RTOS BASED SECURE SHORTEST PATH ROUTING ALGORITHM IN MOBILE AD- HOC NETWORKS

International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.4, July 2011
DOI : 10.5121/ijnsa.2011.3412 130
RTOS BASED SECURE SHORTEST PATH
ROUTING ALGORITHM
IN MOBILE AD- HOC NETWORKS
R. Ramesh1
and S. Gayathri2
1
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Anna University, India
rramesh@annauniv.edu
2
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Anna University, India
gayathri.in50@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Increase of number of the nodes in the wireless computing environment leads to different issues like
power, data rate, QoS, simulators and security. Among these the security is the peak issue faced by most
of the wireless networks. Especially networks without having a centralized system (MANETS) is facing
severe security issues. One of the major security issues is the wormhole attack while finding the shortest
path. The aim of this paper is to propose an algorithm to find a secure shortest path against wormhole
attack. Existing algorithms are mainly concentrated on detecting the malicious node but they are
hardware specific like directional antennas and synchronized clocks. But the proposed algorithm is both
software and hardware specific. RTOS is included to make the ad hoc network a real time application.
KEYWORDS
Mobile ad hoc networking, routing, security, wormhole, shortest path, RTOS, Real time application
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS) have a wide range of applications, especially in military
operations, emergency, e-commerce and entertainment. Mobile ad hoc networks are self
configuring network sometimes called mesh networks which form link by themselves. It
forwards the traffic also establishes a route by route request within its transmission range.
Hence it acts like a transmitter as well as a router. The route establishment is not static it is done
by dynamic ways. Hence these types of systems don’t have a centralized system. This leads to
the evolution of protocols bounded within a mobility range usually nodes which are placed only
few hops of each other. Different protocols are then evaluated based on packet drop rate,
overhead introduced by routing protocol, security etc. In this paper the security issue faced by
the routing protocol is taken into consideration. The routing protocol of mobile ad hoc networks
faces different security issues described in [2]. This paper concentrates on wormhole attack
described in [1]. The effect of wormhole attack creates a malicious node thereby deleting the
legitimate path. Many secure routing protocols against wormhole have been proposed in [3, 5,
6, 8, and 9] for an efficient routing on a general purpose routing environment. This paper focus
on local monitoring and isolation through cryptographic methods in a real time operating system
(RTOS) environment.
2. MANETS ROUTING PROTOCOL
Routing is an activity or a function that connects a call from origin to destination in
telecommunication networks and also plays an important role in architecture, design and
operation of networks. Ad-hoc networks are wireless networks where nodes communicate with
each other using multi-hop links. There is no stationary infrastructure or base station for
communication. Each node itself acts as a router for forwarding and receiving packets to/from

131
other nodes. Routing in ad-hoc networks has been a challenging task ever since the wireless
networks came into existence. The major reason for this is the constant change in network
topology because of high degree of node mobility. A number of protocols have been developed
to accomplish this task.
Classification of routing protocols in MANET’s can be done in many ways, but most of these
are done depending on routing strategy and network structure. According to the routing strategy
the routing protocols can be categorized as Table-driven (Proactive) and source Initiated
(Reactive), while depending on the network structure these are classified as flat routing,
hierarchical routing and geographic position assisted routing. Both the Table-driven and source
initiated protocols come under the Flat routing.
2.1. Proactive Protocol
Each node maintains routing information to other nodes. The routing information is normally
kept in table. These table are updated whenever the network topology changes. Most flat routed
global routing protocols do not scale very well. The increase in scalability can be achieved by
reducing the number of rebroadcasting nodes. Some of the types of proactive routing protocols
are DSDV (Destination sequenced distance vector), WRP (Wireless Routing Protocol).
2.2. Reactive Protocol
In this case the topology information is transmitted by nodes on demand. Whichever node wants
to transmit will flood a route request in the network. A route establishment is created if the
request is received by the destination or through the intermediate route. The most popular
reactive algorithm is AODV (Ad-hoc On Distance Vector). As long as the route lasts it is in
active state whenever it loses it path again RREQ is sent.
3. SECURITY THREATS TO ROUTING PROTOCOLS
3.1. Modification
The attack tries to modify the data by doing packet misrouting. The attack will do
impersonation and spoofing.
3.2. Fabrication
Sleep deprivation is one of the attacks in mobile ad hoc networks which put the battery in
exhaust condition. The attacker tries to consume the batteries of a node.
3.3. Interruption
An intruder tries to drop packets during forwarding of packets. One more attack is flooding of
packets.
3.4. Interception
Black hole attacks and worm hole attacks. Out of these attacks this paper evaluate wormhole
attack scenario.
4. WORM WHOLE ATTACK
Wormhole attack is the most severe attack in MANET routing. Figure 1 depicts a small
wormhole scenario. In this type two or more nodes collaborates each other thereby creating a

132
Figure 1. Wormhole Scenario
shortcut between the packets through that link. The packets are forwarded between the
malicious nodes by encapsulation. Also forwarding the packets through additional hardware like
wired link and directional antenna. It can be launched in two modes hidden mode and
participation mode. Wormhole attacks can be used to drop packets. They are extremely difficult
to detect. Encryption or authentication cannot able to protect against hidden- mode worm holes
because malicious node won’t read or modify the packets it simply forwards. Participation
modes are very difficult to launch once they are launched.
5. RELATED WORK
In [1] wormhole scenario is explained. A wormhole is created in the mobile ad-hoc network
which can able to defend against any type of countermeasures. This attack can create a
malicious path even if the attacker has not malpractice the other host that is even if the other
hosts path is good. Similarly the attack can happen even if there is a good encryption and
decryption is happening.
In [2] surveys the types of complex wormhole attack in wireless
Ad-hoc networks. This paper refers attacks like spoofing, eaves dropping and packet leashes. In
this paper the wormhole is identified as two phase process launched by one or several malicious
nodes, called wormhole nodes, try to lure legitimate nodes to send data to other nodes via them.
In the second phase, wormhole nodes could exploit the data in variety of ways. The wormhole
attack mode and classes, and point to its impact and threat on ad hoc networks.
In [3] two algorithms were proposed which will eliminate the wormhole attack faced when the
ad-hoc network is in mobility state called MOBIWORP. In this paper there is a special node
called Central Authority (CA) which monitors the node locally and if any malicious activity
occurs it isolates the node globally.
In [4] the wormhole attack is detected using the topology changes. This paper does not
concentrate on special hardware or artefacts for finding the attacks. The algorithm is
independent on wireless communication models. The proposed algorithm detects the wormhole
by using the information collected in the upper layer like routing layer. The detection algorithm
looks for forbidden structures which are not present in the legal connectivity.
Work [5] introduces a light weight counter measure for mobile ad-hoc networks (LITEWORP).
This algorithm listens to the neighbour node. In this algorithm every malicious node is detected
and isolated and it’s specially concentrates on resource constraints.
Work [6] examines the wormhole attack in WAHAS (Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor networks).
This paper introduces a protocol called SECOS which provides a secure route between any two
A
B
C
D
M1
M2
Malicious path
Legitimate path
M1 M2 Malicious nodes

133
nodes despite of compromise of any number of other nodes. The algorithm uses a low key-
management and authentication technique
Work [7] mainly concentrates on a specific local monitoring when the ad-hoc network is
vulnerable to stealthy packet dropping. The stealthy packet dropping do a packet dropping by
intermediate node by avoiding the packets to reach the destination. This creates as if the
malicious node is performing a legitimate action thereby creating a suspicious to the legitimate
path. Here there is a protocol called DISA (Detection and Isolation of sneaky attackers in
locally-Monitored Multi-hop wireless networks).
Paper [8] proposed an efficient algorithm called (Wormhole attack prevention algorithm) WAP.
This algorithm avoids the use of specialized hardware. It first monitors the neighbour nodes by
using timer and by maintaining a neighbour node table. The next phase of work is to detect the
wormhole route by flooding the RREQ and getting the false route reply.
Paper [9] runs the AODV in a secure way. The AODV is made to run against wormhole attack.
A mechanism called Wormhole Attack Detection Reaction (WADR) is made to run with
conventional AODV. This paper reduces overhead and the packet loss caused by malicious
nodes.
Paper [10] proposed a concept of monitoring nodes only as end - to -end instead of monitoring
each corresponding neighbour node in a multi-hop environment. Hence the proposal will only
look after the source and destination path and it reduces overhead mechanism. The proposed
algorithm is cell based open tunnel avoidance (COTA) to manage the information. COTA
achieves an equal space for each node between the source and destination through geographic
information. The proposed algorithm can be combined with existing routing algorithm to protect
the MANETS against wormhole attacks.
Paper [11] analyzes the obstacle faced in the conventional cryptographic methods because the
wormhole attack cannot be defeated as the malicious nodes do not send separate packets. In this
paper, we present a cluster based counter-measure for the wormhole attack which alleviates
these drawbacks and efficiently mitigates the wormhole attack in MANET.
6. RTOS (Real Time Operating System) BASED SECURITY ALGORITHM
Already existing routing algorithm is made to run on a geographical area of few kilometres.
Since the area is small the nodes assumed to be less.
A wormhole scenario will be created. The malicious activity created by the wormhole attack
will be monitored and the malicious node will be isolated
The idea of shortest path algorithm will be studied. A probabilistic method of analysis will be
studied
The cryptographic analysis will be made to run in a real time environment using a real time
operating system.
7. PROPOSED WORK
i) Traditional AODV is made to run on the system.
ii) Wormhole scenario is created and monitored.
iii) Node Isolation.

134
8. WORK COMPLETED
The following code describes the traditional AODV. This program deals with 20 nodes. The
nodes are placed by using a random number generator and the nodes are assumed to be
transmitting randomly. Node 1 is taken in to consideration and is distributing the signal to the
nodes whose minimum distance is 1.
8.1. MATLAB SIMULATION
8.1.1. Node Distribution
A=randint (20);
% Making matrix all diagonals=0 and A(i,j)=A(j,i),i.e. A(1,4)=a(4,1),
% A(6,7)=A(7,6)
for i=1:20
for j=1:20
if i==j
A(i,j)=0;
else
A(j,i)=A(i,j);
end
end
end
disp(A);
t=1:20;
%disp( ' a b ' )
disp(t);
disp(A);
status(1)='!';
dist(1)=0;
next(1)=0;
Figure 2. Node Distribution
Figure 2 explains the random integer matrix which contains matrix elements whose values
consists of only 1’s and zeros generated randomly for every t seconds of simulation. In order to
make the nodes to be distributed uniformly the diagonal elements are assumed to be 0. At time
t1 node 1 is assumed to distribute randomly to the corresponding nodes whose minimum
distance is 1 for the above Figure 2 the corresponding nodes are 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 18. The
following code explains the node 1 transmission.

135
for i=2:20
status(i)='?';
dist(i)=A(i,1);
next(i)=1;
disp(['i== ' num2str(i) ' A(i,1)=' num2str(A(i,1)) ' status:=' status(i) ' dist(i)=' num2str(dist(i))]);
for i=4
plot(i,A(i,1),'-mo')
end
flag=0;
for i=2:20
if A(i,1) == 1
disp([' node 1 sends RREQ to node ' num2str(i)
end
end
The above code explains the transmission of route request to the corresponding nodes whose
minimum distance A (i, 1) = 1. Hence the simulated output is as shown in Figure 3.
Output
node 1 sends RREQ to node 2
Figure 3. Node 1 Transmission
8.1.2. Creation of Wormhole
Output
Our agenda is to create a wormhole so that the corresponding node which is going to act as a
wormhole will transmit the route request. Wormhole can be created in different methods we
have created the malicious node by increasing the power factor. Hence the modified code is

136
for j = 0:1:3
power = power+1;
if power>1
flag = 0;
for i=2:20
if A(i,1) == 1
disp([' node 1 sends RREQ to node ' num2str(i)])
end
end
else if power>3
for i = 2:20
status(i)='?';
dist(i)=A(i,2);
next(i)=1;
disp(['i== ' num2str(i) ' A(i,2)=' num2str(A(i,2)) ' status:=' status(i) ' dist(i)=' num2str(dist(i))]);
end
end
end
end
for i = 2: 20
if A(i,2) == 1
end
end
Here an additional parameter power is included whose value is fixed to 3. Whenever the node
trying to transmit is going to have a power factor of more than 3 that corresponding node is
made to act as a malicious node and is going to perform malicious activity. In our case we have
made node 2 to be a malicious node. Hence the output will show node 1 activity till the power
factor becomes greater than 3. Also node will send the packets to its own destinations that got
their own minimum distance.
Output

137
Figure 4. Wormhole Creation
Hence the above Figure 4 shows the malicious activity of node 2 when its i value is 3 since the
minimum distance is 0 for i = 3 node 2 is not transmitting to 3. But for i = 5 node 2 will transmit
because the minimum distance is 1 and the graph is as shown below in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Node 2 Transmission
9. NODE MONITORING
The next important issue is once the wormhole is created it needs to be monitored. This
operation is done using the combination of hardware and software. A counter is made to run at
a specific clock period while the nodes start transmitting. Whenever a malicious activity
happens at any clock period the counter starts incrementing and whenever its value exceeds the
maximum count the counter will set an alarm so that the malicious activity can be predicted
explicitly.
for k=0:1:5
counter = counter + 1;
if counter >3
for i = 2: 20

138
if A(i,2) == 1
disp(['couter value exceeds maximum hence malicious activity starts'])
plot(k, counter, '-mo')
%for i = 5
%plot(i,A(i,2),'-mo')
end
end
end
end
Output
counter value exceeds maximum hence malicious activity starts
10. NODE ISOLATION
The next step is once the wormhole is created and monitored we need to check how the
communication is taking place. It is well known that node should be permanently cut off from
the communication link at the time instant say t1. In the same time we are creating a path
between the malicious node and its corresponding receiving nodes. Hence only node 2 should
come in picture. Hence the above code has been modified and the node 1 communication is
stopped and node 2 only transmitting.

139
next(i) = 2
for newi= next(i)
count = count + 1;
if count >1
disp ([num2str(newi) 'sends RREP to ' num2str(i)])
%disp([ num2str(i) 'Sends message to node ' num2str(newi)]) end
end
end
end
end
end
Output
next =
0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6sends rep to node2
next =

140
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7sends rep to node2
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8sends rep to node2
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12sends rep to node2
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
6sends rep to node2
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
next =
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1

141
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The work will be formulated to an advanced mathematical concept. This can be extended to a
Wide area Network. This can be applicable to any wireless application. We can extend this
project to connect group of classroom, places and buildings apart from the calculated
geographical area.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge financial support of Council of Scientific & Industrial
Research (CSIR), Govt. of India.
REFERENCES
[1] Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, Member, & David B. Johnson, (2006) “Wormhole Attacks in
Wireless Networks” IEEE Journal on selected areas in Communications, Vol. 24, No. 2.
[2] Mohit Jain &Himanshu Kandwal, (2009)“A Survey on Complex Wormhole Attack in Wireless
Ad Hoc Networks”. International Conference on Advances in Computing, Control, and
Telecommunication Technologies.
[3] Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi & Ness B. Shroff, “MOBIWORP: Mitigation of the Wormhole
Attack in Mobile Multihop Wireless Networks”.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4198824
[4] Ritesh Maheshwari, Jie Gao &Samir R Das,” Detecting Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Networks
Using Connectivity Information”.http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=04068262
[5] Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi& Ness B. Shroff,(2007) “LITEWORP: Detection and Isolation of the
Wormhole Attack in Static Multihop Wireless Networks”. The International Journal of Computer
and Telecommunications Networking, Vol. 51, Issue 13, pp 3750- 3772.
[6] Issah Khalil,(2008)“Mitigation of Control and data traffic attacks in wireless ad-hoc and sensor
networks” IEEE Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp 344-362.
[7] Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi, Najah AbuAli & M. Hayajneh, “DISA: Detection and
Isolation of Sneaky Attackers in Locally-Monitored Multi-hop Wireless Networks”
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sec.152/abstract
[8] Sun Choi, Doo-young Kim, Do-hyeon Lee &Jae-il Jung(2008) “WAP: Wormhole Attack Prevention
Algorithm in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks” IEEE International Conference on Sensor Networks,
Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy Computing SUTC’08. pp 343- 348
[9] Emmanouil A. Panaousis, Levon Nazaryan & Christos Politis(2009) “Securing AODV Against
Wormhole Attacks in MANET” Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Mobile Multimedia
Communications Conference, Article 34.
[10] Weichao Wang ,Bharat Bhargava & Yi XiaoxinWu(2006) “Defending against Wormhole Attacks in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks” Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing, Vol. 6, Issue 4,pp
483-503

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[11] Debdutta Barman Roy, Rituparna Chaki, &Nabendu Chaki (2009) “A new `cluster-based wormhole
intrusion detection algorithm for mobile ad-hoc networks” International Journal of Network
Security & Its Application , Vol. 1, No.1.
Authors
Dr Ramesh pursued his B.E. Degree in Electrical and Electronics
Engineering at University of Madras, Chennai, and completed his M.E
degree in power systems Engineering at Annamalai University
Chidambaram. He received Ph.D degree at Anna University Chennai, and
has been a faculty of Electrical and Electronics Engineering Department
Of College of Engineering , Guindy, Anna University, Chennai since
2003. His areas of interest are Real –Time Distributed Embedded Control,
On-line Power System Analysis and solar power system.
Ms Gayathri pursued her B.E. Degree in Electrical and Electronics
Engineering at University of Madras, Chennai, and completed her M.E
degree in Embedded System Technologies at Anna University Chennai.
She is currently pursuing Ph.D at Anna University Chennai, and has been a
Teaching Research Associate of Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Department of College of Engineering, Guindy, Anna University, Chennai
since 2008. Her areas of interest are Real Time Operating Systems,
Cryptography and Network Security, and Nanotechnology.

RTOS BASED SECURE SHORTEST PATH ROUTING ALGORITHM IN MOBILE AD- HOC NETWORKS

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