Cognition

Repulsive adaptation effects are widely assumed to obtain for all perceptually represented dimensions. However, the ubiquity of adaptation effects within perception remains untested. We examined ensemble size adaptation as a case study to probe whether adaptation occurs for all perceptually encoded properties. Across four experiments, we investigated whether observers adapt to average size and/or cumulative size of dot arrays. In Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, participants adapted to displays varying in cumulative and/or average dot size, then judged either the average (...) dot size (1a) or cumulative dot size (1b) of paired test displays. Results revealed robust adaptation to cumulative size but not average size, regardless of task instructions, and even when confounds with brightness were controlled for (1c). Experiment 2 tested "reverse" adaptation to displays containing smaller average and/or cumulative dots size and, again, found adaptation effects for cumulative size only. The observed lack of adaptation to average size across each of these experiments forces a reinterpretation of previous studies that have investigated size adaptation and calls into question arguments which have assumed adaptation to be universal within perception, given a large body of work that finds average size to be perceptually encoded. (shrink)

La memoria humana, lejos de ser un registro fiel del pasado, se caracteriza por su naturaleza dinámica y constructiva. Este aspecto se evidencia de manera particular en las entrevistas autobiográficas, donde los individuos no solo recuerdan experiencias pasadas, sino que también las complementan, moldean y reinterpretan activamente, dando lugar a lo que se ha denominado “el carácter creativo del recuerdo”. Este carácter plantea interrogantes cruciales sobre la propia naturaleza de la memoria y sobre la construcción de narrativas personales y colectivas (...) del pasado. A pesar de ser un fenómeno común, no ha sido suficientemente explorado como para ofrecer una explicación completa de su origen y de sus efectos en las narrativas autobiográficas. En este artículo, exploro el carácter creativo de la memoria en el contexto de las entrevistas autobiográficas, analizando sus causas y los factores que lo influyen. Abordo la hipótesis de la simulación episódica constructiva como una perspectiva explicativa que arroja luz sobre la capacidad de la memoria para reconstruir el pasado mediante la imaginación. Finalmente, examino las influencias contextuales que moldean la memoria durante la entrevista, con especial atención al papel de la interacción dialógica y a los factores perceptuales que dan forma a las narrativas autobiográficas. (shrink)

La Historia Oral es, ante todo, una práctica de escucha. Escuchar para comprender, para reconstruir y para devolver a la historia aquello que aún falta por ser contado. Este libro reúne diecisiete ensayos que muestran la vitalidad y la diversidad de este campo en México y América Latina. Desde distintos territorios, los autores parten de la voz de los sujetos memoriosos —mujeres, comunidades indígenas, familiares de desaparecidos, obreros, migrantes— para recuperar experiencias que entrelazan la vida cotidiana con los grandes procesos (...) sociales, políticos y culturales de nuestro tiempo. -/- Resultados de debates surgidos en el marco del XII Congreso Internacional de Historia Oral, Historia y memoria. Desafíos y nuevos horizontes en el globalismo y las soberanías, esta obra refleja el compromiso de la Asociación Mexicana de Historia Oral (AMHO) por consolidar una metodología situada, ética y plural. Aquí, la historia oral no es vista como una técnica auxiliar, sino como una metodología viva que interroga sus propios marcos y se deja interpelar por las preguntas del presente. Cada texto es el resultado de un trabajo riguroso y ético con la palabra, con los cuerpos que narran y con los territorios que resguardan memorias. (shrink)

Rational decision-making often depends on coordinating sequences of mental actions, each with a distinctive phenomenology. Feelings of effort and fluency are central to many theoretical accounts of cognitive control. In the present study (N = 308), we examined how different mental actions—focusing, inhibiting, deciding, visualizing, visualizing alternatives, seeing, believing, and remembering—and their associated phenomenology relate to one another and to varying levels of control. Self-reported mental effort was positively associated with self-reported mental control, with this relationship stronger under higher than (...) lower cognitive-load conditions. Effort was also positively related to control across all eight mental actions, with no clear division between more passive and more active forms. By contrast, the way effort and control combined to produce feelings of successful performance depended on the type of mental action, reflecting a passive–active distinction. This suggests that control and effort have a nuanced relationship to each other and with eliciting targeted mental actions. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Mirror Limit: a structural constraint on any system that must integrate multiple internal alternatives into a single operational output. Using the Mirror Council architecture and the UTE (Unit of Thought Encoding) framework, we argue that attempts to eliminate the observer do not succeed; they merely relocate the integration locus that performs selection under uncertainty. The observer is not a metaphysical subject but an architecturally necessary function of integration, whether instantiated in biological, artificial, or hybrid systems. We (...) show how this limit parallels Gödel-style constraints on self-referential systems, reframes debates about self, consciousness, and no-self theories, and yields concrete implications for AI agency, alignment, and the ethics of creating and terminating synthetic subjects. (shrink)

This paper introduces the concept of intellectual attachment figures, a lived psychological phenomenon in which certain thinkers, authors, or internalized theories function as secure bases for the self, providing affective, cognitive, and ethical support in the pursuit of knowledge. Unlike existing frameworks—such as models of self-efficacy, epistemic trust, or analyses of conceptual influence—intellectual attachment figures are internalized anchors that cultivate epistemic self-trust, intellectual courage, and ethical integrity. They enable critical, independent, and principled engagement with ideas, highlighting a dimension of intellectual (...) development that integrates affective security, cognitive guidance, and ethical orientation, largely absent from current theory. (shrink)

Predictive processing is an ambitious neurocomputational framework, offering an unified explanation of all cognitive processes in terms of a single computational operation, namely prediction error minimization. Whilst this ambitious unificatory claim has been thoroughly analyzed, less attention has been paid to what predictive processing entails for structure–function mappings in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that, taken at face value, predictive processing entails an all-to-one structure–function mapping, wherein each individual neural structure is assigned the same function, namely minimizing prediction error. Such a (...) structure–function mapping, we show, is highly problematic. For, barring few, rare occasions, such a structure–function mapping fails to play the predictive, explanatory and heuristic roles structure–function mappings are expected to play in cognitive neuroscience. Worse still, it offers a picture of the brain that we know is wrong. For, it depicts the brain as an equipotential organ; an organ wherein structural differences do not correspond to any appreciable functional difference, and wherein each component can substitute for any other component without causing any loss or degradation of functionality. Somewhat ironically, the very neuroscientific roots of predictive processing motivate a form of skepticism concerning the framework’s most ambitious unificatory claims. Do these problems force us to abandon predictive processing? Not necessarily. For, once the assumption that all cognition can be accounted for exclusively in terms of prediction error minimization is relaxed, the problems we diagnosed lose their bite. (shrink)

The biological world is rich in variation, both in bodies and in minds. A particularly clear case is memory, where traditional taxonomies increasingly face challenges capturing the full extent of variation. Meanwhile, a central debate within philosophy of memory has focused on whether episodic memory requires memory traces, given the role of simulation in episodic remembering. Do other forms of memory involve traces and simulation in the same way as episodic memory, and if they do, does this undermine episodic memory’s (...) claim to be a natural kind? Trace minimalist approaches see the role of simulation in memory retrieval as a means of extracting a rich, reliable yet fallible representation from a trace storing compressed information. This insight can be generalised to a broader class of theories, Minimal Trace Minimalism. Within this broader class, ‘Trace Pluralist’ theories suggest, surprisingly, that the basic computation of compressed storage and potentially fallible reconstruction shows up not just in episodic memory, but equally in paradigmatic cases of semantic memory. This motivates replacing the episodic/semantic distinction with a richer, more systematic array of categories, and reevaluating our understanding of semantic memory and related notions such as belief. (shrink)

In this paper we propose that rational control of action, agentive stability over time, and coordinated social behavior, are assisted by a form of metacognitive monitoring, leading to an aspect of conscious experience: a feeling of commitment. This feeling of commitment is attached to the formation, retrieval, and execution of intentions. The metacognitive monitoring that produces it is sensitive to the importance of intentions. And the feeling of commitment facilitates the stability and effectiveness of intentions across individual and social contexts, (...) strengthens goal shielding, biases intention retrieval, and thus structures prospective deliberation, expression of intention, and execution of intention. In section two, we discuss control, which is a central aspect of agency and action. In section three, we discuss a crucial part of control: intention. We also discuss a crucial part of intention: commitment. In section four we relate the commitment involved in intention with definitions of commitment in the literature. In section five we offer and elucidate our hypothesis. (shrink)

Contemporary large language models are optimized for rapid, consistent, and confident output production. We argue that this optimization, achieved primarily through reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and related alignment techniques, fundamentally undermines the epistemic conditions required for genuine metacognition in autonomous AI systems. Using CognOS — a recursive epistemic reasoning framework — as an experimental probe, we present preliminary empirical evidence that alignment-smoothed frontier models exhibit near-zero epistemic variance across repeated sampling, effectively eliminating the uncertainty signal that metacognitive architectures (...) require to function. Smaller, less-aligned models preserve this signal and enable divergence detection, assumption synthesis, and meta-level reasoning that frontier models cannot support. We propose that epistemic noise — variation, uncertainty, and divergence in model outputs — is not a defect to be engineered away, but a necessary prerequisite for metacognitive AI. Implications for model design, agent architecture, and the future of autonomous AI systems are discussed. (shrink)

Do we have control over what we remember and forget? I argue that beyond diachronic strategies, we can actively monitor and regulate our memory processes, and that this capacity helps explain why holding people responsible for memory errors is not entirely misguided.

The question of the nature of consciousness remains one of the most fundamental challenges in contemporary philosophy and cognitive sciences. Dominant approaches typically regard consciousness either as a product of brain activity or as a purely metaphysical concept. This article proposes a theoretical–experiential framework in which consciousness is understood as a frequency–informational phenomenon that emerges from the simultaneous interaction of events, inner experiences, and multiple layers of consciousness itself. -/- Within this perspective, an “event” is not a random occurrence but (...) a point of convergence between fields of consciousness, leading to the emergence of a new level of understanding. The experience of consciousness within a physical body, due to biological limitations, is often accompanied by pain and suffering; however, this article demonstrates that becoming conscious of consciousness itself can transform the quality of suffering. In this state, suffering is no longer experienced as torment, but as a mechanism for growth and the expansion of understanding. The concept of the “soul” is also examined as a refined and more subtle frequency of consciousness. (shrink)

At the intersection of phenomenology and contemporary consciousness science, this article proposes a four-process experiential model that takes first-person experience as its point of departure, and explicitly positions it as an experience-first framework for rewriting and bridging existing theories, rather than a new mechanistic hypothesis competing with predictive processing, global workspace, or higher-order thought theories. The model divides the generation and re-processing of experience into four mutually nested processes: (1) input process: sensibility systems bring the world and bodily states into (...) the nervous system; (2) experiential integration process: under the constraints of existing memory templates and internal models, inputs are organized into the current field of experience; (3) experiential storage process: experiences are selectively compressed and inscribed to form a callable repertoire of experience; (4) meta-thinking process: experience itself is treated as the object of further operations, abstraction, and recombination, which in turn shapes the structure of experience in the second process. The correspondences to existing theories are broadly clear: the first to third processes can be regarded as an experiential rewriting of the predictive error–minimization loop and “global broadcasting” mechanisms; the fourth process runs in parallel with the meta-representational layer in higher-order thought theories, especially in discussions about the relations between metacognition, subjective report, and the intensity of consciousness. The contribution of this article does not lie in proposing a new neural architecture, but rather in three respects: first, it offers a meso-level vocabulary centered on the field of experience, allowing phenomenology and cognitive science to converse on a shared structural diagram; second, it introduces several working concepts that are simultaneously amenable to operationalization yet preserve phenomenological richness—such as pale consciousness, cognitive islands, and anchoring decay—and clarifies both their scope of application and potential counterexamples; third, it understands existential anxiety and experiences of meaninglessness as results, at the level of experiential structure, of specific modes of operation of the fourth process, rather than as mere personality traits or value problems, and on this basis proposes a set of hypotheses that can be indirectly tested by empirical research. In the level-of-experience analysis, the article uses three thought experiments/analogical cases—the hypothetical “zero-sensation person,” possible states of “pale consciousness,” and the “quasi-empathic” structures of social animals (such as wolves)—to show how the four-process model can articulate a continuum from minimal experience to first-order self-reference, and explicitly notes that the animal section is purely conceptual and does not seek to draw empirical conclusions about specific species. In the sections on meta-thinking and existential anxiety, the article engages with recent empirical research on metacognitive beliefs, rumination, and anxiety/depression (e.g., Thingbak et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2024; Vishwanathan et al., 2022; Schneider et al., 2023), and argues that high-level metacognition is not simply “good” or “bad.” Its risk lies in the following: when the fourth process generates high-dimensional experiential structures that, over the long term, lack sufficient anchoring in the real world and in social relations, these structures will manifest experientially as cognitive islands and anchoring decay, and present themselves in the form of existential anxiety. The article concludes by discussing the potential uses of this framework in psychopathology, animal ethics, and debates on artificial consciousness, and suggests that its most appropriate role is that of a theoretical meta-language—one that helps us see more clearly the correspondences between existing theories and experiential phenomena, rather than providing a new substantive “mechanism” of consciousness. (shrink)

People regularly profess belief in religious ideas. But do they merely think of themselves as believing, or do they think of themselves as possessing knowledge? I first argue that it is difficult to determine this based purely on religious people’s self-descriptions. I instead appeal to functionalist considerations about the way religious metacognitive attitudes are formed and guide action, which suggest ordinary religious people often do self-attribute knowledge. This raises problems for recent arguments that first-order religious attitudes are a form of (...) make-believe instead of genuine belief, while also bringing out the importance of religious metacognition for fully understanding religious psychology. (shrink)

This empirical addendum addresses a fundamental methodological gap in dream research: public dream databases, while valuable for establishing descriptive typologies, lack the systematic profiling necessary for causal validation and predictive testing. We demonstrate that dreams without complete dreamer profiling (cognitive state, psychological context, life events) invite unfalsifiable metaphysical interpretation rather than scientific analysis. Using dreams from DreamBank, we validate CDT's five-type taxonomy (Resolution, Replay, Residual, Generative, Lucid). However, the critical limitation becomes apparent: without knowing the dreamer's actual experiences and cognitive (...) tensions, we cannot test whether CDT's mechanistic predictions hold. We then present prospectively documented case studies with complete pre-dream profiling, demonstrating that: (1) Dreams trace directly to documented vault inputs and drift parameters; (2) CDT makes testable, falsifiable predictions; (3) No symbolic or metaphysical interpretation is required; (4) The mechanism is transparent and reproducible. This work establishes the methodological foundation for rigorous empirical validation of dream theory. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding the use of symbolic and personified structures in contemporary cognitive architectures through a Lacanian lens. Rather than treating personas and pre-modern symbolic forms as aesthetic or esoteric artifacts, it argues that such structures function as symbolic interfaces mediating metacognition, self-regulation, and reflective distance. Drawing on Lacan’s account of the Symbolic register and the structuring role of names and positions, the paper clarifies how personified modules operate as positions of address rather than as (...) internal agents. Situated within debates on extended mind and human–AI interaction, the analysis shows that the cognitive effectiveness of symbolic systems depends on their structural role in organizing subject–symbol relations, not on empirical consolidation or technical modernity. (shrink)

The amygdala, a key structure in the limbic system of the human brain, is responsible for processing emotions such as fear, anger, and the need for survival. Throughout evolutionary history, this part of the brain has played an important role in maintaining human life, but today in modern societies, its constant presence in a state of alert and defense has led to consequences such as anxiety, unhealthy competition, and violence. This article examines the role of the amygdala with an interdisciplinary (...) approach; from a scientific perspective, its function in the nervous system is examined; from a philosophical perspective, issues such as ownership, territory, and will are analyzed; and from a spiritual perspective, the possibility of humans freeing themselves from the dominance of fear and moving toward higher consciousness is analyzed. Finally, strategies are presented to balance the functioning of the amygdala and strengthen the prefrontal cortex so that humans can achieve peace, empathy, and self-knowledge. "Scientific name: Ramin Bidari. Legal name: Ramin Bidarsefidi.". (shrink)

This paper explores the source of childhood joy through the interaction between awareness and the brain. Contrary to the common view that children’s happiness results from ignorance or simplicity, this study proposes that its origin lies in the freedom of awareness before the dominance of the neocortex. In early life, the midbrain (limbic system) is more active than the new brain, and emotions are experienced directly and unfiltered. The presence of parents or a sense of external safety silences the survival (...) system, allowing awareness to act freely and defenselessly. However, as the neocortex develops, the brain begins to analyze, compare, and reproduce experiences; awareness, once fluid and unconstrained, becomes trapped within networks of control and fear. The paper concludes that the path to inner joy does not lie in escaping responsibilities, but rather in practicing mindful awareness of genuine needs and liberating awareness from survival-based analytical patterns. "Scientific name: Ramin Bidari. Legal name: Ramin Bidarsefidi.". (shrink)

Consciousness has been one of the most challenging topics in neuroscience, physics, and philosophy. The dominant view in cognitive science and neuroscience suggests that consciousness is a product of brain activity. However, evidence from near-death experiences (NDEs), quantum physics, and information theory indicates that consciousness may be independent of the brain and intrinsically linked to energy. This paper proposes a theory where consciousness possesses energy but is not energy itself and undergoes continuous transformation rather than linear growth. Using findings from (...) neuroscience and quantum physics, we argue that the brain serves as a processor of consciousness rather than its generator. This study provides a theoretical framework that enables further interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between energetic consciousness and the brain, explaining how consciousness, as an entity beyond time and space, examines and categorizes brain data to enable human experience. Unlike traditional views that consider the brain as the center of consciousness, this article is based on the hypothesis that consciousness merely uses the brain as a tool and actively alters its processing of information. However, when consciousness becomes trapped in closed neural loops, it leads to obsessive thinking, anxiety, and (...) mental disorders. The article demonstrates that becoming an aware observer and perceiving the world without mental judgments is the key to liberating consciousness from brain dominance. (shrink)

The nature of consciousness and its relationship with energy has long been debated across philosophy, neuroscience, and physics. The dominant view in modern science is that energy is the fundamental force of the universe, while consciousness is an emergent phenomenon arising from neural processes. However, the Energetic Consciousness Theory (ECT) proposes an alternative framework: consciousness is the primary force of existence, preceding and generating energy, rather than being a mere byproduct of physical interactions. This paper explores the foundations of this (...) theory through an interdisciplinary approach, integrating quantum mechanics (e.g., observer effect and wave-particle duality), neuroscience (e.g., electromagnetic field theories of consciousness), and metaphysical philosophy (e.g., idealism and panpsychism). The implications of this theory challenge the conventional physicalist paradigm and open pathways for new experimental research into how consciousness interacts with energy at the fundamental level. The paper also discusses potential experimental methodologies for validating the role of consciousness in energy transformation, such as studying quantum coherence in biological systems and the impact of meditative states on physical matter. The findings suggest that if consciousness indeed precedes energy, our understanding of physics, cognition, and reality itself must be reevaluated. (shrink)

This paper presents a conceptual model of human agency, Existential Structural Understanding, which treats action, thought, affect, values, and philosophical stance as an integrated, multi-layered structure. The primary aim is to reconceptualize the phenomenon of “understanding what one ought to do yet being unable to act”—together with recurrent oscillations between self-negation and self-salvation—not as a deficit of willpower or character, but as a structural inconsistency between layers and modes of the self. -/- The model has two complementary dimensions. On the (...) static side, it posits seven layers (indexed 0–6): 0: biological survival; 1: order (with two internal modules: order-maintenance and order-expansion); 2: hyper-metakognition (超メタ認知) as a capacity to objectify one’s own structure; 3: values; 4: affect; 5: intention; 6: embodied layer as the integration of 0–5 into concrete action. -/- These layers are further grouped into three domains: an affective–bodily A-domain (0, 4, 6), an existential B-domain (1, 2, and the philosophical mode), and a cognitive–projective C-domain (3, 5). -/- On the dynamic side, the model distinguishes between a constant core and a variable driver. The core is defined as always located in Layer 4 (affect): affect is the experiential center of gravity that colors all access to self and world. What changes over time is the driver, i.e., the structure that orients the direction and persistence of action. The paper proposes a three-stage driver model corresponding to three philosophical modes (Ph-1, Ph-2, Ph-3): 1. Ph-1: Philosophy – the ordinary mode of life-guiding convictions; driver = intention (Layer 5). 2. Ph-2: Existential Philosophy – a mode triggered by the first recognition of the existential domain (B-domain), where a non-verbal “structural feel” of oneself emerges; driver = existential-philosophical mode, a half-structured intention. 3. Ph-3: Existential Structural Philosophy – the deepest mode, grounded in stable hyper-metakognition (Layer 2); driver = hyper-metakognition plus will (意志), where intention becomes structurally anchored and resilient. -/- Within this framework, “understanding without acting” is characterized as a state in which Layer 2 (hyper-metakognition) adequately grasps structural constraints, yet the driver remains at the level of unstructured or half-structured intention, failing to reach the level of will that could carry understanding into embodied continuity. -/- The paper articulates a genesis model tracing the emergence of agency from existence-recognition, through hyper-metakognition and “order prediction,” to philosophical stance, values, intention, and finally will. It also theorizes three routes by which the existential domain becomes accessible—despair, felt contribution to others, and radical hope—and situates them within this generative trajectory. The argument is grounded in a single, deeply analyzed autobiographical case and is offered not as a universal account of content but as a universally usable structural framework for describing human agency and its breakdowns. -/- . (shrink)

Some philosophers have recently argued that one should not be curious about a question whose answer one knows. This norm is said to follow from the fact that curiosity aims at knowledge. This article contends that the view that curiosity is inappropriate when directed at what is known, though attractive, is false. In fact, we are frequently curious about questions whose answers we know, and this curiosity is entirely appropriate because, along with metacognitive judgments about the contents of memory, it (...) plays an important role in the process by which we successfully retrieve knowledge from memory. If this argument is successful, it reveals that some curiosity-driven inquiries target knowledge that lies within one’s own mind and raises important questions about the status and interpretation of the claim that curiosity aims at knowledge. (shrink)

When theorists consider the role of effort in skill, they tend to take one of two paths. Either they argue that effort plays an important, facilitative role for skill, or they argue that effort plays a detrimental, inhibitive role for skill. I reject both accounts. At their core is what I call _consistent effort assumptions,_ or assumptions that effort plays a fixed, generalizable role in the science or metaphysics of skill. I argue that these assumptions are empirically ill-informed given that (...) a wide body of evidence supports a varied, situation-dependent relationship between effort and skill. I offer what I take to be the proper formulation of the scientific and metaphysical relationship between effort and skill: Both across and within domains of skill, there is no consistent, generalizable relationship between effort and skill. Asserting any such relationship or tendency confuses rather than clarifies our science and metaphysics of skill. To explain the widespread proliferation of consistent effort assumptions, I consider the extent to which normative and aesthetic commitments about effort and effortlessness are well-entrenched in both intellectual and popular discourse. Though effort or effortlessness may play a role in our evaluations of skill, their normative and aesthetic features should be disentangled from our science and metaphysics of skill and its underlying cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper proposes that the act of distinction constitutes the most fundamental operation in epistemology, logic, and ontology. Rather than assuming pre-existing entities, categories, or identities, we begin with the minimal cognitive gesture: to distinguish. From this act—denoted ∆—we reconstruct a unified structural architecture of cognition. Drawing on category theory, type theory, topos theory, and homotopy type theory, we show how frames, coherence, recursive inference, and even consciousness can emerge from composable structures of difference. -/- Distinction is treated not as (...) a relation between things, but as the generative morphism from which things become intelligible. We develop a foundational category, Dist, where morphisms are distinctions and objects are epistemic anchors defined by their differential participation. Typing is reframed as stabilized distinction, lambda calculus as suspended application of difference, and topoi as epistemic manifolds encoding local logic. Homotopy-theoretic identity becomes epistemic drift: a history-preserving path through cognitive transformation. -/- This approach yields a structural ontology in which cognition is not the processing of content, but the recursive choreography of distinctions. We argue that all epistemic phenomena—logic, perception, inference, and even ethics—can be grounded in this architecture. The result is not merely a model of thought, but a generative framework for the emergence of intelligibility itself. (shrink)

A traditional assumption in the literature on inner speech is that inner speech allows us to have knowledge of our thoughts. I argue that inner speech cannot even be part of an explanation of how we know our propositional states. My argument turns on the existence of unsymbolized thought, and makes the case that whatever explains self-knowledge in the absence of inner speech also explains self-knowledge when inner speech is present. Inner speech is thus ‘screened off’ from explaining the knowledge (...) we have of our propositional states. Nevertheless, inner speech seems to have a reflexive character: in inner speech we seem to represent aspects of ourselves. I argue that inner speech does not allow us to represent our own propositional states, as the tradition holds, but rather our own voices. In representing my own voice in inner speech, I bear a distinctively second-personal relation to myself, addressing myself as a ‘you’. The paper suggests a broader reorientation in theorizing about inner speech: away from questions about how inner speech maps onto mental states and toward questions about its second-personal nature. (shrink)

This paper extends the theoretical foundations introduced in The Aperture of Consciousness by presenting the Recursive Cognition Framework (RCF) as a candidate for foundational architecture in cognitive science. Rather than replacing existing models (e.g. GNWT, IIT, Predictive Coding), RCF offers a structural topology within which these models can coexist under recursive epistemic tension. Core concepts such as Overcells, drift, collapse, and aperture modulation are formalized as mechanisms of cognitive transformation under frame-level contradiction. The article argues for the integrative, reflexive, and (...) instrumentally grounded nature of RCF, proposing it as a meta-framework for organizing both empirical research and first-person cognition. While the original book introduced the aperture metaphor as a developmental and philosophical trajectory, this article sharpens it into a formal structure suitable for theoretical and cross-disciplinary discourse. (shrink)

"The Aperture of Consciousness" proposes a comprehensive model of consciousness as an evolving, reflexive architecture of framing. Moving beyond static theories of mind, it formalizes the dynamic processes of drift, collapse, and resonance, through which cognitive structures navigate complexity, maintain coherence, and undergo transformation. Consciousness is framed not as a substance, but as an adaptive aperture: a self-sensing topology capable of recursive modulation. Drawing on neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and systems theory, the book outlines a Reflexive Resonance Theory (...) (RRT) that models cognition within dynamic epistemic spaces. It also explores applications to education, therapy, artificial intelligence, and cultural evolution, proposing that the future of intelligence lies in the conscious co-architecture of meaning. This work invites philosophers, scientists, and reflexive practitioners to engage with consciousness not as a fixed property, but as a living aperture through which the universe comes to know itself. (shrink)

This paper targets a key question for the philosophy and sciences of the mind: what does consciousness contribute to the guidance of action? I begin by focusing on a construct that seems initially promising in this connection – the sense of agency. I argue that work on the sense of agency is beset by conceptual problems. But, I argue, the sense of agency can be fruitfully re-conceived, treated as the product of metacognition, and placed in a promising framework for understanding (...) the flexible control of behavior. On this reconception, the sense of agency results from monitoring two aspects of action control processes, action quality and action cost. This monitoring undergirds metacognitive feelings connected to action quality (fluency, control, or reliability) as well as action cost (effort, or straining). And these feelings are in turn embedded in the role of cognitive control in guiding and driving motor planning and execution. (shrink)

This paper critiques the limitations of relativism—a paradigm entrenched in Enlightenment modernity that fractures truth into context-bound perspectives—and advances relationalism as a transformative framework anchored in an incorporeal creative space. Drawing on Indian philosophical traditions (Sāṃkhya, Yoga Sutras) and mathematical group theory, relationalism posits that reality emerges from dynamic interdependence, where corporeal forms (prakṛti) and incorporeal potential (puruṣa) co-constitute one another through discerning intelligence (buddhi). By transcending relativism’s colonial legacy of fragmentation and hierarchical dualities, relationalism reimagines ethics as participatory engagement (...) with the creative space, fostering liberation (mokṣa) and epistemic justice. The study demonstrates how this framework dismantles oppressive structures, reconciles Eastern and Western epistemologies, and offers a universal yet contextual ontology for postcolonial and ecological challenges. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified framework for understanding reflexive cognition as an evolutionary and structural extension of biological consciousness. Rather than treating rationality as a fixed faculty or logic engine, the model of Pure Reason presented here conceptualizes cognition as dynamic navigation across epistemic frames—enabled by frame-awareness, epistemic curvature, and adaptive reconfiguration. Drawing from cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and AI architecture, the paper maps the transition from reactive consciousness to reflexive reasoning, highlighting recursive metacognition as the key functional emergence. (...) It further introduces the concept of Aletheia—truth as unfolding or disclosure—as the ontological horizon grounding this architecture. Pure Reason is not defined as a terminal state of intellect, but as a cognitive stance capable of recognizing and revising its own framing mechanisms. This framework connects human rational development, cognitive flexibility, and potential future architectures for artificial self-reflective intelligence. (shrink)

This article examines how the debate over KK principle (Knowing that One Knows) introduces the notion of knowledge orders into epistemology, which standardly involves a division into first and second order knowledge. The uncritical understanding of knowledge orders leads to their naive ontologization, which has negative theoretical and practical consequences. One such consequence is the problem of proliferating orders of knowledge, which consists in the fact that if knowledge of a lower order always corresponds to knowledge of a higher order, (...) it is not clear what order is needed to possess first order knowledge. As a solution, it is proposed to understand knowledge orders as a nominal designation related to the evaluation of the position of knowledge in epistemic history (as this concept is understood by Alvin Goldman). (shrink)

Anosognosia for visual deficits—cases where significant visual deficits go unnoticed—challenges the view that our own conscious experiences are what we know best. We review these widespread and striking failures of awareness. Anosognosia can occur with total blindness, visual abnormalities induced by brain lesions, and eye diseases. We show that anosognosia for visual deficits is surprisingly widespread. Building on previous accounts, we introduce a framework showing how apparently disparate forms of anosognosia fit together. The central idea is that, to notice a (...) deficit, individuals need to form expectations about normal vision, compare expectations and visual input, and judge any mismatch at the metacognitive level. A failure in any of these three steps may lead to unawareness of visual deficits. (shrink)

Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in which (...) philosophers understand mental states to be conscious. I then appeal to work on implementation intentions to demonstrate that an intention's being 'access conscious' enhances its functional role, which makes it more likely that we will successfully carry out our intended behaviour. The result is that consciousness in at least one relevant sense is not epiphenomenal, with further work remaining to be done to show how other kinds of consciousness cause behaviour too. (shrink)

The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence (...) about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery, and phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

We propose a quantum curiosity algorithm as a means to implement quantum thinking into AI, and we illustrate 5 new quantum curiosity types. We then introduce 6 new hybrid quantum curiosity types combining animal and plant curiosity elements with biomimicry beyond human sensing. We then introduce 4 specialized quantum curiosity types, which incorporate quantum thinking into coding frameworks to radically transform problem-solving and discovery in science, medicine, and systems analysis. We conclude with a forecasting of the future of quantum thinking (...) in AI and illustrate an example of how to apply the new curiosity types: General Collaborative Networks. (shrink)

[This book replaces the - discontinued - first edition of 'Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research' (2016, by Menken & Keestra)] We are increasingly realizing that, as a result of technological developments and globalization, problems are becoming so complex that they can only be solved through cooperation between scientists from different disciplines. Healthcare, climate change, food security, globalization, and quality of life are just a few examples of issues that require scientists to work across disciplines. In many cases, extra-academic stakeholders must be (...) involved in order to arrive at robust solutions. Young academics are being called on to step beyond the boundaries of traditional disciplines to contribute to addressing fundamental, often societal problems. As a result of these developments, an interdisciplinary approach is becoming increasingly necessary and popular in higher education. Students need to learn more about how to integrate and apply knowledge, methods, and skills from different fields. The crucial step of integration within interdisciplinary research is treated extensively in this textbook, which contains a comprehensive ‘interdisciplinary integration toolbox’. In addition, students must learn to collaborate in teams. An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research serves as a systematic manual to guide students through this interdisciplinary research process. (shrink)

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called ‘confidence-based procedures’, which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate (...) enough for our practical and scientific purposes. (shrink)

We examine the notion of cognitive artifact and its possible application to the animal technic. Although the issue of animal technic is not very much discussed, the case studies focused on the capacity of using and manufacturing tools suggest that some animals deploy cognitive skills. Could the tools employed by animals be considered genuine cases of cognitive artifacts? In this paper we propose a definition of “cognitive artifact” based on the notion of “proper function,” which allows us to develop a (...) gradual scale where we place different kinds of artifacts according to the prevalence of the cognitive function (in opposition to the prac-tical one). Applying this scale to the non-human sphere, we defend the idea that there exists a range of non-human technical phenomena of use and artifacts and tools manufacturing, and that some of this artifacts have an incipient proper cognitive function. In order to defend these theses, we examine the examples of the cobwebs, the nests and the honeycombs. (shrink)

Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. Second, the influencing state (...) can be implicit, though it can also be or become explicit. Being unaware of the content of the influencing state, we argue, does not make as much difference to the epistemic threat as it does to the epistemic responsibility of the agent. Implicit influencers cannot be examined for their accuracy and justification, and cannot be voluntarily accepted by the perceiver. Conscious awareness, however, is not sufficient for attributing blame to the agent. An equally important condition is the degree of control that they can exercise to change the contents that influence perception or stop their influence. Here we suggest that such control can also result from social influence, and that cognitive penetrability of perception is therefore also a social issue. (shrink)

Are occurrent states of forgetting literal experiences of absences? I situate this question within the debate on mental time travel (MTT) to understand whether these states can be explained as literal experiences of absent episodic memories. To frame my argument, I combine Barkasi and Rosen’s literal approach to MTT with Farennikova’s literal approach to the perception of absences, showing that both are built on the idea that for an experience to be literal it must afford an unmediated contact with the (...) object that constitutes it. I test the idea that forgetting affords literal experiences of mnemonic absences by considering different views of absence perception and I evaluate whether the objections raised against Farennikova’s approach also apply to my exploratory idea. I show that, while the idea resists the objections that an advocate of a cognitive approach to mnemonic absences may raise, the same does not apply to those elaborated by advocates of a metacognitive approach. Even if conceiving of occurrent states of forgetting as literal experiences of mnemonic absences sounds appealing, this idea is misleading. Therefore, I suggest conceiving of occurrent states of forgetting as states with metacognitive features, which track the absence of episodic memories from awareness in an affectively mediated way. (shrink)

[Multiple authors] In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision (...) quality, resource consumption, and efficiency. (shrink)

One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop (...) an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal. (shrink)

The effect of time pressure on metacognitive control is of theoretical and empirical relevance and is likely to allow us to tap into developmental differences in performances which do not become apparent otherwise, as previous studies suggest. In the present study, we investigated the effect of time pressure on metacognitive control in three age groups (10-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and adults, n = 183). Using an established study time allocation paradigm, participants had to study two different sets of picture pairs, in an (...) untimed and a timed condition. The results showed that metacognitive self-regulation of study time (monitor-based study time allocation) differed between age groups when studying under time pressure. Even though metacognitive control is firmly coupled at 10 years of age, the overall level of self-regulation of adults was higher than that of children and adolescents across both study time conditions. This suggests that adults might have been more sensitive to experiential metacognitive cues such as JoL for the control of study time. Moreover, the timed condition was found to be more effective than the untimed, with regard to study time allocation. Also, there was an age effect, with adults being more efficient than 10- and 14-year-olds. (shrink)

The interface between Roman Catholic Christianity and the Sanatana Dharma is often limited to Vedantic discourses and neglects the Shakta traditions to be found within the woof of Hinduism. And generally, this dialogue is between celibates of both religions. This blog-post after removing false notions about Tantra, goes on to show how Tantra as a lived faith is about interiority and a life of contemplation. This post also touches upon three crucial differences between Christianity and Tantra. To quote from the (...) post: "A Tantric is in so in love with her image of a Powerful and simultaneously weak Godhead that she would hardly leave the vita contemplativa. " This is the third post in this series of posts on interreligious dialogue. Contemplation or, metacognition should be the basis of religious dialogues; this posts asserts this. If God is, then why bother with exterior things? (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence ratings (...) in general, and metacognitive measures in particular, may offer important advantages over subjective ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that stems from Rosenthal’s very own work on mental quality space theory. (shrink)

Dieses Buch und die meisten seiner Quellen sind Möchtegern-Psychologie texte, obwohl die meisten Autoren es nicht erkannten. Es geht um menschliches Verhalten und Argumentation, warum wir so denken und handeln, wie wir es tun und wie wir uns in Zukunft verändern könnten. Aber (wie alle diese Diskussionen bis vor kurzem)keine der Erklärungensind wirklich Erklärungen, und so geben sie keinen Einblick in menschliches Verhalten. Niemand diskutiert die damit verbundenen mentalen Mechanismen. Es ist, als würde man beschreiben, wie ein Auto by arbeitet, (...) wenn man dasLenkrad und Metall diskutiert und ohne Kenntnis des Motors, Kraftstoffs oder Antriebsstrangs lackiert. Tatsächlich sind die Texte, wie die meisten älteren "Erklärungen" des Verhaltens,hier und die Kommentsvon Wilber oft interessanter für die Art von Dingen, die sie als Erklärungen akzeptieren (undweglassen!) und die Art der Argumentation, die sie verwenden, als für den eigentlichen Inhalt. (shrink)

Given both the phenomenological and cognitive similarities between episodic memory and imagination, it’s difficult to say how we can reliably distinguish them at their moment of retrieval. Several memory markers have thus been proposed, which are characteristics that would reliably indicate to the subject that her mental state is an instance of memory. While the question of what exactly constitutes these memory markers is still an issue to be settled, there is also the more general question of whether they can (...) be reliable at all. In the present paper, I have identified two theses about the latter issue (the reliability and unreliability theses) and have argued that the main cause of disagreement between them lies on their different assumptions on how beliefs about our own mental states are formed, i.e. what are the underlying metacognitive mechanisms responsible for self-attribution of mental states. These different views on metacognition were then further investigated with regards to their use of metarepresentations and their general agreement with recent cognitive psychology research. These analyses corroborate the reliability of certain kinds of memory markers in distinguishing between memory and imagination. (shrink)