Inspiration

BART has a money problem. Fares brought in $243.9M in fiscal 2025 and covered 23% of operating costs, and the fiscal 2027 gap is about $375M. BART pays for every car it runs, full or empty. So we asked one question: how many cars does each station and hour actually need?

What it does

Rushover forecasts riders at all 50 BART stations, hour by hour, a week ahead, and turns that forecast into a capacity plan.

Capacity is planned as expected riders plus a safety margin. The worse the forecast, the bigger the margin has to be. We held every plan to the same standard, room for riders in 95% of station-hours in 2025, and measured how much capacity each one needs per rider:

Plan Capacity per rider
Same hour last week 1.57x
Plain timetable, set twice a year 1.39x
Best timetable, its own margin for every station and hour 1.32x
Weekly rolling rule, no machine learning 1.30x
Rushover, trained on the cost of running short 1.22x

That is 5 to 8% fewer cars than the best timetable and 10 to 12% fewer than a plain one. Using BART and FTA published figures, it is about $2.1M to $5.8M a year in electricity alone. BART's own switch to shorter trains in 2023 saved about $12M a year; this is the same lever, set for each day instead of each season. If BART keeps the same number of cars instead, overcrowded hours drop by 61 to 64%.

For the days a timetable cannot know about, such as games and concerts, a set of agents finds next week's events, and our code opens every source page before a claim is kept. No language model ever writes a rider number. It can only scale crowd curves we measured on real games, inside fixed limits.

How we built it

  • Data: every BART trip from 2021 through 2025 (222 million, by origin, destination and hour), five years of hourly weather, 757 games with start times and attendance, and BART's published timetable.
  • Forecast: five forecasters blended: gradient-boosted trees, a small transformer, deep feed-forward networks, and similar-day matching by cosine similarity. On 2025, a year the models never saw, the blend is off by 12.7%. Using the same hour last week is off by 20.1%.
  • Capacity model: gradient-boosted trees retrained with a 95th-percentile loss, so the model learns where the margin is needed instead of adding the same percentage everywhere.
  • Events: league schedule feeds and web search, three specialist agents (crowd, access, timing) running in parallel, a lead agent that checks them against measured curves, and guardrails in code.
  • Testing: no random split, because last week's counts are inputs and a random split leaks the future. Every choice was made on 2024, and 2025 was scored once.
  • Site: plain HTML, CSS and JavaScript, reading the measured results as JSON.

Challenges we ran into

  • Our first answer failed. Sizing cars from our best average forecast only tied a good timetable, 1.32 against 1.32. A forecast trained to be right on average is the wrong tool, because running short costs more than running long. Retraining on that cost is what worked.
  • Our first transformer lost to the trees (13.7% against 13.1%) until we added deeper networks and blended.
  • Of 23 corrections we tested for things like conventions, gas prices and festivals, 20 did nothing or hurt.
  • The search agent once invented a link to a page that did not exist. Now our code opens every page.
  • We assumed nobody rides after midnight. Nine million trip rows showed 31% of concert riders leave in the midnight hour, so we threw out our own "stranded riders" estimate.

Accomplishments that we're proud of

  • An independent re-check of our own work reproduced every capacity number exactly and found no leakage. It also found a stronger plain rule than ours, a weekly rolling one. We added it to the results: Rushover still needs 4 to 6% fewer cars.
  • The event layer cut the busiest-hour error on Giants game days at Embarcadero from 17.2% to 9.6%.
  • With football data hidden, the agents reasoning from baseball alone cut the error on Cal football games from 34.3% to 23.5%.
  • Given only a date, a station and an hour, the search agents found the cause of 18 of 24 real 2025 surges, each with a page that opened.

What we learned

  • Train on what the decision costs, not on average error.
  • Build the strongest simple baseline you can before claiming a win. Ours beat our first model.
  • A language model is useful for finding and reading, and should not be trusted with a number.

What's next for Rushover

  • Train loads. We see gate entries and exits, not how full each train is between stations. BART has that data.
  • Live counts, so the forecast checks itself every day. BART has not published hourly data for 2026 yet, so everything here is tested on 2025.
  • A weather forecast in place of the weather that actually happened, which is what the models are given today.
  • Car wear and maintenance costs, so the saving is more than an electricity floor.
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