Sme And Entrepreneurship During Crisis Oedc

The Impact of the Global Crisis
on SME and Entrepreneurship
Financing and
Policy Responses

Contribution to the OECD Strategic Response
to the Financial and Economic Crisis

Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and
Local Development

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Foreword
F
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Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
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F Foreword

FOREWORD

Access to financing continues to be one of the most significant challenges for the creation,
survival and growth of SMEs, especially innovative ones. The problem is strongly exacerbated
by the financial and economic crisis as SMEs and entrepreneurs have suffered a double shock: a
drastic drop in demand for goods and services and a tightening in credit terms, which are severely
affecting their cash flows. Governments are responding generally by three types of measures
aimed at: i) supporting sales and preventing depletion of SMEs’ working capital; ii) enhancing
SME’s access to liquidity; iii) helping SMEs to maintain their investment level. The present report
brings to the attention of governments recommendations to tackle the long-standing deficiencies
in the SME financial environment, as well as to prepare SMEs and entrepreneurs for a phase of
innovation-led growth.

In October 2008, the OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE) started
a debate on the impact of the global crisis on SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to finance and
on government responses in this area. A survey among member and non-member countries was
subsequently conducted in January and February 2009 to gather information on the situation and
on the measures adopted or to be adopted by governments, in order to contribute to the OECD
Strategic Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis launched by the Secretary General.
Twenty-nine countries, the European Commission and the European Investment Fund responded
to the questionnaire. The results of this exercise were discussed at the Turin Round Table, which
was held in Italy on 26-27 March 2009, under the auspices of the WPSMEE at the invitation of
Banca Intesa Sanpaolo.

This report, entitled The Impact of the Global Crisis on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing
and Policy Responses, presents the findings of the survey and the outcome of the discussion at
the Turin Round Table, which gathered more than 100 participants from thirty seven countries/
economies and international financial institutions.

The report has been prepared by a team of the SME and Entrepreneurship Division of the OECD
Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development (CFE), led by Marie-Florence Estimé
(Deputy Director, CFE) and including Yasuhiko Yoshida and Jorge Galvez Mendez, together
with Lorraine Ruffing (Consultant, Senior Advisor to UNCTAD). Paul Dembinski (Director,
Observatoire de la Finance, Geneva) and his team, and Glenda Napier (FORA, Copenhagen),
sponsored by Switzerland and Denmark respectively, provided important inputs.

Both the report and the Turin Round Table benefited from the close guidance of the WPSMEE
informal Steering Group on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing, chaired by Salvatore Zecchini,
President, IPI, Italy. The report also reflects valuable comments expressed by WPSMEE delegates
and delegates of the Committee on Industry, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (CIIE), its parent
committee.

Foreword

The report was transmitted to the OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría, by Ken Warwick
(United Kingdom), Chairman of the Committee on Industry, Innovation and Entrepreneurship
F
(CIIE) and Jacques Augustin (France), Chairman of the WPSMEE, as an input to the OECD
Strategic Response to the Global Crisis, and its Executive Summary will be part of the background
documentation for the upcoming meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial level (MCM) on
23-24 June 2009

Sergio Arzeni
Director, OECD Centre for
Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local
Development

T T.O.C.

TAbLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
Background
Importance of SMEs in “normal times” and in times of crisis 5
Impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship financing 6
Policy responses of governments 9
Proposals for further action 10
Preparing SMEs and entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led growth 12
Proposed Role for the OECD 14
I. BACKGROUND 15
II. IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON SMES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING 17
A. SMEs under stress – the indicators 17
B. SMEs’ reactions 19
C. SMEs’ demand for bank credit 20
D. Tightened credit conditions 21
E. Supply of equity, venture capital and alternative sources of financing 26
III. POLICY RESPONSES OF GOVERNMENTS 30
A. Existing measures 30
B. Proposals for further action 40
IV. PREPARING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS FOR RECOVERY AND INNOVATION-LED GROwTH 44
V. PROPOSED ROLE FOR THE OECD 46
ANNEXES 48
Annex 1. “Short term financial balance” – the French example 48
Annex 2. Evidence on credit demand 49
Annex 3. Evidence on credit conditions 52
Annex 4. Alternative financing sources for SMEs 55
Annex 5. Policy measures supporting sales and preventing depletion of SMEs’ working capital 56
Annex 6. Policy measures enhancing SMEs’ access to liquidity, Especially to bank lending 59
Annex 7. Private Equity Venture Capital Markets 66
Annex 8. Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship
informal Steering Group on SME entrepreneurship financing List of members 68

BOXES
Box 1: SMEs and the regulatory framework of Basel II 26
Box 2: New credit guarantee scheme for working capital in Greece 33
Box 3: Credit Mediation in France 35
Box 4: New Zealand’s Investment Ready Training 37

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ex. Summary
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Background

Access to financing continues to be one of the most significant challenges for the
creation, survival and growth of SMEs1 especially innovative ones. The problem is being
exacerbated by the most severe financial and economic crises in decades. Financing has
been a key area of work for the OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship
(WPSMEE) for several years. In June 2004, Financing Innovative SMEs in a Global
Economy was one of the themes addressed by the 2nd OECD SME Ministerial Meeting
in Istanbul. In March 2006, the OECD Global Conference on Better Financing for
Entrepreneurship and SME Growth, held in Brasilia, assessed the SME financing gap.
Further work and research on Financing Innovative and High- Growth SMEs was carried
out in 2007-2008. In October 2008 the 34th Session of WPSMEE engaged in a preliminary
exchange of views on the impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship financing
and discussed strategies so far adopted by governments to deal with the problem.

In order to further the debate on policy responses to the global crisis, a Round Table
on the Impact of the Global Crisis on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing and Policy
Responses was held in Turin on 26-27 March 2009 under the auspices of the OECD
WPSMEE and hosted by Intesa Sanpaolo. The Turin Round Table had before it an issues
paper which was based on the responses of 29 OECD Members and non-Members, as
well as the European Commission and the European Investment Fund, to a questionnaire
which covered the supply of financing to SMEs, their demand for financing, the credit
conditions, loan approvals and defaults as well as information on equity financing. The
responses also described in detail the policy measures taken by governments for SME and
entrepreneurship financing. The presentations and discussions of the Turin Round Table
have been incorporated into this report. The Round Table was an important milestone in the
WPSMEE’s commitment to contribute to the OECD Strategic Response to the Financial
and Economic Crisis which may have persistent effects on SME and entrepreneurship
financing. The outcomes of the Turin Round Table will be further developed

1 There is no single agreed definition of what constitutes a SME. A variety of definitions are applied among
OECD member countries and non member economies, and the number of employees is not the sole defining
criterion. Generally speaking, the OECD WPSMEE considers SMEs as non-subsidiary, independent firms
which employ less than a given number of employees.
2 The Turin Round Table was attended by more than 100 participants from 37 countries/economies [OECD
Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States -- Non OECD
Members: Chile, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation,
South Africa, Thailand], the European Commission (EC), the Business and Industry Advisory Committee
to the OECD (BIAC), the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), 4 international
financial institutions [the European Association of Mutual Guarantee Societies (AECM), the Bank for
international Settlements (BIS), the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Investment Fund (EIF)]
and an international organisation [the International Labour Organisation (ILO)].

S Ex. Summary

for the OECD High-level (possibly Ministerial) Meeting on SMEs and Entrepreneurship,
“Bologna + 10”, to be held in November 2010.

Importance of SMEs in “normal times” and in times of crisis

SMEs and entrepreneurs play a significant role in all economies and are the key
generators of employment and income, and drivers of innovation and growth. In the
OECD area, SMEs employ more than half of the labour force in the private sector. In
the European Union, they account for over 99 % of all enterprises. Furthermore, 91 % of
these enterprises are micro-firms with less than 10 workers. Given their importance in all
economies, they are essential for the economic recovery.

Even in ‘normal’ economic conditions governments have recognised that, to survive
and grow, SMEs need specific policies and programmes – hence the comprehensive range
of SME measures currently in place across the OECD members. However, at the present
time, SMEs have been especially hard hit by the global crisis. These firms are more
vulnerable now for many reasons: not only has the traditional challenge of accessing
finance continued to apply, but new, particularly supply-side, difficulties are currently
apparent. It is important to stress that SMEs are generally more vulnerable in times of
crisis for many reasons among which are:

- it is more difficult for them to downsize as they are already small;
- they are individually less diversified in their economic activities;
- they have a weaker financial structure (i.e. lower capitalisation);
- they have a lower or no credit rating;
- they are heavily dependent on credit and
- they have fewer financing options.
SMEs in global value chains are even more vulnerable as they often bear the brunt of
the difficulties of the large firms.

Impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship financing

Although there is no internationally agreed definition of small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs), the evidence suggests that these firms are being affected by the financial
and economic crisis across economies. There is evidence that SMEs in most countries are
confronted with a clear downturn in demand for goods and services if not a demand slump
in the fourth quarter of 2008. Many expect a further worsening to come. For SMEs there
are two related stress factors: a) increased payment delays on receivables which added -
together with an increase in inventories- result in an endemic shortage of working capital and
a decrease in liquidity and b) an increase in reported defaults, insolvencies and bankruptcies.

Extended payment delays on receivables, especially in times of reduced sales, are leading
rapidly to a depletion of working capital in many countries. For example, in Belgium 43
Ex. Summary
S
% of surveyed SMEs recently experienced extended delays in their receivables and in the
Netherlands 50 % of SMEs have to deal with longer payment terms from their customers.
In New Zealand, the share of enterprises waiting over 60 days for payment has risen
dramatically from 4.8 % to 29.5 % between February 2007 and 2008. In Denmark, Italy,
Ireland, Norway and Spain the surge in corporate insolvencies was higher than 25 %. In
Finland, while short-term solvency problems among SMEs normally involve 6-8 % of
these firms, in January 2009 more than 17 % of small firms with less than 50 employees
declared insolvency problems. In Sweden, according to ALMI (the Swedish state owned
Development Bank), bankruptcies increased over 50% in the first two months of 2009
compared to the same period in 2008.

Increased insolvency rates appear to confirm SMEs’ increased inability to obtain
short-term financing. In all countries using the Bankers’ Lending Survey method, the
tightening of credit conditions by banks3 was clearly evident for all the banks’ clients.
The European Central Bank (ECB) data also confirmed the tightening. The ECB attributes
the tightening to the banks’ ability (or inability) to access capital, the banks’ liquidity
positions, expectations regarding the recession and higher risk on collateral. Interest
rate spreads have risen to unprecedented levels, thereby partially offsetting the effects
of the easing of monetary policy. The main factors exacerbating the banks’ attitude
towards lending to SMEs are: a) the poor SME economic prospects already discussed; b)
stagnation in inter-bank lending and increased cost of capital; and c) the desire to rebuild
bank balance sheets. In all reporting countries, banks are under pressure and are trying to
preserve or strengthen their capital base. As a result, they are seeking fully collateralised
transactions. In consequence, by choosing to keep only the strongest clients, banks and
other financial institutions are contributing to a polarisation process. For example, Korea
reported that lending to blue-chip SMEs has increased whereas lending to SMEs with
poorer credit ratings has deteriorated. For many banks this may be a sensible survival
strategy and their survival is vital. In some countries it is also a case of returning to
“normal” lending practices after a number of years of excessive flexibility and generosity
in lending.

The stagnation in lending is true even of banks in countries where governments have
deliberately strengthened banks’ balance sheets to allow them to grant additional credit
to SMEs and/or where credit guarantee schemes exist. As it will be seen later in the
summary, most countries have not only recapitalised their banks, but also extended the
funds and guarantees available for SME financing. But the effects of the incentives to
lend to SMEs put in place by governments in some countries (such as the provision of
additional capital) have not yet yielded the desired results. Some governments are closely
monitoring this situation or have put in place “credit mediators” to ease the flow of credit
to SMEs or have enacted binding codes of conduct for SME lending.
3 Loan conditions encompass many aspects among which the most important are the spread between banks
cost of funds and their interest rate, their commissions and fees, the difference between the amounts granted
and those demanded by enterprises; the level of collateral required, and the duration of loans.

S Ex. Summary

During the Round Table there was much discussion about the fact that large banks
have evolved into very complex institutions where loan decision making is centralised
and based on automated credit assessment systems. Thus, SMEs often lack face-to-
face contact with bank managers who understand their specificities. Inappropriate and
indiscriminate use of credit scoring mechanisms can lead even deserving SMEs to be
denied credit. To some extent, a proper use of individual assessment through “relationship
banking” can counteract this, and it has survived in some countries because the banking
sector is composed of many “local” or “regional” banks which have been less affected
by the crisis, are liquid, and continue to lend to SMEs (Switzerland and the United States,
for example). There are also some large banks that are preserving “relationship banking”
at the local level (in Italy, Intesa Sanpaolo is one of them and in Indonesia, the Bank
Rakyat).

Confronted with worsening access to credit, SMEs are exploring alternative sources
of finance such as the mobilisation of reserves, self-financing and factoring. Access to
venture capital and private equity also appears to be constrained but there are no official
statistical data available covering the fourth quarter of 2008. The financial crisis has had
a three-fold impact on venture capital and private equity markets. First, exit opportunities
are reduced. Second, fundraising activities seem to be shrinking. And thirdly, invested
capital has stagnated or even slowly started to decline, especially investments in new
projects.

Global venture capital fundraising slowed down between 007 and 008. The current
economic recession and the global downward pressure on prices are expected to influence
the future prospects for fundraising in the markets in the long run. Institutional investors
providing funding will simply be less willing to supply new funds with fresh capital.
Figures from Canada confirm the global trend as fundraising has decreased by roughly
25 % in 2007 and 2 % in 2008. Similar declines have been registered in Australia and
the UK.

Under the influence of these trends, public funds (both direct and indirect investment
funds) will be impacted as much as the private funds. In markets with public or semi-
public investment funds, which provide capital to funds-of-funds activities, such public
funds are likely to witness a more limited possibility for co-investment with private
funds, simply because the private funds increasingly reduce their investment activities.
As a result, public funds cannot be expected to provide the same leverage effect as before
the crisis, unless supplied with more capital.

Policy responses of governments

The participants in the Round Table stressed that the appropriate broader framework
conditions are a critical determinant for SME financing. Indeed there is a need for “reliable
governance, tax, regulatory and legal frameworks that provide a level playing field for all

Ex. Summary

economic entities irrespective of size” as stated in the OECD Brasilia Action Statement
on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing (March 2006). In particular, participants noted
S
that any government measures taken to ease SME financing should not impair fair
competition and should avoid contributing to a rise in protectionism.

Countries’ abilities to deal with the crisis depend to a large extent on the margin provided
by their respective fiscal and monetary policies. Many of the reporting countries have
recently put in place anti-crisis packages combining in different proportions three lines
of action: stimulation of demand (consumption packages, infrastructure programmes, tax
policies); credit enhancement measures, including recapitalisation of banks which, in
some cases, include explicit provisions or mechanisms to preserve or enhance banks’
capacity for financing SMEs such as public credit guarantees; and labour-market
measures (reduced employment taxes or social security charges and extended temporary
unemployment programs).

The anti-crisis packages and accompanying measures address, in many countries, the
financing problems of SMEs. The measures put in place by countries can be classified
in three different groups: (a) measures supporting sales and preventing depletion of
SMEs’ working capital such as export credit and insurance, factoring for receivables, tax
reductions and deferrals, and better payment discipline by governments, (b) measures
to enhance SME’s access to finance, mainly to credit through bank recapitalisation and
expansion of existing loan and credit guarantee schemes; (c) measures aimed at helping
SMEs to maintain their investment level and more generally their capacity to respond
in the near future to a possible surge in demand through investment grants and credits,
accelerated depreciation, and RD financing.

Many governments have implemented measures to maintain or increase cash flows. For
instance, they have allowed accelerated depreciation for investments already undertaken.
Some countries are also giving tax credits, cuts, deferrals and refunds. In Japan, the
Government has reduced the corporate tax rate from 22 % to 18 % for the SMEs with
8 million yen (€61 thousand) or less in annual income in the coming 2 years. In the
Netherlands one of the tax brackets has been reduced from 23 % to 20 % for both 2009
and 2010 for amounts up to 200,000 euros and Canada increased the income threshold
for which the small business rate applies. The Czech Republic, France and Spain are
refunding VAT payments immediately or monthly. The idea was introduced during the
Turin Round Table that governments concentrate first on reducing those taxes that are
“profit-insensitive”, that is, taxes that are paid regardless of whether the SME is making a
profit. This would increase the ability of SMEs to finance working capital internally.

Governments are taking moves to shorten payment delays for public procurement
(Australia, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and UK) and enforce
payment discipline (France). The European Commission has suggested that public
authorities should pay their bills within 30 days. In parallel, the Commission commits
itself to speed up payment of goods and services so to fully respect the targets for paying

S Ex. Summary

bills. In the case of the UK it has cut government payment times to 10 days. Governments
are also easing tendering and procurement procedures and policies (Australia, France,
the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom). Lastly, in order to maintain
employment, some governments are giving wage subsidies to enterprises so that
employees can receive full wages while working part time.

The most widely used policy measure to increase access to finance has been until
now the extension of loans and loan guarantees. These measures vary widely in their
design and execution. Although some measures such as new credit guarantee scheme for
working capital by Greece, launched in December 2008, are already showing positive
results, time is too short to draw conclusions about what are the “best practices” in the
field of emergency measures and in the field of loan guarantees. The OECD WPSMEE
has, in the past, identified a few schemes in the field of loan guarantees4 which could lay
the groundwork for future comparisons and evaluations.

In some countries, the governments have found the response of the newly recapitalised
banks to the needs of SMEs unsatisfactory or insufficient even though guarantees are
available. These countries have resorted to discipline measures that in some cases
complement the incentives, in order to pressure banks to continue lending to enterprises.
Belgium and France have appointed a “credit mediator”, who at regional and central
levels, may intervene to ease difficulties and help enterprises obtain bank funding. The
US has chosen to strictly monitor, on a monthly basis, the credit activities of banks that
0 have been rescued by public funding. Furthermore, it is requiring all banks to report on
a quarterly basis. Ireland has enacted a legally binding code of conduct on SME bank
lending. The Belgian Ministry for SMEs is giving pre-fund agreements directly to SMEs
which can be taken to the banks to obtain guaranteed loans.

Proposals for Further Action

The discussions during the Turin Round Table revealed the participants’ sense of
urgency to alleviate the shortage of working capital SMEs are facing. SMEs are caught
in a vicious circle because of the causal connections between the demand shock and
the decline in working capital. At the same time the impaired credit markets are not
responding to the SMEs’ need for liquidity. As was highlighted during the Round Table,
“… a downward spiral has been created which is damaging the fabric of many economies”.
Therefore, governments were urged to review the policy measures already taken with
the aim of reinforcing them or complementing them with new measures. The Round
Table distinguished between the short-term emergency measures such as tax measures
that could be reversed and the long-term measures which need to be undertaken to make
structural improvements and institutional changes in the SME financial environment in
order to restore growth.

4 Cf. OECD Framework for the Evaluation of SME and Entrepreneurship Policies and Programmes, OECD
2007.

Ex. Summary

In addition to the policy measures reviewed above, countries may wish to consider
the following policy recommendations related to measures which are more institutional
S
or structural in nature to remedy the long-standing deficiencies in the SME financial
environment:

• Encourage banking competition across economies and, to alleviate the
stagnation in bank lending, consider the monitoring of SME lending by banks
through timely reporting and the establishment of a code of conduct for SME
lending by banks.
• To know the real situation of SMEs, policy makers also need more timely and
SME specific data on the supply of and demand for financing so that they can
determine if their measures are working. Already several OECD countries
are improving transparency in bank lending by encouraging the timely public
disclosure by banks of the composition of their loan portfolios by size of firm.
• As SMEs often lack face-to-face contact with bank managers due to the current
impersonal structure of the modern banking system, banks could consider using
their scoring methods for assessing SME credit-worthiness with appropriate
discretion so that adequate room would be left for the specificities of the client,
as happens with “relationship banking”. Appropriately balanced use of any
assessment method could help in cases where the circumstances and viability
of individual businesses can be accounted for. Consequently, staffing local
branches with personnel who have adequate skills in dealing with SME lending
becomes important. Banks could also enter partnerships with business service
providers to help them reduce the risks in SME lending.
• Evidence was offered that automatic systems of credit evaluation do not always
function to the effect that viable companies can obtain credit, which could
be addressed with a more appropriate and discriminate use of these methods.
Systems are needed to evaluate the credit risk of SMEs on a company basis rather
than on a sectoral basis, while being consistent with prudential management
practices in terms of sectoral allocation of funds.
• The specific financing needs of micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees in
the EU) which dominate the SME sector were considered at the Round Table.
Research on start-ups by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (United States)
revealed that they also need modest capital injections and that the most important
source was outside credit averaging USD 32,000. This could be provided through
micro-finance in countries which do not already have such schemes.
• Improving the means by which SMEs are informed about the availability of
SME-related government support measures, especially those that are responses
to the current crisis, is crucial for the implementation of government policy

S Ex. Summary

and programmes. It could be facilitated in partnership with business service
providers or business associations. As indicated in the OECD Brasilia Action
Statement “…informing SMEs of the range of financing options (e.g., public
guarantee programmes, business angels, and bank loans) will ensure greater
take-up of schemes”.
• Also competence building should spur the demand for financing among SMEs.
The managerial competencies of SMEs—especially in the field of finance—
have to be supported. Governments should take the opportunity offered by
SME owners’ realisation that they did not have all the skills needed to help
their firms survive the crisis to encourage participation in general managerial
skills development, including mentoring and business advice.
• SMEs should be engaged in the design of relevant finance-related policies
and programmes from the outset to ensure that their perspectives and needs
are well understood and taken into account. Examples were given of regular
communication and consultation with the representatives of SMEs through
forums and round tables to raise awareness and to assess the effectiveness of
existing measures and programmes to help SMEs to access finance.

Preparing SMEs and entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led growth

It was also noted that the crisis brings certain opportunities to improve the SME legal

framework and the business environment. The crisis could accelerate the redeployment
of resources to new activities. Emerging firms and those redesigning their processes
should be encouraged to focus on sustainability and knowledge-based outcomes.

Both the Istanbul Ministerial Declaration on Fostering the Growth of Innovative and
Internationally Competitive SMEs (2004) and the OECD Brasilia Action Statement
on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing (2006) acknowledged that SMEs’ financing
requirements differ at each stage of their development. In particular innovative SMEs
need have access to appropriately structured risk capital.

The OECD Brasilia Action Statement highlighted the fact that access to appropriate
types of financing structures and facilities are especially required to allow SMEs
and entrepreneurs to take advantage of the opportunities provided by innovation.

The Statement proposes actions which could contribute to preparing SMEs and
Ex. Summary

entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led growth which are relevant in the current
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situation.

• “A lack of appropriate financing notably represents a hindrance to the creation
and expansion of innovative SMEs (…). Comprehensive efforts are needed
to bolster the early stages (i.e. pre-seed, seed and start-up) of SMEs, which
are marked by negative cash flows and untried business models. This can be
done by entrepreneurs themselves leveraging the capital lying dormant in their
personal assets, or by “business angel networks” or venture capital markets
(…). Successful approaches to developing early stage venture capital markets
include both tax-based programmes and programmes that use government’s
ability to leverage private risk capital such as co-investment.
• Business incubators, clusters of innovative SMEs, science and technology parks,
and development agencies play an important role in facilitating appropriate
access to financing for SMEs at local and regional level. Cities and regions
can underpin and strengthen this function through partnerships with private
financial institutions and universities. Appropriate financial incentives can
correct market failures and stimulate equity investment in local enterprises.
• There is a need to promote enhanced awareness, educate and communicate
more broadly the value of equity financing, including raising the recognition
among entrepreneurs of fair value and transparency in valuing investments.
• The combined legal, tax and regulatory framework should ensure that risk
capital is not discriminated against, including by safeguarding orderly,
equitable and transparent exit routes. Taxes should not put SMEs, entrepreneurs
or their financial backers at a disadvantage. There should be neutrality between
alternative sources of risk capital, such as domestic versus foreign venture
capital funds. Maintaining neutrality between debt and equity should also be
an aim for tax policies.
• There is no venture capital without venture capitalists and business angels
greatly enhance the effectiveness of informal finance. Representing an evolving
entrepreneurial breed, these actors thrive on their ability and courage to assume
risk. Obstacles should be identified and eliminated. Effective role models can
also be promoted to spur the dynamism of these actors. Ways should be explored
to facilitate the establishment of “business angel networks”, which may greatly
enhance information and capital flows.”
The review of measures recently implemented by Governments reveals the paucity of
measures directed to venture capital. As such, there is some scope to provide additional
incentives to encourage investors to participate in venture capital funds or to act as
business angels. Governments may want to consider greater support for venture capital
such as increasing guarantees for risk capital and/or more co-investment as well as fiscal

S Ex. Summary

incentives such as tax credits for venture capital investments, or tax reductions on capital
gains from venture capital investments and enhanced efforts to prepare SMEs to be
more ‘investment-ready’. In sum, governments should not stop with the current short-
term measures for SME survival but consider the medium and long-term measures for
preparing SMEs and entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led growth.

Proposed Role for the OECD

One of the principal recommendations in the Brasilia Action Statement was that
the OECD consider the development of definitions, indicators, and methodologies for
gathering data on the supply of financing available to SMEs and the demand for financing
by SMEs. In response to this recommendation, the OECD has already undertaken the
following:

- A review of terminology on business financing used by national and international
organisations;
- An overview and assessment of some of the main sources of data on both the
supply of and demand for financing for SMEs;
- A collection of policies and programmes related to SME and entrepreneurship
financing, in particular to financing innovative and high growth SMEs.
In light of the extreme importance of data availability for effective policy responses,
as revealed by the current global crisis, the OECD should continue efforts to improve
availability and international comparability of data sets on SME and Entrepreneurship
Financing. The OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE), in
close cooperation with its parent Committee, the CIIE:

• Could promote a Scoreboard on SME and entrepreneurship financing data and
policies (a pilot project will be carried out in the framework of the 2009-2010
programme of work in view of the “Bologna +10” High level Meeting) ; and
• Should monitor, report on, and discuss SME and entrepreneurship financing
trends on a regular basis.
As a follow-up, the WPSMEE should also carry out, in the framework of its programme
of work 2009-2010, an assessment of the effectiveness of measures taken to assist SMEs
and entrepreneurs in weathering the financial and economic crisis, as reported in the
present report.

Finally, the OECD should also continue facilitating the Tripartite Dialogue between
governments, SMEs and the financial institutions, to periodically review progress in
strengthening SME and entrepreneurship financing.

I. BACKGROUND
I - Background
I
SMEs and entrepreneurs play a significant role in all economies and are key agents
of employment, innovation and growth. A significant number of entrepreneurs and
SMEs could use funds productively if they were available, but are often denied access
to financing, thus impeding their creation, survival and growth. Although SMEs form
a broad spectrum as far as their relative size, sector of activity, seniority, location and
performance are concerned, there is a vital need for innovative solutions for their
financing in particular for innovative and high- growth SMEs in a globalised knowledge-
based economy.

Financing has always been a key area of work for the OECD Working Party on SMEs
(WPSMEE). In June 2004, the theme Financing Innovative SMEs in a Global Economy
was discussed by Ministers at the 2nd OECD SME Ministerial Meeting in Istanbul. In
March 2006, the Brasilia Conference on Better Financing for Entrepreneurship and SME
Growth assessed the SME “financing (debt and equity) gap”. The OECD Brasilia Action
Statement for SME and Entrepreneurship Financing, which was issued at the end of the
Conference, stressed that the financing gaps are not insurmountable and can be mitigated
by a series of actions. The WPSMEE has been pursuing research in this area and carried
out work in 2007-2008 on Financing Innovative and High Growth SMEs. In late October
2008 on the occasion of its 34th Session WPSMEE delegates engaged in a preliminary
exchange of views on the impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship
financing, and discussed the strategies so far adopted by governments in dealing with the
problem and what should be done next.

It was recognised that in the current context of the most severe financial and economic
crisis in decades, various factors such as increased risk aversion, decreased liquidity,
bleak prospects for economic growth, etc. are having or are expected to have a highly
negative effect on SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to short and long term financing. Small
firms are particularly vulnerable because a) it is more difficult for them to downsize since
they are already small, b) they are individually less diversified in their activities, c) they
have weaker financial structures or lower capitalisation, d) they have lower or no credit
ratings, e) they are heavily dependent on credit, and f) they have fewer options for finance,
especially in financial markets. With this in view, the measures that most governments
are taking or planning to take to counteract the effects of the crisis and stimulate their
economies should include easing SME and entrepreneurship access to finance.

To further the debate on policy responses to the crisis, and also to discuss how to
ensure that these responses are consistent with the medium and long- term actions
taken by governments which can help accelerate the recovery and foster SME growth

I I - Background

in the long term, the Turin Round Table on the Impact of the Global Crisis on SME and
Entrepreneurship Financing and Policy Responses was held on 26-27 March 2009 under
the auspices of the WPSMEE and hosted by Intesa Sanpaolo.

The present report is based on an Issues Paper prepared for the Turin Round Table
and was subsequently enriched by the presentations and debate at the Round Table
and comments received afterward. The report analyses the country responses (OECD
members and non-members) to a survey launched in mid-January 2009 covering data on
the situation of SME and entrepreneurship financing and information on policy measures,
as well as publicly available information. Responses to the questionnaire were provided
by 29 governments5, the European Commission and the European Investment Fund.

This document is divided into i) background, ii) the impact of the global crisis on SME
and entrepreneurship financing iii) the policy responses, existing and proposed and iv)
preparing SMEs and entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led growth and v) the
proposed role of the OECD.

The Executive Summary of the present paper will be part of the background
documentation of the OECD Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level (24-25 June 2009),
in the context of the OECD’s Strategic Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis.

5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Brazil, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Thailand, Chile and Estonia.

II. IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON SMEs
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING
II
II - Impact of the crisis

A. SMEs under stress – the indicators

The demand shock

The national responses and other publicly available information provide some
indications about the effective and expected movements in levels of sales of SMEs. As
shown in the Table 1, SMEs in most countries reported a clear downturn in demand for
goods and services, if not a demand slump, in Q4-2008 and expect a further worsening
to come. The magnitude of the reported shock is severe, but it differs from country to
country, in part due to the differences in methods of assessment in each country.

Table 1: Indications on the magnitude of demand shock

Country Assessment of intensity of experienced or expected demand shock
According to a survey conducted among small enterprises only (firms employing up to 19
employees), more than 1/2 reported either an increase or no change in sales;. In terms of
anticipations, almost 2/3 were expecting a recession to occur within the next year. According to
another survey covering enterprises with up to 199 employees, business confidence fell during
Australia
the Q1-2009 to its lowest level, also showing a record low in the sales performance indicator. Only
around 31 per cent of enterprises reported facing no problems in their business. Lack of work or
sales is the primary concern of SMEs Q1-2009, remaining close to its highest level since May
1998. Medium-sized businesses were more confident than small businesses.
According to an “Access to Finance” survey, 60% of respondents report falling sales as the main
Belgium manifestation of the crisis, followed by a worsening of their financial condition (52%) and extension
of their clients’ payment delays.
According to Business Barometer (Dec 2008) : 29% of SME owners say their performance in 2008
Canada was much stronger than in 2007, while 40% say performance is much worse or somewhat worse.
Only 17% expect improvement and 44% anticipates worsening performance.
For a majority of SMEs, orders or pre-orders have been postponed (47%) or cancelled (24%)
Finland during the last few months. Demand conditions were worsening further from Q3-2008, when
postponed orders affected 34% and cancellations 14% of SMEs.
According to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, in Q4-2008 poor sales were
Germany seen as the single most important problem for 25% of businesses, while financial issues were a
top concern for about the same proportion of enterprises.
The current economic crisis has affected businesses in different ways: for 58% it has been through
Greece
insufficient working capital, for 55% by way of insufficient sales.
According to Eurostat, retail trade volume fell by 4.9% in December 2008 compared to December
2007 (new car registrations fell by 17.2%). According to Istat (National Institute of Statistics),
exports in 2008 rose by 2% compared to 2007, but fell during the last quarter (5.5% in December
Italy 2008 as compared to December 2007. Industrial orders in manufacturing fell by 13.1% in
December 2008 compared to the same period of 2007. Business confidence recorded in the ISAE
(Institute of Studies and Economic Analysis) surveys has fallen in recent months to all-time lows
in all the sectors.

II

Country Assessment of intensity of experienced or expected demand shock
During Q4-2008, 29% of respondents to a recent survey reported that the volume of total new
Sweden orders slumped at a very high rate, 47% of respondents reported a high rate, 15% reported that it
was unchanged and 7 % of respondents reported an increase.
On a seasonally adjusted basis, a net 44% of firms reported a drop in their own activity Q4-2008,
which is the worst result for this measure since at least 1970. In addition, a net 43% of firms
New
expected a drop in their activity for the Q1-2009 quarter. In a survey of mid-February, 60.9% of
Zealand
the 659 surveyed firms reported that their sales/revenue has decreased (somewhat or greatly) in
the last three months.
A recent survey found that the volume of total new orders during Q4-2008
slumped at its fastest rate since July 1991. Of the SME manufacturers surveyed,
United 54% reported a fall of new orders compared to only 13% reporting an increase.
Kingdom SMEs report that demand is by far the biggest factor to constrain output. The
British Chambers of Commerce Economic Survey found a similar decline in
manufacturing demand, as well as declines for SMEs in the service sector.
The rate of owners (seasonally adjusted) reporting higher sales in the previous three months lost
United 4 points, falling to a net negative 29 %, the worst reading in survey history. The Index of Small
States Business Optimism fell 2.6 points to 85.2 (1986=100), the second lowest reading in the 35 year
history of the survey.
Source: Country Responses to the OECD WPSMEE Questionnaire on the Impact of the Global Crisis on SMEs and Entrepreneurship
Financing and the Policy Responses, launched on 14 January 2009 and publicly available information.

Countries not included in this table, such as Chile, Japan, Korea, Mexico and the
Netherlands also report that SMEs have suffered poor sales. In Luxembourg, information
from the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Crafts indicate that demand and
economic activity are falling in comparison to the last years. Although not yet a demand
slump, Luxembourg authorities are concerned by the declines. In Hungary, surveys show
that the self-employed have the worst business expectations, while optimism increases
with firm size. Although general, the fall in demand hit some sectors or activities
with particular force: construction (Finland, Netherlands); automotive supplies and
manufacturing (Slovenia, Netherlands, India, Italy); wholesale (Italy); semiconductors
(Netherlands); exports (Chile, Denmark, India, Thailand).

The above mentioned evidence suggests that the experienced and expected fall in sales
is having a strong impact on SMEs. This is further supported by two additional stress
indicators: (a) increased payment delays on receivables which add –together with an
increase in inventories - to an endemic shortage of SMEs’ working capital and a decrease
in liquidity; and (b) an increase in reported defaults, insolvencies, and bankruptcies.

Increased payment delays

Extended payment delays on receivables, especially in times of reduced sales,
rapidly leads to a depletion of working capital and may entail frequent liquidity or
even insolvency problems. In Belgium, 43 % of surveyed SMEs recently experienced
extended delays in their receivables while 14 % reacted by extending their own payment
delays. In New Zealand, the share of enterprises waiting over sixty days for payment has
risen dramatically from 4.8 % a year ago to 29.5 % in mid-February. In the Netherlands,
50 % of SMEs have to deal with longer payment terms from their customers. In France,

payment delays have been identified as a major problem for SMEs. An Observatory of
payment delays was set up there in 2006 (see annex 1). Australia, Canada, Italy, Korea,
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Mexico and the UK also report payment delays as a growing problem. Governments are
aware that if SMEs cannot quickly obtain additional funding this will lead to insolvencies
and they are taking action to prevent this as will be seen in section III.

Increase in enterprise insolvencies and bankruptcies

Reduced demand rapidly depletes working capital in the smallest firms. Insolvency
frequently increases if short- term financing cannot be obtained. According to “Insolvencies
in Europe 2008/09” (Creditreform), the total number of insolvencies increased by 11 %
between 2007 and 2008. In some countries like Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Norway, and
Spain the surge in corporate insolvencies was higher than 25 %. The Confederation of
Finnish Industries found in its January 2009 survey that among the small firms (less
than 50 employees) the incidence of solvency problems was more than 17% compared
to the usual 6-8%. Furthermore, 51 % of the sample reported some increase in their
clients’ insolvency problems. A review by size indicated the most significant increase
in insolvency problems was for medium-sized enterprises. These trends have to be
interpreted with great caution because legislation on insolvency and bankruptcies differs
greatly by country, and so do statistical reporting methodologies – which means that
the figures may not capture short-term changes. In order to have a proper reading of
such figures, they should be put in longer-term perspective. With regard to corporate
liquidations, data from New Zealand shows that company liquidations are increasing
and the twelve month moving average is trending upwards, as are receiverships and
creditor initiated bankruptcies. At the Round Table Sweden reported that bankruptcies
had increased over 50 % in the first two months of 2009 compared to the previous year.
Normally viable businesses were going into bankruptcy unnecessarily because of the lack
of working capital.

B. SMEs’ reactions

The response of the surviving SMEs to the double pressure of falling sales and
extended payment delays in a general context of bleak medium-terms perspectives is – in
theory - three fold: (a) cost-cutting to restore profitability and adjustment of production
to lower demand levels, measures that materialise mainly in a reduced wage bill; (b)
search for additional sources of liquidity (extending own payment delays, reducing or
suppressing dividends – if any); (c) postponing of investment and expansion plans, when
possible (including MA activity for the small subset of high- growth SMEs). In the case
of entrepreneurship, this could simply mean the postponement or even the cancellation
of new business ventures.

Among the possible SME responses to the demand shock for goods and services, cost-
cutting and lay-offs and the subsequent labour market impacts are clearly outside the

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terms of reference of the present paper which is focused on financial considerations.
The next three sections are devoted to identifying how the SMEs’ responses have
affected their demand for credit, how the lending conditions of banks and other financial
intermediaries have changed, and what is the availability of equity and venture capital in
the new situation.

C. SMEs’ demand for bank credit

The assessment of credit demand is difficult from the methodological point of view.
Some countries use the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) method to capture changes in demand
as perceived by bank officials. These responses are weighted according to the relevant
bank’s market share and presented as a balance of opinions: the weighted percentage that
sees an increase in demand minus the weighted percentage that see a decrease in demand.
The evidence from countries applying this methodology (presented in Annex 2) clearly
shows (a) the overall slump in credit demand is being experienced in all countries but one
in Q4-2008 and is expected to last in Q1-2009 even if its severity varies from country to
country; (b) in all countries the reduction of credit demand for investment or acquisition
purposes is extremely severe (50% or more of respondents); (c) SMEs’ demand for credit
in Italy, and to a lesser extent Germany, did not change so dramatically when compared
to their French, British and US counterparts.

0 Figure 1: Demand for credit in the US

Source: Federal Reserve, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, released February 2, 2009

In countries either not using or not publishing BLS results, the evidence provided
refers to the many SMEs that feel frustrated in accessing credit and not to changes in
the level of demand as such. In Australia, almost 50 % of small business feel it is harder
to borrow funds now, in comparison to 12 months ago; in the Netherlands, one out of
five SMEs was looking for additional funding in 2008. During the Round Table, Canada
reported that one out of four SMEs were underfinanced and Spain said that more than 80
% of SMEs have problems in accessing financing. In contrast, in Finland or New Zealand

less than 10 % of SMEs were facing major difficulties in obtaining working capital or
investment funding.
II

The overall SME reactions that emerge from the available information suggest that
entrepreneurs are not willing to increase their indebtedness despite the fact that sales fall
and payment delays increase. Facing an uncertain future, this reaction is fully rational
especially when these enterprises are confronted with tightened credit conditions imposed
by banks and other creditors.

D. Tightened credit conditions

Loan conditions encompass many dimensions among which the most important
are the spread between the banks and other financial intermediaries’ cost of funds and
interest levels, the commissions, the difference between the amounts granted and those
demanded by the enterprises, the level of collateral required, the duration of the loans,
and processing delays. In all countries using the BLS methodology, the tightening of
SME credit conditions by banks is clearly visible for all the banks’ clients. This being
said (see Annex 3), in some countries – Germany and France - SMEs seem to have been
slightly less affected than larger enterprises, while the reverse is true in the US.

Figure 2 shows the tightening of credit standards for enterprise loans as calculated
by the European Central Bank. There has been an increased tightening since mid-2008
due to the banks’ inability to access capital, the banks’ liquidity position, expectations
regarding the recession and higher risk on collateral.

Figure 2: Tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises,
SMEs and large enterprises

Net percentages

100
90 SMEs realised
SMEs expected
80
large enterprises realised
70 large enterprises expected
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
07 Q3 08 Q1 08 Q3 09 Q1
-20

Source: European Central Bank

II

The above mentioned evidence suggests that (1) SMEs (and enterprises in general)
have strongly reduced their investment projects financed by credit; (2) SMEs demand
for working capital and short-term loans has been reduced in some countries but not as
dramatically as for investment purposes; (3) banks have tightened their lending policies
in terms of security guarantees and amounts, but not exclusively towards SMEs; (4) in
some countries banks and other financial intermediaries have substantially increased the
cost (and spread) of credit to all their clients, which may appear paradoxical in a situation
of a general fall in interest rates. The European Central Bank reported a dramatic increase
in bank spreads in the late 2008 for small loans. The Round Table participants were
struck by the fact that interest rate spreads had risen to exceptionally high levels, thereby
partially offsetting the effects of the easing of monetary policy.

Figure 3: Bank spreads on small and large loans to non-financial corporations

Monthly data, August 2007-January 2009, basis points
250
small loan, short maturity Increase in spreads
small loan, long maturity for small loans
200 large loan, short maturity
large loan, long maturity
150

100

50

0
A ug-07 N ov -07 Feb -08 Ma y-08 A ug-08 N ov -08

Source: European Central Bank

In consequence, this evidence suggests that in addition to the demand shock described
above, conditions under which SMEs can access credit have significantly worsened in some
reporting countries. If this is true, then the enterprises in general and SMEs in particular are,
de facto, exposed to two different shocks reinforcing each other: a demand slump or downturn
and a financial shock due to banks and other financial intermediaries’ reluctance to lend.

Banks and other financial intermediaries’ strategy and constraints

Three factors may have exacerbated the banks and other financial intermediaries’
attitude towards lending to SMEs: (a) poor SME economic prospects (already discussed),
(b) the stagnation in inter-bank lending and the increased cost of capital and (c) balance
sheet constraints. In all reporting countries, banks and other financial intermediaries are
under pressure and are trying to preserve or strengthen their capital base. As part of
this strategy they are seeking fully collateralised transactions that minimise the use of
their economic (as opposed to regulatory) capital. In consequence, by choosing to keep

only the strongest among their existing clients, banks and other financial intermediaries
are contributing to a polarisation process. For example, Korea reported that lending to
II

blue-chip SMEs has increased whereas lending to SMEs with poorer credit ratings has
deteriorated. In some countries, banks have reduced lending not just because risk has
gone up, but also because they are having difficulty raising new funds overseas and are
directly affected by the substantially reduced access to short term inter-bank funding
at other than very expensive rates resulting from a significant deterioration in banks’
confidence in the banking sector’s general level of solvency and credit rating.
Table 2: Experienced or expected impacts of the crisis on SME and
entrepreneurship financing

Impacts on SMEs (Cf. Table 1) SME demand for credit (Cf. Annex 2)
Exits
working
(Insolven-
capital
Demand cies and Total Short-term Long-term
Payment
bankrupt-
delays
cies)
OECD
Australia +
Austria =
Belgium --- ++ + - -
Canada -- + - +
Czech Republic =
Denmark ++
Finland -- ++ +
France + + ---
Germany - = - --
Greece --- + =
Hungary + + -
Ireland +++
Italy - + ++ - = -
Japan - +
Korea - + + -
Luxembourg - + + -
Mexico - +
Netherlands - + --
New Zealand -- ++ + --
Poland - +
Spain +++
Switzerland =
UK -- + + -- + ---
USA -- --- + ---
EC -- -- ---
Non OECD
Chile -
Estonia =
Romania
Russia + +
Slovenia =
Thailand
Note: One or more “+” signs (depending on the intensity) indicate that the information points out to an
experienced or expected increase on the impacts for the indicators in each column. A “=” sign indicates no
change, and one or more “-” signs indicate an expected or experienced decrease.
Source: Country Reponses to the 14 January 2009 OECD WPSMEE Questionnaire on the Impact of the Global Crisis on SMEs and
Entrepreneurship Financing and publicly available information, including Creditreform (2009) Insolvencies in Europe 2008/09 and Opora Russia.

II

During the Round Table there was much discussion about the fact that large banks
have evolved into very complex institutions where loan decision making is centralised
and based on automated credit assessment systems. Thus, SMEs often lack face-to-face
contact with bank managers who understand their business. It is the large, troubled banks
which are now refusing to lend working capital to SMEs. Under local branch banking
these SMEs might have been judged as viable. There are a few countries where the banking
sector is composed of many “local” and “regional” banks which have been less affected
by the crisis, are liquid and continue to lend to SMEs. It was reported that in the United
States, for example, there are approximately 8,000 small commercial banks (in addition
to non-bank lenders) whose capital has not been impaired by the credit market collapse.
These banks compete with each other to provide lending and other services to consumers
and small businesses, and as a result in the US small businesses had not reported in 2008
a sudden freezing up of capital flows. Similarly, Switzerland, due to the duality of its
banking system (two big banks which have a significant share of the market, and suffered
from the consequences of the crisis) is not suffering from a credit crunch: regional banks
provide 75% of the credit demanded by SMEs and they currently have strong liquidity.
There are also some large banks that are aiming at preserving “relationship banking” at
the local level: in Italy, Intesa Sanpaolo is one of them and in Indonesia, the Bank Rakyat
has joined forces with other institutions (NGOs, microfinance institutions, etc.) to reach
SMEs in remote areas.

Already before the financial crisis structural changes within the banking sector had put
additional constraints on SME lending for financial intermediaries. One tool to mitigate
these constraints and to improve the access to finance for SMEs is SME loan securitisation
[in both forms: synthetic (mainly for capital relief purposes; only the risk of the portfolio
is transferred) and true sale (mainly for funding purposes; originator sells a homogenous
set of assets)]. This rather young market segment is now suffering from contagion effects
from the general adverse securitisation environment, including uncertainties stemming
from methodological adjustments by the rating agencies. Although exaggerations in the
securitisation industry have caused the financial crisis, this market in general played and
plays an important economic role but is currently severely affected. For the SME loan
securitisation as a niche market segment, the investor base is now limited to specialised
investors and the number of new transactions that came to the market in Europe in 2008
and so far in 2009 has significantly decreased. The new synthetic SME loan balance sheet
transactions in some countries are driven by Basel II and only the mezzanine tranche(s)
are offered, whereas the other tranches are retained by the originators. The majority of
true sale securitisations are retained by banks mostly for the purpose of accessing central
bank liquidity.

The stagnation in lending is true even of banks in countries where governments have
deliberately strengthened banks’ balance sheets to allow them to grant additional credit
to SMEs and/or where credit guarantee schemes exist. As will be seen in the next section
most countries have not only recapitalised their banks but also extended the funds and
guarantees available for SME financing. But the effects of the incentives to lend to SMEs

put in place by governments in some countries (such as the provision of additional capital)
have not yet yielded the desired results. Some governments are closely monitoring this
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situation or have put in place “credit mediators” to ease the flow of credit to SMEs. Such
actions will be further described in section III.

Some question whether the current regulatory framework under Basel II has caused
deterioration in SMEs’ access to credit. As the box below explains there is no evidence
of this. In fact under Basel II there is preferential treatment for SME lending. SMEs
can be treated as “retail” if certain conditions are met and this results in a reduced risk
weighting. However, if Basel II is revised in the wake of the financial crisis, governments
could assess the possible effects on SME lending (see Box 1).

Box 1: SMEs and the regulatory framework of Basel II

Many of the revisions of Basel II since the first draft of 2001 have been intended to
render the rules more flexible. Amongst the beneficiaries of these revisions are SMEs.

These revisions have included a downward adjustment in the weighting for credit
risk of SMEs in the Internal Ratings-based Approach of Basel II, a downward shift in
the curve relating probability of default to the regulatory capital requirements, and a
flattening of its slope. The downward shift is expected to increase the number of firms
for which minimum regulatory capital requirements under Basel II would not be greater
than under Basel 1. The flattening of the curve would reduce the procyclical impact
on bank lending of Basel II’s weightings for credit risk by slowing the rise in capital
requirements in response to the rise of the probability of default. Small SMEs could also
be the beneficiaries of lower risk weights for retail exposures.

A number of estimates of the quantitative impact of these revisions suggest that they will
have the desired effect of reducing the risk weights and thus the minimum regulatory
capital requirement for SMEs, thus avoiding adverse effects on SMEs’ access to bank
finance. However, there is still concern over the potential impact of the introduction of
Basel II on lending to SMEs. Reasons for this concern include continuing uncertainty
over its pro-cyclicality, despite the revisions of the rules already described, and the way
in which changes in the legal framework for banking linked to Basel II and changes in
banks’ risk management and internal controls are actually introduced at country level.

The introduction of Basel II is intended to be accompanied by more rigorous risk
management on the part of banks. However beneficial on other grounds, such risk
management can conflict with the relationship-based banking that is closely associated
with much lending to SMEs and capable of sustaining lending during economic
downturns.

Continuing concern over pro-cyclical effects on bank lending is already evident in
information concerning the introduction of special rules directed at mitigating the
pro-cyclicality of Basel II in some countries. Unsurprisingly these include developing

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countries particularly concerned to protect from adverse consequences a category of
institutions (SMEs) considered to be an engine of economic development.

Ultimately only experience can show whether Basel II – as implemented today - will
result in higher borrowing costs for SMEs or even in some cases their exclusion from
borrowing from banks. Governments have considerable flexibility concerning the way
in which Basel II is incorporated in their regulatory frameworks (though to a somewhat
lesser extent for EU countries for which the rules of Basel II are implemented through
the Capital Requirements Directive). Banks in their turn have flexibility over the way
in which Basel II is incorporated in their practices as to access to, and pricing of, loans.
So long as the authorities remain alert to the possible adverse effects of Basel II, they
should be able to take offsetting action without violating the letter or the spirit of the
Basel II framework.

E. Supply of equity, venture capital and alternative sources of financing

Confronted with worsening access to credit, SMEs are exploring alternative sources
of finance such as mobilisation of reserves and self-financing (Euro-area, Canada,
Thailand); self-financing and factoring (Slovenia) (see Annex 4). Although private equity
and venture capital markets have not contributed to the global financial crisis, the extent
of the impact the crisis has and will have on entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial firms and
SMEs’ access to equity financing around the world remains uncertain.

Global trends in private equity

In terms of venture capital and private equity, the information provided is largely
anecdotal and for many countries there are no official statistical data available covering
2008. However, new anecdotal information indicates that entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial
firms and SMEs find it increasingly difficult to access financing for new projects.

In order to better understand the impact of the financial crisis on the equity
markets, some global trends on the private equity market are discussed. Whenever
possible, the newest available venture capital and/or private equity data is used to
underline these trends.

As is explained in more detail below, the financial crisis has had a three- fold
impact on venture capital and private equity markets. First, exit opportunities are
reduced. Second, fundraising activities seem to be shrinking. And thirdly, invested
capital has stagnated or even slowly started to decline, especially investments in
new projects. It is expected that invested capital will see further declines in the
coming period. It should be noted that the venture capital market has experienced
similar declines after the 2001 economic downturn.

According to data by VentureXpert (a private information source), invested venture
capital did not decline between 2007 and 2008. The reason for this apparently steady
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level of investment was that many of the existing funds raised sufficient capital before the
crisis. Their mandate is to invest and this short-term obligation to maintain investment
levels could very well be a reason for the stable investment level. However, there is a
need to understand the apparent flat level of VC investment around the globe, especially
when the US, the biggest VC market in the world, experienced an 8 % drop in its VC
investment in 2008 compared to 2007 and 26 % drop in the last Q4 2008 compared to
Q4 2007. It is also worth mentioning that the financial credit crunch effect varies across
countries with some countries like Canada experiencing steep declines. More serious
drops in invested capital across the globe are expected in the coming period as a reaction
to worsened exit opportunities and difficulties in raising new funds.

Figure 4: Recent investment trends in the US

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers and National Venture Capital Association

National trends in venture capital

According to the Italian private equity and venture capital data from the first semester
2008, 170 new deals were recorded (+11 %) for a total value of €2,772 million (+45 % on
first semester 2007 figures). The market dynamism in the first semester is confirmed by
the increase in the amounts invested in start ups (+35 % on first semester 2007 figures).
However, as the crisis did not really unfold until the last quarter of 2008, it is expected
that data from this quarter would show a decrease in investment.

In Australia, the supply of venture capital from ‘business angels’ to companies participating
in the COMET programme (a government programme providing financial assistance and

II

business development advice to very young companies to enable them to grow and become
more attractive to private sector investors) has decreased in the period from June 2008 to
January 2009 in comparison to the period June 2007 to January 2008. From June 2008
to January 2009, there was AUD $19 million (€10.3 million) invested by business angels
compared to AUD $29 million (€15.8 million) in the period June 2007 to January 2008.
Indicators for the investment funds for exit and fundraising data show a similar downward trend.

Due to the financial crisis, exit opportunities also seem severely hit. According to
the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), the most significant impact of the
US financial crisis on the venture capital industry has clearly taken place in the exit
markets. Falling prices on the world’s stock markets have made investors turn to more
safe investments, which consequently makes it almost impossible to exit a venture capital
investment through either an IPO (initial public offering) or a merger or acquisition. In
the US, the number of exits and IPOs were historically low in 2008. 2008 brought just six
IPO exits, the fewest annual venture-backed offerings since 1977, when there were also
six IPO exits. According to the latest figures from the NVCA, IPO profits in 2008 reached
USD 470.2 million, the lowest value since 1979 with USD 339.7 million.

As a result, the time it takes from when an investment is made until it can be exited has
increased. In 2000, the period before exit would average four years. In 2008, the average
period has increased to seven years although it varies between sectors. And this period
has gone up between 2007-2008. Because investors find it harder to exit their investment,
they are forced to hold on to it longer. As a result, they must provide more follow-up
capital to their portfolio firms in order to ensure the survival and development of the
firms. New companies/projects are therefore likely to feel the consequences of the crisis
first, as investors will be more reluctant to make new investments.

According to the Korean Venture Capital Association, the largest venture capital
investors are the Korean Government and corporations. The number of new companies
funded by venture capital has been declining as a trend between 2000-2009. The number
of exits usually via IPOs on the KOSDAQ has also declined as a trend over time from
171 (2000) to 38 (2008).The Government is increasing the size of the Korean Fund of
Funds so that it can take a much larger share in venture funds launched in 2009.

Global trends in fundraising activity

The global fundraising activity has also slowed down between 2007-2008. The current
economic recession and the global downward pressure on prices are expected to influence
the future prospects for fundraising in the markets in the long run. Institutional investors
providing funding will simply be less willing to supply new funds with fresh capital.
Figures from Canada confirm the global trend, as fundraising has decreased by roughly
25 % in 2007 and by 2 % in 2008. As a result, the number of new venture capital funds
could be lower than expected before the crisis.

In Australia, the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research consulted
with venture capital industry stakeholders in December 2008 and identified that venture
II

capital fund managers were generally unable to raise new capital; the supply of follow-
on funding was drying up; institutional investors were seeking to reduce their exposure
to risky investments; and, pension funds were seeking to rebalance their investment
portfolios and to reduce their exposure to venture capital assets.

Similar trends were found in the United Kingdom. Other than yearly data up to 2007
provided by the British Venture Capital Association, there are no up to date published
data on the provision of equity finance during the economic downturn. However, there is
anecdotal evidence that VC funds are delaying making investments, and are also having
problems raising funds themselves. Exit routes through IPOs are also restricted due to
liquidity issues, which may cause investors to hold onto their investments for longer,
reducing the flow of capital for new investments.

If the private venture capital and private equity funds do not raise sufficient capital,
they will have to reduce the number of investment managers. For many markets this will
mean a significant setback in investment and have a negative impact on the development
of investment expertise in the markets, and thus make it even harder for entrepreneurial
firms and SMEs to survive and grow – in the longer run as well.

Possible impacts and policy implications

Under the influence of these trends, public funds (both direct and indirect investment
funds) will be impacted as much as the private funds. In markets with public or semi-
public investment funds, which provide capital to funds-of-funds activities, such public
funds are likely to witness a more limited possibility for co-investment with private
funds, simply because the private funds increasingly reduce their investment activities.
As a result, public funds cannot be expected to provide the same leverage effect as before
the crisis, unless supplied with more capital.

III III - Responses

III. POLICY RESPONSES OF GOVERNMENTS

A. Existing measures

Countries’ abilities to deal with the crisis depend to a large extent on the margin provided
by their respective fiscal and monetary policies. Many of the reporting countries have
recently put in place anti-crisis packages combining in different proportions three lines
of action: stimulation of demand (consumption packages, infrastructure programmes, tax
policies); credit enhancement measures, including recapitalisation of banks which, in
some cases, include explicit provisions or mechanisms to preserve or enhance banks’
capacity for financing SMEs such as public credit guarantees; and labour-market
measures (reduced employment taxes or social security charges and extended temporary
unemployment programs).

The anti-crisis packages and accompanying measures address, in many countries, more
specifically the financing problem of SMEs. According to the preceding analysis, the
measures put in place by countries can be classified in three different groups depending
on the aspect of the SME financing problem to which they are geared. Three main groups
of measures can be distinguished: (a) measures supporting sales, cash flows, and working
0 capital; (b) measures to enhance SME’s access to liquidity, mainly to bank lending; (c)
measures aimed at helping SMEs to maintain their investment level and more generally
to build their capacity to respond in the near future to a possible surge in demand.

1. Short-term measures supporting sales, cash flows and working capital

The stimulus packages are intended to revive demand either through consumption
or investment spending. Some of the packages include spending on health, education,
technology and infrastructure. SMEs in these sectors could benefit either directly or
indirectly. More direct are the measures to increase cash flow, thereby contributing to
working capital. A robust cash- flow is a condition sine qua non for business development
and growth. Many governments have implemented measures to maintain or increase cash
flows. For instance, they have allowed accelerated depreciation for investments already
undertaken. France and Germany have introduced accelerated depreciation either on all
categories of assets or on specific ones as in Germany where depreciation thresholds are
targeted to SMEs thereby reducing taxable income. Some countries are also giving tax
credits, cuts, deferrals and refunds. In Japan, the Government has reduced the corporate
tax rate from 22 % to 18 % for the SMEs with 8 million yen (€61 thousand) or less in
annual income in the coming 2 years. In the Netherlands one of the tax brackets has been
reduced from 23 % to 20 % for both 2009 and 2010 for amounts up to 200,000 euros and
Canada increased the income threshold for which the small business rate applies. The
Czech Republic, France and Spain are refunding VAT payments immediately or monthly.

III
III - Responses

The idea was introduced during the Turin Round Table that governments give preference
to reducing those taxes that are “profit-insensitive”, that is, taxes that are paid regardless
of whether the SME is making a profit. This would increase the ability of SMEs to finance
working capital internally. Lastly, in order to maintain employment, some governments
are giving wage subsidies to enterprises so that employees can receive full wages while
working part time.

To address the depletion of SMEs’ working capital, some countries have implemented
specific measures that, without involving additional credit lines, are aimed at easing SMEs’
liquidity. As mentioned in Annex 5, two main types of instruments are used; either legal
moves to shorten payment delays and enforce payment discipline (France) or reduction
of government payment delays (Australia, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, UK). In the case of the UK it has cut government payment delays to 10 days.
Governments are also easing tendering and procurement procedures and policies.

Some of the responding countries are highly internationalised economies, and thus
depend on export markets. SMEs are among the exporters, either directly, or indirectly
through their participation in Global Value Chains. In order to alleviate the sales shock
on export markets and strengthen enterprises’ liquidity in case of extended international
payment delays, many countries have put in place or reinforced existing export financing
or guarantee facilities. Annex 5 provides additional details on measures adopted which
range from dedicated export credit lines (Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Mexico, Slovenia), credit insurance mechanisms, (Germany, Luxembourg, New Zealand
and the Netherlands), investment credit for exporting SMEs (Mexico), and general
support for internationalisation and competitiveness of SMEs (Austria, Italy, Spain).
These measures either strengthen existing ones or are ex novo creations.

2. Enhancing SMEs’ access to liquidity, especially to bank lending

Despite the fact that in many of the responses, some of the largest banks have been
recapitalised with public funds, the evidence from previous sections of this paper suggests
that banks have significantly tightened their credit policies. In order to alleviate the
effects on SMEs of the twin shock of falling sales and more difficult access to funding,
governments are using two different approaches to increase availability of credit to SMEs:
(a) on the incentive side, the creation and extension of guarantee schemes for loans to
SMEs, or when that fails direct public lending; (b) on the discipline or sanction side,
setting targets for SME lending for banks that have been recapitalised by public monies,
putting them under administrative monitoring or putting in place specific procedures to
solve problems between individual SMEs and banks.

III III - Responses

Incentives: the loan guarantee schemes

Extension and diversification of public guarantee schemes or, in some cases, even
direct lending by public institutions, are among measures being widely used by reporting
countries. These policy measures deal with one of the key reasons that may explain banks’
reluctance to lend to SMEs that is, their constraint in terms of their capital requirements
ratio. According to Basel II methodology, for banks operating under the “standardised
approach”, the level of capital requirement for a publicly guaranteed credit line is very
low or even nil, depending on the extent and the exact modalities of the public guarantee.
For banks operating under the “internal rating-based approach”, the regulatory capital
requirement is very low, if any, and in the last analysis depends on the internal risk
model. For this reason, public guarantee schemes for SME credit are expected to be an
incentive for bank lending to this segment of clients. It is also worth mentioning that
even for guarantee structures without regulatory capital relief, loan guarantee schemes
can improve the access to finance for SMEs through economic capital relief as an
incentive for banks. For European Union member countries, the potential leverage effect
of public guarantees on SME bank lending has been further extended by the decision
of the European Commission to temporarily authorise Member States to ease access to
finance for companies through subsidised guarantees and loan subsidies for investments.
In France, for instance, this easing of rules makes it possible for the guarantee schemes
to cover up to 90 % of the risks related to a loan as compared with 50 to 60 % on
average before. The United Kingdom guarantees 75 % of the loan and Korea, 100 %.
Japan, in principle, guarantees 80 % of the loan but there are some exceptional cases
of 100 % coverage. Almost all reporting countries have enhanced, or put in place, a
credit guarantee scheme either focused on SMEs or a general one. For example, Greece
introduced new credit guarantee scheme, which recorded €2.2 billion credit guarantee
provision for SME working capital for its first three months (see Box 2). Exceptions
are Australia and New Zealand, which do not have a credit guarantee scheme in the first
place as well as Denmark, which has been maintaining its credit guarantee scheme as it
was before the crisis.

Box 2: New credit guarantee scheme for working capital in Greece
III
III - Responses

Greece has introduced a new credit guarantee scheme for working capital which is a
public-private risk sharing scheme where the Government covers 80% of the risks. The
scheme offers fixed interest rate loans for SMEs which have recorded profits in the last
three years.

The Credit Guarantee Fund of Small and Very Small Enterprises (TEMPME S.A.)
launched in December 2008, the programme “Loan Guarantee and Interest Rate Subsidy
for the Working Capital of Small and Micro Enterprises”. In this programme, TEMPME
S.A. guarantees part of the loans contracted among Small/Micro Enterprises and financial
auxiliaries in a way that the entrepreneurial risk is shared. The allocated budget, for the
first phase, amounts to 100 million Euros for the interest rate subsidies and to 2.5 billion
Euros for the allocation of guarantees. In brief, the programme includes the working
capital loan guarantees and full subsidy of interest rates.

The duration of the loan, and thus the duration of guarantee and subsidy, is three years
(without a grace period)

➧ The loans are guaranteed by TEMPME S.A. up to 80%.

➧ For the remaining 20% that is not guaranteed by TEMPME S.A, the bank does not
ask enterprises for any other collateral.

➧ The interest rate which is covered by TEMPME S.A has been negotiated between
TEMPME and the banking sector and has been agreed at EURIBOR +210 base
units (2.10%).

➧ The loan cannot exceed 30% of the average turnover of the last three accounting
years and also cannot exceed 350 000 Euros.

The number of the applications approved reached 20,000 and the amount guaranteed
reached 2.2 billion Euros in loans for the first three months.

There are also a number of private guarantee schemes. The Association Europeenne
de Cautionement Mutuel AECM), which is composed of non-profit organisations
giving SME credit guarantees, has provided 55 billion euros for 1.6 million SMEs
(roughly 8 % of total SMEs in the EU). AECM members have knowledge of the local
context and the SME sector and therefore they can undertake a reliable individual
risk analysis of each loan. They also provide additional information to both the bank
and the SME partner and act as an interface. From the perspective of the AECM, EU
counter-guarantees are extremely useful and value-adding but the Competition and
Innovation Programme was suffering from implementation delays and only a few

III III - Responses

AECM member organisations have been able to sign their bilateral agreements with
the European Investment Fund so far. At the Turin Round Table it was suggested that
during the crisis, governments should be more flexible with their counter-guarantee
mechanisms and widen their scope to include working capital and widen their terms
to include short-term guarantee commitments. The AECM also proposed that banks
accepting private guarantees have the respective loans exempted from reserve
requirements.

During the Turin Round Table direct lending to SMEs by public institutions such
as France’s Organisation for SME Support (OSEO), the Belgium Ministry for SMEs,
Spain’s Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO), the Japan Finance Corporation and the
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) were put forward as another means
to provide liquidity in the face of private banks’ reluctance to lend to SMEs even
with guarantees. In Belgium the Ministry for SMEs provides SMEs with pre-fund
agreements which they can take to the banks to obtain a guaranteed loan. Sweden
also increased the lending capacity of ALMI’s subsidiary SME banks by 50 % and
lending demand doubled.

Mediation and monitoring

In some countries, the governments have found the response of the newly
recapitalised banks to the needs of SMEs unsatisfactory or insufficient. These
countries have resorted to discipline measures that in some cases complement the
incentives, in order to pressure banks to continue lending to enterprises. Belgium
and France have appointed a credit mediator, who at regional and central levels,
may intervene to ease difficulties and help solve divergences between enterprises
and banks (see Box 3). The UK has established the SME Lending Monitoring Panel.
In the US, the Government has chosen to strictly monitor, on a monthly basis, the
credit activities of banks that have been rescued by public funding. The first such
report has been released in January 2009 under the title “Treasury Department
Monthly Lending and Intermediation Snapshot”. The purpose of the document is “to
provide the Treasury Department and the public with regular insight into the lending
trends and intermediation activities – including underwriting, buying and selling of
securities, and other activities in capital markets – of the banks that received the
most funding via the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). This snapshot seeks to gather
information to help answer the question asked by many during this crisis: “Are banks
doing what they are supposed to do, providing credit to borrowers in a safe and sound
manner?” Furthermore, the US has also required all banks to provide information on
SME lending in their quarterly reports. Ireland has instituted a legally binding code
of conduct for banks’ SME lending.

Box 3: Credit Mediation in France
III
III - Responses

Credit mediation was set up in November 2008 in order to assist SMEs to resolve their
liquidity problems by maintaining or obtaining credit. To start the process the enterprise
must establish a “mediation file” on the website of the Credit Mediator who has been
appointed at the national level to coordinate and act as a final “referee”. He is assisted by
departmental mediators who are the regional directors of the Bank of France. After the
file is received, the banks are notified by mail and they have five business days to reply
to the enterprise. After this, the departmental mediator has five business days to review
the file and indicate how the file should be treated. When the mediator has identified
solutions, the enterprise is notified by mail. If the enterprise is not satisfied, it may
appeal to the national mediator.

Between November 2008 and February 2009:

➧ 8 000 enterprises have been seen by credit mediators;

➧ 90 % are SMEs with less than 50 employees;

➧ The main cause of referral to the mediator is the need for short-term credit (69 % of referrals);

➧ The rate of successful mediation within 15 days is 66 %;

➧ 60 000 jobs have been preserved.

3. Strengthening pro investment measures

In the context of bleak medium-term prospects amid falling sales, many SMEs have
reduced or withheld their investment plans. In consequence, their demand for long- term
lending has significantly fallen, as discussed earlier. In order to prevent SMEs from losing
their competitive edge in the medium term, and help them to remain ready for the upturn,
some governments have put into place measures to strengthen their capital base or to
develop their productive capacities, or both. These measures are either tax incentives
(US), or provision of specific funding possibilities such as grants (Germany) or credit
(Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Spain). On the top of this, the existence
of Structural Funds within the European Union gives to new-member countries a margin
of maneuvre to support SMEs investment projects in specific technologies, sectors or
regions (Romania and the Czech Republic). Annex 6 provides more information on
specific instruments used by each country.

III III - Responses

4. Strengthening the capital base, private equity and venture capital

Some countries have addressed the venture capital and equity market within the rescue
plan. However, it is uncertain to what extent the list of government interventions have
actually been designed as responses to the crisis or were already planned interventions
that have been adjusted accordingly. Annex 7 provides some information about the
means put in place to strengthen the equity base of SMEs. These range from private-
public partnerships (Finland) to ad hoc programmes (Austria, Chile, Hungary, Mexico)
and international projects like the Japanese-Hungarian Venture Capital Fund. The UK is
setting up the Capital for Enterprise Fund with 75 million pounds (€85 million) in equity
and quasi-equity. It is a mix of government and private sector funds. Korea is improving
exit opportunities by activating a MA market and enhancing the KOSDAQ.

Various policy measures are implemented via the European Investment Bank Group’s
European Investment Fund (EIF)6. The EIF provides long term equity financing and
guarantees on SME loan portfolios/securitisations to enhance access to finance for SMEs.
It has provided 3.5 billion euros in net equity (venture and growth capital portfolio)
commitments and 12.3 billion euros in outstanding guarantees and securitisation
commitments at the end of 2008. During the Round Table it was mentioned that in
its Private Equity Business, the EIF –as a Fund of Funds – sees a severe slowdown in
fundraising and problems especially but, not only, for young VC . With regard to the SME
loan securitisation, this small, but important market for SME financing, is negatively
affected by contagion effects from the general securitisation market. It was noted that the
EIF’s products cover mainly long term SME financing and that there is little it can do to
ease the situation in terms of working capital even for innovative start-ups.

The Australian Government has established the Innovation Investment Follow On
Fund to assist high potential young innovative companies to be sustainable through the
financial crisis. The capital provided by the Government will be allocated on a competitive
basis to selected venture capital fund managers to provide follow-on funding to early-
stage innovative companies in their portfolio that have already received funding under
specified government programs. Up to AUD 83 million (€45.2 million) will be available
over a three year period. Improving SMEs’ and entrepreneurs’ readiness to receive capital
is also very important. In New Zealand, in order to inform small firms of the capital
raising process and therefore to make them “investment ready”, the Government has
been providing specialised training assistance to small firms.

6 For details regarding the main policy measures by the EIB/EIF see annexes 4 and 6.

Box 4: New Zealand’s Investment Ready Training
III
III - Responses

Investment Ready Training helps businesses learn about the type of finance they require
to expand, diversify or commercialise a new concept, and how to access equity funding
from investors. It is offered in a series of free workshops as part of Enterprise Training
programme which is provided by New Zealand’s national economic development agency,
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE). Investment Ready Training consists of
seven modules that are delivered across two half-day workshops.

Owners or managers of small businesses employing fewer than 50 full-time staff are
eligible for this training, which is divided into the following modules:

➧ 1. Understanding the capital raising process (The alternatives / angel investors
and venture capitalists – what are they and how do they work? / What type of
funding is appropriate at each stage of business?)

➧ 2. Understanding what investors look for (Why do small businesses miss out on
venture capital? / What do investors look for?)

➧ 3. Preparing your business case - business plan (Six key things investors look for
/ Starting your own business plan / What kind of deal can you offer?)

➧ 4. Preparing your business case - what is your business worth? (The principles of
valuation and the key steps in valuing your business / The drivers of value in your
business)

➧ 5. Legal implications of raising funds (The Securities Act and the exemptions /
Background on public issues / Guidelines on private debt legal documentation)

➧ 6. Finding an investor (Deal process and timetable /What to provide investors /
Critiquing potential investors and identifying/targeting investors / The importance
of “the pitch”)

➧ 7. Doing the deal (Due diligence - what to expect / The negotiation process and key
negotiating strategies How and when to use the earn in formula / Legal agreements
required)

New Zealand set up this training programme in November 2003: it succeeded a similar
programme evaluated in 2005 which reported high rates of repeat attendance.

III III - Responses

Table 3: Policy responses

B. Enhancing SME
A. Measures supporting sales, access to liquidity, D.
cashflows and working capital (Annex 5) especially to bank Strengthening
lending (Annex 6) C.
Strengthening capital base
Alleviating proinvestment and private
Creation equity and
working Reducing Easing pro-- measures
and exten- Mediation
- venture
capital and easing Export curement (Annex 6)
sion of loan and capital
shortage tax facilitation payment (Annex 7)
guarantee monitoring
in the payments procedures
economy schemes

OECD
Australia ✔ ✔ ✔
Austria ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Belgium ✔ ✔ Mediator
Canada ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Czech
Republic ✔ ✔ ✔
Denmark ✔ ✔ ✔
Finland ✔ ✔
France ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Mediator ✔
Germany ✔ ✔ ✔
Greece ✔
Hungary ✔ ✔ ✔

Italy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Monitoring ✔
Japan ✔ ✔
Korea ✔
Luxembourg ✔ ✔
Mexico ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Netherlands ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
New Zealand ✔ ✔ ✔
Spain ✔ ✔ ✔
Switzerland ✔ ✔
UK ✔ ✔ ✔
USA ✔ Monitoring ✔
EC ✔ ✔
Non-OECD
Brazil ✔ ✔ ✔
Chile ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Estonia ✔
Romania ✔
Russia ✔
Slovenia ✔ ✔ ✔
Thailand ✔
International Financial Institutions
EIB/EIF ✔ ✔ ✔
Source: Country Reponses to the 14 January 2009 OECD WPSMEE Questionnaire on the Impact of the Global Crisis on SMEs and
Entrepreneurship Financing and publicly available information.

5. Conclusions on existing measures III
III - Responses

Most of the measures described in this paper are very recent and thus have not been
evaluated. In consequence it is impossible to identify best practices. This being said,
extension of existing credit guarantee schemes is the most widely adopted measure (24
countries). It has to be stressed that these measures help SMEs by solving their immediate
liquidity problem, but if the macroeconomic situation continues to worsen, they may only
postpone an insolvency problem. In some countries, measures aimed at solving the long-
term problem of insufficient own capital base are being taken. They address the issue
either by helping enterprises to strengthen their cash-flow and self-financing or by putting
in place additional sources of equity capital.

Although the present paper is based on an impressive volume of information from
the country responses, a number of questions remain unanswered. Indeed, the evidence
provided by reporting countries derives from a variety of surveys with different
methodologies which make general conclusions difficult. First, the crisis has been
unfolding in many countries with different sequence and timing before hitting the “real”
economy; second the reporting methods and indicators used work with different lags.
This being said, the convergence of otherwise heterogeneous information is striking on
two main points: the demand shock and the tightened bank lending conditions. Clearly,
SMEs experience additional difficulties today in achieving adequate levels of liquidity,
but it is still unclear to what extent they are willing to borrow, on what terms and to what
extent they are credit constrained. Indeed, increased borrowing today may result – in case
of prolonged poor sales - in over indebtedness tomorrow. In such a situation the current
liquidity problem would be transformed in the medium-term into an insolvency one.

Obviously, the banks’ attitude towards lending is an important aspect of the issues
addressed in this paper. Compelled to revise their business models and lines of activities,
most banks are constrained by their poor capital base and sensitive to the fact that investors
are putting a premium on the shares of financial institutions that are better capitalised. It
is unclear, for the time being, if the evident tightening of lending conditions is linked to
the revisions in the financial institutions’ strategy, or to their – pro-cyclical - regulatory
environment (Basel II), or to the general bleak economic perspectives or to the financial
market scepticism towards poorly capitalised banks.

The most widely used policy measure to increase access to finance has been until now
the extension of loans and loan guarantees. These measures are also very heterogeneous in
their modalities, in their cost and also target groups. Time is too short to draw conclusions
about what are the “best practices” in the field of emergency measures and in the field of
loan guarantees. The OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE)
has, in the past, identified examples of best practices in the field of loan guarantees7

7 Cf. OECD Framework for the Evaluation of SME and Entrepreneurship Policies and Programmes, OECD
2007
.

III III - Responses

which could lay the groundwork for future comparisons and evaluations. The second most
widely used measures are those which improve cash flows such as tax cuts and deferrals,
and the adoption of prompter payment schedules for government procurement.

In terms of venture capital and private equity markets, worsened exit opportunities
and declining fundraising activities are slowly resulting in lower investment levels. It is
expected that investment levels – in particular new investment – will decline further in
the coming period. In terms of policy interventions on the venture capital markets, it is
uncertain whether the newly introduced policy instruments have been designed following
the crisis or planned prior to crisis and since adapted to the new situation.

B. Proposals for further action

The discussions during the Turin Round Table revealed the participants’ sense of
urgency to alleviate the shortage of working capital SMEs are facing. SMEs are caught in
a vicious circle because of the causal connections between the demand shock, the decline
in working capital and the increase in insolvencies. At the same time the impaired credit
markets are not responding to the SMEs need for liquidity. Hence a downward spiral has
been created which is destroying the backbone of many economies. Therefore, governments
were urged to review the policy measures already taken with the aim of reinforcing them
or complementing them with new measures. The Round Table distinguished between
0 the short-term emergency measures such as tax measures that could be reversed and the
long-term measures which need to be undertaken to make structural improvements and
institutional changes in the SME financial environment in order to restore growth.

1. Resolving the problem of insufficient working capital

Almost all participants acknowledged that there is an increased problem of insufficient
working capital which is threatening the survival of SMEs. Several speakers noted that
the situation regarding working capital had deteriorated rapidly at the end of 2008 and
worsened in the first quarter of 2009. There is evidence that if steps are not taken to
resolve the liquidity crisis, SME exits will increase in the near future.

A number of examples of good practices were put forward to resolve this problem of
insufficient working capital.

Making guarantees effective

• The most widely used measure has been the extension of SME loans and
loan guarantees. What was learned from previous crises was that in order to
encourage financial institutions to increase lending, it may also be necessary
to utilise government guarantees in tandem with capital injection schemes. In

countries where SMEs are export-oriented, governments are also expandingIII
III - Responses

export credit guarantees. However, some banks are still reluctant to take up
loan guarantees.
• Participants described the additional measures being taken by their governments
such as the creation of “credit mediators”; the monitoring of SME lending
by banks through timely reporting and the establishment of a code of conduct
for SME lending by banks. Another policy response which attracted interest is
where the government gives pre-fund agreements directly to the SMEs which
then can be taken to the banks to obtain guaranteed loans.

Dealing with cash flow problems

• To deal with cash flow problems, countries reported a number of temporary tax
measures they had undertaken such as tax cuts and deferrals. It was suggested
that governments give priority to reducing taxes that are “profit insensitive”
that is, taxes which are paid regardless of whether the SME is making a profit
(e.g. payroll taxes). Some governments are also deferring social contributions
by SMEs.
• SMEs in supply chains are particularly vulnerable and some governments are
guaranteeing their accounts receivable. In a number of countries fiscal stimulus
packages allocate a percentage of government procurement to SMEs. Another

major problem noted by a number of speakers is the increase in payment delays.
To alleviate cash flow problems some governments are leading the way in
paying their SME suppliers within 30 days or less. Furthermore, the European
Commission is revising the directive on payment delays in view of improving
the payment behaviour.

2. Assisting innovative start-ups and high -growth SMEs

There was a general consensus that it is necessary to ensure that innovative start-ups and
high- growth SMEs have access to adequate funding in times of economic recession.

• Some governments are stimulating the provision of private risk capital through
co-investment. They are in line with OECD Brasilia Action Statement which
emphasises that “with appropriate incentives for management, public equity
funds can operate so as to help catalyse and leverage the provision of private
risk capital.”
• Some governments are also reducing or eliminating taxes on capital gains for
investment in SMEs by venture capital funds.

III III - Responses

3. Improving the SME and entrepreneurship financial environment

In addition to the policy measures reviewed above, measures which are more
institutional or structural in nature were proposed during the Round Table that could
remedy the long-standing deficiencies in the SME financial environment.

• As SMEs often lack face-to-face contact with bank managers due to the current
impersonal structure of the modern banking system, banks could consider
balancing their scoring methods for assessing SME credit-worthiness with
adequate room being left for “relationship banking”. Returning, to some
extent, decision making on SME loans to local branches could help in cases
where the circumstances and viability of individual businesses need to be better
accounted for. Consequently, staffing local branches with personnel who have
adequate skills in dealing with SME lending becomes important. Banks could
also enter partnerships with business service providers to help them reduce the
risks in SME lending. Overall, it needs to be stressed that banks and the financial
community are part and parcel of any solution to the SME and entrepreneurs’
financing problem. SMEs have to do their part to improve the transparency of
their economic and financial conditions, as well as in improving the quality of
their credit demand.
• Issues have been raised regarding SMEs and the regulatory framework of Basel
II and its pro-cyclical potential effects; when Basel II is revised in response
to the financial crisis, governments should assess the possible effects on SME
lending.
• Automatic systems of credit evaluation do not always function to the effect
that viable companies can obtain credit, which could be addressed with a more
appropriate and discriminate use of these methods. Systems are needed to
evaluate the credit risk of SMEs on a company basis rather than on a sectoral
basis, while being consistent with prudential management practices in terms of
sectoral allocation of funds.
• SME loan securitisation is an important element to support the SME financing
environment. In order to enable the market to fulfil its function, over regulation
as a reaction to the financial crisis should be avoided. However, measures with
proper incentive structures are preferable in order to prevent moral hazard and
to ensure less complexity/more transparency.
• The specific financing needs of micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees) which
dominate the SME sector were considered. Small firms often require modest
financing to conduct their business. Research on start-ups by the Kauffman
Foundation revealed that they also need modest capital injections and that the
most important source was outside credit averaging USD 32,000. This could be
provided through micro-finance in countries which do not already have such
schemes.

4. Other policy responses to improve SME and entrepreneurship financing III
III - Responses

Improving SME and entrepreneurs’ information and competencies

• Improving the provision of general information on SME-related government
measures is crucial for the implementation of government policy and
programmes. It could be facilitated in partnership with business service
providers or business associations. As indicated in the OECD Brasilia Action
statement “…informing SMEs of the range of financing options (e.g., public
guarantee programmes, business angels, and bank loans) will ensure greater
take-up of schemes”.
• Also competence building should spur the demand for financing among SMEs.
The managerial competencies of SMEs - especially in the field of finance - have
to be supported. In order to improve the level of financial knowledge among
SMEs, governments could support business development services and training
programmes.

Facilitating dialogue and consultation between governments, SMEs and financial
institutions

• SMEs should be engaged in the design of relevant finance-related policies
and programmes from the outset to ensure that their perspectives and needs
are well understood and taken into account. Examples were given of regular
communication and consultation with the representatives of SMEs through
forums and round tables to raise awareness and to assess the effectiveness of
existing measures and programmes to help SMEs to access finance.

Improving knowledge of the situation of SME and entrepreneurs’ financing

• There is a need for more timely and SME specific data on the supply of and
demand for financing so that the real situation of SMEs is known and so that
policy makers can determine if their measures are working. Several OECD
countries are improving transparency in bank lending by encouraging the
timely public disclosure by banks of the composition of their loan portfolios
by size of firm.

IV
IV - Preparing SMES

IV. PREPARING SMEs AND ENTREPRENEURS FOR RECOVERY
AND INNOVATION-LED GROWTH

As many have said the crisis brings certain opportunities. Crises are always moments
when change accelerates and new possibilities arise. The crisis could accelerate the
redeployment of resources to new activities so that growth is greener and knowledge-
based. The current stimulus packages and the normal public procurement programmes
could be further tailored to promote innovation and a restructuring of the economy toward
the provision of more energy-efficient and greener goods and services. Governments
should ensure they are utilising their SMEs as suppliers and could consider procurement
targets ensuring SMEs receive purchase orders from government. SMEs should be put in
the position to offer these goods and services.

Both the Istanbul Ministerial Declaration and the OECD Brasilia Action Statement
acknowledged that SMEs’ financing requirements differ at each stage of their development.
In particular innovative SMEs have to have access to appropriately structured risk capital
at all stages of their development. As discussed earlier, venture capital and private equity
have been in short supply since 2001 and with the current crisis are on the verge of
collapse. If SMEs are to be the drivers of innovation-led growth, then governments must
redouble their efforts to promote private sector risk capital. The European Business
Angel Network (EBAN) reported that there is “an unexpected flow of capital demands
to business angel networks across Europe which clearly demonstrates the current lack of
access to bank credit. This is creating some important challenges for early stage investors
but also opportunities which policy makers should help to tackle and leverage.”

The OECD Brasilia Action Statement dealt extensively with this issue. It highlighted
the fact the access to appropriate types of financing structures and facilities are especially
required to allow SMEs and entrepreneurs to take advantage of the opportunities provided
by innovation, notably through the diffusion of information and communications
technologies (ICTs). They are also needed for SMEs with new business models and high-
growth prospects. The OECD Brasilia Action Statement contained a number of proposed
actions which could prepare SMEs and entrepreneurs for recovery and innovation-led
growth:

• “A lack of appropriate financing notably represents a hindrance to the creation
and expansion of innovative SMEs (…). Comprehensive efforts are needed
to bolster the early stages (i.e. pre-seed, seed and start-up) of SMEs, which
are marked by negative cash flows and untried business models. This can be
done by entrepreneurs themselves leveraging the capital lying dormant in their
personal assets, or by “business angel networks” or venture capital markets
(…). Successful approaches to developing early stage venture capital markets

include both tax-based programmes and programmes that use government’s
ability to leverage private risk capital such as co-investment.
IV
IV - Preparing SMES

• Business incubators, clusters of innovative SMEs, science and technology parks,
and development agencies play an important role in facilitating appropriate
access to financing for SMEs at local and regional levels. Cities and regions
can underpin and strengthen this function through partnerships with private
financial institutions and universities. Appropriate financial incentives can
correct market failures and stimulate equity investment in local enterprises.
• There is a need to promote enhanced awareness, educate and communicate
more broadly the value of equity financing, including raising the recognition
among entrepreneurs of fair value (this is being rolled back) and transparency
in valuing investments.
• The combined legal, tax and regulatory framework should ensure that risk
capital is not discriminated against, including by safeguarding orderly,
equitable and transparent exit routes. Taxes should not put SMEs, entrepreneurs
or their financial backers at a disadvantage. There should be neutrality between
alternative sources of risk capital, such as domestic versus foreign venture
capital funds. Maintaining neutrality between debt and equity should also be
an aim for tax policies.
• There is no venture capital without venture capitalists and business angels
greatly enhance the effectiveness of informal finance. Representing an
evolving entrepreneurial breed, these actors thrive on their ability and
courage to assume risk. Obstacles should be identified and eliminated.
Effective role models can also be promoted to spur the dynamism of these
actors. Ways should be explored to facilitate the establishment of “business
angel networks”, which may greatly enhance information and capital flows.”
The review of measures recently implemented by governments reveals the paucity of
measures directed to venture capital. As such, there is some scope to provide additional
incentives to encourage investors to participate in venture capital funds or to act as
business angel, if venture capital is to play a role in the road to recovery and to stimulate
innovation-led growths. EBAN reported that “…there are great opportunities at attractive
values on the market… but angel funding for newly formed early stage businesses will
not come easy in the next 12 to 24 months…”. Government actions could include
guarantees for risk capital and/or more co-investment and fiscal incentives such as tax
credits for venture capital investments, or tax reductions on capital gains from venture
capital investments—whatever is appropriate and for however long it is necessary to re-
start venture capital. Incentives must be given to the SMEs as well to encourage them
to invest both in upgrading technology as well as shifting toward greener goods and
services. These incentives have already been discussed such as accelerated depreciation
and tax credits for investments.

VV - Role for OECD

V. PROPOSED ROLE FOR THE OECD

One of the principal recommendations in the Brasilia Action Statement was that the
OECD considered the development of definitions, indicators, and methodologies for
gathering data on the supply of financing available to SMEs and the demand for financing
by SMEs. In response to this recommendation, the OECD has undertaken in particular:

• A review of terminology on business financing used by national and international
organisations. This work has resulted in a proposed common set of definitions
for all relevant terms. These definitions and other relevant material on measuring
access to finance for SMEs and Entrepreneurship will form a section on
“Measuring Access to Finance” in the OECD Entrepreneurship Measurement
Manual to be published in 2009.
• An overview and assessment of some of the main sources of data on both the
supply of and demand for financing for SMEs. This work highlighted that:
- Few truly comparable datasets exist across countries. This applies generally
to information both on the demand side and the supply side. In one area,
i.e. the supply of equity financing, internationally comparable information
can be compiled, although many differences exist in the data published by
the venture capital and private equity organisations. A temporary database,
the Entrepreneurship Financing Database (EFD), has been developed by
gathering the available data on the supply of equity financing with a view of
enhancing comparability.
- Available information on the supply of debt financing does not allow one to
separate amounts for firms of different sizes and it is therefore impossible
to identify the supply of debt financing for SMEs. Proxies are used for firm
sizes, e.g. borrowing limits size of loans. In the case of the supply of equity
financing, data are classified by stage of firm development and by industry
sector.
• A collection of policies and programmes related to SME and entrepreneurship
financing in particular financing innovative and high growth SMEs. A systematic
database of these programmes will be established in the framework of the
2009-2010 programme of work of the OECD Working Party on SMEs and
Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE).

In light of the extreme importance of data availability for effective policy responses,
as revealed by the current global crisis, the OECD should continue efforts to improve the
V
V - Role for OECD

availability and international comparability of data sets on SME and Entrepreneurship
Financing. The WPSMEE, in close cooperation with its parent Committee, the Committee
on Industry, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (CIIE):

• Could promote a Scoreboard on SME and entrepreneurship financing data and
policies (a pilot project will be carried out in the framework of the 2009-2010
programme of work in view of the “Bologna +10” High level Meeting) ; and
• Should monitor, report on, and discuss SME and entrepreneurship financing
trends on a regular basis.
As a follow-up, the WPSMEE should also carry out, in the framework of its programme
of work 2009-2010, an assessment of the effectiveness of measures taken to assist SMEs
and entrepreneurs in weathering the financial and economic crisis, as reported in the
present report.

Finally, the OECD should also continue facilitating the tripartite dialogue between
governments, SMEs and the financial institutions, to periodically review progress in
strengthening SME and entrepreneurship financing.

A Annexes

ANNEXES

Annex 1.
“Short term financial balance” – the French example

The notion of “short term financial balance” is defined as a difference between a firm’s
receivables and its own trade debts. The Observatory of Payment delays (set up in 2006)
expresses the outstanding balance in terms of an average daily turnover. The graph below
represents the evolution of this “balance” for different size classes of enterprises in French
industry. Expressed in days of turnover, the SME situation is most problematic relative
(25 working days) to large enterprises.

Figure 6: Net balance (receivables – commercial debt) expressed in average
days of turnover in France, by enterprise size

Average of ratios (in days of turnover)

Size class (by number of employees)

Source: Bank of France – Fiben, Economic sectors: Food industry (EB); consumer goods (EC); automobile (ED); capital goods (EE);
intermediate goods (EF).

Annex 2.
Evidence on credit demand
Annexes
A
Countries

In Q4-2008 the overall enterprise demand for credit dramatically decreased,
according to 78% of respondents, while for the Q1-2009 a further decrease is
France expected by 73%; as far as SMEs are concerned, in Q4-2008, 90% of respondents
reported a fall in demand (66% for large enterprises) while 73% expect a further fall
in Q1-2009 (as opposed to 34% for large enterprises).

In Q4-2008 the overall enterprise demand for credit decreased, according to 7%
of the respondents, while for the Q1-2009 a slight overall increase is expected by
4%; as far as SMEs are concerned, for Q4-2008, 19% of respondents reported a
fall (8% for large enterprises) while for Q1-2009 the situation is expected to remain
Germany
stable for SME while large enterprise demand is expected to raise by 4%. The
overall demand behaviour is explained by a drastic fall in fixed investment financing
demand (-44% in Q1-2009 and -12% in Q4-2008) and MA financing demand
(-14% in Q1-2009 and -10% in Q4-2008).

The overall enterprise demand for credit was stable in Q4-2008, while for Q1-2009
an increase is expected by 12% of respondents; the same figure applies for SMEs,
Italy while demand by large enterprises is expected to drop by 25% of bank officials.
While demand for short term credit is expected to rise by 12% of respondents, the
demand for investment credits is expected to fall also by a net 12.5%.

Since the beginning of 2008, the Swiss National Bank has been conducting a
qualitative survey with twenty banks which make up the bulk of the domestic loan
market. The survey carried out in January 2009 shows that some banks have
Switzerland
tightened their lending conditions slightly. Moreover, a growing number of banks
are expecting to do the same in the near future. While statistics confirm lower
growth in overall lending, they do not show an actual decline.

Demand for new credit facilities by medium-sized and large non-financial
enterprises is reported to have experienced a fall superior to that anticipated in
Q4-2008, while drawdowns on existing committed credit lines are reported to have
increased. For Q1-2009, lenders expected further declines in demand for new
credit. Drawdowns on committed credit lines were expected to rise. When small
enterprises are concerned, in Q4-2008, 53% of lenders report a fall in demand
for unsecured credits, and 34% for secured ones. The situation is rather similar
United
for medium and large enterprises when Q4-2008 is concerned (35% reported a
Kingdom
fall), while prospects for Q1-2009 differ as 37% of respondents expect a further
fall in demand from medium sized enterprises, and only 17% from the larger ones.
Sharp fall in capital investment, real estate and MA activity in medium and large
enterprises are the main explanations of the stalled demand in the two quarters
under review (-37% to – 66%). Inventory financing and balance sheet restructuring
are the two reasons that have contributed to maintain demand (11% to 36% of
respondents).

A Annexes

Countries

In the US about 60% of respondents expect for Q1-2009 a very strong fall in credit
demand, with a slightly higher value for large enterprises (above 50 million USD
turnover) than for small enterprises; in Q4-2008 only 7% of respondents report a
fall in demand for small enterprises and 17% for larger ones. While enterprises
United States
falling credit demand is explained mainly by reduction in investment and MA
projects, the only reasons mentioned that motivate an increase in demand is
growth in enterprises’ inventories and receivables. No alternative source of funding
is mentioned as a possible explanation of the fall.

“Net demand for loans by enterprises declined considerably and remained negative
in the Q4-2008, standing at -40%, after -26% in the Q3-2008. The negative net
demand was driven by a decline in the financing needs for fixed investment (to
-60%, from -36% in Q3-2008) and by a further drop in the demand stemming from
EURO ZONE MA activity and corporate restructuring (-44%). In terms of borrower size, while
net loan demand, in contrast to preceding quarters, was negative for both large
firms and SMEs, the decline was somewhat more pronounced for SMEs in the
fourth quarter of 2008. Regarding the maturity spectrum, net demand decreased
particularly markedly in the case of long-term loans.”
OECD
Almost 50% of small businesses feel it is harder to borrow funds now, in comparison
to 12 months ago. A forthcoming report by MYOB also shows that 31% of small
Australia
businesses are currently funded by loans or borrowings, compared to 45% in
September 2006.

The demand for loans is expected to decline together with the investments put on
Belgium
hold by many SMEs.
0
In order to measure banks’ expectations related to SMEs’ demand for credit
and its’ changes, the Ministry for National Development and Economy, the Bank
Association and the National Federation of Savings Co-operatives make a monthly
survey among Hungarian financial institutions in 2009. According to it, the financial
resources that can be provided to SMEs by financial institutions will decrease in
the near future. Financial institutions expect that SMEs’ credit risk will grow in the
following three months especially related to micro and small enterprises. Although
there was a smaller increase in the credit stock of SMEs in Q4-2008 financial
institutions expect that the demand for credit will decrease, especially among
small enterprises. For the question that according to their opinion how the demand
Hungary for investment credit and short term loans will change in the future the financial
institutions answered that the demand for investment credit will decrease and for
short term loans will increase.

In Hungary 2/3 of SME credit was short term loan in 2008. In the new financial
situation caused by the crisis the biggest risk of the banks is to renew short term
loans of SMEs that they need for their continuing operation.

The investment credits of SMEs have always been very low (5% of the total SME
credit in 2008). The business expectation of SMEs is very pessimistic which makes
them to postpone their investment.

Approximately one out of five SMEs was in 2008 looking for additional funding.
Netherlands
This is particularly strong among small businesses with 10-49 employees.

Countries
Annexes
A
In 2007 the Business Operations Survey shows that 29% of firms with more than 6
employees sought debt financing, with 93% of them being able to access finance
on acceptable terms. In the same year, 11% of firms sought equity finance and 81%
of those firms received financing on acceptable terms. In a survey conducted in
mid-February 2009, 62% of firms applying for finance in the previous three months
had it granted as requested and 24% with amended terms. In the same survey,
New Zealand
of predominantly small firms, 48.5% of respondents answered that their business
had not been affected at all by the availability of finance. Of those that had been
affected the most common effect was to have put expansion plans on hold (22.6%).
The next most cited effect was to put reinvestment/refurbishment plans on hold
(17.6%). In relation to employment 15.2% said they are laying off staff, 15% have
implemented a hiring freeze and 11.8% have put staff on reduced hours.

Since the beginning of 2008, the Swiss National Bank has been conducting a
qualitative survey with twenty banks which make up the bulk of the domestic loan
market. The survey carried out in January 2009 shows that some banks have
Switzerland
tightened their lending conditions slightly. Moreover, a growing number of banks
are expecting to do the same in the near future. While the statistics confirm lower
growth in overall lending, they do not show an actual decline.
Non-OECD
SMEs face severe credit constraints, finding it very difficult to obtain loans from
Thailand
commercial banks or to raise funds from capital markets.

A Annexes

Annex 3.
Evidence on credit conditions
Countries Based on Bank Lending Surveys methodology

The Senior Loan Officer Survey focused on changes to business-lending practices
in the Q4-2008. Survey respondents reported a further widespread tightening in
lending conditions attributed mainly to concerns about the general and industry
economic outlook. For the second consecutive quarter, the balance of opinion on
tightening was the highest recorded since the survey began in 1999. While tightening
applied to both pricing and non-pricing aspects of lending. Credit conditions for
businesses in general have deteriorated considerably since the summer of 2007.
From an average 0.12 % points between January 2000 and July 2007, the spread
has increased to an average 0.86 % points between August 2007 and December
Canada 2008. In September 2008, it reached 1.55, its highest level since late 1974.

The Bank of Canada’s Business Outlook Survey (Dec 2008) indicates that credit
has been getting tighter since the third quarter of 2007 and that the net proportion
of businesses reporting tighter credit conditions has reached, in the fourth quarter
of 2008, its highest point since this survey exists, at 58%.

Traditional lenders such as banks have increased lending by 13.2% in December
2008 compared to a year earlier. This increase in lending does not, however,
appears to fully meet the increased demand.

The credit standards are reported to be tighter in Q4-2008 by 37% of respondents
and are expected to tighten further by 21% in Q1-2009, while SMEs credits are
expected to have stricter conditions by 17% of respondents. Lending banks have
France
significantly increased their margins on risky loans (smaller increases for average
risk levels); somehow reduced the loan amounts but not their maturity while not
increasing the level of required security.

The tightening in credits conditions for large enterprises is, and is expected to be,
stronger than for the SMEs: 52% in Q4-2008 and expected 44% for Q1-2009 as
opposed to “only” 19% for Q4-2008 and expected 37%, for SMEs. The main factors
explaining this situation are above all related to the economic perspectives (macro,
sector and borrower specific) and to the banks’ balance sheet constraints, i.e. cost
Germany of capital and access to debt financing. While lending to enterprises banks have
and will continue to increase their margins. However, in Germany the situation of
SMEs is slightly better than of large corporations: for Q1-2009, 48% of respondents
expect a margin increase on average SME loans (50% do so on the riskier SME
loan) while 65% expect that the margin on average large enterprise loan will rise
(59% on riskier ones).

Annexes
A

During Q4-2008 the change in credit standards was dramatic: 100% of the
respondents report tightening (87% in case of SMEs). In Q1-2009 loans to large
companies are expected to fall by 25%. The tightening concerned the totality of
long-term credits and only a proportion of short-term ones. The stress on long
term financing is expected to continue. The main factors justifying – in the eyes of
responding banks – this evolution are related to the expectations concerning the
level of general, and industry specific, activity. Considerations related to banks’ cost
of capital or balance sheet constraints play clearly a secondary role as compared
with France and Germany. In Italy, tightening of credit conditions meant above all
Italy higher margins (according to 100% of respondents on riskier loans and 62% on
average ones) and reduced size of loan (88%).

According to the report of the Bank of Italy (Economic Bulletin n.55, January 2009)
borrowing by enterprises and households, especially by SMEs, slowed down in
the last quarter of 2008.Moreover, borrowing costs rose significantly, especially
for riskier loans. A moderate tightening of credit conditions occurred since October
2008, as seen from lending fees, size, contractual clauses and maturity. The
percentage of firms that did not receive a favourable answer to their loan request
also rose significantly.

A net balance of lenders reported that they had reduced overall corporate credit
availability in Q4-2008. As in Q3, lenders reported a larger than anticipated reduction
in credit availability to the commercial real estate sector. A further reduction in
overall credit availability is expected for Q1-2009. The reduction in the availability of
credit is associated with a reduction in maximum credit lines, increasing collateral
United requirements, and declining loan approval rates. During Q1-2009, UK lenders
Kingdom expected further tightening in these factors. The changing cost and availability of
funds to banks is reported to have been a key factor contributing to the decline in
credit available to enterprises (-55% expected at –21% in Q1-2009). In addition,
concerns about the economic outlook, changing sector-specific risks (expected at
– 40% and –33% in Q1-2009) and a reduction in lenders’ appetite for risk had also
contributed to the tightening of standards.

Respondents expect for Q1-2009 an increase in spreads between the loan rates
and banks’ cost of capital to continue, as during Q4-2008 (almost 90%) and affect
to a similar extent both small and large borrowers. When it comes to the broader
notion of “standards” the surge initiated in Q2-2008 is supposed to continue but
United States at a slightly lower pace than in Q4-2008. Small enterprises will be more affected
than large and medium ones (69% v. 64%). Among factors explaining the changing
attitude of banks, the uncertain economic outlook comes first (100%) closely
followed by a reduced tolerance for risk (85%); factors related to banks’ financial
structure or environment do not belong to the most important factors..

A Annexes


“In contrast to the previous survey rounds, the net tightening of credit standards
reported for large enterprises (63%, after 68% Q3-2008) was equal to that given
for SMEs (63%, after 56% in Q3-2008. While there was a certain degree of
stabilisation in the case of large enterprises, net tightening for SMEs increased
further in Q4-2008. With regard to the factors underlying the changes in credit
standards, for both large enterprises and SMEs, expectations regarding general
economic activity and the industry or firm specific outlook continued to be the most
important contributors. At the same time, banks’ cost of funds and balance sheet
EURO ZONE constraints played a somewhat more important role in the net tightening for large
firms than for SMEs, and they seem even to have gained in importance, especially
for lending to SMEs. Moreover, competition from other banks contributed for the
first time, albeit to a limited extent (8%), to the net tightening of credit standards
for both SMEs and large firms. With respect to the terms and conditions for credit,
net tightening of credit standards continued to be reflected most in net increases
in banks’ margins on both average and riskier loans to both large firms and SMEs.
Regarding non-price terms and conditions, the net tightening for both large firms
and SMEs remained broadly at the same high levels as in the previous quarter”.
OECD
According to a recent survey taking into account 833 enterprises: more than 2/3
feels a more difficult access to financing. Besides the tightening of credit conditions,
Czech credit also has become more expensive according to 22 % of respondents. Loans
Republic for MA are being discontinued by banks almost completely, investment loans
being largely reduced and access to short-term financing having become to some
extent more difficult.

SMEs surveyed reported that access to financing is worrying compared to the normal
situation. About 25% of responding SMEs considered that access to financing had
Finland become more difficult, at least to some extent, during the last months. Access to
investment funding, for instance, had become significantly more difficult for 14 per
cent of industrial enterprises.

Most of the loans were provided to blue-chip SMEs, and financial status of
Korea SMEs with low credit rating has deteriorated, which means polarisation of SME
financing.

In a survey of 659 firms (two-thirds of which had fewer than 20 employees)
conducted in mid-February 71.7% of respondents answered that their overdraft/
New Zealand
credit facilities had stayed the same and four times as many (21.5%) reported that
theirs has been increased compared to those who reported a decrease

In Q4-2008, 80% of SMEs seeking a bank credit have had problems in obtaining
one. The amounts offered by banks in 59% of the cases were lower than requested
Spain
by their clients, and in 26% credit horizon has been reduced by the bank. In more
than 70% of cases, credit conditions have been tightened.

In Q-1 2009, credit standards are reported to be much tighter by 50 % of
Sweden respondents, tighter by 38%, unchanged by 15% and eased by 2 % of
respondents.
Non-OECD
SMEs have difficulties in accessing credit from commercial banks because of
restrictive guarantee requirements and increased commissions charges. In
Slovenia and
Slovenia banks have increased their interest charges and are also more careful
Romania
when approving new credits (especially long-term credits),as they demand further
guarantee even for short-term loans.

Annex 4.
Alternative financing sources for SMEs
Annexes
A

In 2006 and 2007 SMEs started to tap the leasing market with a 9.3% increase in
the value of outstanding leases. Lease financing also appears to be gathering an
increasing share in SME financing, representing 15.0% of the outstanding amount
Canada of SME credit (debt and leasing) in 2007 compared to 9.2% in 2000. The leasing
market has been significantly impacted during the credit crisis and this source of
financing has been more difficult to obtain, which had led to a greater demand for
traditional debt financing. This increased demand does not appear to be fully met

In New Zealand as in Switzerland, private equity and alternative sources such
New as mezzanine capital have only played a negligible role in providing SMEs with
Zealand and funds. A survey of New Zealand firms in mid-February 2009 showed 73.7% of
Switzerland respondents have made no changes to their pre-crisis sources of finance and 23%
had looked into alternative methods of raising finance.

Bank Lending Surveys reports a more important use of self-financing possibilities
EURO ZONE
by SMEs as a substitute to more difficult access to bank financing.
Non-OECD
Banks are reported to start proposing new products such as leasing and
Slovenia
factoring.

In 2008, SMEs used more extensively their own savings to run their businesses
and were more likely to turn to alternative financial sources such as factoring
Thailand credit to address the working capital shortage and enhance the business liquidity.
Government also turned to joint venture to support SME projects at an initial
stage.
The European Investment Bank will put an additional €1 billion at the disposal of
EIB/EIF
the European Investment Fund for a mezzanine finance facility.

A Annexes

Annex 5.
Policy measures supporting sales and preventing
depletion of SMEs’ working capital

EXPORT FINANCING AND GUARANTEES
OECD
A program to promote export competitiveness has been extended until the end of
Austria
2010 and endowed with a yearly budget of €25 million.

In order to address emerging stresses and financial gaps in Canada’s export sector,
most notably in auto-related and other manufacturing enterprises, the government
Canada is injecting $350 million (€218.7 million) for Export Development Canada supporting
up to about $1.5 billion (€937.3 million) in increased credit capacity for the exporters
most affected by the financial crisis;

The government will increase the availability of state advantageous loans to
exporting SMEs. In consequence, the basic capital of the Czech Export Bank will
Czech
be increased by an additional CZK 1 billion (€37.2 million), which should provide
Republic
for state assistance to exports in the amount of CZK 20-25 billion (€744-€930
million).

An export lending scheme will be set up under the auspices of Eksport Kredit
Fonden to secure funding for the export activities of Danish businesses. The
lending scheme will run for a period of three years and will have a limit of DKK 20
billion (€2.7 billion).

In addition to loans to fund export activities involving long-term credits, the Eksport
Denmark Kredit Fonden will also support export activities involving short-term credits,
including components, semi-manufactures, comsumer non-durables and food. This
will take place by the Eksport Kredit Fonden reinsuring the private credit insurers
(debtor insurance). Such reinsurance will contribute to alleviating the problems
businesses may be experiencing in terms of obtaining bank loans to fund their
export activities. The reinsurance scheme will have a limit of DKK 10 billion (€1.3
billion).

Various products of the Federal Government’s “Hermes” export credit guarantees
Germany have been improved and extended until the end of 2010. Thus, supplementary
flexibility in export financing has been created.

An anti-crisis export promotion plan has been introduced, with an overall allocation
of €185 million in 2009, managed by the Institute for Foreign Trade (ICE).
Italy Internationalisation support services provided by ICE to Italian companies will
benefit from up to a 50% discount on fees, and special payment conditions aimed
at small companies will be made available.

To facilitate export activities the funds available for credit insurance on export are
Luxembourg raised from €20 million to €35 million. The “Office du Ducroire” handles this mission
for the Luxembourg State.

The financing of exports will be expanded, through BANCOMEXT, to provide credit
for working capital to the exporting enterprises, as well as to provide them with the
Mexico necessary equipment. Also, a Productive Chains Program is put in place to prevent
Mexican enterprises from being dropped because of financial weakness from
Global Value Chains. In this way the flow of Mexican exports is being protected.

Annexes
A

The Dutch credit insurance facility is expanded so as to cover through public
funds risks for markets where commercial insurances are not possible any more
Netherlands
(especially in Eastern Europe) and by doing so enable trade. In order to provide
support for large transactions the government will guarantee their payment.

The Export Credit Scheme has been expanded so as to provide short-term trade
New Zealand
credit insurance on export contracts with payment terms of less than 360 days.

Two new programs: “Internacionalización” and “Proinmed” run by the Instituto de
Spain Credito Oficial are aimed at helping SMEs in their internationalisation projects and
programs.

Increase available funding (+ CHF 10 million -€6.6 million) allocated to the agency
Switzerland responsible for promoting export activities and broaden the scope of export
insurance to include products that private insurance companies do not offer.
Non-OECD
Extension of COFORO is aimed at reducing further liquidity problems that exporters
Chile are facing. In consequence, the turnover limit of eligibility has been increased from
US$ 20 to US$ 30 million.

The government is endowing the Slovene Export and Development Bank with
Slovenia additional resources to enhance export financing, credit and insurance. In 2009
the bank will receive additional funds specifically aimed for exporting SMEs.
ALLEVIATING WORKING CAPITAL SHORTAGE IN THE ECONOMY
OECD
A $100 million (€62.4 million) capital injection to the Business Development Bank
Canada of Canada will support the implementation of a new program for working capital
guarantee.

Starting from January 2009, payment delays are capped to 45 days, moratory
France interests are doubled and other legal deterrents are put in place. These measures
are supposed to provide SMEs with an extra €4 billon of working capital.

Netherlands The government intends to shorten terms for payments from 45 to 30 days

United A Prompt Payment program is put in place reducing official institutions’ payment
Kingdom delays to 10 days.
EASING OF TAX AND PROCUREMENT PAYMENT PROCEDURES
OECD
The government has made possible for firms facing financial difficulties to postpone
payments of VAT and tax advances and has granted payment facilities in terms of
social security contributions.
Belgium
The Federal Government has also committed to accelerate payments on public
procurements and has created a new product aimed at transferring unpaid debts
hold by SMEs on public authorities to the Participation Fund, which will execute the
payments more rapidly.

A Annexes


The Government increased the amount of small business income eligible for the
Canada
reduced federal tax rate.

To ease liquidity in companies, the Danish government has temporarily prolonged
Denmark
the payment of tax and value added tax.

The Ministry of Defence will immediately balance its arrears towards its suppliers,
and many tax credits will be reimbursed in cash; VAT payments and refunds will
France
be made on a monthly basis, and advance payments on public procurements will
be increased;

New tax benefits were granted to enterprises, with an allocation amounting to ca.
€2,900 million for the 2009-2011 period. The benefits include:

• Tax exemption for productivity contracts aimed at boosting labour
productivity ;
Italy
• Deduction of 10% of the regional tax from company income tax and
personal income tax

• Payment of VAT at the time of actual receipt of sale payment.

The Government has reduced the corporation tax rate from 22% to 18% for the
Japan
SMEs with 8 million yen (€61 thousand) or less annual income in coming 2 years.

A governmental purchases program has been initiated according to which at
Mexico least 20% of the total of annual purchases of the Federal Government and its
dependences will be bought from SMEs

A suite of tax changes that will ease cash-flow for SMEs including lowering of
New Zealand
interest rates used in case of unpaid or late business taxes.

Annex 6.
Policy measures enhancing SMEs’ access to liquidity, especially to bank lending
Annexes
A
Countries Creation and extension of loans and guarantee schemes for SMEs
OECD
Available total public guarantee have been increased from €3 to €5.3 billion and
a further increase of about €400 million guarantees per year is expected. Austria
Austria has also increased its low interest loans programme (EPR) to €600 million for 2009
from the present €200 million and put in place a new micro-loan program (up to
€30,000) endowed with a total of €50 million.

The government launched a second “Starters Fund”, which is an obligation loan
of €300 million providing additional means for the Participation Fund to finance
starters.
Belgium
A product (“Initio”) is a subordinated loan that can be requested immediately at
the Participation Fund by SMEs to finance any kind of investment (also working
capital) before they go to the banks.

Made improvements to the Canada Small Business Financing Program (loan
guarantee) that will increase the eligible loan amount and increase individual
financial institutions’ cap on claim reimbursement for losses. These changes
should encourage access to credit specifically targeted at SMEs and could increase
lending under the program by some $300 million per year (€187.4 million).
Canada
Has established Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility which may indirectly
encourage lenders on the wholesale market to lend to federally-regulated deposit-
taking institutions that may lend in turn to SMEs. It is a temporary program that will
ensure that financial institutions in Canada are not put at a competitive disadvantage
when raising funds in wholesale markets given similar actions recently announced
by other countries.

At the end of 2008 the Ministry of Industry and Trade transferred CZK 1 billion
(€37.2 million) to the turnover fund of the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and
Development Bank as guarantee for loans provided by commercial banks. In
Czech
February the Ministry of Industry and Trade will announce another section in the
Republic
program Guarantee, which will allow entrepreneurs to gain a guarantee for bank
loans from commercial banks. In total the Ministry of Industry and Trade is counting
with CZK 1.650 billion (€61.4 million) for the programme Guarantee.

The government has increased the ceiling of guarantees and loans for the
Finland Government-owned SME-bank between November 2008 and January 2009 by
€1.6 billion ;

The government has increased the guarantee programmes run by OSEO so as to
France allow it to cover up to €4 billion of new loans, to large extent targeted to SMEs,
including an important portion linked to short-term credits;

The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (public bank) has created an additional
financing instrument with a volume of up to €15 billion, temporarily in place until the
end of 2010, through which the supply of credit from the private banks to SMEs will
Germany
be enhanced. This measure is part of a general effort to implement a €115 billion
programme of loans and credit guarantees by expanding existing measures and
creating new instruments.

A Annexes


A new programme for the enhancement of liquidity of Small and Micro enterprises
has been launched by the Credit Guarantee Fund of Small and Very Small
Enterprises (TEMPME S.A.). Since December 2008, TEMPME S.A has launched,
Greece
the programme “Loan Guarantee and Interest Rate Subsidy for the working capital
of small and micro enterprises” (Endowed with €100 million for interest subsidies,
and €2.5 billion of guarantees).

In Hungary, the New Hungary Portfolio Guarantee Programme has been put place
further to the financial crisis. Within the portfolio guarantee program, Venture
Finance Hungary Plc. provides direct guarantee for the financial claims (backing
SME credits) of the financial intermediaries (mostly commercial banks) based on
pre-determined risk sharing, thus improving the SMEs’ bank finance options. For
a given credit, the amount of collateral to be secured by Venture Finance Hungary
Hungary Plc is a maximum of 80% of the bank claim – the rest constitutes the bank’s own
risk. The guarantee programme offers credits amounting to a maximum of HUF
100 million (€ 344 thousand). The resources to be invested for this purpose total to
HUF 28.2 billion (€97 million).
In Hungary the total public guarantee that is provided by Garantiqa Credit guarantee
Co. Ltd. to banks against loans to SMEs have been increased from HUF 450 million
(€1.5 million) to HUF 900 million (€3 million euro).

In January 2009 a re-financing of the Central Guarantee Fund for SMEs has been
put in place, and a State guarantee as a last-resort guarantee has been provided
to this Fund. A total of 70% of the resources will be allocated directly to guarantees
Italy to banks against bank loans to SMEs, while 30% will be devoted to back guarantee
to the Loan Guarantee Consortiums (Confidi –Allocations for the 2009-2011 3-year
0 period total €450 million). The resources for the Central Guarantee Fund may be
further increased.

Additional 21 trillion yen (€160.6 billion) have been targeted for emergency guarantee
schemes and loans provided by government-affiliated financial institutions. An
Emergency Guarantee System has been set up and between October 31, 2008-
Japan December 31, 2008 it has approved 0.17 million loans for a total amount of 3.9
trillion (€9.8 billion) yen; in addition a Safety Net Loan was in operation and in Q4-
2008 between the approved number of 49.5 thousand loans for a total amount of
564.8 billion yen (€4.3 billion).

The government will increase SME lending by $35.7 billion in 2009 by expanding
guarantees for guarantee organisations as well as bank capitalisation and
increasing SME lending by state-run banks. New guarantees volume increased
from $9.6 billion in 2008 to $18 billion in 2009. Collateralised Bond Obligation worth
Korea
$1.4 billion will be issued in early 2009. State banks including Korea Development
Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea increased their SME loans from $21.4 billion in
2008 to $31.4 billion in 2009. In order to have access to these funds SMEs with
liquidity shortages will be classified into A, B, C, and D categories.

A guarantee scheme was put into place in compliance to the Communication 2009/
Luxembourg C16/01 of the European Commission. The total volume of credit the Luxembourg
State will cover by its guarantee is limited to €500 million

Annexes
A
The National Guarantee System strategy aims at enlarging the supply of affordable
financial resources for all categories of SMEs; the National Financial Extension
Program aimed at increasing SME access to finance and helping SMEs enter into
credit relationship through the upgrading of their organisational and managerial
Mexico
faculties. The Development Bank of Mexico has increased significantly its lending
to SMEs, to the rural sector and to infrastructure and housing projects. The bank is
also offering guarantees to financial intermediaries and solvent businesses hit by
the lack of international liquidity.

Amounts eligible for guarantees has been increased from €1 million to 1.5 million
per company. The guarantee of start-ups has been expanded from €100 to €200
Netherlands
thousand euro. About €80 million have been put aside for financing the extended
guarantee scheme.

The Instituto de Credito Oficial has put in place a programme for SMEs whereby
SMEs are allowed to use up to 40% of the loan to finance working capital under
the condition that he remaining 60% are financing investment in productive assets.
Also in Spain la Compañía Española de Refinanziamiento (CERSA) provides the
Spain
second tier of national second level guarantee fund to loans granted by mutual
guarantee companies to SMEs that require additional guarantees to get access to
finance. Priority goes to innovative investments and projects, as well as to micro
enterprises and new or early-stage business ventures.

In the event of an intensification of the crisis, the government envisages the
possibility of strengthening the loan guarantee scheme for SMEs, particularly by
raising the guarantee limit from CHF 500,000 (€330 thousand) to CHF 1 million
Switzerland
(€660 thousand) per enterprise. The guarantee scheme was restructured in 2007
but has remained a marginal measure because its funding totals CHF 150 million
only (€99.3 million).

Through the Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme, the government will guarantee
lending by High Street Banks to viable businesses to ensure that they can get the
working capital and investment that they need. This £1.3 billion (€1.5 billion) scheme
will support bank lending, from 3 months to 10 year maturity, to UK businesses with
a turnover of up to £25 million (€28.3 million) which are currently not in a position to
easily access the finance they need. It will enable them to secure loans of between
£1,000 and £1 million (€1.1 thousand and €1.1 million). The scheme will remain in
operations up to 31 March 2010. In addition UK set up a Working Capital Scheme
United in direct response to the constraint on bank lending to ordinary-risk businesses
Kingdom with a turnover of up to £500 million (€623.5 million) a year. The Government will
provide banks with guarantees covering 50 per cent of the risk on existing and new
working capital portfolios worth up to £20 billion (€22.7 billion). Finally, a Regional
Loan Transition Fund has been set up in England only with £25 million (€28.3
million) to help businesses at a regional level up to the end of June 2009. The loan
fund is primarily aimed at supporting small and medium sized businesses which
are suffering from short term liquidity problems caused by the current economic
climate. The loan fund will operate in conjunction with existing or new founders to
assist with immediate liquidity problems.

The European Commission has temporarily made it easier for its Member States
to help access to finance for companies through subsidised guarantees and loan
subsidies for investments. Member States are also urged to reduce administrative
E.C. burdens on business, and to promote their cash flow and help more people to
become entrepreneurs. For example, in France, the easing of rules makes it
possible for the guarantee schemes to cover up to 90% of the risks related to a
loan as compared with 50 to 60 % on average before.

A Annexes

Non-OECD
The Guarantee Fund for SMEs (FOGAPE) has been endowed with additional US$
130 million, bringing its present resources to US$ 200 million. These resources
allow guaranteeing loans for more than US$ 2 billion. FOGAPE will expand its
Chile coverage to include about 20 thousand medium-sized companies in the country, so
they can have access to financing for working capital. Said guarantee will account
to up to 50% of the loan. The maximum limit for loan coverage will be raised from
US$ 104 thousand to US$ 3.5 million per company.

A newly introduced permanent measure is aimed at providing public mezzanine
Estonia financing for enterprises, which are not able to achieve self-financing ratio that
banks expect before granting credit.

New tax benefits were granted to enterprises, with an allocation amounting to ca.
€2,900 million for the 2009-2011 period. The benefits include:

• Tax exemption for productivity contracts aimed at boosting labour
productivity ;
Romania
• Deduction of 10% of the regional tax from company income tax and
personal income tax

• Payment of VAT at the time of actual receipt of sale payment.

The Government has reduced the corporation tax rate from 22% to 18% for the
Russia
SMEs with 8 million yen (€61 thousand) or less annual income in coming 2 years.
A governmental purchases program has been initiated according to which at
Slovenia least 20% of the total of annual purchases of the Federal Government and its
dependences will be bought from SME.s

Annexes
A
The European Investment Bank put together a package of €30 billion for loans
to SMEs, an increase of €10 billion over its usual lending in this sector; and it will
also reinforce by €1 billon a year its lending to mid-sized corporations. This allows
some Member countries to use a second level guarantee scheme provided by EIB.
This is the case for Belgium both at central and regional government levels; the
UK government has facilitated discussion between UK banks and EIB that opened
the way to EIB credit lines of more than £1 billion (€1.1 billion) which are coming
on-stream now to provide SME lending.

Jeremie, Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises: Jeremie uses
European Regional Development Funds for enhancing SME access to finance in
New Member States and in Regional Development areas. This instrument was
designed before the crisis but main elements are customised and calibrated as
reaction to the crisis. Instruments: equity, funded risk sharing, guarantees, quasi
EIB/EIF equity and tech transfer. EIF has so far signed 7 funding agreements with €613
million).

CIP, Competitiveness and Innovation Programme by the EC (managed by the
EIF) with an envelope for Guarantees of €550m (covering 2007-2013) and of
€550 million for VC. The products have been designed before the crisis but the
implementation considers necessary reactions to the crisis.

Micro Finance Facility/pilot project Jasmine – Joint Action to Support Micro-finance
Institutions in Europe, a joint initiative between the European Commission, the EIB,
the European Parliament, and the EIF as manager. Support and development of

microfinance sector in Europe via debt and equity products (initial resources: €30
million).

MEDIATION AND MONITORING MEASURES
OECD
The credit mediator in Belgium is a contact point for SMEs and entrepreneurs that
Belgium have problems with their funding at the bank. The motto used: “No entrepreneur
should stand alone with his financial problems”.

The credit mediator can intervene at regional and central levels, to ease difficulties
and help solve divergences between enterprises that are seeking bank funding
France
and the banks. 5 331 have used this facility, 892 enterprises in two weeks with an
increasing success rate of 66%.

The government has chosen to strictly monitor, on a monthly basis, the credit
activities of banks that have been rescued by public funding. First, such a report
has been released in January 2009 under the title “Treasury Department Monthly
Lending and Intermediation Snapshot”. The purpose of the document is “to provide
USA
the Treasury Department (Treasury) and the public with regular insight into the
lending trends and intermediation activities – including underwriting, buying and
selling of securities, and other activities in capital markets -- of the banks that
received the most funding via the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).

A Annexes

STRENGTHENING SME’s CASH-FLOW, CAPITAL BASE
AND PRO-INVESTMENT MEASURES
OECD
The service agency for enterprises can contact international financing institutions
Austria like EIB and KfW for refinancing of SME projects especially related to RD and the
environment (plus €300 million).

The government is collaborating with the European Investment Bank in order to
liberate supplementary means for investment credits. It is also accelerating several
Belgium
public investment programs and stimulation of green investments and has reduced
VAT in the construction sector (to 6% from 21%).

Has provided financial assistance for innovative SMEs by allocating $200 million
(€125 million) over two years to the Industrial Research Assistance Programme.
Canada These non-refundable contributions will act as a source of fund for innovative SMEs
to offset difficulty accessing financing to undertake innovative business strategies
and technology-related projects.

The Ministry of Industry and Trade will also announce a new call in the programme
Czech Progress, from which entrepreneurs can also gain a loan for development projects
Republic which are more demanding in terms of investment. In the calls which will be
announced the Ministry will release CZK 2.5 billion (€93 million).

France, Have introduced accelerated depreciation possibilities either on all categories of
Germany and assets or on specific ones as in Germany where specific depreciation thresholds
Italy are targeted to SMEs thereby reducing taxable income.

The funding available to support SMEs’ RD projects will be increased by an
Germany
additional €450 million per year for 2009 and 2010.

Commercial banks received new refinancing credit from the Hungarian Development
Bank in order to maintain and increase their investment credit offer to SMEs (HUF
50 billion - €172 million) with a capped interest rate. Due to this credit line, SMEs
can obtain preferential credits of between HUF 10-100 million (€34 thousand-€340
thousand).

The New Hungary Enterprise Development Credit Programme (total resources of
HUF 160 billion, €550 million) operate through the National Development Bank and
its intermediaries and offer SMEs a long term preferential investment credits with
interest rates based on 3 monthly EURIBOR rate with a 4-6% spread. The SMEs
can obtain credit between HUF 1 million-3 billion (€3.5 thousand - €10.3 million).
Hungary
The New Hungary Microcredit Programme started to operate in order to provide
credit for micro enterprises. The total resources of the programme are HUF 58.5
billion (€201 million).

A new Working Capital Credit is put in place through which SMEs can obtain
working capital credit with preferential conditions between of HUF 10-200 million
(€34 thousand - €688 thousand). 80% of the Working Capital Credit is guaranteed
by the Garantia Credit guarantee Co. Ltd

Annexes
A
The Instituto de Credito Oficial grants credits on preferential terms to self-
employed and entrepreneurs to launch new businesses and may finance up to
Spain 90% of investments in new productive assets. The same institution also supports
extension projects of SMEs by financing up to 80% of new productive assets - the
programme is endowed with €600 million.

The Stimulus Package enables SMEs to expense up to $250,000 in property
purchased in the 2008 tax year, and it grants 50% bonus depreciation allowance
USA
for 2008 capital asset purchases acquired in 2008. Other temporary tax incentives
are also put into place to encourage investment job creation;

Within the European Union, the Structural Funds of the European cohesion policy
give the Member States and their regions considerable margin of manoeuvre to
E.C. support SMEs, including through investment projects in specific technologies or
sectors. Many Member States are using these opportunities, including Romania
and the Czech Republic.
The European Investment Bank will put an additional €1 billion at the disposal of
EIB/EIF
the European Investment Fund for a mezzanine finance facility.

A Annexes

Annex 7.
Private equity and venture capital markets

OECD
The Australian Government announced on 18 March 2009 that up to AUD83 million
Australia (€45.2 million) over a three year period to assist high potential young innovative
companies to be sustainable through the financial crisis.

€1 billion to support small and medium sized companies:- Participation-Fund for
Austria
SMEs: €40 million per annum for 2009 and 2010.

The government will set up a risk capital fund that will act as a minority investor in
Finland Venture Capital or MBO –funds or directly in companies on equal terms with private
investors.

A) The New Hungary Venture Capital Programme has been designed to improve
the financial status of Hungarian SMEs by providing early-stage equity financing.
The Hungarian capital market is relatively underdeveloped in this field; larger
transactions are dominant – only a few market players are involved in financing
SMEs in their seed and start-up stages. Under the Program, Venture Finance
Hungary Plc. – as the fund manager of a Fund of Funds (FoF) – relays resources
to venture capital funds. A total of HUF 35 billion (€120.3 million) is being allocated
to the Program, 85% of which is going to be financed by the European Union. The
partners of Venture Finance Hungary Plc. will be venture capital fund management
firms, who are tasked with raising a fixed proportion of additional private funding to
the resources committed by Venture Finance Hungary Plc. The abovementioned
partners will be selected by open tender. The amount of the investment may have
a transaction size of an annual €1.5 million. Potential target enterprises: SMEs in
the early (seed or start-up) or growth stage, which were founded no more than
Hungary five years prior to the investment decision and have a net annual turnover not
exceeding HUF 1.5 billion (€5.2 million) in any business year.

B) A Japanese-Hungarian Venture Capital Fund (SBI Europe Fund) has also
been announced in December 2008 with effect from first quarter 2009. This is the
first private equity fund established by a public bank and a private investor in the
Central and Eastern European region, focusing on the SME sector. The Fund plans
investments in the range between €1 million and €20 million, of around €5 to €7
Million on average in exchange for majority if possible, but in exceptional cases,
minority equity interest will be considered. ELAN SBI will be the Fund Manager
for the SBI Europe Fund and will target investments in promising companies
with high growth potential, with no sector preference. Ideal investment targets
will be companies with established management teams, existing revenues and
fast growing profits. The Fund will seek to realise exits within 3 to 4 years. The
committed amount is €100 million (60 % by the SBIH Group and 40% MFB)

The Capital for Development Schemes seek to increase the supply of venture capital
Mexico (Seed Capital Program and Fund of Productive and Infrastructural Development
Projects FOPRODE).

The Capital for Enterprise Fund will provide £75 million (€85 million) of equity, made
up of £50 million (€56.7 million) of Government funds and an additional £25 million
(€28.4 million) from Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds TSB and RBS to provide equity and
UK
quasi equity of between £250,000 to £2 million (€283 thousand and €2.3 million) for
companies with a turnover of up to €50 million who have viable business models
and growth potential in need of long term capital.

Annexes
A
Non-OECD
CORFO Venture Capital for Innovative SMEs will contribute to investment funds
Chile that back the creation or expansion of SMEs with innovative projects and high
growth potential.

The first public venture capital company (PDTK) will start to operate in 2009 with a
Slovenia budget of €35 million. PDTK will complement private investments in “start-up» and
innovative companies with the high-growth potential.

A Annexes

ANNEX 8.

OECD WOrking Party On SMEs anD EntrEPrEnEurShiP
StEEring grOuP On SME anD EntrEPrEnEurShiP finanCing
liSt Of MEMbErS

CHAIR

Mr. Salvatore Zecchini, President, Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPI), Italy.

PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES and ORGANISATIONS

Belgium

• Mr. Frédéric Lernoux, Vice president of the scientific steering group of the Belgian
Knowledge Centre for SME financing (BeCeFi), Representative of the Ministry of
SMEs, Freelancers, Agriculture and Scientific Policies.
• Mr. Pierre-François Michiels, Attaché, Federal Public Service (FPS) Economy,
SME, Middle Classes, Energy.
Brazil

• Mr. João Carlos Parkinson de Castro, Counsellor, Embassy of Brazil in Ireland.
Canada
• Mr. Denis Martel, Director, Research and Analysis Division, Small Business and
Tourism Branch, Industry Canada.
• Ms. Adele Deschamps, Policy Analyst, Industry Canada.
• Mr. Jérôme Nycz, Vice President, Strategy and Planning, Business Development
Bank of Canada (BDC).
Finland
• Mr. Pertti Valtonen, Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
France
• Mr. Jacques Augustin, Deputy Director for Tourism, General Directorate
for Competitiveness, Industry and Services, Ministry of Economy, Industry
and Employment, and Chairman of the OECD Working Party on SMEs and
Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE).
• Mr. Henry Savajol, Director, SME Observatory (OSEO).
• Mme Nadine Levratto, Researcher, Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre, National
Council of Scientific Research (CNRS).

Greece
•
Annexes

Mr. Nicolas Tritaris, Managing Director, Credit Guarantee Fund of Small and
A
Very Small Enterprises, and Vice-Chair of the OECD WPSMEE.
Italy
• Mr. Massimo Deandreis, Head of Management Board Chairman Office, Banca
Intesa Sanpaolo.
• Mr. Mario Calderini, President, Finpiemonte.
Japan
• Mr. Hiromichi Moriyama, First Secretary, Japanese Permanent Delegation to the
OECD, Paris, and Vice-Chair of the OECD WPSMEE.
Luxembourg
• Mr. Gilles Scholtus, Government Attaché, Tourism and Housing, Ministry of
Middle Classes.
Netherlands
• Mr. Dinand Maas, Senior Policy Advisor, Department for Entrepreneurship and
Innovation, Directorate for Entrepreneurship cluster Corporate Finance, Ministry
of Economic Affairs.
New Zealand
• Mr. Roger Wigglesworth, Director, SMEs Industry and Regional Development
Branch, Ministry of Economic Development.
Sweden
• Mr. Mattias Moberg, Deputy Director, Energy and Communications, Ministry of
Enterprise.
• Ms. Petra Gråberg, Desk Officer, Energy and Communications, Ministry of
Enterprise.
Switzerland
• Mr. Philippe Jeanneret, Head of SME Policy, State Secretariat for Economic
Affairs (SECO).
• Mr. Christian Weber, Head, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), and
Vice-Chair of the OECD WPSMEE.
European Commission
• Mr. Vesa Vanhanen, Department of Enterprise and Industry.
European Investment Fund (EIF)
• Mr. Helmut Krämer-Eis, Head of Research and Market Analysis.

A Annexes

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