| // Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "components/sync/driver/sync_service_crypto.h" |
| |
| #include <utility> |
| |
| #include "base/bind.h" |
| #include "base/bind_helpers.h" |
| #include "base/feature_list.h" |
| #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" |
| #include "base/no_destructor.h" |
| #include "base/sequenced_task_runner.h" |
| #include "base/threading/sequenced_task_runner_handle.h" |
| #include "components/sync/base/passphrase_enums.h" |
| #include "components/sync/base/sync_prefs.h" |
| #include "components/sync/driver/sync_driver_switches.h" |
| #include "components/sync/driver/sync_service.h" |
| #include "components/sync/engine/sync_string_conversions.h" |
| #include "components/sync/nigori/nigori.h" |
| |
| namespace syncer { |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| // Used for the case where a null client is passed to SyncServiceCrypto. |
| class EmptyTrustedVaultClient : public TrustedVaultClient { |
| public: |
| EmptyTrustedVaultClient() = default; |
| ~EmptyTrustedVaultClient() override = default; |
| |
| // TrustedVaultClient implementation. |
| std::unique_ptr<Subscription> AddKeysChangedObserver( |
| const base::RepeatingClosure& cb) override { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| void FetchKeys( |
| const CoreAccountInfo& account_info, |
| base::OnceCallback<void(const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>>&)> cb) |
| override { |
| std::move(cb).Run({}); |
| } |
| |
| void StoreKeys(const std::string& gaia_id, |
| const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>>& keys, |
| int last_key_version) override { |
| // Never invoked by SyncServiceCrypto. |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| } |
| |
| void RemoveAllStoredKeys() override { |
| // Never invoked by SyncServiceCrypto. |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| } |
| |
| void MarkKeysAsStale(const CoreAccountInfo& account_info, |
| base::OnceCallback<void(bool)> cb) override { |
| std::move(cb).Run(false); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| // A SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer implementation that simply posts all calls |
| // to another task runner. |
| class SyncEncryptionObserverProxy : public SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer { |
| public: |
| SyncEncryptionObserverProxy( |
| base::WeakPtr<SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer> observer, |
| scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> task_runner) |
| : observer_(observer), task_runner_(std::move(task_runner)) {} |
| |
| void OnPassphraseRequired( |
| PassphraseRequiredReason reason, |
| const KeyDerivationParams& key_derivation_params, |
| const sync_pb::EncryptedData& pending_keys) override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnPassphraseRequired, |
| observer_, reason, key_derivation_params, pending_keys)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnPassphraseAccepted() override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnPassphraseAccepted, |
| observer_)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired() override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired, |
| observer_)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnTrustedVaultKeyAccepted() override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnTrustedVaultKeyAccepted, |
| observer_)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnBootstrapTokenUpdated(const std::string& bootstrap_token, |
| BootstrapTokenType type) override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnBootstrapTokenUpdated, |
| observer_, bootstrap_token, type)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnEncryptedTypesChanged(ModelTypeSet encrypted_types, |
| bool encrypt_everything) override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnEncryptedTypesChanged, |
| observer_, encrypted_types, encrypt_everything)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnEncryptionComplete() override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnEncryptionComplete, |
| observer_)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnCryptographerStateChanged(Cryptographer* cryptographer, |
| bool has_pending_keys) override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnCryptographerStateChanged, |
| observer_, /*cryptographer=*/nullptr, has_pending_keys)); |
| } |
| |
| void OnPassphraseTypeChanged(PassphraseType type, |
| base::Time passphrase_time) override { |
| task_runner_->PostTask( |
| FROM_HERE, |
| base::BindOnce( |
| &SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer::OnPassphraseTypeChanged, |
| observer_, type, passphrase_time)); |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| base::WeakPtr<SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer> observer_; |
| scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> task_runner_; |
| }; |
| |
| TrustedVaultClient* ResoveNullClient(TrustedVaultClient* client) { |
| if (client) { |
| return client; |
| } |
| |
| static base::NoDestructor<EmptyTrustedVaultClient> empty_client; |
| return empty_client.get(); |
| } |
| |
| // Checks if |passphrase| can be used to decrypt the given pending keys. Returns |
| // true if decryption was successful. Returns false otherwise. Must be called |
| // with non-empty pending keys cache. |
| bool CheckPassphraseAgainstPendingKeys( |
| const sync_pb::EncryptedData& pending_keys, |
| const KeyDerivationParams& key_derivation_params, |
| const std::string& passphrase) { |
| DCHECK(pending_keys.has_blob()); |
| DCHECK(!passphrase.empty()); |
| if (key_derivation_params.method() == KeyDerivationMethod::UNSUPPORTED) { |
| DLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot derive keys using an unsupported key derivation " |
| "method. Rejecting passphrase."; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<Nigori> nigori = |
| Nigori::CreateByDerivation(key_derivation_params, passphrase); |
| DCHECK(nigori); |
| std::string plaintext; |
| bool decrypt_result = nigori->Decrypt(pending_keys.blob(), &plaintext); |
| DVLOG_IF(1, !decrypt_result) << "Passphrase failed to decrypt pending keys."; |
| return decrypt_result; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| SyncServiceCrypto::State::State() |
| : passphrase_key_derivation_params(KeyDerivationParams::CreateForPbkdf2()) { |
| } |
| |
| SyncServiceCrypto::State::~State() = default; |
| |
| SyncServiceCrypto::SyncServiceCrypto( |
| const base::RepeatingClosure& notify_observers, |
| const base::RepeatingCallback<void(ConfigureReason)>& reconfigure, |
| CryptoSyncPrefs* sync_prefs, |
| TrustedVaultClient* trusted_vault_client) |
| : notify_observers_(notify_observers), |
| reconfigure_(reconfigure), |
| sync_prefs_(sync_prefs), |
| trusted_vault_client_(ResoveNullClient(trusted_vault_client)) { |
| DCHECK(notify_observers_); |
| DCHECK(reconfigure_); |
| DCHECK(sync_prefs_); |
| DCHECK(trusted_vault_client_); |
| |
| trusted_vault_client_subscription_ = |
| trusted_vault_client_->AddKeysChangedObserver(base::BindRepeating( |
| &SyncServiceCrypto::OnTrustedVaultClientKeysChanged, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())); |
| } |
| |
| SyncServiceCrypto::~SyncServiceCrypto() = default; |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::Reset() { |
| state_ = State(); |
| } |
| |
| base::Time SyncServiceCrypto::GetExplicitPassphraseTime() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| return state_.cached_explicit_passphrase_time; |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::IsPassphraseRequired() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| switch (state_.required_user_action) { |
| case RequiredUserAction::kNone: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching: |
| return false; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption: |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::IsUsingSecondaryPassphrase() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| return IsExplicitPassphrase(state_.cached_passphrase_type); |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::IsTrustedVaultKeyRequired() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| return state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired || |
| state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching; |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::EnableEncryptEverything() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DCHECK(state_.engine); |
| |
| // TODO(atwilson): Persist the encryption_pending flag to address the various |
| // problems around cancelling encryption in the background (crbug.com/119649). |
| if (!state_.encrypt_everything) |
| state_.encryption_pending = true; |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::IsEncryptEverythingEnabled() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DCHECK(state_.engine); |
| return state_.encrypt_everything || state_.encryption_pending; |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::SetEncryptionPassphrase(const std::string& passphrase) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| // This should only be called when the engine has been initialized. |
| DCHECK(state_.engine); |
| // We should never be called with an empty passphrase. |
| DCHECK(!passphrase.empty()); |
| |
| switch (state_.required_user_action) { |
| case RequiredUserAction::kNone: |
| break; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching: |
| // Cryptographer has pending keys. |
| NOTREACHED() |
| << "Can not set explicit passphrase when decryption is needed."; |
| return; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption: |
| // |kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption| implies that the cryptographer does |
| // not have pending keys. Hence, as long as we're not trying to do an |
| // invalid passphrase change (e.g. explicit -> explicit or explicit -> |
| // implicit), we know this will succeed. If for some reason a new |
| // encryption key arrives via sync later, the SyncEncryptionHandler will |
| // trigger another OnPassphraseRequired(). |
| state_.required_user_action = RequiredUserAction::kNone; |
| notify_observers_.Run(); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| DVLOG(1) << "Setting explicit passphrase for encryption."; |
| |
| // SetEncryptionPassphrase() should never be called if we are currently |
| // encrypted with an explicit passphrase. |
| DCHECK(!IsExplicitPassphrase(state_.cached_passphrase_type)); |
| |
| state_.engine->SetEncryptionPassphrase(passphrase); |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::SetDecryptionPassphrase(const std::string& passphrase) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| // We should never be called with an empty passphrase. |
| DCHECK(!passphrase.empty()); |
| |
| // This should only be called when we have cached pending keys. |
| DCHECK(state_.cached_pending_keys.has_blob()); |
| |
| // For types other than CUSTOM_PASSPHRASE, we should be using the old PBKDF2 |
| // key derivation method. |
| if (state_.cached_passphrase_type != PassphraseType::kCustomPassphrase) { |
| DCHECK_EQ(state_.passphrase_key_derivation_params.method(), |
| KeyDerivationMethod::PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1_1003); |
| } |
| |
| // Check the passphrase that was provided against our local cache of the |
| // cryptographer's pending keys (which we cached during a previous |
| // OnPassphraseRequired() event). If this was unsuccessful, the UI layer can |
| // immediately call OnPassphraseRequired() again without showing the user a |
| // spinner. |
| if (!CheckPassphraseAgainstPendingKeys( |
| state_.cached_pending_keys, state_.passphrase_key_derivation_params, |
| passphrase)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| state_.engine->SetDecryptionPassphrase(passphrase); |
| |
| // Since we were able to decrypt the cached pending keys with the passphrase |
| // provided, we immediately alert the UI layer that the passphrase was |
| // accepted. This will avoid the situation where a user enters a passphrase, |
| // clicks OK, immediately reopens the advanced settings dialog, and gets an |
| // unnecessary prompt for a passphrase. |
| // Note: It is not guaranteed that the passphrase will be accepted by the |
| // syncer thread, since we could receive a new nigori node while the task is |
| // pending. This scenario is a valid race, and SetDecryptionPassphrase() can |
| // trigger a new OnPassphraseRequired() if it needs to. |
| OnPassphraseAccepted(); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| PassphraseType SyncServiceCrypto::GetPassphraseType() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| return state_.cached_passphrase_type; |
| } |
| |
| ModelTypeSet SyncServiceCrypto::GetEncryptedDataTypes() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DCHECK(state_.encrypted_types.Has(PASSWORDS)); |
| DCHECK(state_.encrypted_types.Has(WIFI_CONFIGURATIONS)); |
| // We may be called during the setup process before we're |
| // initialized. In this case, we default to the sensitive types. |
| return state_.encrypted_types; |
| } |
| |
| bool SyncServiceCrypto::HasCryptoError() const { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| // This determines whether DataTypeManager should issue crypto errors for |
| // encrypted datatypes. This may differ from whether the UI represents the |
| // error state or not. |
| |
| switch (state_.required_user_action) { |
| case RequiredUserAction::kNone: |
| return false; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption: |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnPassphraseRequired( |
| PassphraseRequiredReason reason, |
| const KeyDerivationParams& key_derivation_params, |
| const sync_pb::EncryptedData& pending_keys) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| // Update our cache of the cryptographer's pending keys. |
| state_.cached_pending_keys = pending_keys; |
| |
| // Update the key derivation params to be used. |
| state_.passphrase_key_derivation_params = key_derivation_params; |
| |
| DVLOG(1) << "Passphrase required with reason: " |
| << PassphraseRequiredReasonToString(reason); |
| |
| switch (reason) { |
| case REASON_ENCRYPTION: |
| state_.required_user_action = |
| RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption; |
| break; |
| case REASON_DECRYPTION: |
| state_.required_user_action = |
| RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| // Reconfigure without the encrypted types (excluded implicitly via the |
| // failed datatypes handler). |
| reconfigure_.Run(CONFIGURE_REASON_CRYPTO); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnPassphraseAccepted() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| // Clear our cache of the cryptographer's pending keys. |
| state_.cached_pending_keys.clear_blob(); |
| |
| // Reset |required_user_action| since we know we no longer require the |
| // passphrase. |
| state_.required_user_action = RequiredUserAction::kNone; |
| |
| // Make sure the data types that depend on the passphrase are started at |
| // this time. |
| reconfigure_.Run(CONFIGURE_REASON_CRYPTO); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| // To be on the safe since, if a passphrase is required, we avoid overriding |
| // |state_.required_user_action|. |
| if (state_.required_user_action != RequiredUserAction::kNone) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| state_.required_user_action = RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys; |
| |
| if (!state_.engine) { |
| // If SetSyncEngine() hasn't been called yet, it means |
| // OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired() was called as part of the engine's |
| // initialization. Fetching the keys is not useful right now because there |
| // is known engine to feed the keys to, so let's defer fetching until |
| // SetSyncEngine() is called. |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeys(); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnTrustedVaultKeyAccepted() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| |
| switch (state_.required_user_action) { |
| case RequiredUserAction::kNone: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption: |
| return; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| state_.required_user_action = RequiredUserAction::kNone; |
| |
| // Make sure the data types that depend on the decryption key are started at |
| // this time. |
| reconfigure_.Run(CONFIGURE_REASON_CRYPTO); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnBootstrapTokenUpdated( |
| const std::string& bootstrap_token, |
| BootstrapTokenType type) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DCHECK(sync_prefs_); |
| if (type == PASSPHRASE_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN) { |
| sync_prefs_->SetEncryptionBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token); |
| } else { |
| sync_prefs_->SetKeystoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnEncryptedTypesChanged(ModelTypeSet encrypted_types, |
| bool encrypt_everything) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| state_.encrypted_types = encrypted_types; |
| state_.encrypt_everything = encrypt_everything; |
| DVLOG(1) << "Encrypted types changed to " |
| << ModelTypeSetToString(state_.encrypted_types) |
| << " (encrypt everything is set to " |
| << (state_.encrypt_everything ? "true" : "false") << ")"; |
| DCHECK(state_.encrypted_types.Has(PASSWORDS)); |
| DCHECK(state_.encrypted_types.Has(WIFI_CONFIGURATIONS)); |
| |
| notify_observers_.Run(); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnEncryptionComplete() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DVLOG(1) << "Encryption complete"; |
| if (state_.encryption_pending && state_.encrypt_everything) { |
| state_.encryption_pending = false; |
| // This is to nudge the integration tests when encryption is |
| // finished. |
| notify_observers_.Run(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnCryptographerStateChanged( |
| Cryptographer* cryptographer, |
| bool has_pending_keys) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| // Do nothing. |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnPassphraseTypeChanged(PassphraseType type, |
| base::Time passphrase_time) { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| DVLOG(1) << "Passphrase type changed to " << PassphraseTypeToString(type); |
| state_.cached_passphrase_type = type; |
| state_.cached_explicit_passphrase_time = passphrase_time; |
| notify_observers_.Run(); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::SetSyncEngine(const CoreAccountInfo& account_info, |
| SyncEngine* engine) { |
| DCHECK(engine); |
| state_.account_info = account_info; |
| state_.engine = engine; |
| |
| // This indicates OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired() was called as part of the |
| // engine's initialization. |
| if (state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys) { |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeys(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| std::unique_ptr<SyncEncryptionHandler::Observer> |
| SyncServiceCrypto::GetEncryptionObserverProxy() { |
| DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_); |
| return std::make_unique<SyncEncryptionObserverProxy>( |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::OnTrustedVaultClientKeysChanged() { |
| switch (state_.required_user_action) { |
| case RequiredUserAction::kNone: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForDecryption: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kPassphraseRequiredForEncryption: |
| // If no trusted vault keys are required, there's nothing to do. If they |
| // later are required, a fetch will be triggered in |
| // OnTrustedVaultKeyRequired(). |
| return; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys: |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching: |
| // If there's an ongoing fetch, FetchKeys() cannot be issued immediately |
| // since that violates the function precondition. However, the in-flight |
| // FetchKeys() may end up returning stale keys, so let's make sure |
| // FetchKeys() is invoked again once it becomes possible. |
| state_.deferred_trusted_vault_fetch_keys_pending = true; |
| return; |
| case RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired: |
| state_.required_user_action = |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeys(); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::FetchTrustedVaultKeys() { |
| DCHECK(state_.engine); |
| DCHECK(state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys || |
| state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching); |
| |
| state_.deferred_trusted_vault_fetch_keys_pending = false; |
| |
| trusted_vault_client_->FetchKeys( |
| state_.account_info, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysFetchedFromClient, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), |
| /*is_second_fetch_attempt=*/false)); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysFetchedFromClient( |
| bool is_second_fetch_attempt, |
| const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>>& keys) { |
| if (state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys && |
| state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| DCHECK(state_.engine); |
| |
| if (keys.empty()) { |
| // Nothing to do if no keys have been fetched from the client (e.g. user |
| // action is required for fetching additional keys). Let's avoid unnecessary |
| // steps like marking keys as stale. |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeysCompletedButInsufficient(); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| state_.engine->AddTrustedVaultDecryptionKeys( |
| keys, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysAdded, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), is_second_fetch_attempt)); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysAdded(bool is_second_fetch_attempt) { |
| if (state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys && |
| state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Reaching this codepath indicates OnTrustedVaultKeyAccepted() was not |
| // triggered, so the fetched trusted vault keys were insufficient. Let the |
| // trusted vault client know. |
| trusted_vault_client_->MarkKeysAsStale( |
| state_.account_info, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysMarkedAsStale, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), is_second_fetch_attempt)); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysMarkedAsStale( |
| bool is_second_fetch_attempt, |
| bool result) { |
| if (state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys && |
| state_.required_user_action != |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // If nothing has changed (determined by |!result| since false negatives are |
| // disallowed by the API) or this is already a second attempt, the fetching |
| // procedure can be considered completed. |
| if (!result || is_second_fetch_attempt) { |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeysCompletedButInsufficient(); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| trusted_vault_client_->FetchKeys( |
| state_.account_info, |
| base::BindOnce(&SyncServiceCrypto::TrustedVaultKeysFetchedFromClient, |
| weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), |
| /*is_second_fetch_attempt=*/true)); |
| } |
| |
| void SyncServiceCrypto::FetchTrustedVaultKeysCompletedButInsufficient() { |
| DCHECK(state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kFetchingTrustedVaultKeys || |
| state_.required_user_action == |
| RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequiredButFetching); |
| |
| // If FetchKeys() was intended to be called during an already existing ongoing |
| // FetchKeys(), it needs to be invoked now that it's possible. |
| if (state_.deferred_trusted_vault_fetch_keys_pending) { |
| FetchTrustedVaultKeys(); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Reaching this codepath indicates OnTrustedVaultKeyAccepted() was not |
| // triggered, so the fetched trusted vault keys were insufficient. |
| state_.required_user_action = RequiredUserAction::kTrustedVaultKeyRequired; |
| |
| // Reconfigure without the encrypted types (excluded implicitly via the failed |
| // datatypes handler). |
| reconfigure_.Run(CONFIGURE_REASON_CRYPTO); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace syncer |