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The Rugged Way in the
 Cloud–Building Reliability
and Security Into Software
        James Wickett
     james.wickett@owasp.org

                               1
2
@wickett
• Operations and Security for software
  delivered on the cloud
• National Instruments, R&D
• Certs: CISSP, GSEC, GCFW, CCSK
• Tags: OWASP, Cloud, DevOps, Ruby
• Blogger at theagileadmin.com
• I do stuff for LASCON (http://lascon.org)
• Twitter: @wickett
                                              3
Cloud @ NI
We built a DevOps team to rapidly deliver
new SaaS products and product functionality
using cloud hosting and services (IaaS, PaaS,
SaaS) as the platform and operations, using
model driven automation, as a key
differentiating element.
With this approach we have delivered
multiple major products to market quickly
with a very small staffing and financial outlay.

                                                 4
National Instruments
•   30 years old; 5000+ employees
    around the world, half in Austin,
    mostly engineers; $873M in
    2010

•   Hardware and software for data
    acquisition, embedded design,
    instrument control, and test

•   LabVIEW is our graphical
    dataflow programming language
    used by scientists and engineers
    in many fields
                                        5
From toys to black holes




                           6
NI’s Cloud Products

• LabVIEW Web UI Builder
• FPGA Compile Cloud
• more to come...


                           7
ni.com/uibuilder
                   8
9
10
FPGA Compile Cloud
• LabVIEW FPGA compiles take hours and
  consume extensive system resources;
  compilers are getting larger and more
  complex
• Implemented on Amazon - EC2,
   Java/Linux,C#/.NET/Windows,
   and LabVIEW FPGA
• Also an on premise product,
  the “Compile Farm”

                                          11
Using the FPGA
Compile Cloud




                 12
Building
Rugged
In

           13
Am I healthy?
                14
Am I healthy?

• Latest and greatest research
• Justification to insurance companies
• Measurement and testing as available
• Point in time snapshot

                                         15
Am I secure?




               16
Am I secure?

• Latest and greatest vulnerabilities
• Justification of budget for tools
• Measurement and testing as available
• Point in time snapshot

                                         17
People, Process, Tech



                        18
It’s not our problem anymore




                           19
If you want to build a ship, don't
drum up people together to collect
wood and don't assign them tasks
and work, but rather teach them to
long for the endless immensity of
the sea
- Antoine Jean-Baptiste Marie Roger de Saint Exupéry




                                                       20
Twitter Survey

What is one word that you
would use to describe ‘IT
Security’ people?


                            21
unicorns
                paranoid                   prepared
                               Tenacious
 HAWT!
                   smart          masochistic


demented   jaded       smart
                                            sisyphean

                                  omnium-gatherum
           facebored
   passionate
                                                 weird
                 drunk           compassionate


                                                         22
Us vs. Them

• Security professionals often degrade
  developers
• Developers don’t get security people
• There is interest across the isle, but often
  ruined by negative language



                                                 23
Why do you see the speck that is in your
brotherʼs eye, but do not notice the log that is in
your own eye?
                                           - Jesus
                                                      24
Adverse conditions
need Rugged solutions


                        25
Adversity fueled
        innovation

• NASA in Space
• Military hard drives
• ATMs in Europe


                         26
Chip and PIN ATM




                   27
The Internets is Mean

• Latency
• Distribution
• Anonymity
• Varied protocols
• People

                        28
Systems are complex

• “How Complex Systems Fail”
• Failure at multiple layers
• Synonyms in other industries
• Defense in Depth

                                 29
Software needs to
 meet adversity


                    30
Intro to Rugged
   by analogy


                  31
Current Software

               32
Rugged Software




              33
Current Software




                   34
Rugged Software

                  35
Current Software




                   36
Rugged Software
                  37
Current Software




                   38
Rugged Software

                  39
Current Software




                   40
Rugged Software




                  41
Current Software
                   42
Rugged Software




                  43
44
Rugged Software
   Manifesto


                  45
I am rugged... and more importantly,
my code is rugged.




                                       46
I recognize that software has become
a foundation of our modern world.




                                       47
I recognize the awesome
responsibility that comes with this
foundational role.




                                      48
I recognize that my code will be used
in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it
was not designed, and for longer
than it was ever intended.




                                          49
I recognize that my code will be
attacked by talented and persistent
adversaries who threaten our
physical, economic, and national
security.




                                      50
I recognize these things - and I
choose to be rugged.




                                   51
I am rugged because I refuse to be a
source of vulnerability or weakness.




                                       52
I am rugged because I assure my
code will support its mission.




                                  53
I am rugged because my code can
face these challenges and persist in
spite of them.




                                       54
I am rugged, not because it is easy,
but because it is necessary... and I
am up for the challenge.




                                       55
Rugged-ities
 • Availability
 • Survivability
 • Defensibility
 • Security
 • Longevity
 • Portability
                   56
Security vs. Rugged
• Absence of   • Verification of
  Events         quality
• Cost         • Benefit
• Negative     • Positive
• FUD          • Known values
• Toxic        • Affirming
                                  57
Rugged Survival Guide
 • Defensible Infrastructure
 • Operational Discipline
 • Situational Awareness
 • Countermeasures

On YouTube: “PCI Zombies”
                               58
Security as a Feature

• SaaF is possible, but hard for most products
• Tough to measure
• Hiding among other features


                                                 59
Rugged as a Feature

• RaaF addresses to customer felt needs
• Values that people covet
• Buyers want it


                                          60
Qualities of Rugged
       Software
• Availability - Speed and performance
• Longevity, Long-standing, persistent - Time
• Scalable, Portable
• Maintainable and Defensible - Topology Map
• Resilient in the face of failures
• Reliable - Time, Load
                                                61
Measuring Ruggedness

• Physical: Heat, Cold, Friction, Time, Quantity
  of use, Type of use
• Software: Concurrency, Transactions, Speed,
  Serial Load, Input handling, Entropy, Lines of
  Code




                                                   62
Measuring Frameworks
• Measured by lack of incidents and
  quantifying risk and vulns
• OWASP / CVE tracking
• Common Vuln Scoring System (CVSS)
• Mitre Common Weakness Enumeration
  (CWE)
• Common Weakness Scoring System
  (CWSS)
                                      63
Supply and ______



                    64
Marketing Possibilities

• Positive: Rugged Rating System
 • 3rd party verification of Ruggedness
 • Self Attestation
• Negative: warning signs
• Buyers Bill of Rights

                                         65
Measuring Rugged

                   66
3rd Party Warnings
                     67
Self Attestation
                   68
Implicit vs. Explicit



                        69
Explicit Requirements

• Customers Demand
• 20% Use Cases
• Most Vocal
• Failure results in loss of customers but not
  all customers



                                                 70
Implicit Requirements

• Customers Assume
• 80% of use cases
• Unsaid and Unspoken
• Most basic and expected features
• Failure results in a loss of most customers

                                                71
Is Security Explicit
    or Implicit?




                       72
Is Rugged Explicit
    or Implicit?
                     73
74
Rugged
Implementations




              75
build a
rugged
team
          76
People and Process

• Sit near the developers... DevOpsSec
• Track security flaws or bugs in the same bug
  tracking system
• Train to automate
• Involve team with vendors
• Measurement over time and clear communication
                                                  77
OPSEC Framework
• Know your system and people
• Make security better in small steps
• Add layers of security without
  overcompensating
• Use a weekly, iteration-based approach to
  security


                                              78
79
Programmable
Infrastructure
Environment


             80
Configuration
        Management
• Infrastructure as Code (IaC)
• Model driven deployment
• Version control everything
• PIE (Programmable Infrastructure
  Enviroment)
• Know Your Environment if you want to
  make it defensible


                                         81
What is PIE?
•   a a framework to define, provision,
    monitor, and control cloud-based systems

•   written in Java, uses SSH as transport,
    currently supports Amazon AWS (Linux
    and Windows)

•   takes an XML-based model from source
    control and creates a full running system

•   to define, provision, monitor, and control
    cloud-based systems


                                                 82
PIE ingredients
•   model driven automation

•   infrastructure as code

•   DevOps

•   dynamic scaling

•   agility

•   security in the model



                              83
84
The Model
•   XML descriptions of the system as ‘specs’

•   system (top level)

•   environment (instance of a system)

•   role (“tier” within a system)

•   image (specific base box config)

•   service (specific software or application)

•   commands (for various levels)

•   templates (files to be parsed)
                                                85
86
87
The Registry
•   uses Apache Zookeeper
    (part of Hadoop project)

•   the registry contains information
    about the running system

•   specific addressing scheme:

•   /fcc/test1/external-services/2/tomcat

•   [/<system>/<environment>/<role>/<instance>/<service>]
       pie registry.register /fcc/test1/external-services/2
       pie registry.bind /fcc/test1
       pie registry.list /fcc/test1



                                                              88
Control
        • create, terminate, start, stop instances using
            the AWS API
        • enforce scaling policy
        • execute remote commands
pie control.create /fcc/test1/external-services/2
pie control.stop /fcc/test1/external-services/2
pie control.enforce /fcc/test1
pie control.remote.service.restart /fcc/test1/external-services/2/external-tomcat
pie control.remote.execute /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i exe[0]=“ls –l /etc/
init.d”



                                                                                    89
Provisioning
         • deploy services and apps
         • two-phase for fast deploys
         • update config files and parse templates
pie provision.deploy.stage /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i pack[0]=lvdotcom-auth
pie provision.deploy.run /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i pack[0]=lvdotcom-auth
pie provision.remote.updateConfig /fcc/test1




                                                                                 90
Monitoring

• integrated with third party SaaS monitoring
  provider Cloudkick
• systems register with Cloudkick as they
  come online and immediately have
  appropriate monitors applied based on tags
  set from the model



                                                91
92
Logging

• logging in the cloud using splunk
• logging agents are deployed in the model
  and they are given the config from registry
  and the model as they come online




                                               93
Rugged Results
• repeatable – no manual errors
• reviewable – model in source control
• rapid – bring up, install, configure, and test
  dozens of systems in a morning
• resilient – automated reconfiguration to
  swap servers (throw away infrastructure)
• rugged by design
                                                  94
build
the new
DMZ


          95
What’s a DMZ?

• Demilitarized Zone
• Physical and logical divisions between assets
• Military history
• Control what goes in and what goes out

                                                  96
Control your
        environment
• Make every service a DMZ
• Cloud environment
• 3-tier web architecture
• Allow automated provisioning

                                 97
Traditional 3-Tier Web Architecture
                 Firewall


                 Web
                  Web
                   Web
                                          DMZ 1

                 Firewall


   Middle Tier              Middle Tier
                                          DMZ 2

                 Firewall


      DB                      LDAP
                                          DMZ 3


                                                  98
Rugged Architecture
firewall                 firewall                 firewall

 Web                     Web                     Web         DMZ x3



           firewall                 firewall

          Middle Tier             Middle Tier
                                                          DMZ x2


           firewall                 firewall

             DB                     LDAP
                                                          DMZ x3


                                                                      99
firewall                 firewall                 firewall

 Web                     Web                     Web
                                                                Repeatable
           firewall                 firewall
                                                                 Verifiable
          Middle Tier             Middle Tier             Prod/Dev/Test Matching
           firewall                 firewall
                                                                Controlled
             DB                     LDAP                       Automated


firewall                 firewall                 firewall     firewall                 firewall                 firewall

 Web                     Web                     Web         Web                     Web                     Web




           firewall                 firewall                             firewall                 firewall

          Middle Tier             Middle Tier                         Middle Tier             Middle Tier



           firewall                 firewall                             firewall                 firewall

             DB                     LDAP                                 DB                     LDAP




                                                                                                                      100
firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall
 Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web



            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
          Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier


            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP



firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall
 Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web



            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
          Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier


            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP




firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall   firewall               firewall               firewall
 Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web      Web                   Web                    Web



            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
          Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier                     Middle Tier           Middle Tier


            firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall                         firewall               firewall
             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP                             DB                   LDAP



                                                                                                                                                                  101
Rugged 3-Tier
 Architecture Benefits
• Control
• Config Management
• Reproducible and Automated
• Data can’t traverse environments
  accidentally
• Dev and Test Tier accurate
                                     102
OWASP Secure Coding
    Quick Reference Guide

• Checklist format that can be added to into
  your sprints
• Helps development team find common
  security flaws
• Topics include: Input Validation, Output
  Encoding, Auth, Session Management,
  Memory Management, ...
• http://bit.ly/OWASPQuickRef
                                               103
Rugged Next Steps

• Use Rugged language
• Know your systems
• Automate, track results, repeat
• Begin weekly OPSEC in your org
• Attend LASCON (http://lascon.org)
                                      104
Rugged Resources



                   105
h"ps://groups.google.com/a/owasp.org/group/rugged-­‐so4ware




                                                              106
Recommended Reading




                      107

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The Rugged Way in the Cloud--Building Reliability and Security into Software

  • 1. The Rugged Way in the Cloud–Building Reliability and Security Into Software James Wickett [email protected] 1
  • 2. 2
  • 3. @wickett • Operations and Security for software delivered on the cloud • National Instruments, R&D • Certs: CISSP, GSEC, GCFW, CCSK • Tags: OWASP, Cloud, DevOps, Ruby • Blogger at theagileadmin.com • I do stuff for LASCON (http://lascon.org) • Twitter: @wickett 3
  • 4. Cloud @ NI We built a DevOps team to rapidly deliver new SaaS products and product functionality using cloud hosting and services (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) as the platform and operations, using model driven automation, as a key differentiating element. With this approach we have delivered multiple major products to market quickly with a very small staffing and financial outlay. 4
  • 5. National Instruments • 30 years old; 5000+ employees around the world, half in Austin, mostly engineers; $873M in 2010 • Hardware and software for data acquisition, embedded design, instrument control, and test • LabVIEW is our graphical dataflow programming language used by scientists and engineers in many fields 5
  • 6. From toys to black holes 6
  • 7. NI’s Cloud Products • LabVIEW Web UI Builder • FPGA Compile Cloud • more to come... 7
  • 9. 9
  • 10. 10
  • 11. FPGA Compile Cloud • LabVIEW FPGA compiles take hours and consume extensive system resources; compilers are getting larger and more complex • Implemented on Amazon - EC2, Java/Linux,C#/.NET/Windows, and LabVIEW FPGA • Also an on premise product, the “Compile Farm” 11
  • 15. Am I healthy? • Latest and greatest research • Justification to insurance companies • Measurement and testing as available • Point in time snapshot 15
  • 17. Am I secure? • Latest and greatest vulnerabilities • Justification of budget for tools • Measurement and testing as available • Point in time snapshot 17
  • 19. It’s not our problem anymore 19
  • 20. If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless immensity of the sea - Antoine Jean-Baptiste Marie Roger de Saint Exupéry 20
  • 21. Twitter Survey What is one word that you would use to describe ‘IT Security’ people? 21
  • 22. unicorns paranoid prepared Tenacious HAWT! smart masochistic demented jaded smart sisyphean omnium-gatherum facebored passionate weird drunk compassionate 22
  • 23. Us vs. Them • Security professionals often degrade developers • Developers don’t get security people • There is interest across the isle, but often ruined by negative language 23
  • 24. Why do you see the speck that is in your brotherʼs eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye? - Jesus 24
  • 26. Adversity fueled innovation • NASA in Space • Military hard drives • ATMs in Europe 26
  • 27. Chip and PIN ATM 27
  • 28. The Internets is Mean • Latency • Distribution • Anonymity • Varied protocols • People 28
  • 29. Systems are complex • “How Complex Systems Fail” • Failure at multiple layers • Synonyms in other industries • Defense in Depth 29
  • 30. Software needs to meet adversity 30
  • 31. Intro to Rugged by analogy 31
  • 44. 44
  • 45. Rugged Software Manifesto 45
  • 46. I am rugged... and more importantly, my code is rugged. 46
  • 47. I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world. 47
  • 48. I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role. 48
  • 49. I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever intended. 49
  • 50. I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic, and national security. 50
  • 51. I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged. 51
  • 52. I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness. 52
  • 53. I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission. 53
  • 54. I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them. 54
  • 55. I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary... and I am up for the challenge. 55
  • 56. Rugged-ities • Availability • Survivability • Defensibility • Security • Longevity • Portability 56
  • 57. Security vs. Rugged • Absence of • Verification of Events quality • Cost • Benefit • Negative • Positive • FUD • Known values • Toxic • Affirming 57
  • 58. Rugged Survival Guide • Defensible Infrastructure • Operational Discipline • Situational Awareness • Countermeasures On YouTube: “PCI Zombies” 58
  • 59. Security as a Feature • SaaF is possible, but hard for most products • Tough to measure • Hiding among other features 59
  • 60. Rugged as a Feature • RaaF addresses to customer felt needs • Values that people covet • Buyers want it 60
  • 61. Qualities of Rugged Software • Availability - Speed and performance • Longevity, Long-standing, persistent - Time • Scalable, Portable • Maintainable and Defensible - Topology Map • Resilient in the face of failures • Reliable - Time, Load 61
  • 62. Measuring Ruggedness • Physical: Heat, Cold, Friction, Time, Quantity of use, Type of use • Software: Concurrency, Transactions, Speed, Serial Load, Input handling, Entropy, Lines of Code 62
  • 63. Measuring Frameworks • Measured by lack of incidents and quantifying risk and vulns • OWASP / CVE tracking • Common Vuln Scoring System (CVSS) • Mitre Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) • Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) 63
  • 65. Marketing Possibilities • Positive: Rugged Rating System • 3rd party verification of Ruggedness • Self Attestation • Negative: warning signs • Buyers Bill of Rights 65
  • 70. Explicit Requirements • Customers Demand • 20% Use Cases • Most Vocal • Failure results in loss of customers but not all customers 70
  • 71. Implicit Requirements • Customers Assume • 80% of use cases • Unsaid and Unspoken • Most basic and expected features • Failure results in a loss of most customers 71
  • 72. Is Security Explicit or Implicit? 72
  • 73. Is Rugged Explicit or Implicit? 73
  • 74. 74
  • 77. People and Process • Sit near the developers... DevOpsSec • Track security flaws or bugs in the same bug tracking system • Train to automate • Involve team with vendors • Measurement over time and clear communication 77
  • 78. OPSEC Framework • Know your system and people • Make security better in small steps • Add layers of security without overcompensating • Use a weekly, iteration-based approach to security 78
  • 79. 79
  • 81. Configuration Management • Infrastructure as Code (IaC) • Model driven deployment • Version control everything • PIE (Programmable Infrastructure Enviroment) • Know Your Environment if you want to make it defensible 81
  • 82. What is PIE? • a a framework to define, provision, monitor, and control cloud-based systems • written in Java, uses SSH as transport, currently supports Amazon AWS (Linux and Windows) • takes an XML-based model from source control and creates a full running system • to define, provision, monitor, and control cloud-based systems 82
  • 83. PIE ingredients • model driven automation • infrastructure as code • DevOps • dynamic scaling • agility • security in the model 83
  • 84. 84
  • 85. The Model • XML descriptions of the system as ‘specs’ • system (top level) • environment (instance of a system) • role (“tier” within a system) • image (specific base box config) • service (specific software or application) • commands (for various levels) • templates (files to be parsed) 85
  • 86. 86
  • 87. 87
  • 88. The Registry • uses Apache Zookeeper (part of Hadoop project) • the registry contains information about the running system • specific addressing scheme: • /fcc/test1/external-services/2/tomcat • [/<system>/<environment>/<role>/<instance>/<service>] pie registry.register /fcc/test1/external-services/2 pie registry.bind /fcc/test1 pie registry.list /fcc/test1 88
  • 89. Control • create, terminate, start, stop instances using the AWS API • enforce scaling policy • execute remote commands pie control.create /fcc/test1/external-services/2 pie control.stop /fcc/test1/external-services/2 pie control.enforce /fcc/test1 pie control.remote.service.restart /fcc/test1/external-services/2/external-tomcat pie control.remote.execute /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i exe[0]=“ls –l /etc/ init.d” 89
  • 90. Provisioning • deploy services and apps • two-phase for fast deploys • update config files and parse templates pie provision.deploy.stage /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i pack[0]=lvdotcom-auth pie provision.deploy.run /fcc/test1/external-services/2 –i pack[0]=lvdotcom-auth pie provision.remote.updateConfig /fcc/test1 90
  • 91. Monitoring • integrated with third party SaaS monitoring provider Cloudkick • systems register with Cloudkick as they come online and immediately have appropriate monitors applied based on tags set from the model 91
  • 92. 92
  • 93. Logging • logging in the cloud using splunk • logging agents are deployed in the model and they are given the config from registry and the model as they come online 93
  • 94. Rugged Results • repeatable – no manual errors • reviewable – model in source control • rapid – bring up, install, configure, and test dozens of systems in a morning • resilient – automated reconfiguration to swap servers (throw away infrastructure) • rugged by design 94
  • 96. What’s a DMZ? • Demilitarized Zone • Physical and logical divisions between assets • Military history • Control what goes in and what goes out 96
  • 97. Control your environment • Make every service a DMZ • Cloud environment • 3-tier web architecture • Allow automated provisioning 97
  • 98. Traditional 3-Tier Web Architecture Firewall Web Web Web DMZ 1 Firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier DMZ 2 Firewall DB LDAP DMZ 3 98
  • 99. Rugged Architecture firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web DMZ x3 firewall firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier DMZ x2 firewall firewall DB LDAP DMZ x3 99
  • 100. firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web Repeatable firewall firewall Verifiable Middle Tier Middle Tier Prod/Dev/Test Matching firewall firewall Controlled DB LDAP Automated firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web Web Web Web firewall firewall firewall firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier firewall firewall firewall firewall DB LDAP DB LDAP 100
  • 101. firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall DB LDAP DB LDAP DB LDAP firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall DB LDAP DB LDAP DB LDAP firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web Web firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier Middle Tier firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall firewall DB LDAP DB LDAP DB LDAP 101
  • 102. Rugged 3-Tier Architecture Benefits • Control • Config Management • Reproducible and Automated • Data can’t traverse environments accidentally • Dev and Test Tier accurate 102
  • 103. OWASP Secure Coding Quick Reference Guide • Checklist format that can be added to into your sprints • Helps development team find common security flaws • Topics include: Input Validation, Output Encoding, Auth, Session Management, Memory Management, ... • http://bit.ly/OWASPQuickRef 103
  • 104. Rugged Next Steps • Use Rugged language • Know your systems • Automate, track results, repeat • Begin weekly OPSEC in your org • Attend LASCON (http://lascon.org) 104