The main conclusions highlighted in this report regarding the educational levels in the United States of employed workers of Mexican origin are as follows: a) During the 2011–2025 period, these educational levels showed significant improvement, both for workers of Mexican origin born in the country and for immigrants, as well as among men and women; b) The educational level of Mexican-origin workers born in the United States is higher than that of Mexican immigrants, implying that these are distinct labor groups in terms of skill levels and productivity; c) Throughout the period under consideration, women’s educational levels exceeded those of men, among both natives and immigrants; d) The educational attainment of Mexican immigrant workers who are citizens is much higher than that of those without citizenship; and e) The increase in the educational attainment of Mexican migrant workers in the United States was achieved through their attendance at educational institutions in that country and not due to the arrival of new migrants with higher educational levels.

The Banco de México currently publishes quarterly data on remittance inflows to Mexico via electronic transfers, broken down into those received for deposit into bank accounts and those paid out in cash. This information is valuable because it allows for tracking the formalization of remittances. Electronic remittances account for 99% of total remittances. In the 2013–2015 period, remittances received for deposit into bank accounts accounted for only 11% of total electronic remittances, but began to increase starting in 2016, reaching 14.7% in 2019, 18.8% in 2020, 50.4% in 2025, and 52.7% in the first quarter of 2026. Consequently, there has been a significant shift from remittances previously received for cash payment to those deposited into accounts. This trend highlights, on the one hand, that the remittance sector has made a significant effort to channel these transfers through the banking system, thereby achieving the financial inclusion of this substantial amount of funds; and, on the other hand, the interest of remittance recipients in integrating into the formal financial system, receiving these funds in bank accounts and benefiting from the services it offers, including access to credit.  Furthermore, as the inflow of funds into the financial system through remittances deposited in accounts increases, it becomes easier to channel credit toward productive uses, allowing these transfers from abroad to contribute to the country’s economic development.

The report highlights that remittances received by Mexico from abroad improve the standard of living of recipient households and reduce poverty. In fact, remittances as a percentage of GDP reach very high levels in states with lower per capita income. The contribution of this substantial income—whose primary purpose is to cover the living expenses of Mexican households—is not adequately reflected in the ENIGH, meaning that its impact is virtually ignored in the measurement of poverty and inequality in the country. Thus, the 2024 ENIGH captured only 7.8% of remittance income, leaving out $59.68 billion received by Mexican households that improved their standard of living. Furthermore, the 2024 ENIGH captured only 44% of household disposable income. This means that, in that year, the average household income in Mexico was 2.3 times higher than that reported by the ENIGH, leading to a significant overestimation of poverty levels in the country. Given these limitations, the ENIGH is also not useful for measuring inequality and income distribution in Mexico.

Between 2015 and 2025, the annual wage bill in the United States for Mexican immigrant workers increased by 142.5 billion dollars, rising from 226.8 billion dollars in the first year to 369.3 billion dollars in the last year. This increase was entirely due to the rise in their average wages, as employment among these workers declined during that period. The decline in employment among Mexican migrants reflected the fact that net migration of Mexicans to the United States was negative during that period. This contrasts with what was observed in the United States for most other groups of Latin American migrants.

In the first quarter of 2026, the decline in employment among Mexican immigrant workers—which had begun in late 2024—accelerated. By the end of the first quarter of 2026, annual declines of more than 300,000 Mexican workers had been recorded in the construction sector, nearly 230,000 jobs in professional and administrative services, and about 90,000 jobs in the manufacturing industry.

The report quantifies the average wages earned in the United States by Mexican workers, including both those born in the U.S. to Mexican parents and immigrants. The wage figures are broken down by gender, full-time and part-time employment, and, in the case of immigrants, whether they hold U.S. citizenship. The report also presents figures on the total payroll or labor income of these workers and compares them to Mexico’s GDP.

This article focuses on estimating the number of hours worked and paid per week by Mexican workers in the United States in 2025, considering both U.S.-born individuals of Mexican origin and Mexican immigrants, and breaking down the data by gender, immigration status, and full-time versus part-time employment. It also compares these working hours with those of the total U.S. labor force and with those of the immigrant population. For Mexican immigrants, weekly working hours are also presented by industry and by gender.

This article focuses on measuring the level of employment among Mexican workers in the United States. In 2025, this employment amounted to 19 million people and was made up of 11.8 million Mexicans born in the country and 7.2 million Mexican immigrants. Mexicans accounted for 11.6% of total employment and 1 in 12 workers in that country. The article quantifies the significant drop in employment among Mexican immigrant workers in the United States in 2025, which affected their remittances to Mexico.

In 2025, the employment of Mexican workers in the United States was equivalent to 84.5% of the number of workers insured by the IMSS, which is the most recognized indicator of formal employment in Mexico.

From 2020 to 2025, Mexico's annual remittance income increased by 48.2% in US dollars. During that five-year period, income in current pesos increased by 31.7%, reflecting the appreciation of the Mexican peso against the US dollar during that period. Furthermore, over those five years, the increase in annual remittance income measured in constant pesos was only 0.7%. Thus, inflation in Mexico and the strength of the peso during most of the 2020-2025 period reduced the purchasing power of remittances received by Mexican households.

The Note analyzes the main factors that explain the contraction in remittance income in Mexico and highlights how several of them are interrelated. It presents figures on the evolution of the total wage bill of Mexican migrant workers in the United States and how it declined from the second quarter of 2025 to the fourth quarter. It also notes that in that year, the percentage of income earned in the United States by Mexican migrant workers that was assigned to support their families in Mexico declined.

The Note quantifies the number and percentage of households receiving remittances in the country's states and highlights that there are significant differences between states in terms of the percentage of households and adults benefiting from these transfers from abroad. In the country, 11.3% of households receive remittances, or one in every 8.8 households, but in Michoacán, 31.8% of households benefit from remittances, or practically one in every three households. Furthermore, the receipt of remittances is more frequent if the head of the household is a woman. 14.5% of households in the country headed by a woman receive remittances, but in the state of Michoacán the corresponding percentage is 42.4%, or one in every 2.4 households headed by a woman.

Note 15 on remittances analyzes how the absence of a positive net migration flow of Mexicans to the United States over a prolonged period of years led to changes in the demographic characteristics of this group of migrants. The note details these demographic changes and argues that they are not conducive to the growth in remittance income from Mexico observed in previous years.

Note 14 on remittances highlights the factors that explain the decline in remittance income from Mexico in 2025. It also points out that, in the period 2015-2024, net migration of Mexicans to the United States was negative. During that period, this group of migrants decreased by half a million people, but the other 14 groups of Latin American migrants increased by 4.1 million people, or 44.8%.

This note focuses on a virtually unknown aspect of the economics of emigration and remittances, namely whether Mexican emigrants own assets abroad and whether they own the homes in which they live. It documents that, in the case of Mexican emigration to the United States, the employment and income opportunities that these migrants have achieved as a group have allowed them not only to support their families in Mexico with remittances, but also to accumulate wealth through the acquisition of real estate.

It also documents that, in Mexico, adults who receive remittances are more likely to own a home than those who do not. This suggests that remittances contribute to the financing of real estate purchases by these beneficiaries. Savings play a more important role in home purchases by remittance recipients than by non-recipients.

Employment in the United States for Mexican immigrant workers peaked in the third quarter of 2024 but then declined in the fourth quarter of that year and in the first half of 2025. In July-August 2025, this weakness in employment became more pronounced and was accompanied by declines in their wages and, consequently, in their total payroll.

The note quantifies the potential revenue from a 1% tax on cash remittances sent from the United States to nine Latin American countries: Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Colombia. In 2024, these countries received $123 billion in remittances from the United States. The measurement suggests that this tax, which will take effect on January 1, 2026, will not affect the amounts of remittances sent from the United States to Latin American countries. In addition, there are ways to circumvent the tax, and this process can lead to greater financial inclusion for remittance senders.

Over the 2015-2024 period, the U.S. wage bill of Mexican immigrant workers increased by $146.9 billion. This mainly reflected increases in compensation, as the increase in employment was very small, due to the negative net migration of Mexicans to the United States. This contrasts with what was observed in the U.S. for most other Latin American migrant groups.

In the first few months of 2025, employment of Mexican immigrant workers in the United States declined. At the sectoral level, significant declines in employment occurred in food services, recreation and accommodation; educational services; professional and administrative services; health care and social assistance; and construction, while employment increased in manufacturing and agriculture.

During the period under consideration, the annual wage bill of these workers increased as a net result of the combination of the decline in employment and the increase in their average compensation, the effect of which more than offset the former.

The note highlights the importance of remittances in relation to the GDP of Mexican states by 2024 and how in 4 of them this income exceeded 10 percentage points of state GDP. It also quantifies those remittances increased on average 31% the income/product of recipient households, but in the southern region of the country they did so by 42%.

U.S. labor market figures show that employment of Mexican immigrant workers weakened in the first quarter of 2025. The information does not allow us to identify whether this was due to a lower demand for their labor, whether it originated because some undocumented workers were absent from their jobs for fear of being deported, or a combination of these two factors.

The note presents detailed information showing that most remittance recipient households in Mexico are concentrated in small towns in the country, mainly in towns with less than 2,500 inhabitants and in those with 2,500 to less than 15 thousand people. In some regions of the country this phenomenon is more frequent.  In the Occidente and Bajío region, the main recipient of remittances in the country, one out of every 3.1 households residing in towns with less than 2,500 inhabitants receives this income from abroad.

CEMLA's results from the processing of ENIF 2024 microdata show that 9,833,040 adults in Mexico receive remittances, which represents 10.4% of the country's adults, but in the case of women the percentage is 12% and in women in the Occidente and Bajío regions it is 17.4%. Likewise, 4,495,526 households are beneficiaries of remittances, which represents 11.3% of the country's households, but the percentage rises to 14.5% when the head of household is a woman.

Employment of Mexican immigrant workers in the United States lost steam in early 2025. In the first two months of the year, employment measured using seasonally adjusted data was 7,458,279 workers and was comprised of 4,756,619 men and 2,701,660 women. This weakening of employment added to the declines that had already occurred in the two previous two-month periods, which had been concentrated among male workers.

Mexican immigrant workers in the United States sent 16.7 percent of their labor income to family members in Mexico in 2024. That income was equivalent to 3.38 percentage points of Mexico's GDP. From the states of New York and New Jersey, Mexican migrants sent 27 percent of their wage bill as remittances to their relatives in our country.

The note analyzes the evolution during 2024 of the wage bill in the United States of Mexican immigrant workers, distinguishing between that obtained by men and women and by workers with and without citizenship. It also quantifies the wage bill according to the sector of activity in which they work and for 12 U.S. states, which account for 80% of employment and the corresponding wage bill.

The article analyzes the employment figures of Mexican immigrant workers in the United States, distinguishing by sex and sector of activity. It also reviews in detail the employment figures of these workers in twelve U.S. states, which account for 80 percent of the total employment of Mexican workers in the United States.