Vampire attack in wsn
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The document discusses vampire attacks on wireless sensor networks (WSN), detailing their nature as denial-of-service attacks that drain the power of sensor nodes. It provides an overview of characteristics and applications of WSN, the security threats they face, and requirements for protection. Proposed solutions to detect and prevent vampire attacks are also presented, alongside related work in the field.
![Introduction ContâdâĻ
âĸ Scalability: It is the capability of a WSN to handle a growing no.
of sensor node.
âĸ Node for common task: Each sensor node performs some task
like collecting the information, computation and communicating
with other nodes in the network.
âĸ In network data processing: This technique of WSN is very
common and also very important in which an intermediate node
has a special transmission function to aggregate the sensing data
from the source and pass the resultant data to sink node [14].
âĸ Self-Organization: Due to autonomous feature of the sensor
network each nodes can organize itself during ambiguous
situations [11].](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-5-320.jpg)
![Security Threats
âĸ There are different threats that target WSN [3] [7]. Which are
categorise as follows-
âĸ Common Attacks: In WSN, wireless transmission medium is used
for communication so it is easy to present many types of attacks
like: Active attack (data modification, data injection, delay, DoS)
and passive attack (traffic analysis, eavesdropping).
âĸ Denial of Service Attacks (DoS [4] [16]): These type of attacks
prevent the normal use of communication functionality. This attack
may suppress all packet directed to a particular destination e.g.
jamming attack [15], Target the power of a nodes e.g. power-
exhaustion, vampire attack.
âĸ Node Compromise: When a node come into network attacker
extract vital information from a node like routing information,
data, access control, security key etc. these attacks are These
attacks are more dominant than other attacks.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-7-320.jpg)
![Security Requirement
There is need to use some security mechanism to avoid attack in
WSN [5] [7].
âĸ Confidentiality: It ensure that a given information must not be
reveal by anyone other than the intended sender and receiver.
âĸ Integrity: This security service stated that the data receive by the
receiver are absolute as sent by an authorize sender.
âĸ Authorization: This security service ensure that only the
authorized entities (e.g.: sensor nodes and base station) can be able
to execute functions in the network like data gathering, routing,
processing and controlling the system.
âĸ Authentication: It allows a recipient to verify that the data is
really sent by the authorised sender. In sensor network this security
services is quite significant.
âĸ Auditing: Important information which is observed from
environment by the sensor nodes must be stored by nodes.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-9-320.jpg)
![Security Requirement contâdâĻ
âĸ Availability: The principle of this property is that network
services or resource should be always available to the authentic
users when they needed.
âĸ Freshness [7]: In WSN Sensor node collect the real information
from environment at every moment and transmit it to base stations.
So this information must be recent.
âĸ Forward and Backward Secrecy: There are two properties
needed whenever a new node join a network and a sensor node
fail. First is forward secrecy where a sensor node should not be
able to read any future messages after it leaves the network and the
other one is backward secrecy, where a joining sensor node should
not be able to read any previously transmitted message.
âĸ Privacy and Anonymity: This property ensure that the location
and identities of WSN entities (sensor node and base stations)
should be hidden or protected from the outsiders.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-10-320.jpg)
![Vampire Attack ContâdâĻ
a) Vampire Attack on Stateless Protocol
âĸ Carousel Attack: In carousel attack, an attacker compose a packet
with a path that contain series of loops of that path, so that same of
nodes will traverse by the single packet many times[9] as shown in
Figure.
Figure 1: Carousel Attack](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-12-320.jpg)
![Vampire Attack ContâdâĻ
b) Vampire attacks on Stateful Protocol
Stateful routing protocols in which network topology and its state
are already known by the nodes so local forwarding decisions at
each is done by using stored state.
âĸ Directional Antenna Attack: In this type of attack intruder have
small control over the packet progress when forwarding decisions
are made independently by each node but by using directional
antenna they can still waste energy[10].
âĸ Malicious Discovery Attacks: AODV and DSR routing
algorithms are vulnerable to vampire, when route discovery initiate
by the node at any time, not just during change in a topology.
There are many ways for the malicious node to activate topology
change: it may simply falsely claim that a link is down, or claim a
new link to a non-existent node.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-14-320.jpg)
![Related Work
1. Eugene y. vasserman et. al. [6], Describe PLGP protocol which is
developed By Parno, Luk, Gaustad and Perrig to prevent the
vampire attack. PLGP have mainly two phases, first is Topology
discovery Phase and other is Packet forwarding phase.
2. K. Vanitha and V.dhivya et. al. [8], They have invented a routing
protocol to Prevent from Vampire Attacks in WSN, name is
Valuable Secure protocol. It has mainly three phases, first is
network configuration phase, second is key management and last
one is communication phase.
3. B. Umakanth and J. Damodhar et. al. [13], Describe the EWMA
(Energy Weighted Monitoring Algorithm) to detect the vampire
attack. It has mainly two phases, first is network configuration and
other is communication phase. First phase is responsible for
creating an excellent routing path from source to sink. Second
phase perform aggregation of the packet transmission to avoids the
same packets.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-15-320.jpg)
![Related Work ContâdâĻ
4. Ashish Patil and Rahul Gaikwad et. al.[2], Describe a method to
prevent vampire attack by using EWMA and finding corresponding
trust value of each node. For preventing vampire attack first detect
carousal and stretch attack. After detection of carousal and stretch
attack reduce their impact in wireless sensor networks by using
energy weight monitoring algorithm (EWMA). Then finding trust
value of each node in the network for performing routing operation.
5. Amee A. Patel and Sunil J. Soni et. al [1], Describe a method for
detection and prevention against vampire attack in AODV routing
protocol. The main goal of approach is defending the energy
draining of nodes in wireless sensor network against vampire attack
and increase the life time of network.
6. Shrikant C. Chumble1 and M. M. Ghonge et. al.[12], Describe
the vulnerability to the vampire attack on exiting routing protocol
like AODV even they design to be secure routing. The author also
proposed, vampire attack removal protocol (VARP).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-16-320.jpg)
![References ContâdâĻ
9. P.Rajipriyadharshini and V.Venkatakrishnan, S.Suganya and A .Masanam, âVampire Attacks
Deploying Resources in Wireless Sensor Networksâ International Journal of Computer Science
and Information Technologies, Vol. 5 (3), 2014, pp: 2951-2953 ; ISSN: 0975-9646.
10. Richa kumari, Pankaj Sharma, âA Literature Survey on Detection and Prevention against
Vampire Attack in WSNâ international conference on computer, communication &
computational sciences [IC4S 2016], pp:122-126, Ajmer (Raj.) August 2016.
11. Snehlata Yadav, Kamlesh Gupta, Sanjay Silakari, âSecurity issues in wireless sensor networksâ
Journal of Information Systems and Communication, vol. 1, pp-01-06, issue 2, 2010.
12. Tawseef Ahmad Naqishbandi and Imthyaz Sheriff C, âA Resilient Strategy against Energy
Attacks in Ad-Hoc WSN and Future IoTâ International Journal of Advanced Research in
Computer Science and Software Engineering Vol. 4, Issue 2, February 2014, pp: 766-773, ISSN:
2277 128X.
13. Umakant, and J. Damodhar, âResource Consumption Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor
Networksâ International Journal of Engineering Research ISSN: 2319 6890, Volume No.3 Issue
No: Special 2, pp: 107-111 22 March 2014.
14. V. Shnayder, M. Hempstead, B. Chen, G.W. Allen, and M. Welsh, âSimulating the Power
Consumption of Large-Scale Sensor Network Applicationsâ Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys 2004), pp. 188-
200, Baltimore (USA), August 2004.
15. W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood, âThe Feasibility of Launching and Detecting
Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networksâ Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium
on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, pp. 46-57, Urbana-Champaign (USA), May 2005.
16. Y.W. Law, M. Palaniswami, L. Van Hoesel, J. Doumen, P. Hartel, and P. Havinga. Energy,
âEfficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocolsâ
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 6:1-6:38, 2009.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/vampireattackinwsn-171116133231/85/Vampire-attack-in-wsn-21-320.jpg)
Vampire attack in wsn
- 1. VAMPIRE ATTACK IN WSN: A DETECTION AND PREVENTION APPROACH AGAINST VAMPIRE Presented By: Richa Kumari
- 2. Outline ī Introduction of WSN īSecurity Threats īSecurity Requirement ī Vampire Attack ī Related Work ī Proposed Work ī Conclusion and Future Work ī References
- 3. Introduction a) Wireless Sensor Network Sometimes WSN is also called WSAN, wireless sensor and actuator networks. WSAN is a collection of autonomous sensors which are distributed in a specific area to monitor environmental conditions, such as pressure, temperature and sound etc. they co-ordinately transfer their information over the network to a destination node. Figure : Sensor Node Architecture
- 4. Introduction ContâdâĻ b) Characteristics of WSN âĸ Large no of nodes: A wireless sensor network uses huge amount of sensor nodes. âĸ Unreliable Communication: In WSN routing is done by using connection-less protocol so obviously communication will be unreliable. âĸ Heterogeneity of nodes: The WSN have sensor nodes with different abilities, such as various transmission or sensing ranges, so that network provides more resilience in distribution. âĸ Battery powered: The power is needed to every sensor node to receive packet and to perform the computation on it. âĸ Very limited resources: Each sensor nodes in WSN have limited resource like memory (48K Program Memory and 1M flash storage), 16 bit 8 MHz CPU with 10K RAM.
- 5. Introduction ContâdâĻ âĸ Scalability: It is the capability of a WSN to handle a growing no. of sensor node. âĸ Node for common task: Each sensor node performs some task like collecting the information, computation and communicating with other nodes in the network. âĸ In network data processing: This technique of WSN is very common and also very important in which an intermediate node has a special transmission function to aggregate the sensing data from the source and pass the resultant data to sink node [14]. âĸ Self-Organization: Due to autonomous feature of the sensor network each nodes can organize itself during ambiguous situations [11].
- 6. Introduction ContâdâĻ c) Application of WSN âĸ Area monitoring: The WSN is deployed over an area where some aspect is to be observed and then transmit that information to the control unit. âĸ Health monitoring: In medical science wearable and implanted these two type of applications. âĸ Air pollution monitoring: To measure the concentration of serious gases in cities, the WSN is used to do this. âĸ Forest fire detection: The Wireless Sensor Network can be installed in a forest to detect the fire in particular coverage area. In this process sensors measure the temperature, humidity and gases which are produced during fire. âĸ Natural disaster prevention: WSN have strongly been set up in water sources like rivers, lacks where variation in the water levels observed in real time.
- 7. Security Threats âĸ There are different threats that target WSN [3] [7]. Which are categorise as follows- âĸ Common Attacks: In WSN, wireless transmission medium is used for communication so it is easy to present many types of attacks like: Active attack (data modification, data injection, delay, DoS) and passive attack (traffic analysis, eavesdropping). âĸ Denial of Service Attacks (DoS [4] [16]): These type of attacks prevent the normal use of communication functionality. This attack may suppress all packet directed to a particular destination e.g. jamming attack [15], Target the power of a nodes e.g. power- exhaustion, vampire attack. âĸ Node Compromise: When a node come into network attacker extract vital information from a node like routing information, data, access control, security key etc. these attacks are These attacks are more dominant than other attacks.
- 8. Security Threats contâdâĻ âĸ Side-channel Attacks: Attacker can observe some real activity of a node like electromagnetic flow of data whenever they implement encryption or decryption. After capturing this information attacker can easily extract secret key. âĸ Impersonation Attacks: There are two types of impersonation attack. One is Sybil attack in which adversary creates multiple fake identities and other is replication attack in which adversary create duplicates of the same identity. âĸ Protocol-specific Attacks: In WSN some protocols are essential to perform some activity in the network. These protocols like data aggregation, routing and time synchronization are pointed by specific attacks that objective to influence the internal network services.
- 9. Security Requirement There is need to use some security mechanism to avoid attack in WSN [5] [7]. âĸ Confidentiality: It ensure that a given information must not be reveal by anyone other than the intended sender and receiver. âĸ Integrity: This security service stated that the data receive by the receiver are absolute as sent by an authorize sender. âĸ Authorization: This security service ensure that only the authorized entities (e.g.: sensor nodes and base station) can be able to execute functions in the network like data gathering, routing, processing and controlling the system. âĸ Authentication: It allows a recipient to verify that the data is really sent by the authorised sender. In sensor network this security services is quite significant. âĸ Auditing: Important information which is observed from environment by the sensor nodes must be stored by nodes.
- 10. Security Requirement contâdâĻ âĸ Availability: The principle of this property is that network services or resource should be always available to the authentic users when they needed. âĸ Freshness [7]: In WSN Sensor node collect the real information from environment at every moment and transmit it to base stations. So this information must be recent. âĸ Forward and Backward Secrecy: There are two properties needed whenever a new node join a network and a sensor node fail. First is forward secrecy where a sensor node should not be able to read any future messages after it leaves the network and the other one is backward secrecy, where a joining sensor node should not be able to read any previously transmitted message. âĸ Privacy and Anonymity: This property ensure that the location and identities of WSN entities (sensor node and base stations) should be hidden or protected from the outsiders.
- 11. Vampire Attack âĸ The vampire attack is the class of Denial-of-Service attack. âĸ Denial-of-Services in network is cause by consuming the power of the sensor node. It is also called power draining attacks because of this attack consume power of sensor nodes and disable the network. âĸ we can categorise vampire attack into two. a) Vampire Attack on Stateless Protocol b) Vampire Attacks on Stateful Protocol
- 12. Vampire Attack ContâdâĻ a) Vampire Attack on Stateless Protocol âĸ Carousel Attack: In carousel attack, an attacker compose a packet with a path that contain series of loops of that path, so that same of nodes will traverse by the single packet many times[9] as shown in Figure. Figure 1: Carousel Attack
- 13. Vampire Attack ContâdâĻ âĸ Stretch Attack: In stretch attack, intruder build up fake long source route. So that the packets move through large number of node rather than the excellent number of nodes as shown in Figure. Figure 2: Stretch Attack
- 14. Vampire Attack ContâdâĻ b) Vampire attacks on Stateful Protocol Stateful routing protocols in which network topology and its state are already known by the nodes so local forwarding decisions at each is done by using stored state. âĸ Directional Antenna Attack: In this type of attack intruder have small control over the packet progress when forwarding decisions are made independently by each node but by using directional antenna they can still waste energy[10]. âĸ Malicious Discovery Attacks: AODV and DSR routing algorithms are vulnerable to vampire, when route discovery initiate by the node at any time, not just during change in a topology. There are many ways for the malicious node to activate topology change: it may simply falsely claim that a link is down, or claim a new link to a non-existent node.
- 15. Related Work 1. Eugene y. vasserman et. al. [6], Describe PLGP protocol which is developed By Parno, Luk, Gaustad and Perrig to prevent the vampire attack. PLGP have mainly two phases, first is Topology discovery Phase and other is Packet forwarding phase. 2. K. Vanitha and V.dhivya et. al. [8], They have invented a routing protocol to Prevent from Vampire Attacks in WSN, name is Valuable Secure protocol. It has mainly three phases, first is network configuration phase, second is key management and last one is communication phase. 3. B. Umakanth and J. Damodhar et. al. [13], Describe the EWMA (Energy Weighted Monitoring Algorithm) to detect the vampire attack. It has mainly two phases, first is network configuration and other is communication phase. First phase is responsible for creating an excellent routing path from source to sink. Second phase perform aggregation of the packet transmission to avoids the same packets.
- 16. Related Work ContâdâĻ 4. Ashish Patil and Rahul Gaikwad et. al.[2], Describe a method to prevent vampire attack by using EWMA and finding corresponding trust value of each node. For preventing vampire attack first detect carousal and stretch attack. After detection of carousal and stretch attack reduce their impact in wireless sensor networks by using energy weight monitoring algorithm (EWMA). Then finding trust value of each node in the network for performing routing operation. 5. Amee A. Patel and Sunil J. Soni et. al [1], Describe a method for detection and prevention against vampire attack in AODV routing protocol. The main goal of approach is defending the energy draining of nodes in wireless sensor network against vampire attack and increase the life time of network. 6. Shrikant C. Chumble1 and M. M. Ghonge et. al.[12], Describe the vulnerability to the vampire attack on exiting routing protocol like AODV even they design to be secure routing. The author also proposed, vampire attack removal protocol (VARP).
- 17. Proposed Work In this approach we add one extra field in the routing table at each node and in data packet that is Bcast_id for AODV routing protocol to detect the directional antenna attack. Step 1: Whenever sensor node want to send the information, first it will check its routing table. âĸ If path available in routing table then goto step 3. âĸ Otherwise it will generate the packet RREQ with Bcast_id and broadcast this packet into the network in read only mode. Step 2: The intermediate nodes either generates RREP with same Bcast_id as RREQ or rebroadcast RREQ. Redundant RREQs are dropped by these node. âĸ If these node have a path to destination in their routing table then generates RREP and goto step 3. âĸ Otherwise rebroadcast the RREQ packet.
- 18. Proposed Work ContâdâĻ Step 3: Node will unicast a âroute_path_alertâ packet in that forward path with fields <dest_addr, source_addr, bcast_id >. So that all intermediate nodes can update their bcast_id field in routing table corresponding to the source and destination entries. Step 4: After establish or alert the reverse and forward path, source node can transmit the information to destination. Now source node prepare data packet including Bcast_id (read only mode) and unicast this packet on particular selected path. Step 5: All Intermediate nodes match bcast_id of packet and the corresponding stored bcast_id in routing table. If bcast_id matches then this node forward the data packet otherwise send message to trusted authorise party that the particular previous node is vampire node.
- 19. Conclusion and Future Work âĸ Various new routing protocol against vampire attack and methods to detect or prevent the vampire in AODV routing protocol are mentioned in related work. âĸ This paper provide a different approach for detect and prevent the vampire attack by adding one extra variable in routing table and data packet. After that performs some computation on that variable to detect and prevent this attack. âĸ The simulation of above proposed algorithm is left for future work.
- 20. References 1. Amee A. Patel and Sunil J. Soni, âA Novel Proposal for Defending Against Vampire Attack in WSNâ International Conference on Communication Systems and Network Technologies,pp: 624-627, DOI 10.1109/CSNT in 2015. 2. Ashish Patil and Rahul Gaikwad, âPreventing Vampire Attack in Wireless Sensor Network by using Trustâ International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology ISSN: 2278-0181 Vol. 4 pp: 254-258, Issue 06, June-2015. 3. C. Karlof , D. Wagner, âSecure routing in wireless sensor networks attacks And countermeasuresâ in proc. Of 1st IEEE Int. workshop on sensor network Protocols and applications (SNPAâ03), pp. 113-127, May 2003. 4. D.R. Raymond, R.C. Marchany, M.I. Brown¯eld, and S.F. Midki, âEffects of Denial-of- Sleep Attacks on Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocolsâ IEEE Trans- actions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 367-380, 2009. 5. Dr. Manoj Kumar Jain, âWireless Sensor Networks: Security Issues and Challengesâ IJCIT, vol. 2, issue 1, pp. 62-67, 2011. 6. Eugene Y. Vasserman and Nicholas Hopper, âVampire Attacks: Draining Life from Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networkâ Ieee Transactions On Mobile Computing, Vol. 12, pp: 318 â 332, No. 2, February 2013. 7. J. Lopez, R. Roman, and C. Alcaraz, âAnalysis of Security Threats, Requirements, Technologies and Standards in Wireless Sensor Networksâ Foundations of Security Analysis and Design 2009, LNCS vol. 5705, pp. 289-338, 2009. 8. K.Vanitha, and V.Dhivya, âA Valuable Secure Protocol to Prevent Vampire Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networksâ IEEE International Conference on Innovations in Engineering and Technology Vol. 3, pp: 2441-2446, Special Issue 3, March 2014.
- 21. References ContâdâĻ 9. P.Rajipriyadharshini and V.Venkatakrishnan, S.Suganya and A .Masanam, âVampire Attacks Deploying Resources in Wireless Sensor Networksâ International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technologies, Vol. 5 (3), 2014, pp: 2951-2953 ; ISSN: 0975-9646. 10. Richa kumari, Pankaj Sharma, âA Literature Survey on Detection and Prevention against Vampire Attack in WSNâ international conference on computer, communication & computational sciences [IC4S 2016], pp:122-126, Ajmer (Raj.) August 2016. 11. Snehlata Yadav, Kamlesh Gupta, Sanjay Silakari, âSecurity issues in wireless sensor networksâ Journal of Information Systems and Communication, vol. 1, pp-01-06, issue 2, 2010. 12. Tawseef Ahmad Naqishbandi and Imthyaz Sheriff C, âA Resilient Strategy against Energy Attacks in Ad-Hoc WSN and Future IoTâ International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering Vol. 4, Issue 2, February 2014, pp: 766-773, ISSN: 2277 128X. 13. Umakant, and J. Damodhar, âResource Consumption Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networksâ International Journal of Engineering Research ISSN: 2319 6890, Volume No.3 Issue No: Special 2, pp: 107-111 22 March 2014. 14. V. Shnayder, M. Hempstead, B. Chen, G.W. Allen, and M. Welsh, âSimulating the Power Consumption of Large-Scale Sensor Network Applicationsâ Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys 2004), pp. 188- 200, Baltimore (USA), August 2004. 15. W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood, âThe Feasibility of Launching and Detecting Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networksâ Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing, pp. 46-57, Urbana-Champaign (USA), May 2005. 16. Y.W. Law, M. Palaniswami, L. Van Hoesel, J. Doumen, P. Hartel, and P. Havinga. Energy, âEfficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocolsâ ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 6:1-6:38, 2009.