SECURITY MODEL
 EVALUATION OF 3G
WIRELESS NETWORKS




          MERCY J
         ABINAYA K
                1
OVERVIEW
•   Abstract
•   Wireless Network
•   3G Wireless Network
•   Security Principles for 3 G
•   References
•   Conclusion


                                  2
ABSTRACT
• 3G mobile phone networks are currently the most widely used
  wireless telephone networks in the world.
• While being an improvement over earlier analog
  systems, active attacks, authentication, encryption, channel
  hijack, inflexibility
• 3G mobile phone standards have been designed to address the
  issues in 2G and provide a better security model.
• Overview of security in 3G networks along with pointing out
  the known problems.
• Security features of 3G systems are presented and solved .


                                                             3
1G WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY
 Developed in 1980s and completed in early 1990’s
 1G was old analog system and supported the 1st generation of
   analog cell phones speed up to 2.4kbps
 Advance mobile phone system (AMPS) was first launched
   by the US and is a 1G mobile system
 Allows users to make voice calls in 1 country




                                                                 4
2G phones using global system for mobile communications
(GSM) were first used in Europe.
 GSM provides voice and limited data services and uses digital
modulation for improved audio quality.
Digital AMPS , CDMA were some of the 2G systems.




                                                                  5
To meet the growing demand in network
capacity, rates required for high speed data transfer
and multimedia applications , 3G standards started
evolving.
    It is based on the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) family of standards.
   3G technologies enable network operators to offer users
a wider range of more advanced services.
   Services include wide-area wireless voice
telephony, video-calls and broadband wireless data , all
in a mobile environment.
  The data are sent through the technology called
   Packet switching.Voice calls are interpreted
   through circuit switching.

                                                      6
FEATURES INCLUDES




                    7
3G Network Security Architecture
                Circuit
               Network                       Circuit/
                                            Signaling
                                            Gateway                   Mobility
                                                                      Manager
                                                     Feature
           Circuit
                              IN Services           Server(s)
           Switch
                              RNC                                 Call
                                                                  Agent
  Voice              Data +
                     Packet          IP Core
                     Voice
    RAC                              Network                      Packet Network
                                                                     (Internet)
                                                         Packet
                                                        Gateway
                                        IP RAN




      2G             2G/2.5G          3G

                                                                                   8
3G Security Principles
• Build on GSM security

• Correct problems with GSM security

• Add new security features



Source: 3GPP
                                        9
GSM Security Architecture




                            10
                              10
GSM Security Elements, 1
            Key functions: privacy, integrity and confidentiality


 Authentication
       Protect from unauthorized service access
       Based on the authentication algorithm A3(Ki, RAND)=> SRES
       Problems with inadequate algorithms
 Encryption
       Scramble bit streams to protect signaling and user data
       Ciphering algorithm A8(Ki, RAND) => Kc
                               A5(Kc, Data) => Encrypted Data
       Need stronger encryption
 Confidentiality
       Prevent intruder from identifying users by IMSI
       Temporary MSI
       Need more secure mechanism
                                                                    11
GSM Security Elements, 2
 SIM
       A removable hardware security module
       Manageable by network operators
       Terminal independent
 Secure Application Layer
       Secure application layer channel between subscriber module and
  home network
 Transparency
       Security features operate without user assistance
       Needs greater user visibility
 Minimized Trust
       Requires minimum trust between HE and SN


                                                                        12
Problems with GSM Security, 1
 Active Attacks
      Impersonating network elements such as false BTS is possible
 Key Transmission
      Cipher keys and authentication values are transmitted in clear within and
      between networks (IMSI, RAND, SRES, Kc)
 Limited Encryption Scope
      Encryption terminated too soon at edge of network to BTS
      Communications and signaling in the fixed network portion aren’t
      protected
      Designed to be only as secure as the fixed networks
 Channel Hijack
      Protection against radio channel hijack relies on encryption.
      However, encryption is not used in some networks.



                                                                                  13
Problems with GSM Security, 2
• Implicit Data Integrity
       No integrity algorithm provided
• Unilateral Authentication
       Only user authentication to the network is provided.
       No means to identify the network to the user.
• Weak Encryption Algorithms
       Key lengths are too short, while computation speed is increasing
       Encryption algorithm COMP 128 has been broken
       Replacement of encryption algorithms is quite difficult
• Unsecured Terminal
       IMEI is an unsecured identity
       Integrity mechanisms for IMEI are introduced late


                                                                          14
Problems with GSM Security, 3
 Lawful Interception & Fraud
       Considered as afterthoughts
 Lack of Visibility
       No indication to the user that encryption is on
       No explicit confirmation to the HE that authentication
  parameters are properly used in SN when subscribers roam
 Inflexibility
       Inadequate flexibility to upgrade and improve security
  functionality over time


                                                                15
New Security Features, 1
 Network Authentication
       The user can identify the network
 Explicit Integrity
       Data integrity is assured explicitly by use of integrity algorithms
       Also stronger confidentiality algorithms with longer keys
 Network Security
       Mechanisms to support security within and between networks
 Switch Based Security
       Security is based within the switch rather than the base station
 IMEI Integrity
       Integrity mechanisms for IMEI provided from the start



                                                                             16
New Security Features, 2
 Secure Services
       Protect against misuse of services provided by SN and HE
 Secure Applications
       Provide security for applications resident on USIM
 Fraud Detection
       Mechanisms to combating fraud in roaming situations
 Flexibility
       Security features can be extended and enhanced as required by new
       threats and services
 Visibility and Configurability
       Users are notified whether security is on and what level of security is
       available
       Users can configure security features for individual services
                                                                                 17
New Security Features, 3
 Compatibility
      Standardized security features to ensure world-wide interoperability and
      roaming
      At least one encryption algorithm exported on world-wide basis
 Lawful Interception
      Mechanisms to provide authorized agencies with certain information
      about subscribers




                                                                                 18
Evolution to 3G
          Drivers: Capacity, Data Speed, Cost
                                                               Expected market share


 TDMA                                               EDGE
                                      EDGE         Evolution
                                    3GPP Core
 GSM                  GPRS           Network                                   90%
                                       WCDMA             HSDPA/HSUPA
 PDC



cdmaOne               CDMA2000                                                 10%
                         1x          CDMA2000        CDMA2000
                                      1x EV/DO      EV/DO Rev A

  2G           First Step into 3G     3G phase 1               Evolved 3G
                                                                                19
CONCLUTION
 This paper presented a survey of three generations of mobile phone
   systems from a security perspective
 3G networks standards were evaluated within availability
   confidentiality- integrity framework and found to not be secure
 Hence New Security Features has been presented and solved.
 Finally, there is no experimental data supporting the claim that 3G
   systems aren’t secure.

 Future work can be geared toward filling those gaps.
References
•   3G TS 33.120 Security Principles and Objectives
    http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/_Specs/33120-300.pdf
•   3G TS 33.120 Security Threats and Requirements
    http://www.arib.or.jp/IMT-2011/ARIB-spec/ARIB/21133-310.PDF
•   Michael Walker “On the Security of 3GPP Networks”
    http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/mike_walker.pdf
•   Redl, Weber, Oliphant “An Introduction to GSM”
    Artech House, 2010
•   Joachim Tisal “GSM Cellular Radio Telephony”
    John Wiley & Sons, 2009
•   Lauri Pesonen “GSM Interception”
    http://www.dia.unisa.it/ads.dir/corso-security/www/CORSO-9900/a5/Netsec/netsec.html
•   3G TR 33.900 A Guide to 3rd Generation Security
    ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG3_Security/_Specs/33900-120.pdf
•   3G TS 33.102 Security Architecture
    ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/2000-12/R1999/33_series/33102-370.zip
•   3G TR 21.905 Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
    http://www.quintillion.co.jp/3GPP/Specs/21905-010.pdf
                                                                                          21
Are Their Any Questions??

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Security model evaluation of 3 g

  • 1. SECURITY MODEL EVALUATION OF 3G WIRELESS NETWORKS MERCY J ABINAYA K 1
  • 2. OVERVIEW • Abstract • Wireless Network • 3G Wireless Network • Security Principles for 3 G • References • Conclusion 2
  • 3. ABSTRACT • 3G mobile phone networks are currently the most widely used wireless telephone networks in the world. • While being an improvement over earlier analog systems, active attacks, authentication, encryption, channel hijack, inflexibility • 3G mobile phone standards have been designed to address the issues in 2G and provide a better security model. • Overview of security in 3G networks along with pointing out the known problems. • Security features of 3G systems are presented and solved . 3
  • 4. 1G WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY  Developed in 1980s and completed in early 1990’s  1G was old analog system and supported the 1st generation of analog cell phones speed up to 2.4kbps  Advance mobile phone system (AMPS) was first launched by the US and is a 1G mobile system  Allows users to make voice calls in 1 country 4
  • 5. 2G phones using global system for mobile communications (GSM) were first used in Europe.  GSM provides voice and limited data services and uses digital modulation for improved audio quality. Digital AMPS , CDMA were some of the 2G systems. 5
  • 6. To meet the growing demand in network capacity, rates required for high speed data transfer and multimedia applications , 3G standards started evolving. It is based on the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) family of standards. 3G technologies enable network operators to offer users a wider range of more advanced services. Services include wide-area wireless voice telephony, video-calls and broadband wireless data , all in a mobile environment. The data are sent through the technology called Packet switching.Voice calls are interpreted through circuit switching. 6
  • 8. 3G Network Security Architecture Circuit Network Circuit/ Signaling Gateway Mobility Manager Feature Circuit IN Services Server(s) Switch RNC Call Agent Voice Data + Packet IP Core Voice RAC Network Packet Network (Internet) Packet Gateway IP RAN 2G 2G/2.5G 3G 8
  • 9. 3G Security Principles • Build on GSM security • Correct problems with GSM security • Add new security features Source: 3GPP 9
  • 11. GSM Security Elements, 1 Key functions: privacy, integrity and confidentiality  Authentication Protect from unauthorized service access Based on the authentication algorithm A3(Ki, RAND)=> SRES Problems with inadequate algorithms  Encryption Scramble bit streams to protect signaling and user data Ciphering algorithm A8(Ki, RAND) => Kc A5(Kc, Data) => Encrypted Data Need stronger encryption  Confidentiality Prevent intruder from identifying users by IMSI Temporary MSI Need more secure mechanism 11
  • 12. GSM Security Elements, 2  SIM A removable hardware security module Manageable by network operators Terminal independent  Secure Application Layer Secure application layer channel between subscriber module and home network  Transparency Security features operate without user assistance Needs greater user visibility  Minimized Trust Requires minimum trust between HE and SN 12
  • 13. Problems with GSM Security, 1  Active Attacks Impersonating network elements such as false BTS is possible  Key Transmission Cipher keys and authentication values are transmitted in clear within and between networks (IMSI, RAND, SRES, Kc)  Limited Encryption Scope Encryption terminated too soon at edge of network to BTS Communications and signaling in the fixed network portion aren’t protected Designed to be only as secure as the fixed networks  Channel Hijack Protection against radio channel hijack relies on encryption. However, encryption is not used in some networks. 13
  • 14. Problems with GSM Security, 2 • Implicit Data Integrity No integrity algorithm provided • Unilateral Authentication Only user authentication to the network is provided. No means to identify the network to the user. • Weak Encryption Algorithms Key lengths are too short, while computation speed is increasing Encryption algorithm COMP 128 has been broken Replacement of encryption algorithms is quite difficult • Unsecured Terminal IMEI is an unsecured identity Integrity mechanisms for IMEI are introduced late 14
  • 15. Problems with GSM Security, 3  Lawful Interception & Fraud Considered as afterthoughts  Lack of Visibility No indication to the user that encryption is on No explicit confirmation to the HE that authentication parameters are properly used in SN when subscribers roam  Inflexibility Inadequate flexibility to upgrade and improve security functionality over time 15
  • 16. New Security Features, 1  Network Authentication The user can identify the network  Explicit Integrity Data integrity is assured explicitly by use of integrity algorithms Also stronger confidentiality algorithms with longer keys  Network Security Mechanisms to support security within and between networks  Switch Based Security Security is based within the switch rather than the base station  IMEI Integrity Integrity mechanisms for IMEI provided from the start 16
  • 17. New Security Features, 2  Secure Services Protect against misuse of services provided by SN and HE  Secure Applications Provide security for applications resident on USIM  Fraud Detection Mechanisms to combating fraud in roaming situations  Flexibility Security features can be extended and enhanced as required by new threats and services  Visibility and Configurability Users are notified whether security is on and what level of security is available Users can configure security features for individual services 17
  • 18. New Security Features, 3  Compatibility Standardized security features to ensure world-wide interoperability and roaming At least one encryption algorithm exported on world-wide basis  Lawful Interception Mechanisms to provide authorized agencies with certain information about subscribers 18
  • 19. Evolution to 3G Drivers: Capacity, Data Speed, Cost Expected market share TDMA EDGE EDGE Evolution 3GPP Core GSM GPRS Network 90% WCDMA HSDPA/HSUPA PDC cdmaOne CDMA2000 10% 1x CDMA2000 CDMA2000 1x EV/DO EV/DO Rev A 2G First Step into 3G 3G phase 1 Evolved 3G 19
  • 20. CONCLUTION  This paper presented a survey of three generations of mobile phone systems from a security perspective  3G networks standards were evaluated within availability confidentiality- integrity framework and found to not be secure  Hence New Security Features has been presented and solved.  Finally, there is no experimental data supporting the claim that 3G systems aren’t secure.  Future work can be geared toward filling those gaps.
  • 21. References • 3G TS 33.120 Security Principles and Objectives http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/_Specs/33120-300.pdf • 3G TS 33.120 Security Threats and Requirements http://www.arib.or.jp/IMT-2011/ARIB-spec/ARIB/21133-310.PDF • Michael Walker “On the Security of 3GPP Networks” http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/mike_walker.pdf • Redl, Weber, Oliphant “An Introduction to GSM” Artech House, 2010 • Joachim Tisal “GSM Cellular Radio Telephony” John Wiley & Sons, 2009 • Lauri Pesonen “GSM Interception” http://www.dia.unisa.it/ads.dir/corso-security/www/CORSO-9900/a5/Netsec/netsec.html • 3G TR 33.900 A Guide to 3rd Generation Security ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG3_Security/_Specs/33900-120.pdf • 3G TS 33.102 Security Architecture ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/2000-12/R1999/33_series/33102-370.zip • 3G TR 21.905 Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications http://www.quintillion.co.jp/3GPP/Specs/21905-010.pdf 21
  • 22. Are Their Any Questions??