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OWASP Mobile Top 10
(M7 & M8)
M7 – Client Side Injection.
M8 – Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs.
By : Shivang Desai
Who am I ?
● Shivang Desai (@5h1vang)
● Researcher at Zscaler Inc.
● Open Source enthusiast
● Small efforts to contribute :
– THC-Hydra [Release 7.6] (Kali Linux)
– OWASP Mobile
– Referenced in “The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook”
– https://github.com/shivang1989
Next 30 min...
● Understanding client-side injection
● Understanding Security Decisions via untrusted Inputs
● What's their impact ?
● Prevention tips !
Understanding M7
Client Side Injection
• next image of client and server
• Then, mobile app and OS and backend
• Hybrid vs native apps
• Hybrid == client-server
• Native == second image (mobiel-OS-backend)
Understanding M7
Client Side Injection
● The name says it all : “Client-Side”
● Myth : Client-Side Injection == SQL injection
● Few types of client side injections :
– Sql Injection
– Cross Site Scripting
– Local File Injection
– XML Injection
– Binary Code Injection
Demo .. ! ??
A quick demo :
– Sql injection (optional)
– XSS (Box App)
– Binary Code Injection (adb backup vuln)
Impacts !
● Consuming Paid Resources
● Data Exfiltration
● Privilege Escalation
Prevention !
● ALWAYS consider input data as malicious.
● Sanitize and/or Escape untrusted data.
● Use Prepared Statements. (SQL injection)
● Minimize the sensitive native capabilities tied to hybrid web
functionality. (As seen in WebView vuln just now)
● Input Validation (Local File Inclusion):
– Input validation for NSFileManager calls.
– Disable File System Access for any WebView
(webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);)
Understanding M8
Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs.
● Decisions based on weak parameters like cookies, hidden form fields,
Intents, URL schemes etc.
● Client Side Injection is one of the attack vector, along with Malicious
apps
● Main causes:
– Developer thinks values (cookies, environment variables, and hidden form
fields) cannot be modified
– Developer thinks client cannot manipulate and update application code
– Lack of proper encryption and/or encoding during client-server
interaction
Abusing iOS : URL Scheme
● URL Scheme is basically URL Protocol Handler
● Used mainly by browser to call internal apps (Eg: Safari
calling dialer app)
– <iframe src="tel:1-408-555-5555"></iframe>
Problem ?????
Abusing URL Scheme (iOS)
What's the problem ?
● Consider victim had opened skype in past and device has
cached the credentials.
● Attacker embeds iframe in his/her site
– <iframe src="skype://14085555555?call"></iframe>
● User visits the malicious site
● And boom...!
● Masque attack used URL scheme
hijacking
Abusing Android : Intents
What is Intent ?
● Intents acts as mechanism used:
– to start an Activity
– as a broadcast to inform interested programs
– as a way to communicate with background services
– to access data through ContentProviders
– as a callback to handle events like returning results or
errors asynchronously
Abusing Android : Intents
Types of Intent Vulnerbilities
● Two types of Intent Vulnerabilities
(1) Intent interception
● Intercept the generated intents (Broadcast events)
(2) Intent Spoofing
● Generate a spoofed intent and target the victim
Abusing Android : Intents
(PayPal Case Study)
● Android SDK comes along with a small tool called “am”
● Paypal Target Activity : SendMoneyActivity
– am start 
-a android.intent.action.SENDTO 
-d mailto:shiv@ng.com 
--es com.paypal.android.p2pmobile.Amount 9.99 
--ei com.paypal.android.p2pmobile.ParamType 42 
-n com.paypal.android.p2pmobile/.activity.SendMoneyActivity
Effects of M8!
● Device Compromise
● Toll Frauds
● Privilege Escalation
Prevention !
● Check caller’s permissions at input boundaries
● Prompt the user for additional authorization before allowing
● Where permission checks cannot be performed, ensure
additional steps required to launch sensitive actions
References
● https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/807.html
● http://secappdev.org/handouts/2012/Ken%20van%20Wyk/1-3%20Android%20applic
ations.pdf
● http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/11/08/insecure-handling-url-schemes-app
les-ios/
● https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios_masque_attackre.html
● http://blog.palominolabs.com/2013/05/13/android-security/
● http://www.slideshare.net/JackMannino/owasp-top-10-mobile-risks?next_slideshow
=1
● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M7
● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M8
Questions ?
Thank You

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Owasp m7-m8-shivang nullmeetblr 21june2015

  • 1. OWASP Mobile Top 10 (M7 & M8) M7 – Client Side Injection. M8 – Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs. By : Shivang Desai
  • 2. Who am I ? ● Shivang Desai (@5h1vang) ● Researcher at Zscaler Inc. ● Open Source enthusiast ● Small efforts to contribute : – THC-Hydra [Release 7.6] (Kali Linux) – OWASP Mobile – Referenced in “The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook” – https://github.com/shivang1989
  • 3. Next 30 min... ● Understanding client-side injection ● Understanding Security Decisions via untrusted Inputs ● What's their impact ? ● Prevention tips !
  • 4. Understanding M7 Client Side Injection • next image of client and server • Then, mobile app and OS and backend • Hybrid vs native apps • Hybrid == client-server • Native == second image (mobiel-OS-backend)
  • 5. Understanding M7 Client Side Injection ● The name says it all : “Client-Side” ● Myth : Client-Side Injection == SQL injection ● Few types of client side injections : – Sql Injection – Cross Site Scripting – Local File Injection – XML Injection – Binary Code Injection
  • 6. Demo .. ! ?? A quick demo : – Sql injection (optional) – XSS (Box App) – Binary Code Injection (adb backup vuln)
  • 7. Impacts ! ● Consuming Paid Resources ● Data Exfiltration ● Privilege Escalation
  • 8. Prevention ! ● ALWAYS consider input data as malicious. ● Sanitize and/or Escape untrusted data. ● Use Prepared Statements. (SQL injection) ● Minimize the sensitive native capabilities tied to hybrid web functionality. (As seen in WebView vuln just now) ● Input Validation (Local File Inclusion): – Input validation for NSFileManager calls. – Disable File System Access for any WebView (webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);)
  • 9. Understanding M8 Security Decisions via Untrusted Inputs. ● Decisions based on weak parameters like cookies, hidden form fields, Intents, URL schemes etc. ● Client Side Injection is one of the attack vector, along with Malicious apps ● Main causes: – Developer thinks values (cookies, environment variables, and hidden form fields) cannot be modified – Developer thinks client cannot manipulate and update application code – Lack of proper encryption and/or encoding during client-server interaction
  • 10. Abusing iOS : URL Scheme ● URL Scheme is basically URL Protocol Handler ● Used mainly by browser to call internal apps (Eg: Safari calling dialer app) – <iframe src="tel:1-408-555-5555"></iframe> Problem ?????
  • 11. Abusing URL Scheme (iOS) What's the problem ? ● Consider victim had opened skype in past and device has cached the credentials. ● Attacker embeds iframe in his/her site – <iframe src="skype://14085555555?call"></iframe> ● User visits the malicious site ● And boom...! ● Masque attack used URL scheme hijacking
  • 12. Abusing Android : Intents What is Intent ? ● Intents acts as mechanism used: – to start an Activity – as a broadcast to inform interested programs – as a way to communicate with background services – to access data through ContentProviders – as a callback to handle events like returning results or errors asynchronously
  • 13. Abusing Android : Intents Types of Intent Vulnerbilities ● Two types of Intent Vulnerabilities (1) Intent interception ● Intercept the generated intents (Broadcast events) (2) Intent Spoofing ● Generate a spoofed intent and target the victim
  • 14. Abusing Android : Intents (PayPal Case Study) ● Android SDK comes along with a small tool called “am” ● Paypal Target Activity : SendMoneyActivity – am start -a android.intent.action.SENDTO -d mailto:[email protected] --es com.paypal.android.p2pmobile.Amount 9.99 --ei com.paypal.android.p2pmobile.ParamType 42 -n com.paypal.android.p2pmobile/.activity.SendMoneyActivity
  • 15. Effects of M8! ● Device Compromise ● Toll Frauds ● Privilege Escalation
  • 16. Prevention ! ● Check caller’s permissions at input boundaries ● Prompt the user for additional authorization before allowing ● Where permission checks cannot be performed, ensure additional steps required to launch sensitive actions
  • 17. References ● https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/807.html ● http://secappdev.org/handouts/2012/Ken%20van%20Wyk/1-3%20Android%20applic ations.pdf ● http://software-security.sans.org/blog/2010/11/08/insecure-handling-url-schemes-app les-ios/ ● https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/ios_masque_attackre.html ● http://blog.palominolabs.com/2013/05/13/android-security/ ● http://www.slideshare.net/JackMannino/owasp-top-10-mobile-risks?next_slideshow =1 ● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M7 ● https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M8