Security issue in cloud by himanshu tiwari
- 1. Security Issues in Cloud Computing Himanshu Tiwari 11402618 Btech-CSE
- 2. Talk Objectives • Present cloud issues/characteristics that create interesting security problems • Identify a few security issues within this framework • Propose some approaches to addressing these issues – Preliminary ideas to think about
- 3. Cloud Computing Background • Features – Use of internet-based services to support business process – Rent IT-services on a utility-like basis • Attributes – Rapid deployment – Low startup costs/ capital investments – Costs based on usage or subscription – Multi-tenant sharing of services/ resources • Essential characteristics – On demand self-service – Ubiquitous network access – Location independent resource pooling – Rapid elasticity – Measured service • “Cloud computing is a compilation of existing techniques and technologies, packaged within a new infrastructure paradigm that offers improved scalability, elasticity, business agility, faster startup time, reduced management costs, and just-in-time availability of resources”
- 4. Cloud Models • Delivery Models – SaaS – PaaS – IaaS • Deployment Models – Private cloud – Community cloud – Public cloud – Hybrid cloud • We propose one more Model: Management Models (trust and tenancy issues) – Self-managed – 3rd party managed (e.g. public clouds and VPC)
- 5. Cloud Computing: A Massive Concentration of Resources • Also a massive concentration of risk – expected loss from a single breach can be significantly larger – concentration of “users” represents a concentration of threats • “Ultimately, you can outsource responsibility but you can’t outsource accountability.”
- 6. Cloud Computing: who should use it? • Cloud computing definitely makes sense if your own security is weak, missing features, or below average. • Ultimately, if – the cloud provider’s security people are “better” than yours (and leveraged at least as efficiently), – the web-services interfaces don’t introduce too many new vulnerabilities, and – the cloud provider aims at least as high as you do, at security goals, then cloud computing has better security.
- 7. Problems Associated with Cloud Computing • Most security problems stem from: – Loss of control – Lack of trust (mechanisms) – Multi-tenancy • These problems exist mainly in 3rd party management models – Self-managed clouds still have security issues, but not related to above
- 8. Loss of Control in the Cloud • Consumer’s loss of control – Data, applications, resources are located with provider – User identity management is handled by the cloud – User access control rules, security policies and enforcement are managed by the cloud provider – Consumer relies on provider to ensure • Data security and privacy • Resource availability • Monitoring and repairing of services/resources
- 9. Lack of Trust in the Cloud • A brief deviation from the talk – (But still related) – Trusting a third party requires taking risks • Defining trust and risk – Opposite sides of the same coin (J. Camp) – People only trust when it pays (Economist’s view) – Need for trust arises only in risky situations • Defunct third party management schemes – Hard to balance trust and risk – e.g. Key Escrow (Clipper chip) – Is the cloud headed toward the same path?
- 10. Multi-tenancy Issues in the Cloud • Conflict between tenants’ opposing goals – Tenants share a pool of resources and have opposing goals • How does multi-tenancy deal with conflict of interest? – Can tenants get along together and ‘play nicely’ ? – If they can’t, can we isolate them? • How to provide separation between tenants?
- 11. Security Issues in the Cloud • In theory, minimizing any of the issues would help: – Loss of Control • Take back control – Data and apps may still need to be on the cloud – But can they be managed in some way by the consumer? – Lack of trust • Increase trust (mechanisms) – Technology – Policy, regulation – Contracts (incentives): topic of a future talk – Multi-tenancy • Private cloud – Takes away the reasons to use a cloud in the first place • VPC: its still not a separate system • Strong separation
- 12. Minimize Lack of Trust: Policy Language • Consumers have specific security needs but don’t have a say-so in how they are handled – What the heck is the provider doing for me? – Currently consumers cannot dictate their requirements to the provider (SLAs are one-sided) • Standard language to convey one’s policies and expectations – Agreed upon and upheld by both parties – Standard language for representing SLAs – Can be used in a intra-cloud environment to realize overarching security posture • Create policy language with the following characteristics: – Machine-understandable (or at least processable), – Easy to combine/merge and compare – Examples of policy statements are, “requires isolation between VMs”, “requires geographical isolation between VMs”, “requires physical separation between other communities/tenants that are in the same industry,” etc. – Need a validation tool to check that the policy created in the standard language correctly reflects the policy creator’s intentions (i.e. that the policy language is semantically equivalent to the user’s intentions).
- 13. Minimize Lack of Trust: Certification • Certification – Some form of reputable, independent, comparable assessment and description of security features and assurance – Sarbanes-Oxley, DIACAP, DISTCAP, etc (are they sufficient for a cloud environment?) • Risk assessment – Performed by certified third parties – Provides consumers with additional assurance
- 14. Minimize Loss of Control in the Cloud • Monitoring • Utilizing different clouds • Access control management
- 15. Minimize Loss of Control: Monitoring • Cloud consumer needs situational awareness for critical applications – When underlying components fail, what is the effect of the failure to the mission logic – What recovery measures can be taken (by provider and consumer) • Requires an application-specific run-time monitoring and management tool for the consumer – The cloud consumer and cloud provider have different views of the system – Enable both the provider and tenants to monitor the the components in the cloud that are under their control – Provide mechanisms that enable the provider to act on attacks he can handle. • infrastructure remapping (create new or move existing fault domains) • shutting down offending components or targets (and assisting tenants with porting if necessary • Repairs – Provide mechanisms that enable the consumer to act on attacks that he can handle (application-level monitoring). • RAdAC (Risk-adaptable Access Control) • VM porting with remote attestation of target physical host • Provide ability to move the user’s application to another cloud
- 16. Minimize Loss of Control: Utilize Different Clouds • The concept of ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one basket’ – Consumer may use services from different clouds through an intra-cloud or multi-cloud architecture – Propose a multi-cloud or intra-cloud architecture in which consumers • Spread the risk • Increase redundancy (per-task or per-application) • Increase chance of mission completion for critical applications – Possible issues to consider: • Policy incompatibility (combined, what is the overarching policy?) • Data dependency between clouds • Differing data semantics across clouds • Knowing when to utilize the redundancy feature (monitoring technology) • Is it worth it to spread your sensitive data across multiple clouds? – Redundancy could increase risk of exposure
- 17. Minimize Loss of Control: Access Control • Many possible layers of access control – E.g. access to the cloud, access to servers, access to services, access to databases (direct and queries via web services), access to VMs, and access to objects within a VM – Depending on the deployment model used, some of these will be controlled by the provider and others by the consumer • Regardless of deployment model, provider needs to manage the user authentication and access control procedures (to the cloud) – Federated Identity Management: access control management burden still lies with the provider – Requires user to place a large amount of trust on the provider in terms of security, management, and maintenance of access control policies. This can be burdensome when numerous users from different organizations with different access control policies, are involved • Consumer-managed access control – Consumer retains decision-making process to retain some control, requiring less trust of the provider (i.e. PDP is in consumer’s domain) – Requires the client and provider to have a pre-existing trust relationship, as well as a pre- negotiated standard way of describing resources, users, and access decisions between the cloud provider and consumer. It also needs to be able to guarantee that the provider will uphold the consumer-side’s access decisions. – Should be at least as secure as the traditional access control model. – Facebook and Google Apps do this to some degree, but not enough control – Applicability to privacy of patient health records
- 18. PEP (intercepts all resource access requests from all client domains) PDP for cloud resource on Domain A Cloud Consumer in Domain B ACM (XACML policies) . . . resources Cloud Provider in Domain A IDP 1. Authn request 2. SAML Assertion 3. Resource request (XACML Request) + SAML assertion 4. Redirect to domain of resource owner 7. Send signed and encrypted ticket 5. Retrieve policy for specified resource 6. Determine whether user can access specified resource 7. Create ticket for grant/deny 8. Decrypt and verify signature 9. Retrieve capability from ticket 10. Grant or deny access based on capability Minimize Loss of Control: Access Control
- 19. Minimize Multi-tenancy in the Cloud • Can’t really force the provider to accept less tenants – Can try to increase isolation between tenants • Strong isolation techniques (VPC to some degree) – C.f. VM Side channel attacks (T. Ristenpart et al.) • QoS requirements need to be met • Policy specification – Can try to increase trust in the tenants • Who’s the insider, where’s the security boundary? Who can I trust? • Use SLAs to enforce trusted behavior
- 20. Last Thoughts: Local Host Security • Are local host machines part of the cloud infrastructure? – Outside the security perimeter – While cloud consumers worry about the security on the cloud provider’s site, they may easily forget to harden their own machines • The lack of security of local devices can – Provide a way for malicious services on the cloud to attack local networks through these terminal devices – Compromise the cloud and its resources for other users • With mobile devices, the threat may be even stronger – Users misplace or have the device stolen from them – Security mechanisms on handheld gadgets are often times insufficient compared to say, a desktop computer – Provides a potential attacker an easy avenue into a cloud system. – If a user relies mainly on a mobile device to access cloud data, the threat to availability is also increased as mobile devices malfunction or are lost • Devices that access the cloud should have – Strong authentication mechanisms – Tamper-resistant mechanisms – Strong isolation between applications – Methods to trust the OS – Cryptographic functionality when traffic confidentiality is required
- 21. Conclusion • Cloud computing is sometimes viewed as a reincarnation of the classic mainframe client-server model – However, resources are ubiquitous, scalable, highly virtualized – Contains all the traditional threats, as well as new ones • In developing solutions to cloud computing security issues it may be helpful to identify the problems and approaches in terms of – Loss of control – Lack of trust – Multi-tenancy problems
- 22. References 1. NIST (Authors: P. Mell and T. Grance), "The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing (ver. 15)," National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (October 7 2009). 2. J. McDermott, (2009) "Security Requirements for Virtualization in Cloud Computing," presented at the ACSAC Cloud Security Workshop, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 2009. 3. J. Camp. (2001), “Trust and Risk in Internet Commerce,” MIT Press 4. T. Ristenpart et al. (2009) “Hey You Get Off My Cloud,” Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, Chicago, Illinois, USA
- 23. References for Cloud Security • M. Armbrust, et al., "Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing," UC Berkeley Reliable Adaptive Distributed Systems LaboratoryFebruary 10 2009. • Cloud Security Alliance, "Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing, ver. 2.1," 2009. • M. Jensen, et al., "On Technical Security Issues in Cloud Computing," presented at the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing, Bangalore, India 2009. • P. Mell and T. Grance, "Effectively and Securely Using the Cloud Computing Paradigm," ed: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, 2009. • N. Santos, et al., "Towards Trusted Cloud Computing," in Usenix 09 Hot Cloud Workshop, San Diego, CA, 2009. • R. G. Lennon, et al., "Best practices in cloud computing: designing for the cloud," presented at the Proceeding of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN conference companion on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications, Orlando, Florida, USA, 2009. • P. Mell and T. Grance, "The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing (ver. 15)," National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology LaboratoryOctober 7 2009. • C. Cachin, et al., "Trusting the cloud," SIGACT News, vol. 40, pp. 81-86, 2009. • J. Heiser and M. Nicolett, "Assessing the Security Risks of Cloud Computing," Gartner 2008. • A. Joch. (2009, June 18) Cloud Computing: Is It Secure Enough? Federal Computer Week.
- 24. Thank You !!!
Editor's Notes
- #4: Government and Military sectors: complicated procurement rules and stringent security requirements Cloud-based categories: Cloud-based applications (SAAS) Cloud-based development (e.g. Google App Engine) Cloud-based infrastructure (e.g. Amazon’s EC2)
- #5: Trust and tenancy issues as well as loss of control related to the management model
- #8: Data mobility: the abiltiy to share data between cloud services Where does data reside? - out-of-state, out-of-country issues Security Concerns for government in particular FISMA How to certify and accredit cloud computing providers under FISMA (e.g. ISO 27001)
- #10: Chiles and McMakin (1996) define trust as increasing one’s vulnerability to the risk of opportunistic behavior of another whose behavior is not under one’s control in a situation in which the costs of violating the trust are greater than the benefits of upholding the trust. Trust here means mostly lack of accountability and verifiability
- #11: Who are my neighbors? What is their objective? They present another facet of risk and trust requirements
- #12: While VPC providers argue that they provide superior isolation, the fact of the matter is that your data is not a separate physical system: your data is still stored on actual servers along with other consumers’ data, but logically separated. If the actual server fails, your data and applications stored on it are lost. Also, there needs to be a high level of trust as to the degree of isolation provided.
- #13: These SLAs typically state the high level policies of the provider (e.g. Will maintain uptime of 98%) and do not allow cloud consumers to dictate their requirements to the provider. COI clouds in particular have specific security policy requirements that must be met by the provider, due to the nature of COIs and the missions they are used for. These requirements need to be communicated to the provider and the provider needs to provide some way of stating that the requirements can be met. Cloud consumers and providers need a standard way of representing their security requirements and capabilities. Consumers also need a way to verify that the provided infrastructure and its purported security mechanisms meet the requirements stated in the consumer’s policy (proof of assertions). For example, if the consumer’s policy requires isolation of VMs, the provider can create an assertion statement that says it uses cache separation to support VM isolation.
- #16: When the underlying components fail in the cloud, the effect of the failures to the mission logic needs to be known so that correct recovery measures can be performed. We propose an application-specific run-time monitoring and management tool. With this tool, the application logic can remain on the consumer’s host computer. This allows the consumer to centrally monitor all aspects of the application as well as data flow. Since all outputs from underlying services are sent to the application logic, any data incompatibility between services is not an issue. The capabilities of the run-time monitoring and management tool are as follows: 1) Enable application user to determine the status of the cloud resources that may be used to run the application (across multiple clouds), 2) Enable application user to determine the real-time security posture and situational awareness of the application, 3) Provide the application user with the ability to move user’s application (or part of it) to another site (other VM in same cloud or different cloud altogether), 4) Provide the application user with the ability to change the application logic on the fly, 5) Provide communicate capabilities with cloud providers. There are a few cloud vendors such as NimSoft [41] and Hyperic [42] that provide application-specific monitoring tools that provide some of the above functionality. These monitoring tools may be further enhanced or used in conjunction with other tools to provide the degree of monitoring required. However, any tool that is to be used for military purposes must also receive some type of accreditation and certification procedure.
- #17: Differering data semantics example: does a data item labeld secret in one cloud have the same semantics as another piece of data also labeled secret in a different cliud?
- #18: In cloud computing (as well as other systems), there are many possible layers of access control. For example, access to the cloud, access to servers, access to services, access to databases (direct and queries via web services), access to VMs, and access to objects within a VM. Depending on the deployment model used, some of these will be controlled by the provider and others by the consumer. For example, Google Apps, a representative SaaS Cloud controls authentication and access to its applications, but users themselves can control access to their documents through the provided interface to the access control mechanism. In IaaS type approaches, the user can create accounts on its virtual machines and create access control lists for these users for services located on the VM. Regardless of the deployment model, the provider needs to manage the user authentication and access control procedures (to the cloud). While some providers allow federated authentication – enabling the consumer-side to manage its users, the access control management burden still lies with the provider. This requires the user to place a large amount of trust on the provider in terms of security, management, and maintenance of access control policies. This can be burdensome when numerous users from different organizations with different access control policies, are involved. This proposal focuses on access control to the cloud. However, the concepts here could be applied to access control at any level, if deemed necessary. We propose a way for the consumer to manage the access control decision-making process to retain some control, requiring less trust of the provider. Approach: This approach requires the client and provider to have a pre-existing trust relationship, as well as a pre-negotiated standard way of describing resources, users, and access decisions between the cloud provider and consumer. It also needs to be able to guarantee that the provider will uphold the consumer-side’s access decisions. Furthermore, we need to show that this approach is at least as secure as the traditional access control model. This approach requires the data owner to be involved in all requests. Therefore, frequent access scenarios should not use this method if traffic is a concern. However, many secure data outsourcing schemes require the user to grant keys/certificates to the query side, so that every time the user queries a database, the owner needs to be involved. Therefore, not much different than that so may not be a problem.
- #21: The lack of security of local devices can disrupt the consumer and also provide a way for malicious services on the cloud to attack local networks through these terminal devices. In today’s ubiquitous computing environment, the local host machine may well be a desktop computer, a portable laptop or mobile device. While cloud consumers worry about the security on the cloud provider’s site, they may easily forget to harden their own machines. The lack of security of a local host can compromise the cloud and its resources for other users. With mobile devices, the threat may be even stronger, as users misplace or have the device stolen from them. The security mechanisms on handheld gadgets are often times insufficient compared to say, a desktop computer, providing a potential attacker an easy avenue into a cloud system. If a user relies mainly on a mobile device to access cloud data, the threat to availability is also increased as mobile devices malfunction or are lost. Devices that access the cloud should have strong authentication mechanisms, should be tamper-resistant, and have cryptographic functionality when traffic confidentiality is required. Since this places a part of the security burden onto the consumer, the provider may need to stipulate in its policy or SLA. New approaches to mobile cloud computing in which applications lie in the cloud as opposed to on a smart phone, enable more sophisticated security mechanisms. Users connect to the cloud from their local host machines. In particular, many secure cloud data storing technologies require users to generate master keys (used to encrypt data or session keys) and store them on the local machine. If a malicious service in the cloud can tamper with the local machine and access these keys, confidentiality of data stored in the cloud is at risk. For example, a user’s computer can be a zombie that can be used to attack the cloud. Or it can contain malicious code that damages provider-side resources, affecting not only the provider, but all its other consumers as well. In today’s battle space, new technologies enable war fighters to use handheld devices to gather data for analysis at command centers. Therefore, the durability and robustness of these devices is a major concern not only for cloud computing but for general-purpose military use as well. Memory curtaining techniques for sensitive areas of memories such as those places where keys are stored (i.e. provides isolation of sensitive memory areas). Remote attestation or TPM type requirements.