2. About me
● Software engineer
● Minister of electronic governance of Bulgaria (2021-2022)
● Member of Bulgarian parliament
● https://techblog.bozho.net
● X: @bozhobg
3. Disclaimer
● No classified information in these slides
● I’ve obtained no information present in these slides just because I’m a
member of parliament
● The slides are entirely with my “expert hat” on
5. Methods for (legal) interception
● Interception interfaces (directly streaming calls and sms from telecoms)
● Spyware (Pegasus, Predator)
● Cell-site simulators, stingrays, IMSI-catchers
● Other SS7 vulnerabilities
6. Rumours
● Private interception companies use some of these technologies
● These technologies are used to wiretap activists, journalists and
opposition politicians
● Key leaks for 3G+ authentication
10. How does it work?
● Not much public information; whistleblowers and rumours
● Mobiles devices connect to the strongest signal
● No mandatory cell tower authentication
● 2G-downgrade
● Session key leaks through rouming (3G, 4G)
● Passive IMSI catchers (not actual fake towers)
● Active (fake towers)
11. How to protect ourselves?
● We can’t
● Stop 2G support on your phone (some phones support this)
● Detecting interception:
○ EFF Crocodile hunter (requires specialized hardware)
○ Android IMSI Catcher Detector (requires root, not present in the play store)
○ SnoopSnitch (requires root)
○ Wiretap Detector (https://github.com/Glamdring/wiretap-detector)
12. Wiretap Detector
● Mobile application with no root permission requited
● Built by volunteers, open source
● No guarantees for successful detection
● The app solves only the cell-site simulator approach (and doesn’t detect
spywhare, interception interfaces, etc.)
13. Detection methods
● Compares public IP with the announced IP ranges of the telecom
○ Gets ASN based on the initial IP
○ https://ip.guide (RIPE)
○ Countermeasure that could be used: the simulator can route requests to the right
telecom (if it supports multi-SIM)
● Detecting changes on the first 2 hops of traceroute
○ Countermeasure: removing the first hop(s)
● Detecting changes in the combinnation of (geocoordinates, cell identifier
● Countermeasures: Spoofing all cell IDs
● Countermeasures are possible, but they complicate things and may not
be implemented (yet) by cell-site simulators
14. TODO list
● Deploy on iOS
● Compare more cell details
● Compare with public cell databases
● Detecting attacks using fake roaming
● Centralized database with detections