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Reintroductioncompetition
The introduction of competition into the English NHS appears to have had some positive effects according to evidence from the Health Reform Evaluation Programme. Competition was associated with improved clinical outcomes and shorter hospital stays. Payment by results reduced lengths of stay and increased day surgery rates more in foundation trusts. However, patient choice directly affected only a small percentage of patients and barriers limited new provider entry. Overall, the evidence suggests the NHS market reforms have had some success in improving quality but implementation has been variable.
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Reintroductioncompetition
- 1. New Labour’s reintroductionof competition in the English NHS: a synthesis of evidence from the Health Reform Evaluation Programme* Nicholas Mays Professor of Health Policy Department of Health Services Research & Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Scientific Coordinator, Health Reforms Evaluation Programme Socialist Health Association conference, ‘Conservative health policy – what does it mean for the NHS?’, 25 January 2011 *This is anindependent research programme commissioned and funded by the Policy Research Programme of the Department of Health. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Department.
- 2. English NHS ‘reforms’ Threemain phases: 1991-1997 Predominantly ‘internal market’, supply side competition, variable prices, ‘patients follow contracts’ 1997-2004(?) ‘Command and control’, targets, performance management, investment in return for ‘modernisation’ 2002/03-2008 Quasi-market for NHS services, including private & Third Sector, fixed prices and patient choice of hospital Gradual shift towards a ‘self-improving’ NHS
- 3. The re-invented NHSmarket in England Money following the patients, rewarding the best and most efficient providers, giving others the incentive to improve (transactional reforms) Better care More diverse More choice and a Better patient providers, with much stronger voice more freedom to for patients experience innovate and Better value improve services (demand-side for money reforms) (supply-side reforms) A framework of system management, regulation and decision making which guarantees safety and quality, fairness, equity and value for money (system management Source: DH (2005) reforms) Health reform in England: update and next
- 4. Main components ofphased quasi-market reforms 1. Increased diversity of providers • DH-led ISTC procurement, 2002- • Encouragement to private hospitals, etc. to enter NHS market 2. Foundation trusts, 2003- • High performers with earlier access to PbR, greater autonomy 3. ‘Payment by results’ (administered prices), 2004- 4. Patient choice of 4+ hospitals, 2006, and any hospital, 2008-
- 5. Health Reforms Evaluation Programme funded by DH http://www.hrep.lshtm.ac.uk/
- 6. What did theoryand past research tell us might occur? • US evidence of higher levels of competition associated with higher quality of hospital care under fixed prices (Gaynor, 2004) • Evidence from 1990s NHS internal market of association between greater inter-hospital competition and lower costs, but poorer outcomes (Propper, Burgess & Gossage, 2008) • Overall direction of performance advantage of different types of providers not clear • PbR likely to increase activity (tho’ capacity constraints?) and reduce unit costs, but potential for ‘cream skimming’ • Patient choice could also increase inequities though little evidence
- 7. Impact of competitionwith fixed prices on patient care (Gaynor et al, 2010) • Hospital markets are highly concentrated compared with non-hospital markets, especially for non- electives • But increase in spatial competition, 2003/04- 2007/08 • particularly from 2006/07 • around rather than in urban areas
- 8. The location of,and changes in, competition Imperial College Business School ©
- 9. Impact of competitionwith fixed prices on patient care • Increase in competition associated with an improvement in clinical outcomes, as measured by all-cause & AMI death rates, and shorter length of stay, unlike 1990s • Death rates fell more 2003/04-2007/08 in hospitals which faced more competition, not explained by increase in spending per capita or in admissions • Cooper et al (2010) similarly show quicker fall in AMI mortality (i.e. emergency care) for patients living in more competitive spatial hospital markets after Jan 2006 introduction of patient choice for electives
- 10. 28 day post-hospitalmortality rate (all causes) and levels of HHI pre- and post- reform Imperial College Business School ©
- 11. Impact of ‘Paymentby Results’ (Farrar et al, 2009) • Took advantage of staged roll-out and comparison with Scotland where no PbR • PbR had the expected (modest) effects on unit costs, but not on volumes • DinD analysis of FTs vs Scotland, 03/04-06/07, showed significant 8% greater reduction in LOS, significant 3% greater rise in day case rate in FTs • Feared negative effects on quality did not materialise – e.g. in-hospital mortality reduced faster in England
- 12. Trends in hospitalmortality S cotland E ver-FTs Non-FTs 3 %of Death on Discharge 2 1 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year
- 13. Effects on inequalityof access to health care (Cookson & Laudicella, 2010) • Patients from most deprived decile of areas stayed 6% longer after THR in 2001/02 than those from least deprived decile allowing for other patient characteristics, falling to 2% by 2007/08 • This suggests some, though declining, incentive under PbR to ‘cream skim’
- 14. Mean length ofstay by age group and deprivation decile for THR most deprived 85 plus (n= 12,906) least deprived most deprived 75-84 (n= 75,828) least deprived most deprived 65-74 (n= 107,037) least deprived most deprived 55-64 (n= 60,855) least deprived Mean LOS = 9.1 days most deprived 45-54 (n= 18,053) least deprived 6 8 10 12 14 16 Mean length of stay (days)
- 15. Effects on inequalityof access to health care • But no change in socioeconomic equity of use, 2001/02-2008/09 for electives • And evidence that equity might even have improved despite increase in competition • admission rates rose slightly faster in low income areas • Cooper et al (2009) similarly show fall in waiting time & in SES gradient of waiting, 1997-2007 (over the targets & quasi-market periods) • Raine et al (2010) show SES equity in colorectal, breast and lung cancer procedure rates unchanged 1999-2006
- 16. Trends in hipreplacement rates, 2001-07, by income deprivation groups (intervals of EDI) 240 220 180 200 140 160 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years hip EDI 0-10% CI 95% hip EDI 10-20% CI 95% hip EDI 20-30% CI 95% hip EDI >30% CI 95%
- 17. Impact of providerdiversity (Bartlett et al) • Local commissioners are influential in extent of provider diversity, but strong barriers to new entrants (e.g. in bidding & contracting) and thus limited private penetration affecting competition • Private sector innovation focuses on organisation, management & skill mix • NHS innovation in clinical practice & technology • Third Sector focuses on new services for neglected/hard-to-reach groups
- 18. Impact of providerdiversity • Little evidence favouring one sector over another – ISTC patients report same level of quality of care as NHS patients though some differences in specific aspects (Pérotin et al, 2010) – No significant differences in patient-reported outcomes for electives (Browne et al, 2008)
- 19. How patients chooseand providers respond (Dixon et al, 2010) • Vast majority of patients think choice is important (especially elderly & minorities), 49% reported offered ‘choice’ of hospital • GPs reluctant to prioritise offering choice routinely • Personal experience (41%) and GP (36%) were main sources of advice rather than formal information on quality (4% used NHS Choices)
- 20. How patients chooseand providers respond
- 21. How patients chooseand providers respond • Patients offered a choice were more likely to travel to a non-local hospital (29%) than those not (22%) • If patients had had a bad experience of a hospital they were more likely to go elsewhere • Patients with more education more likely to be aware of choice and to go to a non-local hospital • NHS hospitals perceived patient choice as of limited significance, but a small percent of patients were switching with offer of choice • Is this enough to send a signal to poor providers?
- 22. Main themes emergingfrom health reforms evaluation • Predictions largely confirmed • NHS was still not yet a fully fledged market in all parts though some hospitals seem to be competing on quality • Implementation varied by area and specialty • Reforms appeared to ‘fit’ electives & where there is contestability best rather than e.g. long term conditions, mental health services • PbR only applied to 30-40% of hospital services • Entry of new providers was modest • Patient choice still often GP-led
- 23. Main themes emergingfrom health reforms evaluation • No obvious signs of ‘harm’ (hard to measure) • No evidence of reduction in equity of access to electives or fall in quality • Regulated prices appear to be important for quality • Other impacts comparatively modest compared with the impact of ‘targets’ (e.g. for waiting), but in the direction expected • PbR appears to have improved efficiency (↓ LOS, ↑ day case rates) without upward pressure on activity • Independent contribution of market reforms shown in Anglo-Scottish comparisons
- 24. Main themes emergingfrom health reforms evaluation • Second quasi-market of 2000s may have stronger incentives for quality & efficiency than 1990s version and these may be gathering pace – still too many barriers to market under New Labour from pro-market perspective (Civitas)
- 25. Broad questions fordiscussion • How should we value and explain these findings? – Civitas (Brereton & Gubb, 2010) concluded that little had been achieved but at higher cost (a ‘lose-lose’) – Other policies than competition used in the period • e.g. what is producing lower 30-day hospital mortality in more competitive hospital areas? Bloom et al (2010) found greater competition associated with better management practices, but what about clinical innovation and NSFs? • What might be the effects of choice and competition be in future in a very much more financially constrained NHS with more price variation? – plans to let prices vary may not be wise given association of competition, regulated prices and better outcomes
- 26. Will the effectsof the market be the same in future? • If prices vary, importance of good information on quality rises if market is to improve efficiency • Prospect of more mergers reducing competition – evidence suggests that these should be resisted • Should competition be between hospitals or between vertically integrated providers, at least for chronic care?
- 27. http://www.hrep.lshtm.ac.uk/ Mays N. TheEnglish NHS as a market: challenges for the Coalition Government. In: Holden C, et al, eds. Social Policy Review 23: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy. Bristol: The Policy Press, forthcoming
- 28. Bibliography: HREP studies 1. Gaynor MS, Moreno-Serra R, Propper C. (2010) Death by market power: reform, competition and patient outcomes in the National Health Service. NBER Working Paper 16164. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research 2. Farrar S, Yi D, Sutton M, Chalkley M, Sussex J, Scott A. (2009) Has payment by results affected the way that English hospitals provide care? Difference-in- difference analysis. BMJ ;339:b3047. doi: 10.1136/bmj.b3047 3. Cookson, R. And Laudicella, M. (2010a) Effects of health reform on health care inequalities. Draft final report to the Department of Health Health Reform Evaluation Programme 4. Bartlett W, Allen P, Pérotin V, Turner S, Zamora B, Matchaya G, Roberts J. (2010) Provider diversity in the NHS: impact on quality and innovation. Report to Department of Health Policy Research Programme 5. Pérotin, V, Zamora B, Reeves R, Bartlett W, Allen P. (2010) Does hospital ownership affect patient experience? An investigation into public-private sector differences in England (under review) 6. Dixon A, Robertson R, Appleby J, Burge P, Devlin N, Magee H. (2010) Patient choice: how patients choose and how providers respond, London: King’s Fund
- 29. Bibliography: other studies 1. Gaynor M. (2004) Competition and quality in hospital markets: what do we know? What don’t we know? Economie Publique 15: 3-40 2. Propper C, Burgess S, Gossage D. (2008) Competition and quality: evidence from the NHS internal market 1991 - 1996. The Economic Journal 118: 138-70 3. Cooper Z, Gibbons S, Jones S, McGuire A. (2010) Does hospital competition save lives? Evidence from the English NHS patient choice reforms. Working Paper 16/2010. London: LSE Health, London School of Economics 4. Cooper ZN, McGuire A, Jones S, Le Grand J. (2009) Equity, waiting times, and NHS reforms: retrospective study. BMJ 339: b3264 doi10.1136/bmj/b3264 5. Raine R, Wong W, Scholes S, Ashton C, Obichere A, Ambler G. (2010) Social variations in access to hospital care for patients with colorectal, breast and lung cancer between 1999 and 2006: retrospective analysis of hospital episode statistics. BMJ 2010;340:b5479 doi:10.1136/bmj.b5479
- 30. Bibliography: other studies 1. Browne J, Jamieson L, Lewsey J, van der Meulen J, Copley L, Black N. (2008) Case mix and patients’ reports of outcome in Independent Sector Treatment Centres: comparison with NHS providers. BMC Health Services Research 8: 78 doi:10.1186/1472-6963-8-78 2. Brereton L, Gubb J. (2010) Refusing treatment: the NHS and market- based reform. London: Civitas 3. Bloom N, Propper C, Seiler S, Van Reenen J. (2010) The impact of competition on management quality: evidence from public hospitals. Discussion paper 2010/09. London: Imperial College Business School