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WARNING:WARNING:
Do Not Feed the BearsDo Not Feed the Bears
Miroslav Štampar
(mstampar@zsis.hr; miroslav@sqlmap.org)
WARNING:WARNING:
Do Not Feed the BearsDo Not Feed the Bears
Miroslav Štampar
(mstampar@zsis.hr; miroslav@sqlmap.org)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 2
ContextContext
Croatian Government CERT
Dealing with vast diversity of different
incidents (e.g. ransomware, defacements, DoS
attacks, etc.)
Most interesting (by far) are APT attacks
“Have you noticed anything strange with your
computer lately? -Nope. Though, IE with Twitter
is popping out here and there… and I don’t use
Twitter” (recent APT incident)
We are part of NATO and EU – hence, natural
target of “advanced persistent threats”
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 3
IntroductionIntroduction
In January got two (forwarded) suspicious
emails with question “was this an attack?”
August (Bulletin.doc - bigger) and November
(Operation_in_Mosul.doc - smaller) of 2016
Originally addressed to one “sensitive”
government institution, hence, we expected
the “unexpected”
Attachments were Microsoft Office documents
(.doc), regular attacking vector in this kind of
(spear) phishing attacks
In majority of cases, malicious Macros are
used, while in this case, there were no Macros
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 4
Emails (content)Emails (content)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 5
Emails (headers)Emails (headers)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 6
Emails (reverse DNS)Emails (reverse DNS)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 7
Attachments (.doc / RTF)Attachments (.doc / RTF)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 8
Initial findings (long hex strings)Initial findings (long hex strings)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 9
Initial findings (CLSID)Initial findings (CLSID)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 10
Initial findings (ShockwaveFlash)Initial findings (ShockwaveFlash)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 11
Initial findings (hash/VirusTotal)Initial findings (hash/VirusTotal)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 12
Dummy run (VM)Dummy run (VM)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 13
Extracting OLE objects (OfficeMalScanner)Extracting OLE objects (OfficeMalScanner)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 14
Decompiling SWF files (ffdec)Decompiling SWF files (ffdec)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 15
Encrypted payloads (exploit + dropper)Encrypted payloads (exploit + dropper)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 16
Decryption (LFSR) routine (Bulletin.doc)Decryption (LFSR) routine (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 17
Decryption/Loader routine (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)Decryption/Loader routine (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 18
Payload “choice” (Bulletin.doc)Payload “choice” (Bulletin.doc)
Flash Player Version Embedded Binary Vulnerability
20.0.0.306 - 21.0.0.242 (Ver_)ExtSwf2 CVE-2016-4117
20.0.0.228 - 20.0.0.306 (Ver_)ExtSwf CVE-2016-1019
11.5.502.146 - 19.0.0.207 (Ver_)ExtSwf1 CVE-2015-7645
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 19
Vulnerabilities exploited (Bulletin.doc)Vulnerabilities exploited (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 20
Payload decryptionPayload decryption
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 21
Payload decompression (CWS/FWS)Payload decompression (CWS/FWS)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 22
Payload (dbg) strings (Bulletin.doc)Payload (dbg) strings (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 23
CVE-2016-4117 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2016-4117 (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 24
CVE-2015-7645 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2015-7645 (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 25
CVE-2016-1019 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2016-1019 (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 26
Payload “fetch” (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)Payload “fetch” (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 27
Infection phase (Bulletin.doc)Infection phase (Bulletin.doc)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 28
nshwmpfs.dll (runtime check)nshwmpfs.dll (runtime check)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 29
nshwmpfs.dll (Carberp source)nshwmpfs.dll (Carberp source)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 30
nshwmpfs.dll (string (de)obfuscation)nshwmpfs.dll (string (de)obfuscation)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 31
nshwmpfs.dll (what it is all about?)nshwmpfs.dll (what it is all about?)
Reconnaissance (first stage) malware (aka.
JHUHUGIT)
Downloading, execution and deletion of
arbitrary files
Collects basic data about the infected system
and sends it (in encrypted form) to C&C
In case that C&C server and/or operator finds
the system “interesting” leaves command for
downloading of second stage malware
Second stage malware: SPLM (aka Xagent, aka
CHOPSTICK) and AZZY (aka. ADVSTORESHELL,
NETUI, EVILTOSS)
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 32
Appendix A: Servers (C&C)Appendix A: Servers (C&C)
accgmail.com (mail server)
213.202.214.148
servicecdp.com (C&C - Bulletin.doc)
87.236.211.182
uniquecorpind.com (C&C / exploits -
Operation_in_Mosul.doc)
62.113.232.196
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 33
Appendix B: Passive DNS / WHOISAppendix B: Passive DNS / WHOIS
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 34
Related workRelated work
Palo Alto Networks, “‘DealersChoice’ is Sofacy’s
Flash Player Exploit Platform”, Oct. 2016.
Palo Alto Networks, “Let It Ride: The Sofacy
Group’s DealersChoice Attacks Continue”, Dec.
2016.
FireEye, “CVE-2016-4117: Flash Zero-Day
Exploited in the Wild”, May. 2016.
SonicWall, “Adobe Type Confusion Vulnerability
CVE-2015-7645 Exploits in the Wild”, 2016.
Trend Micro, “A Look Into Adobe Flash Player
CVE-2016-1019 Zero-Day Attack”, Apr. 2016.
BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 35
Questions?Questions?

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WARNING: Do Not Feed the Bears

  • 1. WARNING:WARNING: Do Not Feed the BearsDo Not Feed the Bears Miroslav Štampar ([email protected]; [email protected]) WARNING:WARNING: Do Not Feed the BearsDo Not Feed the Bears Miroslav Štampar ([email protected]; [email protected])
  • 2. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 2 ContextContext Croatian Government CERT Dealing with vast diversity of different incidents (e.g. ransomware, defacements, DoS attacks, etc.) Most interesting (by far) are APT attacks “Have you noticed anything strange with your computer lately? -Nope. Though, IE with Twitter is popping out here and there… and I don’t use Twitter” (recent APT incident) We are part of NATO and EU – hence, natural target of “advanced persistent threats”
  • 3. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 3 IntroductionIntroduction In January got two (forwarded) suspicious emails with question “was this an attack?” August (Bulletin.doc - bigger) and November (Operation_in_Mosul.doc - smaller) of 2016 Originally addressed to one “sensitive” government institution, hence, we expected the “unexpected” Attachments were Microsoft Office documents (.doc), regular attacking vector in this kind of (spear) phishing attacks In majority of cases, malicious Macros are used, while in this case, there were no Macros
  • 4. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 4 Emails (content)Emails (content)
  • 5. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 5 Emails (headers)Emails (headers)
  • 6. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 6 Emails (reverse DNS)Emails (reverse DNS)
  • 7. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 7 Attachments (.doc / RTF)Attachments (.doc / RTF)
  • 8. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 8 Initial findings (long hex strings)Initial findings (long hex strings)
  • 9. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 9 Initial findings (CLSID)Initial findings (CLSID)
  • 10. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 10 Initial findings (ShockwaveFlash)Initial findings (ShockwaveFlash)
  • 11. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 11 Initial findings (hash/VirusTotal)Initial findings (hash/VirusTotal)
  • 12. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 12 Dummy run (VM)Dummy run (VM)
  • 13. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 13 Extracting OLE objects (OfficeMalScanner)Extracting OLE objects (OfficeMalScanner)
  • 14. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 14 Decompiling SWF files (ffdec)Decompiling SWF files (ffdec)
  • 15. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 15 Encrypted payloads (exploit + dropper)Encrypted payloads (exploit + dropper)
  • 16. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 16 Decryption (LFSR) routine (Bulletin.doc)Decryption (LFSR) routine (Bulletin.doc)
  • 17. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 17 Decryption/Loader routine (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)Decryption/Loader routine (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)
  • 18. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 18 Payload “choice” (Bulletin.doc)Payload “choice” (Bulletin.doc) Flash Player Version Embedded Binary Vulnerability 20.0.0.306 - 21.0.0.242 (Ver_)ExtSwf2 CVE-2016-4117 20.0.0.228 - 20.0.0.306 (Ver_)ExtSwf CVE-2016-1019 11.5.502.146 - 19.0.0.207 (Ver_)ExtSwf1 CVE-2015-7645
  • 19. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 19 Vulnerabilities exploited (Bulletin.doc)Vulnerabilities exploited (Bulletin.doc)
  • 20. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 20 Payload decryptionPayload decryption
  • 21. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 21 Payload decompression (CWS/FWS)Payload decompression (CWS/FWS)
  • 22. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 22 Payload (dbg) strings (Bulletin.doc)Payload (dbg) strings (Bulletin.doc)
  • 23. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 23 CVE-2016-4117 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2016-4117 (Bulletin.doc)
  • 24. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 24 CVE-2015-7645 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2015-7645 (Bulletin.doc)
  • 25. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 25 CVE-2016-1019 (Bulletin.doc)CVE-2016-1019 (Bulletin.doc)
  • 26. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 26 Payload “fetch” (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)Payload “fetch” (Operation_in_Mosul.doc)
  • 27. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 27 Infection phase (Bulletin.doc)Infection phase (Bulletin.doc)
  • 28. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 28 nshwmpfs.dll (runtime check)nshwmpfs.dll (runtime check)
  • 29. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 29 nshwmpfs.dll (Carberp source)nshwmpfs.dll (Carberp source)
  • 30. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 30 nshwmpfs.dll (string (de)obfuscation)nshwmpfs.dll (string (de)obfuscation)
  • 31. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 31 nshwmpfs.dll (what it is all about?)nshwmpfs.dll (what it is all about?) Reconnaissance (first stage) malware (aka. JHUHUGIT) Downloading, execution and deletion of arbitrary files Collects basic data about the infected system and sends it (in encrypted form) to C&C In case that C&C server and/or operator finds the system “interesting” leaves command for downloading of second stage malware Second stage malware: SPLM (aka Xagent, aka CHOPSTICK) and AZZY (aka. ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS)
  • 32. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 32 Appendix A: Servers (C&C)Appendix A: Servers (C&C) accgmail.com (mail server) 213.202.214.148 servicecdp.com (C&C - Bulletin.doc) 87.236.211.182 uniquecorpind.com (C&C / exploits - Operation_in_Mosul.doc) 62.113.232.196
  • 33. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 33 Appendix B: Passive DNS / WHOISAppendix B: Passive DNS / WHOIS
  • 34. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 34 Related workRelated work Palo Alto Networks, “‘DealersChoice’ is Sofacy’s Flash Player Exploit Platform”, Oct. 2016. Palo Alto Networks, “Let It Ride: The Sofacy Group’s DealersChoice Attacks Continue”, Dec. 2016. FireEye, “CVE-2016-4117: Flash Zero-Day Exploited in the Wild”, May. 2016. SonicWall, “Adobe Type Confusion Vulnerability CVE-2015-7645 Exploits in the Wild”, 2016. Trend Micro, “A Look Into Adobe Flash Player CVE-2016-1019 Zero-Day Attack”, Apr. 2016.
  • 35. BSidesLjubljana 0x7E1, Ljubljana (Slovenia) March 10th, 2017 35 Questions?Questions?