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Scada deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms

Aleksandr Timorin
Aleksandr Timorin

The document discusses SCADA protocols and security mechanisms. It begins with an introduction to the speaker and overview of the agenda, which includes discussions of common industrial protocols like Modbus, DNP3, PROFINET DCP, IEC 61850, IEC 61870, and protocols from Siemens and Honeywell. It notes that many protocols have no authentication or encryption. The document then demonstrates attacks against protocols like analyzing and spoofing PROFINET DCP packets and causing issues on a Siemens PLC.

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SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms Aleksandr Timorin ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! HACK.LU 2014, 21-24 October 2014, Luxembourg
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 2 # whoami ! • SCADA security researcher, main specialisation - industrial protocols • penetration tester • SCADAStrangeLove team member -> scadasl.org • speaker at PHDays, Power Of Community, Chaos Communication Congress (workshop), CONFidence etc. • @atimorin • atimorin@gmail.com
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 3 # whoami
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 4 # agenda • intro to scada world • current situation in ICS network security • overview of industrial protocols • well-known protocols: profinet, modbus, dnp3, goose • go to particular: • IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) • IEC 61870-5-101/104 • FTE • Siemens S7 • how to analyse protocols • real case • outro: releases, QA
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 5 # intro to scada world ICS - Industrial Control System SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition PLC - Programmable Logic Controller HMI - Human-Machine Interface RTU - Remote Telemetry Unit Sensor, Actuator ! … and much more ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 6 # intro to scada world many many vendors in the world: • siemens • advantech • citectscada • codesys • moxa • schneider electric • rslogics • general electric • wellintech • sielco sistemi • emerson • abb • advanced micro controls • …. problems in security: ! • each vendor - own protocol, technology etc. • out-of-date: don’t touch if it works! • patch management cycle ! ! wild wild industrial world
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 7 # current situation in ICS network security ICS NETWORK absolutely unbreakable ???
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 8 # current situation in ICS network security NO, because of: ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WEP (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 9 # current situation in ICS network security !! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WER (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 10 # current situation in ICS network security How protocols live in the network ? ! • full expanse • not blocked by firewalls/switches • accessible between LAN segments • works from data link layer to application layer • easy to detect • easy to intercept, analyse, reproduce and reply (but not all ! )
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 11 # overview of industrial protocols • modbus • profibus • profinet • dnp3 • ethernet/ip • s5/s7 (siemens protocols family) • CIP (rockwell automation) • cc-link (mitsubishi electric factory automation) • bacnet • iec 60870, iec 61850, iec 61107 • m-bus • zigbee • goose … iec - international electrotechnical commission
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 12 # overview of industrial protocols
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 13 # modbus • published by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 • widely used for connecting industrial electronic devices • in XX: through rs-232/rs-485 • in XXI: modbus tcp • standard port 502/tcp ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 14 # modbus functions: ! • data access: read/write coils, registers, file records • diagnostics: device identification • user defined functions ! ! ! tools: ! • wireshark dissector • plcscan ( https://code.google.com/p/plcscan/ ) • modbus-discover nse (by Alexander Rudakov) • modbus simulators ()
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 15 # modbus security ? • no authentication • no encryption • no security ! transaction id: 2 bytes protocol id: 2 bytes (always 0) length: 2 bytes unit id: 1 byte function code: 1 byte data …
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 16 # dnp3 DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol • first version in 1990 • standartized by IEEE only on 2010 • mainly used in water and electric industry • master - outstation communication • tcp/udp standard port 20000 ! tools: • wireshark dissector • free implementation https://code.google.com/p/dnp3/ ! security ? DNP3 Secure Authentication v5. First version in 2007. Add device and user authentication Data protection
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 17 # dnp3 dnp3 frame: • header - 10 bytes • data - max 282 bytes ! header: • sync - 2 bytes • length -1 byte • link control - 1 byte • destination addr - 2 bytes • source addr - 2 bytes • crc - 2 bytes ! each device in network has unique address 1..65520 crc for every 16 bytes of data -> max frame len = 292 bytes work on iso/osi layers: data link layer, transport layer, application layer
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 18 # profinet dcp PROFINET family ! • Profinet CBA/IO/PTCP/DCP • iec 61158, iec 61784 in 2003 • Ethernet type 0x8892 • exchange data in real-time cycles • multicast discovery devices and stations ! security ? • no encryption • no authentication • no security
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 19 # profinet dcp PROFINET DCP - Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 20 # profinet dcp frame types: • request 0xfefe • response 0xfeff • get/set 0xfefd ! multicast identify (scapy code): payload=‘fefe05000401000200800004ffff’.decode(‘hex’) srp(Ether(type=0x8892, src=smac, dst=’01:0e:cf:00:00:00’)/payload) ! fefe request 05 service id: identify 00 service type: request 04010002 xid (request id) 0080 delay 0004 data len ff option: all ff suboption: all
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 21 # profinet dcp • main interesting fields for playing is option and suboption • for example, set/get network info: opt 0x01, subopt 0x02 • led flashing: opt 0x05, subopt 0x03 ! so we can: • scan profinet supported devices and stations • change name of station • change ip, netmask, gateway • request full network info • LED flashing: PLC, HMI (simulates that smth wrong with device) • and much more
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 22 # profinet dcp profinet dcp scanner (raw sockets and scapy versions) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! discover all devices (PC, PLC, HMI) in subnet !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 23 # profinet dcp profinet fuzzer: fuzz options and sub options on plc siemens s7-1200 ! CVE-2014-2252 “An attacker could cause the device to go into defect mode if specially crafted PROFINET packets are sent to the device. A cold restart is required to recover the system.” ! what is “specially crafted profinet packets” ?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 24 # profinet dcp CVE-2014-2252 ! just “set” request: set network info with all zero values. ! ip 0.0.0.0 mask 0.0.0.0 gw 0.0.0.0 !!!!
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 25 # profinet dcp DEMO: CVE-2014-2252
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 26 # goose GSE - Generic Substation Events - fast and reliable mechanism for transfer events data over entire substation networks: • IEC 61850 • multicast, broadcast mechanism ! GSE: • GOOSE: Generic Object Oriented Substations Events • GSSE: Generic Substation State Events
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 27 # goose • data as grouped dataset • transmitted within 4 ms • works on second layer (Ethernet) of ISO/OSI model • using publisher-subscriber mechanism -> broadcast, multicast MAC addresses (publisher ~ sender, subscriber ~ receiver) • use VLAN (IEEE 802.1Q standard) • message priority level (by VLAN PCP - Priority Code Point - in TCI field of packet) • retransmission mechanism and a message state number (new or retransmitted) • brand independent (i.e., IDE - intelligent electronic devices by some vendors doesn’t require specific cables)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 28 # goose Attack scenarios: • easy to receive multicast or broadcast packets • easy to analyse, modify and reply packets • DDoS • by manipulating the state number in packet we can control the data set which transmitted in entire network (hijacking of communication channel) • VLAN hopping ! Tools: • wireshark dissector • easy to create your own scanner or injection tool • scapy based tool https://github.com/mdehus/goose-IEC61850-scapy
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 29 # IEC 61850-8-1 IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) !!!!! MMS - Manufacturing Message Specification
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 30 # IEC 61850-8-1 • since 1980 • ISO 9501-1, 2003 • use ISO-TSAP as transport • standard tcp port 102 ! functions: • read/write tags, variables, domains (large unstructured data, i.e. program code) • start/stop/rewrite firmware on PLC • read/write/del files and directories ! security ? • simple methods whitelist • TLS (in theory, but in practice not supported by vendors and haven’t seen before in products) ! tools: • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts • emulator, open source libs
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 31 # IEC 61850-8-1
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 32 # IEC 61850-8-1 ~ nmap —script mms-identify.nse —script-args=‘mms-identify.timeout=500’ -p 102 <host> ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 33 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! mainly for gathering telemetry in electricity distribution and power system automation ! huge list of functions, depends on vendors implementation: • read/write tags • upload/download files • broadcast connected devices discovery • time sync • reset process command • query log files • etc. ! security ? • no auth, no encryption • simple ip address whitelist (ip of master devices defined on slaves)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 34 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! standard tcp port 2404 ! tools: • simulators: sim104, mrts-ng etc. • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 35 # IEC 61870-5-101/104
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 36 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 ~ nmap --script iec-identify.nse --script-args='iec-identify.timeout=500' -p 2404 <host> ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 37 # FTE Fault Tolerant Ethernet by Honeywell ! Provides robust and low-cost technology for industrial networks. Each FTE-node connected twice to network, support actual route table and exchanges route table with other nodes through multicast request. ! UDP as a transport. ! Proprietary protocol.
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 38 # FTE ! attack vectors: • flood udp ports • send multicast packets with fake routing table ! ! multicast packet —> ! headers: 0x01000810 0x01a01001 send each second
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 39 # FTE 0x23 node index ! 0x433330302023303335 node name (C300 #5) ! 0x44 and 0xca bytes of packets counter ! 0x32312032 part of firmware version full: EXP3 10.1-65.57 Sat Dec 06 20:22:33 2008 (Fri Nov 21 20:22:57 2008)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 40 # Siemens ! TIA Portal (Totally Intergated Automation Portal) !! TIA - intellectual kernel of more than 100000 products created last 15 years. !! What about users, passwords and permissions?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 41 # Siemens PLC read/write protection for main and critical operations: CPU start/stop/data change, project upload, firmware update, etc. ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 42 # Siemens TIA Portal PEData.plf passwords history ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! passwords in sha-1 but “helpful” redbox value: password_len * 2 + 1 srsly>? for what???
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 43 # Siemens After notification Siemens “strengthened” users passwords and switched to md5… ! ! ! ! ! !!!! TIA Portal V12 UPD 3
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 44 # Siemens s7 password hashes extractor ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 45 # Siemens Improve user rights ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!! User rights - 2 bytes after second md5 hash: 0x8001 —> 0xFFFF
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 46 # Siemens SCADA <-> PLC auth scheme: ! scada -> plc: auth request scada <- plc: challenge scada -> plc: response = HMAC(SHA1(password), challenge) scada <- plc: auth result ! python scripts (for 1200 and 1500 Siemens S7 PLC) for extracting all challenge-responses, export to JtR format and simple bruteforce ! want to crack password? use john the ripper!
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 47 # Siemens
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 48 # Siemens Bruteforce PLC online! ! Use powerful THC-Hydra Tested on S7-300 PLC. Should work on S7-200, S7-400 ! ! ! ~ hydra -F -V -P ./wordlist/500-worst-passwords.txt s7-300://<host>
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 49 # Siemens
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 50 # it’s a cookie time! PRE-DEMO: plc-ownage
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 51 # it’s a cookie time! • CVE-2014-2250, CVE-2014-2251 • SSA-654382, SSA-456423 • Affected devices: • Siemens S7-1200 PLC • Siemens S7-1500 PLC • CVSS Base Score: 8.3 ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 52 # it’s a cookie time! Tested on S7-1200 CPU 1212C, firmware V 2.2.0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 53 # it’s a cookie time! PmzR9733Q8rG3LpwjCGZT9N/ocMAAQABAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! uLiHXZUTy2GMgjr1KmgmcNN/ocMAAQACAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! Mu/vgiIgtrxq0LVp26nkMtN/ocMAAQADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! tjH6vtNWCfa+QZHPDtCnKdN/ocMAAgADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! ! ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b8b8875d9513cb618c823af52a682670d37fa1c30001000200028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! 32efef822220b6bc6ad0b569dba9e432d37fa1c30001000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b631fabed35609f6be4191cf0ed0a729d37fa1c30002000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 54 # it’s a cookie time! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f + d37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f - ? d37fa1c3 - ? 0001 - ? 0001 - ? 00028ad7 - ? 0a00aac8 - ? 00000000000000008ad72143 - ?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 55 # it’s a cookie time! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f MD5 of ? (16 bytes) d37fa1c3 CONST (4 bytes) 0001 user logout counter (2 bytes) 0001 counter of issued cookies for this user (2 bytes) 00028ad7 value that doesn’t matter (4 bytes) 0a00aac8 user IP address (10.0.170.200) (4 bytes) 00000000000000008ad72143 value that doesn’t matter (12 bytes) ! ! ! So, what about 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ???
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 56 # it’s a cookie time! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ! ! MD5( NEXT 26 BYTES OF COOKIE + 16BYTES OF SECRET + 2 NULL BYTES) ! ! What is SECRET ?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 57 # it’s a cookie time! SECRET generates after PLC start by ~PRNG. ! PRNG is a little bit harder than standard C PRNG. ! SEED in {0x0000 , 0xFFFF} ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! It’s too much for bruteforce (PLC so tender >_<)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 58 # it’s a cookie time! What about SEED ? SEED very often depends on time value ! SEED = PLC START TIME + 320 ! 320 by practical way: secret generates after ~ 3-4 seconds of PLC start using current time ! ! How to obtain PLC START TIME ? ! ! ! PLC START TIME = CURRENT TIME – UPTIME
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 59 # it’s a cookie time! Current time via web interface ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Uptime via SNMP with hardcoded read community string “public”
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 60 # it’s a cookie time! !!! * 100 - calculation lapse !!!! To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 65535) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 65535) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) ! ! Still too many values to bruteforce …
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 61 # it’s a cookie time! But if user (admin) not logged out properly then after 7 logins it is not possible to login again ! We should restart PLC or wait 30 minutes (cookie expire time) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! We can minimize logout and issued cookies counters to 7 To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 7) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 7) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 62 # it’s a cookie time!
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 63 # it’s a cookie time! Exploitation dependences: ! • >= 1 success logins to PLC after last restart • SNMP enabled ! BUT IT DOES NOT NEED LOGIN AND PASSWORD !!! ! CVE Timeline: ! • End of July 2013 – vulnerability discovered • 5 August 2013 – vendor notified • 20 March 2014 – patch released, first public advisory
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 64 # heartbleed • a lot of software, devices etc. of popular vendors affected • it’ll be long long story (because of patch management and devices with lifecycle ~10-15 yers) • check https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories for openssl vulns ! Siemens also vulnerable (ICSA-14-105-03B): • eLAN-8.2 eLAN prior to 8.3.3 •WinCC OA only V3.12 • S7-1500 V1.5 • CP1543-1 V1.1 • APE 2.0 ! ! ! DEMO: winccoa-heartbleed
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 65 # S7 protocol ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Standard port 102/TCP ! By Siemens terms it is ISO-on-TCP (RFC 1006) based communication protocol
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 66 # S7 protocol Materials: ! • “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs” by Dillon Beresford • wireshark dissector • libnodave - free communication library • snap7 - open source communication suite • plcscan
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 67 # S7 protocol • based on iso-tcp -> block oriented protocol • block - PDU (Protocol Data Unit) • functions and commands oriented -> each frame contains function request or reply to it ! S7 commands: • plc start/stop cpu • firmware update • read/write data (blocks, tags) • system info • authentication • etc…
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 68 # S7 protocol History of S7: • S5 Communication (FETCH/WRITE, Sinec H1) • S7 Communication • “Another” S7 Communication ! Simply “another” S7 looks like: !! TCP : HEADER | ISO TCP ! ISO TCP: TPKT | COTP | S7 PDU
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 69 # S7 protocol • For old versions: wireshark dissectors, libraries, simulators. ! • Because we know all about that versions of protocol. ! • But we know next to nothing about “another” S7. !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 70 # S7 protocol Find your target: • S7 200/300/400 family ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 71 # S7 protocol Find your target: • S7 1200/1500 family ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 72 # How to analyse protocols
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 73 # How to analyse protocols How to analyse protocols ? ! ! Rob Savoye, FOSDEM 2009 “Reverse engineering of proprietary protocols, tools and techniques” ! “Believe it or not, if you stare at the hex dumps long enough, you start to see the patterns” !!!
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 74 # How to analyse protocols
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 75 # How to analyse protocols show_byte_sequences.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 76 # How to analyse protocols s7-show-payloads.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 77 # How to analyse protocols s7-packet-structure.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 78 # tools recommendations ! Protocol analysing involves: ! • tcpdump, wireshark/tshark + dissectors (keep them up to date from original source) • hex editor • python, perl, etc. • scapy framework • tools like ncat, socat, strings, xxd • sysinternals suite • fuzzers (your own or for example Zulu fuzzer by NCC Group) • disassembler (not so often) ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 79 # How to analyse protocols Use your knowledge about protocols: ! • it’s a universal and complex approach • you can: • detect devices and their protocols • monitor state, commands, exchanging data • inject, modify, reply packets in real-time !! Because most of them INSECURE BY DESIGN ! real example?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 80 # real case Energetic turbine ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!! ! ! Simple UDP packet that set “speed” of turbine to 57 (min=0, max=100)
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 81 # real case What will happen if you send another packet, another value? ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 82 # real case Yes, you’re right ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 83 # outro all scripts, tools -> https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools ! ! greetz to: @scadasl @repdet @GiftsUngiven Dmitry Sklyarov !!!! QA ?
SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 84 # Thank you! ! SCADASTRANGELOVE ! PEACE IS OUR PROFESSION !!!!!!!!!! @atimorin atimorin@gmail.com !

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Scada deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms

  • 1. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms Aleksandr Timorin ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! HACK.LU 2014, 21-24 October 2014, Luxembourg
  • 2. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 2 # whoami ! • SCADA security researcher, main specialisation - industrial protocols • penetration tester • SCADAStrangeLove team member -> scadasl.org • speaker at PHDays, Power Of Community, Chaos Communication Congress (workshop), CONFidence etc. • @atimorin • [email protected]
  • 3. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 3 # whoami
  • 4. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 4 # agenda • intro to scada world • current situation in ICS network security • overview of industrial protocols • well-known protocols: profinet, modbus, dnp3, goose • go to particular: • IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) • IEC 61870-5-101/104 • FTE • Siemens S7 • how to analyse protocols • real case • outro: releases, QA
  • 5. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 5 # intro to scada world ICS - Industrial Control System SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition PLC - Programmable Logic Controller HMI - Human-Machine Interface RTU - Remote Telemetry Unit Sensor, Actuator ! … and much more ! ! !
  • 6. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 6 # intro to scada world many many vendors in the world: • siemens • advantech • citectscada • codesys • moxa • schneider electric • rslogics • general electric • wellintech • sielco sistemi • emerson • abb • advanced micro controls • …. problems in security: ! • each vendor - own protocol, technology etc. • out-of-date: don’t touch if it works! • patch management cycle ! ! wild wild industrial world
  • 7. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 7 # current situation in ICS network security ICS NETWORK absolutely unbreakable ???
  • 8. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 8 # current situation in ICS network security NO, because of: ! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WEP (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols
  • 9. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 9 # current situation in ICS network security !! ➡ typical network devices with default/crappy settings ➡ unpatched, old as dirt, full of junk software [malware] engineering workstations ➡ wireless AP with WER (if the best happend) ➡ low physical security ➡ … and ➡ industrial protocols
  • 10. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 10 # current situation in ICS network security How protocols live in the network ? ! • full expanse • not blocked by firewalls/switches • accessible between LAN segments • works from data link layer to application layer • easy to detect • easy to intercept, analyse, reproduce and reply (but not all ! )
  • 11. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 11 # overview of industrial protocols • modbus • profibus • profinet • dnp3 • ethernet/ip • s5/s7 (siemens protocols family) • CIP (rockwell automation) • cc-link (mitsubishi electric factory automation) • bacnet • iec 60870, iec 61850, iec 61107 • m-bus • zigbee • goose … iec - international electrotechnical commission
  • 12. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 12 # overview of industrial protocols
  • 13. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 13 # modbus • published by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 • widely used for connecting industrial electronic devices • in XX: through rs-232/rs-485 • in XXI: modbus tcp • standard port 502/tcp ! ! !
  • 14. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 14 # modbus functions: ! • data access: read/write coils, registers, file records • diagnostics: device identification • user defined functions ! ! ! tools: ! • wireshark dissector • plcscan ( https://code.google.com/p/plcscan/ ) • modbus-discover nse (by Alexander Rudakov) • modbus simulators ()
  • 15. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 15 # modbus security ? • no authentication • no encryption • no security ! transaction id: 2 bytes protocol id: 2 bytes (always 0) length: 2 bytes unit id: 1 byte function code: 1 byte data …
  • 16. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 16 # dnp3 DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol • first version in 1990 • standartized by IEEE only on 2010 • mainly used in water and electric industry • master - outstation communication • tcp/udp standard port 20000 ! tools: • wireshark dissector • free implementation https://code.google.com/p/dnp3/ ! security ? DNP3 Secure Authentication v5. First version in 2007. Add device and user authentication Data protection
  • 17. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 17 # dnp3 dnp3 frame: • header - 10 bytes • data - max 282 bytes ! header: • sync - 2 bytes • length -1 byte • link control - 1 byte • destination addr - 2 bytes • source addr - 2 bytes • crc - 2 bytes ! each device in network has unique address 1..65520 crc for every 16 bytes of data -> max frame len = 292 bytes work on iso/osi layers: data link layer, transport layer, application layer
  • 18. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 18 # profinet dcp PROFINET family ! • Profinet CBA/IO/PTCP/DCP • iec 61158, iec 61784 in 2003 • Ethernet type 0x8892 • exchange data in real-time cycles • multicast discovery devices and stations ! security ? • no encryption • no authentication • no security
  • 19. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 19 # profinet dcp PROFINET DCP - Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 20. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 20 # profinet dcp frame types: • request 0xfefe • response 0xfeff • get/set 0xfefd ! multicast identify (scapy code): payload=‘fefe05000401000200800004ffff’.decode(‘hex’) srp(Ether(type=0x8892, src=smac, dst=’01:0e:cf:00:00:00’)/payload) ! fefe request 05 service id: identify 00 service type: request 04010002 xid (request id) 0080 delay 0004 data len ff option: all ff suboption: all
  • 21. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 21 # profinet dcp • main interesting fields for playing is option and suboption • for example, set/get network info: opt 0x01, subopt 0x02 • led flashing: opt 0x05, subopt 0x03 ! so we can: • scan profinet supported devices and stations • change name of station • change ip, netmask, gateway • request full network info • LED flashing: PLC, HMI (simulates that smth wrong with device) • and much more
  • 22. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 22 # profinet dcp profinet dcp scanner (raw sockets and scapy versions) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! discover all devices (PC, PLC, HMI) in subnet !
  • 23. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 23 # profinet dcp profinet fuzzer: fuzz options and sub options on plc siemens s7-1200 ! CVE-2014-2252 “An attacker could cause the device to go into defect mode if specially crafted PROFINET packets are sent to the device. A cold restart is required to recover the system.” ! what is “specially crafted profinet packets” ?
  • 24. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 24 # profinet dcp CVE-2014-2252 ! just “set” request: set network info with all zero values. ! ip 0.0.0.0 mask 0.0.0.0 gw 0.0.0.0 !!!!
  • 25. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 25 # profinet dcp DEMO: CVE-2014-2252
  • 26. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 26 # goose GSE - Generic Substation Events - fast and reliable mechanism for transfer events data over entire substation networks: • IEC 61850 • multicast, broadcast mechanism ! GSE: • GOOSE: Generic Object Oriented Substations Events • GSSE: Generic Substation State Events
  • 27. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 27 # goose • data as grouped dataset • transmitted within 4 ms • works on second layer (Ethernet) of ISO/OSI model • using publisher-subscriber mechanism -> broadcast, multicast MAC addresses (publisher ~ sender, subscriber ~ receiver) • use VLAN (IEEE 802.1Q standard) • message priority level (by VLAN PCP - Priority Code Point - in TCI field of packet) • retransmission mechanism and a message state number (new or retransmitted) • brand independent (i.e., IDE - intelligent electronic devices by some vendors doesn’t require specific cables)
  • 28. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 28 # goose Attack scenarios: • easy to receive multicast or broadcast packets • easy to analyse, modify and reply packets • DDoS • by manipulating the state number in packet we can control the data set which transmitted in entire network (hijacking of communication channel) • VLAN hopping ! Tools: • wireshark dissector • easy to create your own scanner or injection tool • scapy based tool https://github.com/mdehus/goose-IEC61850-scapy
  • 29. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 29 # IEC 61850-8-1 IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS) !!!!! MMS - Manufacturing Message Specification
  • 30. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 30 # IEC 61850-8-1 • since 1980 • ISO 9501-1, 2003 • use ISO-TSAP as transport • standard tcp port 102 ! functions: • read/write tags, variables, domains (large unstructured data, i.e. program code) • start/stop/rewrite firmware on PLC • read/write/del files and directories ! security ? • simple methods whitelist • TLS (in theory, but in practice not supported by vendors and haven’t seen before in products) ! tools: • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts • emulator, open source libs
  • 31. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 31 # IEC 61850-8-1
  • 32. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 32 # IEC 61850-8-1 ~ nmap —script mms-identify.nse —script-args=‘mms-identify.timeout=500’ -p 102 <host> ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 33. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 33 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! mainly for gathering telemetry in electricity distribution and power system automation ! huge list of functions, depends on vendors implementation: • read/write tags • upload/download files • broadcast connected devices discovery • time sync • reset process command • query log files • etc. ! security ? • no auth, no encryption • simple ip address whitelist (ip of master devices defined on slaves)
  • 34. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 34 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 IEC 61870-5-101/104 ! standard tcp port 2404 ! tools: • simulators: sim104, mrts-ng etc. • wireshark dissector • python and nmap identify scripts
  • 35. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 35 # IEC 61870-5-101/104
  • 36. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 36 # IEC 61870-5-101/104 ~ nmap --script iec-identify.nse --script-args='iec-identify.timeout=500' -p 2404 <host> ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 37. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 37 # FTE Fault Tolerant Ethernet by Honeywell ! Provides robust and low-cost technology for industrial networks. Each FTE-node connected twice to network, support actual route table and exchanges route table with other nodes through multicast request. ! UDP as a transport. ! Proprietary protocol.
  • 38. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 38 # FTE ! attack vectors: • flood udp ports • send multicast packets with fake routing table ! ! multicast packet —> ! headers: 0x01000810 0x01a01001 send each second
  • 39. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 39 # FTE 0x23 node index ! 0x433330302023303335 node name (C300 #5) ! 0x44 and 0xca bytes of packets counter ! 0x32312032 part of firmware version full: EXP3 10.1-65.57 Sat Dec 06 20:22:33 2008 (Fri Nov 21 20:22:57 2008)
  • 40. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 40 # Siemens ! TIA Portal (Totally Intergated Automation Portal) !! TIA - intellectual kernel of more than 100000 products created last 15 years. !! What about users, passwords and permissions?
  • 41. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 41 # Siemens PLC read/write protection for main and critical operations: CPU start/stop/data change, project upload, firmware update, etc. ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 42. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 42 # Siemens TIA Portal PEData.plf passwords history ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! passwords in sha-1 but “helpful” redbox value: password_len * 2 + 1 srsly>? for what???
  • 43. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 43 # Siemens After notification Siemens “strengthened” users passwords and switched to md5… ! ! ! ! ! !!!! TIA Portal V12 UPD 3
  • 44. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 44 # Siemens s7 password hashes extractor ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 45. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 45 # Siemens Improve user rights ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!! User rights - 2 bytes after second md5 hash: 0x8001 —> 0xFFFF
  • 46. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 46 # Siemens SCADA <-> PLC auth scheme: ! scada -> plc: auth request scada <- plc: challenge scada -> plc: response = HMAC(SHA1(password), challenge) scada <- plc: auth result ! python scripts (for 1200 and 1500 Siemens S7 PLC) for extracting all challenge-responses, export to JtR format and simple bruteforce ! want to crack password? use john the ripper!
  • 47. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 47 # Siemens
  • 48. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 48 # Siemens Bruteforce PLC online! ! Use powerful THC-Hydra Tested on S7-300 PLC. Should work on S7-200, S7-400 ! ! ! ~ hydra -F -V -P ./wordlist/500-worst-passwords.txt s7-300://<host>
  • 49. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 49 # Siemens
  • 50. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 50 # it’s a cookie time! PRE-DEMO: plc-ownage
  • 51. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 51 # it’s a cookie time! • CVE-2014-2250, CVE-2014-2251 • SSA-654382, SSA-456423 • Affected devices: • Siemens S7-1200 PLC • Siemens S7-1500 PLC • CVSS Base Score: 8.3 ! ! !
  • 52. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 52 # it’s a cookie time! Tested on S7-1200 CPU 1212C, firmware V 2.2.0 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 53. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 53 # it’s a cookie time! PmzR9733Q8rG3LpwjCGZT9N/ocMAAQABAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! uLiHXZUTy2GMgjr1KmgmcNN/ocMAAQACAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! Mu/vgiIgtrxq0LVp26nkMtN/ocMAAQADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! tjH6vtNWCfa+QZHPDtCnKdN/ocMAAgADAAKK1woAqsgAAAAAAAAAAIrXIUM= ! ! ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b8b8875d9513cb618c823af52a682670d37fa1c30001000200028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! 32efef822220b6bc6ad0b569dba9e432d37fa1c30001000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! b631fabed35609f6be4191cf0ed0a729d37fa1c30002000300028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143
  • 54. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 54 # it’s a cookie time! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f + d37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f - ? d37fa1c3 - ? 0001 - ? 0001 - ? 00028ad7 - ? 0a00aac8 - ? 00000000000000008ad72143 - ?
  • 55. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 55 # it’s a cookie time! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f MD5 of ? (16 bytes) d37fa1c3 CONST (4 bytes) 0001 user logout counter (2 bytes) 0001 counter of issued cookies for this user (2 bytes) 00028ad7 value that doesn’t matter (4 bytes) 0a00aac8 user IP address (10.0.170.200) (4 bytes) 00000000000000008ad72143 value that doesn’t matter (12 bytes) ! ! ! So, what about 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ???
  • 56. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 56 # it’s a cookie time! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994fd37fa1c30001000100028ad70a00aac800000000000000008ad72143 ! ! 3e6cd1f7bdf743cac6dcba708c21994f ! ! MD5( NEXT 26 BYTES OF COOKIE + 16BYTES OF SECRET + 2 NULL BYTES) ! ! What is SECRET ?
  • 57. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 57 # it’s a cookie time! SECRET generates after PLC start by ~PRNG. ! PRNG is a little bit harder than standard C PRNG. ! SEED in {0x0000 , 0xFFFF} ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! It’s too much for bruteforce (PLC so tender >_<)
  • 58. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 58 # it’s a cookie time! What about SEED ? SEED very often depends on time value ! SEED = PLC START TIME + 320 ! 320 by practical way: secret generates after ~ 3-4 seconds of PLC start using current time ! ! How to obtain PLC START TIME ? ! ! ! PLC START TIME = CURRENT TIME – UPTIME
  • 59. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 59 # it’s a cookie time! Current time via web interface ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Uptime via SNMP with hardcoded read community string “public”
  • 60. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 60 # it’s a cookie time! !!! * 100 - calculation lapse !!!! To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 65535) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 65535) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100) ! ! Still too many values to bruteforce …
  • 61. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 61 # it’s a cookie time! But if user (admin) not logged out properly then after 7 logins it is not possible to login again ! We should restart PLC or wait 30 minutes (cookie expire time) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! We can minimize logout and issued cookies counters to 7 To generate cookie we should brute: • logout number (2 bytes, max 7) • number of issued cookies (2 bytes, max 7) • seed value (2 bytes, but max 100)
  • 62. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 62 # it’s a cookie time!
  • 63. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 63 # it’s a cookie time! Exploitation dependences: ! • >= 1 success logins to PLC after last restart • SNMP enabled ! BUT IT DOES NOT NEED LOGIN AND PASSWORD !!! ! CVE Timeline: ! • End of July 2013 – vulnerability discovered • 5 August 2013 – vendor notified • 20 March 2014 – patch released, first public advisory
  • 64. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 64 # heartbleed • a lot of software, devices etc. of popular vendors affected • it’ll be long long story (because of patch management and devices with lifecycle ~10-15 yers) • check https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories for openssl vulns ! Siemens also vulnerable (ICSA-14-105-03B): • eLAN-8.2 eLAN prior to 8.3.3 •WinCC OA only V3.12 • S7-1500 V1.5 • CP1543-1 V1.1 • APE 2.0 ! ! ! DEMO: winccoa-heartbleed
  • 65. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 65 # S7 protocol ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Standard port 102/TCP ! By Siemens terms it is ISO-on-TCP (RFC 1006) based communication protocol
  • 66. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 66 # S7 protocol Materials: ! • “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs” by Dillon Beresford • wireshark dissector • libnodave - free communication library • snap7 - open source communication suite • plcscan
  • 67. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 67 # S7 protocol • based on iso-tcp -> block oriented protocol • block - PDU (Protocol Data Unit) • functions and commands oriented -> each frame contains function request or reply to it ! S7 commands: • plc start/stop cpu • firmware update • read/write data (blocks, tags) • system info • authentication • etc…
  • 68. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 68 # S7 protocol History of S7: • S5 Communication (FETCH/WRITE, Sinec H1) • S7 Communication • “Another” S7 Communication ! Simply “another” S7 looks like: !! TCP : HEADER | ISO TCP ! ISO TCP: TPKT | COTP | S7 PDU
  • 69. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 69 # S7 protocol • For old versions: wireshark dissectors, libraries, simulators. ! • Because we know all about that versions of protocol. ! • But we know next to nothing about “another” S7. !
  • 70. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 70 # S7 protocol Find your target: • S7 200/300/400 family ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 71. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 71 # S7 protocol Find your target: • S7 1200/1500 family ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 72. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 72 # How to analyse protocols
  • 73. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 73 # How to analyse protocols How to analyse protocols ? ! ! Rob Savoye, FOSDEM 2009 “Reverse engineering of proprietary protocols, tools and techniques” ! “Believe it or not, if you stare at the hex dumps long enough, you start to see the patterns” !!!
  • 74. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 74 # How to analyse protocols
  • 75. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 75 # How to analyse protocols show_byte_sequences.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 76. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 76 # How to analyse protocols s7-show-payloads.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 77. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 77 # How to analyse protocols s7-packet-structure.py ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 78. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 78 # tools recommendations ! Protocol analysing involves: ! • tcpdump, wireshark/tshark + dissectors (keep them up to date from original source) • hex editor • python, perl, etc. • scapy framework • tools like ncat, socat, strings, xxd • sysinternals suite • fuzzers (your own or for example Zulu fuzzer by NCC Group) • disassembler (not so often) ! !
  • 79. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 79 # How to analyse protocols Use your knowledge about protocols: ! • it’s a universal and complex approach • you can: • detect devices and their protocols • monitor state, commands, exchanging data • inject, modify, reply packets in real-time !! Because most of them INSECURE BY DESIGN ! real example?
  • 80. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 80 # real case Energetic turbine ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!! ! ! Simple UDP packet that set “speed” of turbine to 57 (min=0, max=100)
  • 81. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 81 # real case What will happen if you send another packet, another value? ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 82. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 82 # real case Yes, you’re right ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
  • 83. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 83 # outro all scripts, tools -> https://github.com/atimorin/scada-tools ! ! greetz to: @scadasl @repdet @GiftsUngiven Dmitry Sklyarov !!!! QA ?
  • 84. SCADA deep inside: protocols and security mechanisms HACK.LU 2014 84 # Thank you! ! SCADASTRANGELOVE ! PEACE IS OUR PROFESSION !!!!!!!!!! @atimorin [email protected] !