confidence in government income support
in case of illness or disability . Confidence
in government income support in case
of job loss shares a moderate correlation
with public spending on unemployment
benefits, but there is a stronger link with
the generosity of unemployment benefits,
as measured by the net replacement rate
(Tables A .2 .10 .1-3) .
There are exceptions though, and in some
social policy areas there are few or no clear
links between satisfaction and the generosity
of public provision . For example, across the
21 surveyed countries, dissatisfaction with
government old-age income support is only
weakly correlated with public expenditure
on old-age benefits and with public pension
levels . Countries that spend a lot or that
provide comparatively high public pensions
do not necessarily see higher levels of
satisfaction, and countries that spend less
or offer lower pensions do not always see
lower levels of satisfaction . However, there
are slightly stronger links with the old-age
income poverty rate, and to some extent
with pension levels once voluntary schemes
are factored in (Figure 2 .10), suggesting
that actual living standards in old age may
matter more for people’s opinion than public
old-age supports as such (Table A2 .11 .4) .
Non-standard workers do not feel any less well-supported
by government than others

Figure 2.9. Fewer respondents are unhappy with public long-term care services
in countries that spend more on long-term care
Government/compulsory spending per head on long-term care (USD 2010 PPP) and percentage that disagree (or
strongly disagree) that they have access to good quality and affordable public long-term care services for the
elderly and for people with disabilities
Note: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think that my family and I have access to good quality
and affordable public services in the area of long-term care for the elderly” and “...long-term care for people with disabilities”. Response options were “agree”,
“strongly agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree” and “undecided”. Data on public spending per head on long-term care refer to 2016, except for Israel (2014)
and the United States (2013). No data for Chile or Mexico.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018), the OECD Social Expenditure Database (http://www.oecd.org/
social/expenditure.htm), and the OECD Health Statistics Database (http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm).
Figure 2.10. Confidence in government old-age income support is higher in
countries with lower old-age poverty risks
Relative income poverty rate for 66- to 75-year-olds (%), net mandatory and voluntary pension replacement
rate (% of pre-retirement earnings), and percentage that disagree (or strongly disagree) that the government
would provide adequate income support in the case of income loss due to old-age
Note: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think that the government would (or does) provide my
family and me with adequate income support in the case of income loss due to old-age”. Response options were “agree”, “strongly agree”, “disagree”, “strongly
disagree” and “undecided”. Data on the relative income poverty rate for 66- to 75-year-olds are based on equivalised household disposable income, i.e. income
after taxes and transfers adjusted for household size. The poverty threshold is set at 50% of median disposable income in each country. Data refer to 2015,
except for Mexico (2014). Data on the net pension replacement rate are based on entitlements for a man on average earnings, and refer to voluntary and
mandatory pensions. Data refer to 2016.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018), the OECD Income Distribution Database (http://www.oecd.org/
social/income-distribution-database.htm), and (OECD, 2017[26]
).
BEL DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ITA
NLD
NOR
PRT
USA
R² = 0.6756
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 500 1 000 1 500
Disagree
(%)
Government/compulsory spendingper head
on LTC (USD)
BEL
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRLITA
NLD
NORPRT
USA
R² = 0.615
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 500 1 000 1 500
Disagree
(%)
Government/compulsory spendingper head
on LTC (USD)
Panel A. Public LTC spending anddissatisfaction
with LTC services for the elderly
Panel B. Public LTC spending anddissatisfaction
with LTC services for people with disabilities
CAN
DNK
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC ISR LTU
MEX
NLD NOR
POL
USA
R² = 0.2584
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Disagree
(%)
Relative income poverty rate (%)
CAN
CHL
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC ISR
ITA
MEX NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
USA
R² = 0.1771
0
20
40
60
80
100
20 40 60 80 100
Disagree
(%)
Net pension replacement rate (%)
Panel A. Relative old-age income poverty rate and
confidence in government old-age income support
Panel B. Net mandatory and voluntary pension
replacement rate and confidence in government
old-age income support

Feelings of injustice in benefit
receipt tend to be lower in countries
that spend more on social policies
Respondents are also less likely to
report feelings of injustice when they
live in countries with comparatively
comprehensive social policies . Among the
surveyed countries, those that spend more
on social policy tend also to have fewer
respondents believing they do not get their
fair share of benefits (Figure 2 .11, panel A)
or that others get more than they deserve
(Figure 2 .11, panel B) . In contrast, in countries
with lower social expenditures more
respondents report feelings of unfairness
in benefit receipt; Estonia, the fourth lowest
spender out of the surveyed countries, is an
exception (Figure 2 .11, panel B) .
Perhaps surprisingly, the survey results
provide no evidence that higher taxation
drives feelings of unfairness in benefit
receipt . Respondents in countries with
higher average income tax rates are no
more likely to report feelings of unfairness
than those in countries with lower taxes .
In fact, respondents in higher tax countries
are actually sometimes less likely to express
dissatisfaction with what they receive given
the taxes they pay (Table A2 .11 .5) .
Some caution is needed when interpreting
these results . It is likely that other factors,
particularly societal and cultural values,
could play a role in determining both
social policy and feelings of unfairness . For
example, strong egalitarian values in society
are likely to both drive (and perhaps also
reflect) social spending (Esping-Andersen,
1990[27]
; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003[28]
;
Jakobsen, 2011[29]
; Larsen, 2008[30]
) and reduce
feelings of injustice . Still, across countries,
the OECD Risks That Matter survey shows
no evidence to suggest high taxation and
social spending leads to greater feelings of
injustice in social policy .
Figure 2.11. Fewer respondents report feelings of unfairness in countries that
spend more on social issues
Total public social expenditure per head (USD 2010 PPP), percentage that disagree (or strongly disagree) with
the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits, given the taxes and social contributions I
pay”, and percentage that agree (or strongly agree) with the statement “Many people receive public benefits
without deserving them”
Note: Panel A: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits,
given the taxes and social contributions I pay”. Panel B: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “Many
people receive public benefits without deserving them”. For both questions, response options were “agree”, “strongly agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree” and
“undecided”. Data on total public social expenditure per head refer to 2015, except for Poland (2014), Mexico (2016), and Chile and Israel (2017).
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Social Expenditure Database (http://www.oecd.org/
social/expenditure.htm).
CAN
CHL
DNK
EST
FRADEU
GRCISR
ITA
MEX
NLD
NOR
POL
USA
R² = 0.5324
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 5 000 10 000 15 000
Disagree
(%)
Public social expenditure per head (USD)
CHL
DNK
EST
FRA
DEU
ISR
ITAMEX
NLD
NOR
POL PRT
USA
R² = 0.2464
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 5 000 10 000 15 000
Agree
(%)
Panel A. Public social spending and belief that
"I receive a fair share of public benefits"
Panel B. Public social spending and belief that "many
receive benefits without deserving them"

Other factors, like the economic
environment, are likely to play a role
in shaping satisfaction too
Unsurprisingly, the economic setting also
appears important in shaping attitudes to
current policy (see also Blekesaune and
Quadagno, 2003[28]
; Blekesaune, 2007[31]
;
Dallinger, 2010[32]
; Jæger, 2013[33]
) . Looking
across the 21 surveyed OECD countries,
satisfaction with public benefits often seems
higher in countries with better performing
economies, and lower in poorer economies
or in countries experiencing economic
downturns . For example, respondents
in countries with higher GDP per capita
are substantially less likely to express
dissatisfaction with access to public
benefits (Figure 2 .12, Panel A) and to feel
like they do not get the benefits they deserve
(Figure 2 .12, Panel B) . Similarly, they are
also less likely to express dissatisfaction
with access to public services and
income support in almost all policy areas
(Tables A2 .11 .6-7) .
Income inequality may be important too,
especially for perceptions of fairness and
justice in benefit receipt . The share of
respondents who say they do not receive
their fair share of benefits is often larger
in countries with higher Gini coefficients
(Figure 2 .13) and in countries with higher
relative poverty rates, though there are
exceptions . Slovenia, for instance, has the
lowest level of income inequality of all 21
surveyed countries, but one of the highest
shares of respondents believing they do not
get the benefits they deserve . The United
States, in contrast, has the third highest
level of income inequality and the second
highest relative poverty rate, but the third
lowest share feeling like they do not get
their fair share of benefits (Table A2 .11 .8) .
Figure 2.12. Dissatisfaction with benefits is higher in countries with lower GDP
per capita
GDP per capita (USD, current prices and PPPs), percentage that disagree (or strongly disagree) with the
statement “I think I could easily receive public benefits if I needed them”, and percentage that disagree
(or strongly disagree) with the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits, given the taxes
and social contributions I pay”
Note: Panel A: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I think I could easily receive public benefits if I
needed them”. Panel B: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public
benefits, given the taxes and social contributions I pay”. For both questions, response options were “agree”, “strongly agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”
and “undecided”. Data on GDP per capita refer to 2017.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Productivity Database (http://dotstat.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV).
CAN
CHL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITA
MEX
NLD
NOR
POL USA
R² = 0.5518
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000
Disagree
(%)
GDP per capita (USD)
CAN
CHL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITAMEX
NOR
POL
USA
R² = 0.6569
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000
Disagree
(%)
Panel A. GDP per capita and belief that "I could easily
receive public benefits if needed"
Panel B. GDP per capita and belief that "I receive a
fair share of public benefits"

Notably, there is no clear connection between
income redistribution and perceptions of
unfairness or injustice in benefit receipt .
Countries that redistribute more (as
measured by the point difference in the
pre- and post-tax and transfer Gini
coefficient) or that are more effective at
reducing market poverty (as measured by
the percentage point difference in the pre-
and post-tax and transfer relative income
poverty rate) do not systematically see
higher or lower shares of respondents feeling
like they do not receive their fair share of
benefits or that many others receive more
than they deserve (Table A2 .11 .9) .
Respondents are also less likely to report feelings of injustice when
they live in countries with comparatively comprehensive social
policies. Among the surveyed countries, those that spend more
on social policy tend also to have fewer respondents believing
they do not get their fair share of benefits or that others get
more than they deserve...
Figure 2.13. Perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt are often (but not always)
lower in more unequal countries
Gini coefficient on disposable household income (after taxes and transfers), percentage that disagree with the
statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits, given the taxes and social contributions I pay”,
and percentage that agree with the statement “Many people receive public benefits without deserving them”
Note: Panel A: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “I feel that I receive a fair share of public benefits,
given the taxes and social contributions I pay”. Panel B: Respondents were asked about the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “Many
people receive public benefits without deserving them”. For both questions, response options were “agree”, “strongly agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree” and
“undecided”. Data on the Gini coefficient are based on equivalised household disposable income, i.e. income after taxes and transfers adjusted for household
size. Data refer to 2015, except for Mexico (2014).
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Income Distribution Database (http://www.oecd.org/
social/income-distribution-database.htm).
CAN
CHL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRCISR
ITA
MEX
NOR
POL
SVN
USA
R² = 0.2024
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Disagree
(%)
Gini coefficient
CAN
CHL
DNK
EST
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISR
ITA
MEX
NLDNOR
POL
SVN
USA
R² = 0.2402
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Agree
(%)
Gini coefficient
Panel A. Gini coefficient and beliefthat "I receive a
fair share of public benefits"
Panel B. Gini coefficient and beliefthat "Many
receive public benefitswithoutdeserving them"

37
3. Wants, needs and preferences
“I’m concerned
about the elderly
being able to
maintain a good
quality of life
after retirement.
Pensions should
be maintained and
increased to help
out the population
that can no longer
work to support
themselves.”
–51-year-old respondent
Matter survey from
Canada
Current social policy is not meeting the
public’s needs and expectations . As the
previous section of this report makes clear,
many people are unhappy with what they
receive from government and express strong
feelings of unfairness in benefit receipt .
Dissatisfaction and a sense of injustice
threaten the political sustainability of current
social policy models . Now, as much as ever,
it is vital that governments properly listen
to and, where appropriate, respond to what
people want from social policy .
This section looks at the public’s preferences
for social policy . It asks what people want
from social policy going into the future, and
where their priorities lie . Questions look at
what supports, if any, people believe they
need most, and whether they would be
prepared to see taxes increase in order to
pay for greater support . It starts first with an
examination of overall preferences, before
zooming in on the wants and needs of specific
groups .
Overall, results suggest the public
overwhelmingly want more from government
– and a fair number say they are prepared to
pay for it . Pension and health care supports
are particular priorities, with almost 40% of
respondents on average saying they would
be prepared to pay more in taxes to receive
better benefits and services in these areas .
There is less support for expansion in other
policy areas . Still, roughly one-quarter of
respondents say they would be happy to pay

3 . Wants, needs and preferences
more in taxes for better housing, education
and long-term care services .
Despite many shared preferences, exact
policy wants and needs differ from
group to group and country to country .
Understandably, older respondents are most
likely to prioritise better health care and
pensions, younger people are more likely
to want improved housing and job-seeking
supports, and parents are more likely than
others to favour better education services .
Looking across countries, respondents in
less wealthy economies are more likely
than others to prioritise labour market
supports like job-seeking services or funds
to start a business, and those in more
unequal countries put particular weight on
education services . Respondents in richer
countries more often say better housing
supports are one of the things they need
most from government . Notably, people in
countries that spend less on social policies
want government to do more generally,
but otherwise there are few clear links
between current policies and future policy
preferences .
Most people want the government to provide more in the way
of social policy – and a fair number are willing to pay for it
The majority want the government
to do more to secure their economic
and social well-being
Unsurprisingly, given levels of dissatisfaction
with what government currently provides,
most respondents to the Risks That Matter
survey say they want more support from
their government . Across all but two
of the surveyed countries, a majority
of respondents say they would like the
government to do more to ensure their
economic and social security, as opposed
to the same or less (Figure 3 .1) . Even in
Denmark and France – the countries
where people are most satisfied with how
government is current doing – more than
45% of respondents believe that government
should do more . In Chile, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Lithuania, Mexico, Portugal, and Slovenia,
this share rises to 80% or more (Table A3 .1 .1) .
Some social groups are in particular
need of more help . Women and older
respondents are more likely than others
to say the government should be doing
more to safeguard their economic and
social security, as are those whose financial
situation has deteriorated in the last year .
Respondents expressing strong feelings of
injustice and disillusionment with social
policy are especially likely to want the
government to do more . On average, 78%
of both respondents who feel they do not get
their fair share of benefits and respondents
who feel government does not listen also
say the government should be doing more to
ensure their economic and social security .
This compares to 62% and 61% among the
rest of the sample, respectively (Tables
A3 .10 .1, A3 .13 .1 and A3 .14 .1) .
People especially want more invest-
ments in pensions and health care
Priorities for specific supports differ and
vary across social groups but, reflecting
the risks perceptions shown in Section
1, increased investment in pensions and
health care are often top priorities . On
average across the 21 surveyed countries,
54% of respondents pick a better pension
and 48% list improved health care as one
of the three top supports they would “need
most from the government” to make them
and their family feel more economically
secure (Figure 3 .2) . Indeed, a better pension
is the most popular pick in 14 of the

Figure 3.1. In all but two countries, the majority think their government should
be doing more to ensure their economic and social security
Distribution of responses to the question “Do you think the government should be doing less, more, or the
same to ensure your economic and social security?”, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked whether they thought the government should be doing less, more, or the same as they are currently doing to ensure their
economic and social security. They could also choose “don’t know” as a response option. Countries are ranked by the percentage of respondents choosing
“more”.
Although most people in almost all
of the 21 countries surveyed want the
government to do more to safeguard their
economic and social security, there are
some people who seem relatively satisfied
with their situation .
In a logit model, after controlling for other
factors, men are less likely to demand
more from government than women,
as are younger people (18- to 29-year-
olds) . There are few clear differences
across levels of education or income, but
respondents who feel that their economic
situation has improved over the past
twelve months are significantly more
likely to say the government should do
less to ensure their economic and social
security (Table A3 .10 .1) .
Notably, respondents who self-identify
as “upper-middle” or “upper class” are
also less likely to demand more from
government, even after accounting for
other factors like education and income .
On average, only 58% of self-identified
upper-middle or upper class respondents
want the government to do more for their
economic and social security, compared to
78% of lower or working class respondents .
Does anyone not want more from government?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
% More Same Less Don't Know

21 surveyed countries, and health care
the most common in another five (Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the
United States) . The only countries to not
list either are Mexico – where better public
safety was the most frequent top-three pick
– and Finland where, notably, respondents
were most likely to pick “a guaranteed
transfer sufficient to cover my basic needs
(e .g ., government payment of basic income)”
(Table A3 .1 .2) .
Many respondents even say they would
be prepared to see taxes rise to pay for
better pensions and health care . In 19 of
the 21 surveyed countries, respondents
are more likely to agree than disagree that
government should increase spending on
pensions, even if it means taxes will rise
and some other programmes need to be
cut, and an average of almost 40% say they
would be willing to pay an extra 2% of their
own income in taxes for better health care
and pensions (Figure 3 .3) . Respondents
in Ireland are the most likely to say they
would be happy to pay more in tax for
better health care (51% say this), followed
by Portugal (49%), Greece and Chile (both
48%) . Respondents in Israel (49%), Chile (51%)
and Lithuania (53%) are the most likely to
say they would be prepared to pay an extra
2% of the income in tax for better pensions
(Tables A3 .1 .3 and A3 .1 .4) .
Not surprisingly, older respondents put most
weight on better pensions and health care .
On average across the 21 OECD countries
surveyed, an overwhelming 74% of 55- to
70-year-old respondents choose “better
pensions” as one of the top-three supports
they would need most from government
to make them and their family more
economically secure (Figure 3 .4), and over
half (53%) agree or strongly agree that the
government should increase spending on
pensions “even if it means that taxes will
rise and some other programmes may have
to be cut” . 59% of 55- to 70-year-olds pick
better health care services as one of the
supports they’d need most (Figure 3 .4) . An
average of 44% of 55- to 70-year-olds say
they would actually be prepared to pay an
additional 2% of their own income in taxes
for access to better pensions, and 40% would
do the same for better health care (Tables
A3 .3 .2-A3 .3 .4 and A3 .10 .2-A3 .10 .4) .
Figure 3.2. Better pensions and health care are the priorities for many
respondents
Percentage of respondents identifying each support as one of the top-three supports they’d need most from
government to make them and their family feel more economically secure, unweighted cross-country average,
2018
Note: Respondents were asked what supports they’d need most from government to make them and their family feel more economically secure. They could
choose from a list of nine supports, and had the option of selecting zero, one, two, or three supports.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Need no additional support
Better access to funds to start a business
Better job-seeking and
skills-training support
Better public safety
Better education for my children
More affordable housing
A guaranteed transfer sufficient
to cover my basic needs
Better health care
Better pension
%

Figure 3.3. Almost 40% are willing to pay more in taxes for better pensions and
health care
Percentage of respondents indicating they would be willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes/
social contributions to benefit from better provision of and access to different public services and benefits,
unweighted cross-country average, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would be willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes/social contributions to benefit from
better provision of and access to the various different public services and benefits. They could chose as many as they liked, or none at all.
Figure 3.4. Older respondents put particular weight on better pensions and
better health care
Percentage of respondents identifying each support as one of the top-three supports they’d need most from
government to make them and their family “feel more economically secure”, by age group, unweighted
cross-country average, 2018
Note: Respondents were asked what supports they’d need most from government to make them and their family feel more economically secure. They could
choose from a list of nine supports, and had the option of selecting zero, one, two, or three supports. Supports are ranked according to the overall percentage of
respondents choosing each as one of their top three.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
None
Child-related leave
Child care services
Public safety
Unemployment benefits/services
Disability benefits/services
Affordable housing
Education
Long-term care for the elderly
Pensions
Health care
%
0
20
40
60
80
100
Better pension Better
healthcare
A guaranteed
transfer
sufficient to
cover my basic
needs
More
affordable
housing
Better
education for
my children
Better public
safety
Better job-
seeking and
skills training
support
Better access
to funds to
start a
business
Need no
additional
support
%
18-29 30-54 55-70

Housing, education and long-
term care also receive support,
especially among those most at risk
in these areas
A fair number of respondents also express a
willingness to pay more in tax for improved
benefits and services in the areas of housing,
education, and long-term care (Figure 3 .3) .
On average across the 21 countries surveyed,
27% of all respondents say they would be
happy to pay an additional 2% of their
income in taxes and social contributions
to benefit from better public long-term care
services for the elderly, and 25% would do
the same for improved public education .
23% say they’d be willing to pay an extra
2% in taxes for improved affordable housing
(Table A3 .1 .3) .
Support in these areas is generally strongest
among those most at risk . Improved public
long-term care services, for instance,
are most likely to be a priority for older
respondents . On average, 36% of 55- to
70-year-old respondents say they would be
willing to pay an additional 2% of the income
in taxes to benefit from better long-term
care services, compared to 22% of 18- to
The perception of a disconnect between
government and the people has become
a common theme in OECD countries
in recent years . To a large degree,
results from Risks That Matter support
this perception – as shown earlier in
Section 2, across almost all included
countries, the majority of respondents
to the Risks That Matter survey feel
government does not listen to the views of
people like them when designing policy,
and believe they are not getting a fair deal
on social benefits . What can governments
do to meet the needs and expectations
of these people? What do those who feel
ignored or like they are not getting their
fair share want from social policy – if
anything?
On the whole, policy priorities for those
who feel ignored and unfairly treated are
not much different to those of the sample
as a whole . The overwhelming majority
want the government to provide them
with more support, with pensions and
health care the top priorities . On average,
59% of those who feel government does
not listen and 58% of those who believe
they are not getting their fair share of
public benefits pick improved pensions
as one of their top-three most needed
supports, compared to 54% across the
sample as a whole . 52% of both groups
also pick better health care, compared to
48% of the overall sample (Tables A3 .11 .1-
2, A3 .12 .1-2, A3 .13 .1-2, and A3 .14 .1-2) .
Yet – at the same time – basic conflicts
remain about how such programmes
should be funded . Not surprisingly, people
who feel they do not receive their fair
share are less willing than others to pay
more in tax for improved benefits and
services in almost every policy area listed .
They are also less likely to approve of other
programmes being cut or taxes increased
more generally in order to fund greater
public investment in social programmes .
One of the challenges for government,
then, is to find ways of improving
support for these people while sticking to
existing budgets and not cutting spending
elsewhere (Tables A3 .11 .3-4, A3 .12 .3-4,
A3 .13 .3-4, and A3 .14 .3-4) . Improving
trust in government institutions is also
important for getting people to “buy in”
to funding social protection systems .
What do the disillusioned want from social policy?

Economic conditions affect policy preferences
Respondents in less wealthy
economies are more likely to
express a need for labour market
supports
People in less wealthy economies face
different challenges to those in the
OECD’s higher-income members . Poverty,
deprivation and social exclusion still exist
in all OECD countries (OECD, 2016[10]
; OECD,
2018[21]
), but more people are struggling to
get by in less wealthy economies . Indeed,
as shown by the risk perceptions outlined
earlier in Section 1, respondents are much
more likely to list simply “Struggling to meet
all expenses” as one of their greatest short-
term concerns when they live in countries
with lower GDP per capita (like Mexico) or
that were hit hard by the financial crisis
(like Greece and Italy) (see Figure 1 .1) .
Respondents in less wealthy economies
want more government support in general
(Figure 3 .5), and they also want different
types of support . Compared to respondents
in higher-income countries, those in
countries with lower GDP per capita are
much more likely to pick labour market
supports like “Better access to funds to start
a business” or “Better job-seeking and skills
training support” as one of the top three
supports they need most from government
(Figure 3 .6) . They are also more likely than
respondents in richer countries to prioritise
29-year-olds and 25% of 30- to 54-year-olds .
The share willing to pay more in tax for
better long-term care is particular high in
both Estonia and Israel, where more than
50% of 55- to 70-year-old respondents (and
more than 35% of all respondents) say they
would be prepared to pay an additional 2%
of their income in tax for improved long-
term care services (Tables A3 .1 .3, A3 .3 .3
and A3 .10 .3) .
Housing is often a priority for younger
respondents, reflecting the particular
fears many young people have about
securing affordable housing (see Section
1) . On average, 43% of 18- to 29-year-old
respondents pick “more affordable housing”
as one of the top-three supports they would
need most from government to make them
more economically secure (Figure 3 .4), and
42% agree that government should “make
housing more affordable, even if it means
that taxes rise” . 31% of 18- to 29-year-olds
even say they’d pay an extra 2% of their own
income in taxes to benefit from improved
affordable housing . This compares to 22%
among 30- to 54-year-olds and 18% among
55- to 70-year-olds (Table A3 .3 .2-4 and
A3 .10 .2-4) .
Education services, not surprisingly, are
more of a priority for parents than for
others . On average, 40% of parents pick
“better education” as one of their top-
three most needed supports, and 29% say
they’d be willing to pay an additional 2%
of their income in taxes to benefit from
better education services . For respondents
without children, these shares fall to 19%
and 23%, respectively . Interestingly, though,
once the specific price tag is removed, many
respondents regardless of parent status
support the idea that government should
increase investment in education services .
On average, 42% of parents and 38% of
non-parents agree (or strongly agree) that
more should be spent on education, “even
if it means that taxes will rise and some
other programmes may have to be cut” .
Support for increased education spending is
particularly strong in Chile, Finland and the
United States, where more than 50% agree
that more should be spent on education even
if it means sacrificing other programmes
and taxes increasing (Tables A3 .1 .3-A3 .1 .4,
A3 .4 .3-A3 .4 .4 and A3 .10 .3-A3 .10 .4) .

investment in education services (Table
A3 .15 .1)
Respondents in countries with higher levels
of GDP per capita are more likely to prioritise
affording housing supports, perhaps a
reflection of escalating house prices in many
OECD countries (OECD, 2018[34]
) . To a lesser
extent, they also express greater support
for a basic income-like guaranteed transfer
(a “guaranteed transfer sufficient to cover
my basic needs [e .g ., government payment
of basic income]”) (Table A3 .15 .1) .
Figure 3.5. Respondents in countries with lower GDP per capita are especially
likely to want more from government
GDP per capita (USD, current prices, current PPPs) and the percentage that want the government to do more to
ensure their economic and social security
Note: Respondents were asked whether they thought the government should be doing less, more, or the same as they are currently doing to ensure their
economic and social security. They could also choose “don’t know” as a response option. Data on GDP per capita refer to 2017.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Productivity Database (http://www.oecd.org/sdd/
productivity-stats/).
People in highly unequal countries
want better education supports
Several recent OECD reports (OECD, 2015[35]
;
2017[36]
; 2018[15]
) have explored in depth the
challenges that unequal societies face .
People in poorer families and from the lower
middle classes often invest much less in
education and face worse job prospects when
they live in more unequal societies, reducing
social mobility, reinforcing inequalities,
and ultimately damaging economic growth
(OECD, 2015[35]
) .
People in countries with higher levels of
income inequality are much more likely
than others to prioritise education supports
(Figure 3 .7) . Indeed, in some of the OECD’s
most unequal countries, many respondents
say they would be prepared to pay more
in taxes to benefit from better public
education services: in Chile, for instance,
43% of respondents indicated a willingness
to pay an extra 2% of their income in tax in
return for better education services (Figure
3 .7, Panel B)*
. OECD work has repeatedly
emphasised the importance of investing
* It should be noted that education is not used as
one of the sampling criteria in Chile and Mexico .
As a result, people with low levels of education
are strongly under-represented in the samples for
these two countries, and people with high levels of
education strongly over-represented . To the extent
that respondents with high education are more likely
than others to support increased education spending
(see Tables A3 .15 .3-A3 .15 .4), the over-representation
of highly-educated respondents could be driving at
least part of the strong support for better education
services in these two countries . Nonetheless, even
with Chile and Mexico removed, the correlations
shown in Figure 3 .7 panels A and B remain positive
and moderate in size .
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
DNK
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITALTU
MEX
NLD NOR
POL
PRT
SVN
USA
R² = 0.4036
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000 80 000
%

Figure 3.6. Labour market supports are more often the priority for respondents
in countries with lower GDP per capita
GDP per capita (USD, current prices, current PPPs) and the percentages that pick “Better access to funds to
start a business” and “Better job-seeking and skills training support” as among the top-three supports they’d
need most to make them and their feel more economically secure
Note: Respondents were asked what supports they would need most from government to make them and their feel more economically secure. They could
choose from a list of nine supports, and had the option of selecting zero, one, two, or three supports. Data on GDP per capita refer to 2017.
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Productivity Database (http://www.oecd.org/sdd/
productivity-stats/).
Figure 3.7. Better public education is one of the top priorities for respondents in
more unequal countries
Gini coefficient on disposable income (after taxes and transfers), percentage that pick “Better education”
among the top-three supports they’d need most to make them and their feel more economically secure, and
percentage that say they’d be willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes for “better provision of
and access to” education
Notes: Panel A: Respondents were asked what supports they would need most from government to make them and their feel more economically secure. They
could choose from a list of nine supports, and had the option of selecting zero, one, two, or three supports. Panel B: Respondents were asked to indicate whether
they would be willing to pay an additional 2% of their income in taxes/social contributions to benefit from better provision of and access to the various diffe-
rent public services and benefits. They could chose as many as they liked, or none at all. Data on the Gini coefficient refer to 2015, except for Mexico (2014).
CHL
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITAMEX
NLD
NOR
POL
USA
R² = 0.3188
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000
%
CAN
CHL
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITA
MEX
NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
USA
R² = 0.3391
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000
%
Panel A. GDP per capita andpercent choosing
"fundsto start a business" as one of most needed
supports
Panel B. GDP per capita andpercent choosing"job-
seeking and trainingsupport" asone of most needed
supports
CAN
CHL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISR
ITA
MEX
NOR
POL
SVN
USA
R² = 0.5408
0
10
20
30
40
50
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
%
Gini coefficient
CAN
CHL
DNK
FRA
DEU
GRC
ISR
ITA
MEXNOR
POL
SVN
USA
R² = 0.3847
0
10
20
30
40
50
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
%
Gini coefficient
Panel A. Incomeinequality and percent choosing
"education"asone of their most neededsupports
Panel A. Incomeinequality and percent sayingthey'd
be prepared to pay more in taxesfor better education
services

more in education with a view to tackling
inequality and promoting social mobility
(OECD, 2015[35]
; OECD, 2018[15]
) . These results
suggest many people in highly-unequal
countries have similar priorities .
Interestingly, the survey does not find much
evidence that respondents from highly
unequal countries want more redistributive
social policy – looking across countries,
those in more unequal countries are no
more or less likely than others to believe
the government should “tax the rich more
than they currently do in order to support
the poor” (Figure 3 .8) . This is consistent with
a number of other studies on links between
inequality and attitudes to redistribution,
many of which find only mixed evidence for
the idea that higher inequality should lead
to greater public demand for redistributive
policies (e .g . Alesina and Glaeser, 2004[37]
;
Lübker, 2007[38]
; Kenworthy and McCall,
2007[39]
) .
Similarly, there is also little to suggest that
support for redistribution is any greater
in countries that currently redistribute
less . Comparing across countries, there
is practically no association between
current redistribution (as measured
by the point difference in the pre- and
post-tax and transfer Gini coefficient) or the
extent to which tax and transfer policies
reduced market poverty (as measured by
the percentage point difference in the pre-
and post-tax and transfer relative income
poverty rate) and the share of respondents
believing the government should “tax the
rich more than they currently do in order
to support the poor” . Some countries that
redistribute little (e .g . Chile) do have large
numbers of respondents expressing a
preference for further redistribution, but the
same is true in other countries with much
higher redistribution (e .g . Greece, Portugal
and Slovenia) . Conversely, some countries
that are at best moderate redistributors
(e .g . Estonia, the United States, and
especially Mexico) have comparatively
low shares believing the government
should redistribute more – though it is
worth emphasising that in all cases these
shares still remain higher than 50% . Most
people in all the surveyed countries want
more redistribution, but differences in the
exact depth of this support appears to be
driven by factors other than current income
inequality and redistribution (Table A3 .15 .5) .
Preferences for future social
policies do not seem to be strongly
linked to current policies
Links between current social policies in
specific areas and preferences for future
policy are less clear . Respondents are
more likely to say that government should
be doing more to ensure their economic
and social security when they live in
countries with lower social expenditure
(Figure 3 .9) . Other than that, however,
priorities and preferences do not seem to
correlate much with existing policies . For
example, respondents are no more or less
likely to pick “more affordable housing” as
one of the supports they need most from
government when they live in countries
that spend less on housing, nor are they
more likely to pick “better health care” when
they live in countries that spend less on
health, or a “better pension” when they live
in countries with lower public spending
on old-age and survivor benefits (Tables
A .3 .15 .2-A .3 .15 .4) .

Figure 3.8. Respondents in more unequal countries are no more likely to want
more redistribution
Gini coefficient on disposable income (after taxes and transfers) and percentage that agree (or strongly agree)
that the government should “tax the rich more than they currently do in order to support the poor”
Notes: Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement “Should the government tax the rich more than they
currently do in order to support the poor”. Possible response options were “definitely not”, “no”, “undecided”, “yes” and “definitely yes”. Data on the Gini coeffi-
cient refer to 2015, except for Mexico (2014).
Figure 3.9. Respondents are more likely to want the government to do more
when they live in countries with lower social expenditure
Total public social expenditure per head (USD 2010 PPP) and the percentage that want the government to do
more to ensure their economic and social security
Note: Respondents were asked whether they thought the government should be doing less, more, or the same as they are currently doing to ensure their eco-
nomic and social security. They could also choose “don’t know” as a response option. Data on total public social expenditure per head refer to 2015, except for
Poland (2014), Mexico (2016), and Chile and Israel (2017).
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates based on the OECD Risks That Matter survey (2018) and the OECD Social Expenditure Database (http://www.oecd.org/
social/expenditure.htm).
CAN
CHL
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU GRC
ISR
ITA
MEX
NOR
POL
SVN
USA
R² = 0.0174
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
%
Gini coefficient
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
DNK
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ISR
ITA
LTU
MEX
NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
SVN
USA
R² = 0.492
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 2 000 4 000 6 000 8 000 10 000 12 000 14 000 16 000
%

List of tables available online
All figures and the following tables are available to download online .
They can be found at: www .oecd .org/social/risks-that-matter .htm
Online Annex A1:
Tables A1 .1 .1-1 .1 .4: Risks, worries and concerns
Tables A1 .2 .1-1 .2 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by sex
Tables A1 .3 .1-1 .3 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by age
Tables A1 .4 .1-1 .4 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by parent status
Tables A1 .5 .1-1 .5 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by education level
Tables A1 .6 .1-1 .6 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by employment status
Tables A1 .7 .1-1 .7 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by worker type
Tables A1 .8 .1-1 .8 .4: Risks, worries and concerns, by income level
Tables A1 .9 .1-1 .9 .4: Pooled fixed effects logit regression models predicting reported
risks, worries and concerns
Online Annex A2:
Tables A2 .1 .1-2 .1 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt
Tables A2 .2 .1-2 .2 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by sex
Tables A2 .3 .1-2 .3 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by age
Tables A2 .4 .1-2 .4 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by parent
status
Tables A2 .5 .1-2 .5 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by
education level
Tables A2 .6 .1-2 .6 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by
employment status
Tables A2 .7 .1-2 .7 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by worker
type
Tables A2 .8 .1-2 .8 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by income
level
Tables A2 .9 .1-2 .9 .8: Satisfaction and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt, by response
to the question “Do you think that your economic situation is better
than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?”
Tables A2 .10 .1-2 .10 .8: Pooled fixed effects logit regression models predicting satisfaction
and perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt
Tables A2 .11 .1-2 .11 .9: Additional cross-country associations between satisfaction and
perceptions of fairness in benefit receipt and measures of public
policy and economic conditions

Online Annex A3:
Tables A3 .1 .1-3 .1 .4: Social policy preferences
Tables A3 .2 .1-3 .2 .4: Social policy preferences, by sex
Tables A3 .3 .1-3 .3 .4: Social policy preferences, by age
Tables A3 .4 .1-3 .4 .4: Social policy preferences, by parent status
Tables A3 .5 .1-3 .5 .4: Social policy preferences, by education level
Tables A3 .6 .1-3 .6 .4: Social policy preferences, by employment status
Tables A3 .7 .1-3 .7 .4: Social policy preferences, by worker type
Tables A3 .8 .1-3 .8 .4: Social policy preferences, by income level
Tables A3 .9 .1-3 .9 .4: Social policy preferences, by response to the question “Do you think
that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse
than it was 12 months ago?”
Tables A3 .10 .1-3 .10 .4: Pooled fixed effects logit regression models predicting social policy
preferences
Tables A3 .11 .1-3 .11 .4: Social policy preferences, by response to the statement: “I feel the
government incorporates the views of people like me when designing
or reforming public benefits .”
Tables A3 .12 .1-3 .12 .4: Social policy preferences, by response to the statement: “I feel that
I receive a fair share of public benefits, given the taxes and social
contributions I pay .”
preferences, with responses to the statement “I feel the government
incorporates the views of people like me when designing or reforming
public benefits” as an additional predictor
preferences, with responses to the statement “I feel that I receive a
fair share of public benefits, given the taxes and social contributions
I pay” as an additional predictor
Tables A3 .15 .1-3 .15 .5: Additional cross-country associations between social policy
preferences and measures of public policy and economic conditions

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References
Image credits:
Cover Page: © Shutterstock/nuu_jeed
Page 2-3: © Shutterstock/DavidEwingPhotography
Page 6-7: © Shutterstock/Nebojsa Markovic
Page 10-11: © Shutterstock/philip openshaw
Page 19: © Pexels .com/rawpixel .com
Page 20-21: © Shutterstock/Nebojsa Markovic
Page 36-37: © Pexels .com/pixabay .com
Page 48-49: © Pexels .com/skitterphoto .com
Page 50-51: © Shutterstock/Mircea Moira
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under
the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities .
The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice
to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and
Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms
of international law .
Please cite as:
OECD (2019), “Risks that Matter: Main Findings
from the 2018 OECD Risks that Matter Survey,”
www .oecd .org/social/risks-that-matter .htm .
Contacts:
Monika Queisser (monika .queisser@oecd .org),
Valerie Frey (valerie .frey@oecd .org),
Chris Clarke (chris .clarke@oecd .org),
OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour,
and Social Affairs
@OECD_Social
www.oecd.org/social/risks-that-matter.htm

References

Falling ill.
Struggling to make ends meet.
Having enough money in old age.
The OECD Risks that Matter survey finds that these worries are
weighing on people’s minds across countries. Risks that Matter
examines people’s perceptions of the social and economic risks
they face and assesses how well people feel government reacts
to their concerns. The survey polled a representative sample of
22 000 adults in 21 OECD countries in 2018.
Across countries, people are largely dissatisfied with existing social
programmes. A majority of respondents believe that government
would not provide them with an adequate safety net if they lost
their income due to job loss, illness or old age. More than half feel
that they would not be able to access public benefits easily if
they needed them. And, on average, nearly three-quarters of all
respondents want government to do more to protect their social
and economic security.
This survey shows that listening to people matters. Implementation
matters. OECD countries have some of the most advanced social
protection systems in the world, but policies are not reaching their
full potential if people do not feel they can access benefits and
services when needed. Governments must recommit to restoring
trust, confidence, and efficacy in social protection.
www.oecd.org/social/risks-that-matter.htm

OECD Report : Risks that matter

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