SEC 573 Project 1 2.22.15

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Timothy S. Haney
SEC 573: E-Business Security
Research Project 1
Sony Breach
Professor Ed Sadeghi
Week 3
2/22/15

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Table of Contents
Company Overview…………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………….3
Analysis……………………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………….………3
Hacker Warning Picture…………………………………………….…………………………………………………………..….4
Phishing Diagram………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………….…….5
Solutions……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8
Kill Chain Model Diagram…………………………………………………………………………………………………………13
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….13
References……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………..…15

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Company Overview
Sony Corporation of America is based in New York, and is a subsidiary of Japan’s Sony
Corporation. Sony’s principle businesses include Sony Music Entertainment Inc., Sony/ATV
Music Publishing, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Sony Electronics Inc., and Sony Computer
Entertainment Inc. Sony announced total revenue of $75.5 billion in 2014, the highest the
figure has been since 2008 (Statista, 2015). Sony specializes in producing movies, music, game
consoles, and personal electronics, among other product and services.
Analysis
On November 22, 2014, a group calling itself #GOP (the Guardians of Peace), displayed a
screen shot on every company PC showing a red skull with warnings and threats of extortion.
Sony’s Twitter accounts were also seized by the hackers, who posted an image of Sony CEO
Michael Lynton in hell (Zetter, 2014). It was at this moment when many servers and PCs started
crashing. The network was unusable and had to be shut down. The hackers were believed to be
from North Korea, and had supposedly infiltrated Sony’s systemfor approximately a few
months to a year before anyone was aware. The attackers appeared to be skilled and very
knowledgeable about Sony’s system. In the months prior to the warnings posted on the PCs,
the hackers leaked large amounts of highly sensitive information online in the form of
unreleased movies and film scripts, network usernames and passwords, network architecture
information, employee health care data, salary data, social security numbers, and email
communications (Alvarez, 2014; Krebs on Security, 2014). Approximately 100 terabytes of data
were stolen from Sony’s systems (Zetter, 2014).

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Fig. 1: Screenshot of the “red skull”warningthatappeared on Sony’s computers on the day the GOP
hacker group made themselves known (Zetter, 2014).
It is still unclear exactly how this breach occurred. Many hacks of this type start with a
phishing attack, which involves sending emails to employees to get them to click on malicious
attachments or links to websites where malware is actively downloaded to their machines
(Zetter, 2014). The other, more likely scenario involves the hackers obtaining the user
credentials from a disgruntled employee in exchange for money or revenge. Once the attackers
possessed the administrator credentials, they were able to map the network and gain access to
other protected systems. This access enabled them to look at the network architecture for
servers and databases around the world, and obtain all of the usernames and passwords for
this equipment. Within the information they obtained was a list of routers, switches, and load
balancers with usernames and passwords to administer them. Sony had to completely shut
down its network once it detected the attack in order to re-structure and secure the network.

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Fig. 2: Graphic describingtheprocess of a malwarephishingattack commonly used to enable hackers to obtain
usernames and passwords fromusers.
This event was extremely damaging to Sony’s reputation. It was very embarrassing to
have all of this sensitive data leaked online. More importantly for Sony’s bottom line, however,
was that the stolen data also included the script for an unreleased TV show pilot by Vince
Gilligan, the creator of Breaking Bad, as well as full copies of several Sony films, most of which
had not been released in theaters yet (Zetter, 2014).
An FBI warning was released the week of the Sony hack alerting companies and
organizations about destructive malware designed to destroy data. The alert warned users
about malware capable of wiping data from systems in such an effective way as to make the
data unrecoverable (Zetter, 2014). The memo warned about how the malware has the
capability to overwrite a victim host’s master boot record (MBR) and all data files. The

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overwriting of data files makes it extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible, to recover the
data using standard forensic methods (Zetter, 2014).
Once analyzed, the malware was shown to contain a hard-coded list that named 50
internal Sony computer systems based in the U.S. and U.K. that the malware was attacking, as
well as the log-in credentials it used to access them. To do the wiping, the attackers used a
driver from a commercially-available product designed to be used by system administrators for
legitimate maintenance of systems. The product is called RawDisk and is made by Eldos. The
driver is a kernel-mode driver used to securely delete data from hard drives or for forensic
purposes to access memory (Zetter, 2014).
Some of the malware files examined appear to have been compiled on a machine that
was using Korean language. This refers to the encoding language on a computer, which is the
language spoken by the user. The FBI has claimed it hacked North Korea a year ago, and has
evidence from the malware which it released on the North Korean network indicating the IP
addresses of the known Korean hackers are the same as the IP addresses used in the attack
against Sony. The hack also coincided with the releasing of the movie The Interview, about an
assassination attempt by the U.S. on Kim Jong Un, leader of North Korea.
The potential damages to Sony for the stolen data are loss of reputation, a drop in stock
price, and a decrease in consumer confidence. People will be less likely to shop at Sony for fear
of having their credit card information leaked online on the Internet for everyone to see. Sony
will lose out a lot of potential revenue for the movies and scripts which were leaked online.

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Potential employees may not want to work at Sony for fear of their private information being
hacked.
This hack had a noted effect on data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Data
confidentiality is affected when unauthorized individuals or groups have access to sensitive
information. In the case of the Sony breach, when the private company’s information, movies,
medical history, and other sensitive data was leaked online, this affected data confidentiality.
Sony’s data integrity was affected when the malware deleted the files from the servers and
databases. Data integrity is affected when data is altered or changed. When the hackers shut
down the systemby deleting the MBR on servers and databases making the network unusable,
Sony had to shut down and re-architect the network, thus affecting data availability. Data
availability is affected when the data is not available to use.
For risk assessment of assets, risk equals vulnerability multiplied by threat. We assess
assets for vulnerabilities and remove them to decrease risk. We still have to take into account
the potential threats. A threat is an object, agent, or event that could cause damage to the
organization’s assets. Threats typically cannot be eliminated altogether. Acts of nature, for
instance, are beyond our control; so, too, are most threats. We can prosecute a hacker, but we
cannot eliminate the threat that hackers pose. According to Verizon’s Data Breach
Investigation Report (DBIR), 92% of the attacks in the last ten years have been either cyber-
espionage, DoS attacks, crimeware, web application attacks, insider misuse, miscellaneous
errors, physical theft & loss, payment card skimmers, or point-of-sale intrusions (Verizon,
2015).

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According to the Verizon DBIR, the most likely attacks are web application attacks and
cyber-espionage (Verizon, 2015). The threat for the Sony breach was probably a combination
of cyber-espionage and insider misuse. It is likely an insider gave administrator credentials to
the hackers. Once inside the network, the hackers took advantage of the unencrypted
passwords for all of the servers, databases, routers, and switches around the world, which were
easily accessible in one data folder. The fact that all these important passwords were
unencrypted is an indicator of compromise (IOC). The threat (in this situation, the group of
hackers) could use this information to cause a lot of damage. Another IOC could be if one of
the hackers left a USB drive in the parking lot of Sony and one of the Sony employees plugged it
into the system, giving the attackers access to the network. To mitigate these threats,
Lockheed Martin’s Computer Incident Response Teamhas created an intelligence-driven
defense process, Cyber Kill Chain, which allows information security professionals to proactively
remediate and mitigate advanced threats in the future. By using this tool, Sony could anticipate
what the threats will do and put controls into place to minimize the threat.
Solutions
There are potentially many controls Sony could put into place to mitigate potential
threats. One control to put into place could be to stop a disgruntled employee with escalated
privileges from attacking or allowing the network to be attacked by outside intruders. A
common challenge organizations are faced with is balancing end user productivity with security.
Sony leaned too far towards a user friendly system, allowing the attackers to move freely
throughout the organization once compromised. It is typical that companies which permit
users to run as administrators are more susceptible to a breach. If this was the entry point,

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removing end user admin permission would be a key change (Tribbey, 2014). The users would
have only need-to-know access—for example, the ability of systems admins to perform
application and database privileges would be restricted (Quora, 2014).
The passwords that the hackers found were in clear-text documents. A very obvious
control to put into place would be encryption of all passwords on the shared network and
desktops. Attackers would have a much tougher time obtaining passwords if they were
encrypted. A policy stating that no passwords can be stored in clear-text should be
implemented and must be enforced.
Another control to put into place would be user awareness training detailing best
practices for security. It would also explain how to avoid common phishing scams. A strong
spam blocker could be implemented from Microsoft. The product will send malicious emails
with attachments to the spam folder to be flagged and checked.
Sony could hire a new CISO (chief information security officer) to rewrite Sony’s security
policies and procedures to coincide with best practices and standards. This officer would
attempt to go above and beyond minimum requirements to gain back the confidence in their
company which was lost due to the breach. The CISO would be responsible for configuring all
tools properly. Companies have many information security tools, but they do no good unless
configured properly. The CISO must also put the processes in place to monitor and use the
tools correctly. Tools are useless without processes. The CISO should implement a plan for
regular audits and an incident response plan (DRP/BCP), which should be tested regularly.

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Sony did not manage the personally identifiable information well. This information
could be segmented and isolated from the rest of the network, along with encryption. It should
go on the high risk asset list to be watched over more carefully than less important data.
A new policy could be put into place to not allow USB ports to upload/download
information. The product USB Block will prevent theft and data leakage of important files,
documents and source codes from devices like USB Drives, CD/DVD, and network computers.
Sony can white-list their own USB drives and devices. Whenever an unauthorized device is
detected, a password prompt comes up (USB Block, 2015).
Sony’s attackers indicated on screenshots that their doors were no longer locked. Sony
could hire security guards to increase physical security to check for intruders piggybacking an
employee at the entrance. A badge should be required to enter the garage, garage elevator,
the building, and to use the elevator in the building. High-resolution cameras should be
installed everywhere to view license plates and faces.
Sony could invest in some tools to detect the intruders while they are still in the
beginning enumeration phase of hacking. The FireEye network security malware tool
recognizes the behavior of viruses while in transit. This tool blocks zero-day web exploits due
to the behavioral anomaly technology. It also blocks multi-protocol callbacks to help scale their
advanced defenses across a range of deployments. When the viruses call back to the sender
(attacker) the software tracks the destination of the callback to find a location. This product is
designed to detect malware on a system. This tool would prevent future attacks using malware
to steal sensitive company data (FireEye, 2014).

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Another useful product Sony could implement is the log management device Splunk.
Splunk provides the industry-leading software to consolidate and index any log and machine
data, including structured, unstructured, and complex multi-line application logs. You can
collect, store, index, search, correlate, visualize, analyze, and report on any machine-generated
data to identify and resolve operational and security issues in a faster, repeatable, and more
affordable way. It is an enterprise—ready, fully integrated solution for log management data
collection, storage and visualization (Splunk, 2015). This tool would help accumulate the data
needed to find an intruder. The event data goes from Splunk to sys log server to be stored.
The tool Exabeam could be used for behavioral analysis. Exabeam adds security
intelligence on top of existing SIEM (security information and event management) and log
management data repositories to understand a complete picture of the user session, allowing
the technology to detect and assemble the full attack chain. The Exabeam User Intelligence
solution uses a powerful combination of session assembly and Stateful User Tracking, behavior
analysis and risk scoring to automatically determine the likelihood of an attack and prioritize
responses. The product specializes in behavior analysis, but performs many functions, such as
enhance current SIEM investments, detect threats in real time, and customize deployment. The
behavior analysis learns user and peer group behavior and characteristics across multiple
dimensions. Dimensions can be time, day of the week, location, or object access, and each
dimension is compared against the normal baseline. Then anomalies are identified (Exabeam,
2015). This tool will notify the security team that something is not right within a certain user’s
behavior because it would not be consistent with the observed pattern of normal user
behavior.

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The managed security services of Solutionary could really help out Sony’s security team.
Solutionary delivers flexible managed security services that work the way the clients want;
enhancing their existing security program, infrastructure, and personnel while relieving the
information security and compliance burden. Solutionary combines deep security expertise and
proven operational processes with the patented, cloud-based ActiveGuard security and
compliance platform to improve security and address compliance with regulations such as PCI
DSS (payment card industry data security standard), HIPAA (health insurance portability and
accountability act), GLBA (Gramm–Leach–Bliley act), Sarbanes-Oxley, and more (Solutionary,
2015). Sony likely has millions of events generated each day for their security team to look
over. Solutionary has trained engineers ready to take over that monitoring position.
Companies like Target could have used Solutionary to catch the high risk events. Sony could
use this service to notice the attackers once the notification is generated by Splunk.
The kill chain model has seven phases, which are reconnaissance, weaponization,
delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objectives. The steps
involve gathering information, creating a malicious program to infiltrate, delivery of the
program, installing the program on the network, taking command of the network, achieving the
goal with keyboard power over the network. These threats are much tougher now than 15
years ago. The threats now are considered APT (advanced persistent threat). The APT will get
on the network and stay as long as possible until detected. Companies with weak information
security infrastructures are easy prey for these advanced attackers.

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Conclusion
There are many policies, procedures, products, and services that will effectively mitigate
the risk of the e-commerce threat. There were many IOCs (indicators of compromise) revealed

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at the Sony breach which should indicate to Sony that they must implement controls to
mitigate the threat. Sony should use these IOCs to create a kill chain framework. The kill chain
framework will focus on the threat instead of the assets. The threat would exploit the
weaknesses I have described earlier to infiltrate the network. Controls will be put into place to
mitigate the threat. The changes should start with a new CISO, enforcing industry policies and
procedures for best practices. The FireEye, Splunk, and Exabeamtools, if implemented with
proper processes, will effectively mitigate a similar intruder in the future by noticing behavior
anomalies and flagged events. The services of Soutionary could facilitate that idea to be
handled properly. The users should not have too many privileges in case of a disgruntled
employee, passwords should not be stored in clear-text (policy of encrypting passwords should
be implemented), and USBs should not be used to upload or download information from the
network. The CISO should implement user awareness training for better email security, stricter
physical security, regular audits, and DRP/BCP with regular testing.

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References
Alvarez, E. (2014, December 10). Sony Pictures hack: the whole story. Retrieved from
http://www.engadget.com/2014/12/10/sony-pictures-hack-the-whole-story/
Exabeam. (2015). Exabeam Solution Overview. Retrieved from http://www.exabeam.com/wp-
content/uploads/Exabeam_SolutionOverview_v0115.pdf
FireEye. (2014). FireEye Network Threat Prevention Platform. Retrieved from
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/products/pdfs/fireeye-
network-threat-prevention-platform.pdf
Krebs on Security. (2014, December 2). Sony Breach May Have Exposed Employee Healthcare,
Salary Data. Retrieved from krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/sony-breach-may-have-exposed-
employee-healthcare-salary-data/
Quora. (2014, December 23). What Do Security Professionals Think Sony Should Have Done
Differently Between the 2011 Playstation Hack and the 2014 Sony Pictures Hack to Protect
Themselves? Retrieved from http://www.quora.com/What-do-security-professionals-think-
Sony-should-have-done-differently-between-the-2011-Playstation-Hack-and-the-2014-Sony-
Pictures-Hack-to-protect-themselves
Solutionary. (2015). Managed Security Services | Solutionary. Retrieved from
http://www.solutionary.com/services/managed-security-services/
Splunk. (2015). Log management solutions: tap log data to see what's happening in your
business | Splunk. Retrieved from http://www.splunk.com/en_us/solutions/solution-areas/log-
management.html
Statista. (2015, January). Sony business segments sales share 2014 | Statistic. Retrieved from
http://www.statista.com/statistics/279272/proportion-of-sonys-sales-by-business/Zetter, K.
(2014, December 3).
Tribbey, C. (2014, December 22). Experts: Lessons to be learned from Sony Cyber Attack
(CDSA): Content Delivery and Security Association. Retrieved from
http://www.cdsaonline.org/latest-news/experts-lessons-to-be-learned-from-sony-cyber-attack-
cdsa/
USB Block. (2015). USB Block - Data Leak Prevention Software - Free Download. Retrieved from
http://www.newsoftwares.net/usb-block/
Verizon. (2015, January). 2014 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) | Verizon
Enterprise Solutions. Retrieved from http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/
Zetter (December, 2014) Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far |
WIRED. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/

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