Kant, Misc

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is a towering figure of Western philosophy, someone whose work continues to exert an influence across all areas of the discipline. His work is characterized by both breadth and unity: he writes powerfully about mind, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, politics, religion, history, aesthetics, education, and more. And across those areas, he is concerned to work out and defend a view of human beings and their place in nature according to which our own reason enables (...) us to discover and uphold the laws of nature and freedom—that is, to think for ourselves. The newly commissioned essays which make up this Handbook collectively present a picture of where the study of Kant’s philosophy finds itself, at this point in the twenty-first century. They are organized around the four questions which Kant said unite all interest of our reason: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? and (4) What is the human being? Their aim is to help students and scholars of Kant’s philosophy think for themselves about the topics about which he wrote with such insight. (shrink)

What makes thought, language, and rational inquiry possible in the first place? This paper argues that intelligibility—the condition under which anything can be grasped as meaningful—is not a product of logic, language, or physical processes, but a necessary precondition for all of them. I explore the implications of this claim for metaphysics and epistemology, particularly in relation to reductionist and naturalist accounts that treat intelligibility as emergent or brute. Drawing on modal reasoning and a phenomenological approach, I suggest that intelligibility (...) must be grounded in something irreducible—most plausibly, foundational consciousness. The paper does not aim to explain consciousness itself, but to clarify what must already be in place for explanation, reasoning, and meaning to arise at all. In doing so, it proposes a metaphysical framework for recognizing when domains are irreducible, and considers the consequences of denying such foundations. (shrink)

This paper develops two theses and one suggestion. The first thesis concerns how to reason about the problem of philosophical progress. Chalmers (2015) and Dellsén et al. (2022) proposed frameworks to reason about this problem. I argue that these frameworks have limits and develop an alternative. Having done this, I put my proposed framework to the test. That is, I use it to analyse the views held by Kant in the first critique and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. The second thesis (...) concerns the relations between these works. My proposed framework makes evident that, for all their differences, Kant and Wittgenstein gave similar answers to the problem of philosophical progress. They both claimed that philosophy has been very unproductive for much of its history and proposed methods to fix this. My suggestion is that this might be a recurring pattern in the history of philosophy, which perhaps could help explain why, to this day, there is so much pessimism concerning philosophical progress. (shrink)

On the eve of the tercentenary of Kant’s birth, just as it was a hundred years ago, Kantianism is simultaneously on the receiving end of the blows of history and attacks by rival philosophical parties, both progressivist and reactionary. The radical wings of both parties perceive modernity as a depressing, nauseating period which must be broken with by moving toward the past or toward the future. One of the most original and profound diagnoses of this attitude was offered by Hans (...) Jonas, who discerned in radical doctrines of a hundred years ago a similarity with the gnosticism of antiquity. Jonas’s diagnosis has not lost its relevance. That is why the central question addressed in this study is as follows: what prescription does the Kantian programme offer for modernity’s “gnostic dizziness?” I maintain that Kant’s critical turn is still an effective strategy by means of which to compensate for the sudden stresses and “gnostic impulses” provoked by the modern worldview revolution, bringing back an “orientation in thinking” which reorients the world process and individual activity. The imperative to always see and respect humanity in a particular individual warns against the “category mistake” committed by modern radicals who ascribe agency (subjectivity) to non-­human abstractions which cannot possess this property. In theory, Kant grounds the view that humanity should resign itself to the fact of its perspective being limited and local. Kantian practical philosophy provides the traveler with a map of regulative ideas and a “moral compass”, along with an explanation of disruptive factors, offering a working explanation of the situation and its possible outcomes. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” brings human beings back into focus and imagination to order, allowing for the hope that new challenges will be successfully met. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the difficulty of distinguishing between science fiction and philosophy. The boundary between these genres is somewhat vague. There is a “neutral zone” separating the genres. But this neutral zone is often transgressed. One key distinction considered here is that between entertainment and edification. Another crucial element is found in the importance of the author’s apparent self-consciousness of these distinctions. Philosophy seeks to edify, and philosophers are often deliberately focused on thinking about the question of the (...) borders that distinguish genres. Science fiction is more interested in entertainment, and narrative authors tend to care less about policing the border. This distinction is a pragmatic one. And canonical authors often violate the boundary. I examine key authors to make this point, including Plato, Kant, and H.G. Wells. My discussion shows that these canonical authors wandered into the neutral zone in their own work, reminding us that the boundaries we draw around genres are arbitrary and subject to transgression. (shrink)

In this essay I position Kant's "psychology" portion of the lectures on metaphysics against the backdrop of Kant's work to develop a new lecture course on anthropology during the 1770s. I argue that the development of this course caused significant trouble for Kant in three distinct ways, though in each case the difficulty would turn on Kant's approach to "empirical psychology." The first problem for Kant had to do with refashioning psychology such that empirical psychology could be reassigned to anthropology (...) and rational psychology protected from the spectre of subreption. The second problem, and in many way the larger one for Kant during this time period, followed from Kant's desire to make use of empirical psychology's account of the mental faculties in his own transcendental theory of cognition. This introduced a separate problem for Kant, however, since this was a time during which physiological psychology was on the rise, a psychology that was being promoted by Ernst Platner and his followers, as "anthropology." This left Kant with the unwelcome task of simultaneously distinguishing his own philosophical anthropology from Platner's, and distancing his own transcendental theory of cognition from the likes of Herder and Tetens, given their embrace of the "embodied mind" approach being advanced by the physiological psychologists. (shrink)

This is a very brief working abstract for students interested in Dracula as being a rebuttal to Immanuel Kant's works and also this abstract comments on the skepticism that we find in this novel. This is put out in the public doamain and if this is used, it should be with proper citation.

Kant’s critical philosophy represents a rudimentary existentialism, or a proto-existentialism, in the following respects: He emphasizes human finitude, limits our knowledge, and argues that human consciousness is characterized by mineness (Jemeinigkeit). He introduces the influential concept of autonomy, something that lead to controversies about constructivism and anti-realism in meta-ethics and anticipated problems concerning decisionism in Existentialism. Kant makes human freedom the central philosophical issue, arguing (in the incorporation thesis) that freedom is inescapable for human agents. He even holds that awareness (...) of freedom leads to anxiety (as opposed to fear), and that anxiety precedes the fall into evil. In the doctrine of radical evil, he argues that human agents are always already suffering from self-deception because of this fall. In order to overcome self-deception and evil, Kant proscribes a radical self-choice in which the agent takes over himself and society by thinking independently and consistently. However, this is not only a moral issue for Kant but also something that concerns religious faith and hope, since Kant argues that we need religion to overcome not only moral evil but also despair. Although he criticizes traditional natural theology, Kant develops a practical (moral) interpretation of religion that anticipates religious Existentialism. In this context, he developed an influential critique of philosophical theodicies and a notion of the hiddenness of God that emphasizes the importance and inscrutability of evil. By doing this, and by introducing philosophy of religion and philosophical anthropology as new disciplines, Kant prepared the ground for Existentialism. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is what I refer to as “non-pathological.” (...) That is, most mental illnesses are for Kant continuous with normally functioning cognition. Someone with a healthy reason can easily fall into mental illness and someone with mental illness can (perhaps not as easily) re-establish healthy reason. By accepting a non-pathological definition of mental illness, it follows for Kant that humans have more agency and responsibility regarding their mental health than current views allow, which explains why several of his writings aim to prescribe a “diet of the mind” (2:271). Contrary to popular readings of Kant as a champion of reason’s power, Kant’s conception of mental illness shows that he recognizes how fragile human reason can be. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: I contend that Sellars defends a uniquely Kantian naturalist outlook both in general and more particularly in relation to the nature and status of what he calls ‘epistemic principles’; and I attempt to show that this remains a plausible and distinctive position even when detached from Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist contention that the perceptible objects of the manifest image strictly speaking do not exist, i.e., as conceived within that common sense framework. I first explain the complex Kant-inspired sense in (...) which Sellars did not take the latter thesis concerning the objects of the manifest image to apply, at least in certain fundamental respects, to persons. In this primary Kantian sense, I suggest, persons as thinkers and agents exist univocally across both the manifest and scientific images, and this in principle would enable an integration of persons within a multi-leveled naturalistic ontology, one that is independent of Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist thesis. Finally, I examine in some detail how this defensible blend of Kantian and naturalist themes turns out to be what is fundamental in Sellars’s complex and controversial views on the nature and status of epistemic principles. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper traces a Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas of conceptual content, object cognition, and modal constraints in the form of counterfactual sustaining causal laws. It is an idea that extends from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason through C. I. Lewis’s Mind and the World-Order to the Kantian naturalism of Wilfrid Sellars and the analytic pragmatism of Robert Brandom. Kant put forward what I characterize as a modal conception of objectivity, which he developed as (...) an extended argument stretching from the transcendental deduction through the analogies of experience to the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment. In related ways in Lewis and Sellars, the very idea of an object of knowledge (and of intentionality more generally) is connected with a certain lawfulness or modal constraint the necessary representation of which, they argue, is an achievement of conceptualization. While Sellars agreed with the spirit of Lewis’s famous pragmatic conception of the a priori, Sellars’s conception of meaning and conceptual content differed in crucial ways with important consequences for this issue. I argue furthermore that a certain phenomenalist temptation threatens to spoil this insight both among some of Kant’s interpreters and in Lewis’s thought. Finally, I point out that Brandom’s “Kant-Sellars thesis” provides new support for this line of thought. Although questions concerning idealism continue to raise controversies for neo-Kantians and pragmatists, the line of thought itself represents a distinctive and still promising approach to questions concerning intentionality and conceptual content. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...) drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire, I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively. (shrink)

The beginning of higher education in Prešov is associated with the Lutheran College of Prešov, which showed interested in Kantian philosophy already in late 18th century. This is also reflected in the book Elements of Philosophical Ethics, written by the rector of the College, Andrej Vandrák. The study presents a comparative analysis of Kant›s ethical works and Vandrák’s textbooks and concludes that although Vandrák’s ethics was strongly influenced by Kant, he had no ambition to become his passive epigon, but that (...) he rather attempted to actively think along with him. As the author emphasized, it is merely an intellectual tradition, to which the current research of the Institute of Philosophy of the Prešov University in Prešov is a follow-up. (shrink)

This is the third chapter of my book Transformation of the self, which covers Schleiermacher's reception of Kant on the problem of personal identity.

Discussione a partire dal libro di Giorgio Agamben "Karman. Breve trattato sull'azione, la colpa e il gesto", Bollati Boringhieri, 2017.

Kant in English: An Index / By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2017. Pages 1 to 2675. Includes bibliographical references. Index. 1. Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4. Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Practice (Philosophy). 7. Philosophy and civilization. 8). Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Wörterbuch. 9. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Concordances. 10. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- 1889-1976 – Indexes. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. MOTTO As a famous motto calls us back to Kant, Otto Liebmann’s (...) writes (Kant and His Epigones of 1865): “Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden.” “Therefore, must return to Kant.” Table of Contents 1). Preface and Introduction. 2. Background on Kant’s Philosophy (hermeneutical historical situation). 3). Main Index (pages, 25 to 2676). Preface and Introduction Total words indexed: 58,928; for the 12 volumes that are in the MAIN INDEX are indexed: pages 1 to 7321. This monograph by Daniel Fidel Ferrer is 2676 pages in total. The following is a machine index of 12 volumes written by Immanuel Kant and translated from German into English. Everything is indexed including the text, title pages, preface, notes, editorials, glossary, indexes, biographical notes, and even some typos. No stop words or words removed from this index. There are some German words in the text, bibliographies, and in the glossaries (also included in Main Index). Titles in English of Kant’s writings for this index (pages 1 to 7321). Anthropology, History, and Education [Starts on page 1 Correspondence [Starts on page 313 Critique of Pure Reason [Starts page 971 Critique of the Power of Judgment [Starts on page 1771 Lectures on Logic [Starts on page 2247 Lectures on Metaphysics [Starts on page 2991 Notes and Fragments [Starts on page 3670 Opus Postumum [Starts on page 4374 Practical Philosophy [Starts on page 4741 Religion and Rational Theology [Starts on page 5446 Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 [Starts on page 5990 Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 [Starts on page 6541 Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or An Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Entire Structure of the Universe Based on Newtonian Principles [Starts on page 7162 The whole single file which includes all of these books ends on page 7321. 12 volumes are pages 1 to 7321. These actual texts of these books by Kant are not include here because of copyright. This is only an index of these 7321 pages by Immanuel Kant. There are some German words in the text and in the glossaries, etc. Searching this Main Index. Please note the German words that start with umlauts are at the end of the index because of machine sorting of the words. Starting with the German word “ße” on page 2674 page of this book (see in Main Index). Use the FIND FUNCTION for all examples of the words or names you are searching. Examples from the Main Index mendacium, 5171, 5329, 5389 mendation, 220 mendax, 2702, 2800 mended, 360 Mendel, 416, 925, 965 Mendelian, 2212 Mendels, 345, 363, 417, 458, 560, 572, 588, 926, 928, 929 MENDELSSOHN, 925 Mendelssohn, 8, 9, 19, 98, 99, 100, 101, . (shrink)

This article examines the reception and portrayal of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) legacy in Latvia from 2011 to 2024, focusing on academic discourse, public debates, and commemorative activities. It explores historical connections, translations, scholarly research, and public commemorations through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) theory of cultural and symbolic capital, illustrating how Kant’s legacy is contextualized and appropriated within Latvian intellectual traditions. The study examines Kant’s physical and symbolic presence in Latvian public spaces, such as monuments and plaques, highlighting the (...) relationship between historical memory, cultural narratives, and myth-making. By providing a comprehensive account of Kant’s significance in Latvia, the study contributes to broader discussions on the integration of global intellectual heritage into national and local contexts. (shrink)

Portraits of Kant is a three-volume work on the life of Immanuel Kant, constructed from the observations of his family, friends, colleagues, and other contemporaries, drawing on more than 160 selected texts and 90 illustrations of Kant and his physical surroundings. Volume I introduces Königsberg – the city where Kant spent his entire life – and collects together observations and records of Kant’s family life and childhood, his studies at the Gymnasium and university, and his years spent as a Hofmeister (...) in the Prussian countryside. Volume II presents Kant’s life in the university as a popular professor with observations by his students and others visiting his classroom. There are accounts of Kant’s home life and his famous dinner parties, his daily walks and travels within Prussia, and his many social engagements, along with his thoughts on women and marriage, the arts, religion and Judaism, and the French Revolution. Volume III focuses on Kant’s work as a scholar and author, along with his growing celebrity and the many visitors drawn to Königsberg to meet him, concluding with his final years of increasing debility and death. Nearly all of the source material is appearing for the first time in English, with extracts from letters, diaries, and journals of the day, as well as longer biographical sketches and memoirs. This is the only biographical resource of its kind, told through the words of those who knew and argued with him. (shrink)

Kierkegaard, like Plato, though using different methods and conclusions, sought to ground knowledge in the ineffability of subjectivity. For Plato, knowledge comes subjectively (internally); for Kierkegaard, it comes by God's grace through faith. Socrates becomes the facilitator for the slave in the /Meno/, as does God for the man of faith. Again, Kierkegaard is also concerned with passion. "...the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion; a mediocre fellow" (p. (...) 37). The paradox is necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the inquiry. Only knowledge through faith can approach the paradox since it is by definition beyond our knowledge. Passion must accompany the leap of faith, since knowledge acquisition for the man of faith is guided by God. (shrink)

Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid (...) and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics. The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority. Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. (shrink)

This is a review of Thomas Nemeth's Kant in Imperial Russia, Cham: Springer, 2017. It gives a rundown of the contents of the book, which may be considered the definitive, comprehensive, and authoritative overview of the Kantrezeption in pre-Soviet Russia in the English language. The book proceeds chronologically, starting from Kant's days up to the Bolshevik Revolution, examining well-known and lesser-known Russian philosophers and thinkers as well as figures of other nationalities who contributed to the dissemination of Kant's ideas in (...) Russia, from intellectuals like Nikolai Karamzin, who paid Kant a visit during his travels, to Mikhail Vladislavlev, Vladimir Solovyov, Aleksej Kozlov, Aleksandr Vvedenskij, Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Berdjaev, the brothers Trubeckoj, Georgij Chelpanov, Gustav Shpet, Pavel Novgorodcev, Ivan Lapshin, Vladimir Ern, Nikolai Losskij, Boris Jakovenko, and many others. The review emphasizes the principal outcome of the book, which is that the Russian reception of Kant's philosophy was largely negative. (shrink)

Kant’s body offered a constant target for his own remarks, both in correspondence and during his lunchtime conversations. Several good descriptions of Kant’s body have come down to us over the centuries, as well as a number of visual representations, but these are remarkably limited, given his stature in the world of ideas. A new description of Kant, written by a novelist who visited Kant while passing through Königsberg, has recently come to light. It is reproduced here — in English (...) translation as well as the original German — and earlier descriptions of Kant are briefly recounted. (shrink)

This paper examines the link between Immanuel Kant’s notion of transcendental self-consciousness and Dan Zahavi’s notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness in order to address the problem of reflection. Zahavi emphasizes the identity in pre-reflective self-consciousness, according to which the subject is conscious of itself as the one undergoing an experience, that is the ‘for-me-ness’ of experience. Reflection marks a difference between the subject and its experience, objectifying the experience. The problem of reflection has to do with how the identity in pre-reflective (...) self-consciousness makes possible a difference in reflection. The preliminary solution Zahavi gives is to consider pre-reflective self-consciousness as internally differentiated. However, a more systematic account is needed. We turn to Kant and adopt a first-order reading of transcendental self-consciousness, according to which self-consciousness is intrinsic to the act of synthesis rather than a second-order consciousness of it. Transcendental self-consciousness is a formal givenness—an immediate, non-objectifying mode through which I am conscious of myself. We argue that Kant’s distinction between transcendental self-consciousness and the self-consciousness of the intuitive understanding offers resources to solve the problem. Transcendental self-consciousness is outward while the self-consciousness of the intuitive understanding is inward. The outwardness of transcendental self-consciousness amounts to its self-enlargement, accounting for the internal differentiation of pre-reflective self-consciousness. The proposed solution not only clarifies the transition from pre-reflective self-consciousness to reflection but also underscores the relevance of Kantian insights for phenomenological discussions on subjectivity. (shrink)

Este trabajo explora, en primer lugar, la recepción heideggeriana de la filosofía de Kant, con especial atención a su concepción de la subjetividad y la función trascendental del tiempo, para posteriormente cuestionar la legitimidad de sus críticas mediante una interpretación alternativa de los textos que son el foco de su diatriba. Al reconstruir esta recepción, ponemos de relieve una ambigüedad: Kant es valorado como precursor del proyecto heideggeriano, pero se le reprocha una falta de radicalismo relativo a la cuestión del (...) tiempo que resulta, en última instancia, en una insuficiente superación del planteamiento ontológico cartesiano. A partir de lecturas recientes que sostienen que la subjetividad kantiana guarda un papel trascendental implícito para la espacialidad del sujeto, proponemos una reinterpretación unitaria de la paradoja de las contrapartes incongruentes, la “Refutación del idealismo” y la “Deducción trascendental de las categorías” de la edición B. Acudiremos, asimismo, a varias Reflexionen, entre las cuales destacaremos la llamada “Reflexión de Leningrado” descubierta en 1986. Sostenemos, contra Heidegger, que la redacción de la KrV de 1787 no pretende suprimir la primacía trascendental del tiempo frente al espacio, sino presentar una concepción de la relación entre ambos en la que el espacio desempeña una función constitutiva en la apertura a la experiencia. Por último, defenderemos que en el curso de Heidegger de 1935-1936 sobre la KrV se produce un giro respecto a la lectura de la década anterior compatible con la interpretación aquí propuesta. (shrink)

This article examines the reception and portrayal of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) legacy in Latvia from 2011 to 2024, focusing on academic discourse, public debates, and commemorative activities. It explores historical connections, translations, scholarly research, and public commemorations through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) theory of cultural and symbolic capital, illustrating how Kant’s legacy is contextualized and appropriated within Latvian intellectual traditions. The study examines Kant’s physical and symbolic presence in Latvian public spaces, such as monuments and plaques, highlighting the (...) relationship between historical memory, cultural narratives, and myth-making. By providing a comprehensive account of Kant’s significance in Latvia, the study contributes to broader discussions on the integration of global intellectual heritage into national and local contexts. (shrink)

La concepción de la existencia como enteramente ajena a los predicados reales del concepto de una cosa no es una concepción original y exclusiva de Kant; es, en rigor, una variación de una concepción posible sobre la existencia que fue ya advertida por la Escolástica medieval y moderna. Recurrir a los debates de la metafísica escolástica sobre el ser y la esencia permite comprender mejor el sentido de las distintas posturas posibles sobre el problema general de la relación entre lo (...) determinado y lo existente. Sobre este trasfondo histórico y conceptual deviene posible abordar con nuevas herramientas teóricas la tesis de Kant sobre la existencia y delimitar con mayor precisión su sentido y su diferencia no sólo respecto de la tesis de autores como Wolff y Baumgarten, sino también respecto de la de los sucesores inmediatos del propio Kant. Éstos criticaron expresamente la postura de Kant sobre la existencia recurriendo, por su parte, a argumentos que en no pocos casos también habían sido reconocidos y parcialmente desarrollados ya por la metafísica escolástica. (shrink)

In this article, I study the development of German metaphysics from Daniel Cramer's Isagoge in metaphysicam Aristotelis to Kant's Critical Philosophy. While most seventeenth-century Lutheran authors conceive of metaphysics as atheoretical or purely speculative science of being in its most general terms, later authors, especially, Wolff, Meier and Kant raise the question of how metaphysics can be reformed in more practical terms. They struggle to articulate what this practical reform should actually amount to. At least two options are on the (...) table: (1) metaphysics as an operative discipline à la Bacon; or (2) metaphysics as the foundation of moral philosophy. (shrink)

One of the big issues which dominated British social anthropology in the 1990s was its relationship to cultural studies. Here are some standard stories of origins: cultural studies developed from applying predominantly French 1960s theoretical frameworks, developed for the study of prestigious arts, to less esteemed culture, on the grounds that they can be used there too or that there is no defensible distinction between the two. Social anthropology, older, had started out in the 19th century as the study of (...) human societies, with a special emphasis on primitive societies, and developed a special method of lengthy intensive fieldwork and later applied this method “at home” too. Its traditional reference points are different and unsurprisingly there is rivalry, sometimes bitter. I interpret Marilyn Strathern as trying to offer an anthropology to win over students for whom cultural studies has appeal, in her 1992 book After Nature: English kinship in the late 20th century. She engages in a kind of worldview analysis of a number of things of interest to students of English culture - she grasps the intellectual tastes of the student and aims at an anthropology which works for that taste, it seems to me. My own synthesis is at a philosophical level. Building on John Searle’’s responses to Jacques Derrida, I observe positivist premises shared by this influential figure in cultural studies and the functionalist tradition which dominated British anthropology from the 1920s to the 1960s at least. These allow us to conceive a more Derridean functionalist anthropology. Also I propose that it is possible to do a number of functionalist analyses for “1990s cultural studies tastes,” as Strathern does worldview analyses. (shrink)

There is substantial scholarship concerning the origin and use of the question “quid facti” in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. There is also substantial scholarship concerning the question in the work of Salomon Maimon, the skeptical critic of Kant. The pictures of the “quid facti” question that emerge from these two bodies of literature, however, are rather different, and there has been no attempt to reconcile them. The goal of this paper is thus to compare Kant’s and Maimon’s understandings of the quaestio (...) facti in order to understand how and why they differ. Part I begins by summarizing the legal context of the quaestio facti and identifying three sub-questions within it. Part II lays out Kant’s understanding of the quid facti as concerning the question of the empirical origin of a judgment. Part III shows how Maimon’s skeptical use of the quid facti question was made possible by his focus on a different aspect of the legal question: the question of whether a judgment has been made. Finally, using these results, Part IV argues, against the usual interpretation, that Maimon’s skeptical use of the quaestio facti can stand alone, separate from the quaestio juris. (shrink)

In this article, I go against some interpretations of the “Träume eines Geistersehers” that read this work as the outcome of a profound crisis in Kant’s thought, triggered by the reading of Swedenborg and ending with the complete abandonment of his entire philosophical production. To do so, I highlight the continuity, on the methodological level, between the “Träume” and the texts of the 1760s that precede it, in particular with the “Deutlichkeit”. Having clarified some of the principles of the analytical (...) method developed by Kant in the latter text of 1762, especially the role played by language in determining the content of the concept, I show how, in the “Träume”, Kant employs this method for analyzing the concept of spirit. Nevertheless, I take into account the specific epistemology adopted by Kant in the “Träume” and the effect it has on the relationship between method and metaphysics, the reconfiguration of which can be observed in the pages of the “Träume”. In contrast to the narrative that paints Kant as skeptical about metaphysics, I thus show how metaphysics was rather subject to a conceptual transformation that prepares the outcomes of Kant’s later thought. (shrink)

The important philosophers in history aren’t all that great. First, their works are full of bad arguments, confused concepts, falsehoods, implausible claims, and lack of clarity. We can see this by using a “peer-review test,” which asks us to evaluate these claims and arguments as if they were submitted to us as anonymous work. Second, I make the case that canonizing some philosophers as great is damaging to the philosophical project of seeking truth regardless of its source. I suggest an (...) alternative hypothesis. The putatively great philosophers were just intelligent individuals who had the right ideas at the right time. They are worth reading not because of their intellectual genius but rather for their creativity and insight, offering novel solutions to certain problems and noticing implications others had missed. Accordingly, my position does not entail that the “great” figures are of no philosophical interest. However, we should do away with the idea of a “great philosopher.” Philosophy might then come to resemble other disciplines that seek the truth, which generally do not revere their historically important predecessors. (shrink)

Throughout his philosophy, Kant relies on the crucial concepts of “objective validity” and “objective reality,” pivotal in arguments such as the “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” and the “Refutation of Idealism” in his Critique of Pure Reason. However, the lack of desired clarity in Kant’s usage impedes scholarly progress. Despite their significance, “objective validity” and “objective reality” have not received sufficient attention in secondary literature. Consensus on whether they represent the same idea remains elusive, and even among those recognizing them (...) as distinct concepts, disagreement persists regarding their precise meanings. In this paper, I show that these concepts are distinct. I argue that a concept is objectively valid when our right or entitlement to apply it to objects is established independently and prior to any intuition. Conversely, a concept is objectively real when presented to us in intuition, either in pure intuition, as seen in geometrical figures, or in empirical intuition, as evident in material objects. This interpretation, however, falls short of fully elucidating Kant’s use of these terms due to his lack of systematicity in their application across concepts, intuitions, objects, cognitions, representations, synthesis, and even ideas, God, and purposiveness. Consequently, while shedding light on many instances, this interpretation encounters limits. (shrink)

Prendendo in esame il decennio 1756-1766 del pensiero di Kant, il volume ritaglia un percorso che attraversa le tematiche filosofiche della cosmologia, della metodologia e dell’epistemologia. Un’analisi attenta dei testi mostra che tali tematiche non si susseguono semplicemente nell’orizzonte del pensiero di Kant, ma si intrecciano e si modificano, talvolta imponendo limiti le une alle altre. Dopo lo scritto accademico sulle monadi fisiche, Kant affronta la questione del metodo avviando una riforma della filosofia volta a liberare quest’ultima dai mondi-di-pensiero dei (...) sistemi razionalistici. Il paradosso di una metafisica che diviene tanto più folle quanto più tenta di spiegare razionalmente la follia dei visionari è il tema al centro dell’ultimo scritto kantiano trattato in questo volume, del quale si dà un’interpretazione originale che tenta di risolvere molte delle difficoltà fino ad oggi sollevate dalla critica. (shrink)

In § 37 of the "Elements of First Practical Philosophy", Baumgarten provides important qualifications to the controversial notion of ‘objective morality’, which had long been at the centre of the dispute between realists like Wolff and his adversaries. The chapter shall examine how he construes his view of morality in §§ 36-38 with a specific focus on the central § 37. I shall analyse that section, first considering how Baumgarten understands the key notion of ‘objective morality’ and how he argues (...) for it, focusing both on its relational character and its connection with God’s will. Then I will examine the last, and arguably most surprising of the implications that he draws per negativum from the main claim, namely that affirming objective morality does not amount to rule out what Baumgarten calls ‘subjective morality’. Finally, I will briefly consider how Baumgarten’s distinctive way to take side in the Wolffian camp in that dispute reflects, through the close dialogue with the Elements in Kant’s private notes and lectures, on the development of Kant’s own views in practical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a critical review of the recent noncontextualist reading of the Kantian notion of sensible intuition. I raise two main objections. First, nonconceptualist readers fail to distinguish connected but different anti-intellectualist claims in the contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Second, I will argue that nonconceptual readings fail because Kan- tian intuitions do not possess a representational content of their own that can be veridical or falsidical in a similar way to how the content of propositional (...) attitudes is true or false. In this paper, I will support my own reading that sensible intuition is better seen as what Evans and McDowell have called a de re sense, whose main characteristic is object dependence. In this sense, Kantian sensible intuitions can be seen as a sensible mode of donation of objects. In my reading, the Kantian opposition between intuitions and concepts is best seen as the opposition between the objectual de re perception of something and the propositional de dicto apperception that something is the case rather than the opposition between nonconceptual and conceptual contents. However, if Kantian sensible intuition is not a mental state with nonconceptual content, it is certainly in the general anti-intellectualist neighborhood. (shrink)

The paper in general investigates Kant’s transcendental theory of moral psychology in its relation to Sellarsian characterization of origin of normativity with respect to the preconditions of a complete conception of humans and their actions. The complete conception of humans and their actions is a conception in which we are able to account for free human in general and for his free will in particular in accordance with the natural law. I argue that Sellars’ manifest and scientific images of a (...) person on the one hand and Kant’s empirical and intelligible character on the other hand has similar accounts for acquiring the knowledge of the source of our normative assessments. In both it is considered that manifest or empirical conception of a person within nature in general fails to provide a deductive procedure from which one can derive the complete conception of a person as a free being in itself. I further argue that any set of procedure for identifying the source of normativity and of our normative assessments cannot be provided from an ontologically oriented perspective in which we aim at establishing a naturalistic model of normativity- a model where accurate descriptions and true explanations of causal relations in the world of appearances can allow us to make sense the blameworthiness of the moral agent as the normative force applied on his actions. (shrink)

Kierkegaard, like Plato, though using different methods and conclusions, sought to ground knowledge in the ineffability of subjectivity. For Plato, knowledge comes subjectively (internally); for Kierkegaard, it comes by God's grace through faith. Socrates becomes the facilitator for the slave in the /Meno/, as does God for the man of faith. Again, Kierkegaard is also concerned with passion. "...the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion; a mediocre fellow" (p. (...) 37). The paradox is necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the inquiry. Only knowledge through faith can approach the paradox since it is by definition beyond our knowledge. Passion must accompany the leap of faith, since knowledge acquisition for the man of faith is guided by God. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 988-1009, December 2021.

Hintikka considers that the “Transcendental Deduction” includes finding the role that concepts in the effort is meant by human activities of acquiring knowledge; and it affirms that the principles governing human activities of knowledge can be objective rules that can become transcendental conditions of experience and no conditions contingent product of nature of human agents involved in the know. In his opinion, intuition as it is used by Kant not be understood in the traditional way, ie as producer of mental (...) images, but rather as that which the mind represents an individual. To support this interpretation refers to the lessons of Kant´s Logics, to individuality space time and the thesis, submitted the winning essay in 1764, characterizing the mathematical method by the use of particular representatives of general concepts. Thus, his exegesis considers the Kantian conceptions of the “Doctrine of Method” not later conceptions, as traditionally interpreted, but prior conceptions to the processing of “Transcendental Aesthetic”. This article reconstructs some of their arguments that eventually will equal the Kantian intuition with the Euclidean ecthesis. (shrink)

World peace was a common theoretical consideration among philosophers during Europe’s Enlightenment period. The first robust essay on peace was written by Charles Irénée Castel de Saint- Pierre, which sparked an intellectual debate among prominent philosophers like Jean- Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham, who offered their own treatises on the concept of peace. Perhaps the most influential of all such writings comes from Immanuel Kant, who argues that world peace is no “high- flown or exaggerated notion” but rather a natural (...) result of the rational progression of the human species. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the mastermind behind the formation of the League of Nations in 1920 that provided the scaffolding to today’s United Nations, read Kant’s philosophy while he was a student at the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University). Some have argued that it is no coincidence that the per-son responsible for embarking upon the first serious political pursuit of world peace on a global scale was familiar with Kant. Indeed, William Galston claims that “Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points [for world peace] were a faithful transcription of both the letter and spirit of Kant’s Perpetual Peace.”3 Historical connections aside, the question remains as to whether Kant’s philosophy is a viable conception of peace in a contemporary context. Using the conceptual distinction of positive and negative peace provided by Johan Galtung, I argue that Kant’s philosophy does provide the scaffolding for a viable conception of peace. In particular, I provide particular examples as to what social rights must be included in a Kantian model of peace. (shrink)

Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid (...) and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics. The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority. Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. (shrink)

The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...) (say) natural scientific contexts from the illegitimate use of it in (say) dogmatic metaphysics. I will then go on to argue that Kant sees Hume’s tendency to slide into more radical forms of skepticism as a symptom of his failure to provide a systematic or principled account of this distinction. This failure, I argue, can be traced (according to Kant) to Hume’s impoverished, non-hylomorphic account of our faculties – which both robs Hume of the materials necessary to construct a genuinely systematic philosophy as Kant understands this, and makes it impossible for Hume to clearly conceive of what Kant calls ‘Formal Idealism.’ In this way, the failings of Hume’s account of causation are (for Kant) symptoms of more fundamental limitations within Hume’s philosophy. I close by briefly discussing the similarities between Hume and Kant’s understanding of the relationship between, first, philosophical methodology and, second, the nature of our faculties. (shrink)

I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism. This article is a précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.

This essay pertains to Nietzsche's and Spinoza's philosophical/historical relationship, and the hitherto unnoticed role Kant plays as an intermediary for Spinoza's ideas and legacy. We advance two main assertions: 1) that Nietzsche is historically related to Spinoza via Kant's Antinomies of Pure Reason and their legacy, and 2) that both the striking similarities and tremendous differences between these two thinkers are best described with reference to the Antithesis positions of Kant's Antinomies. Our account rests primarily on the works of two (...) other scholars. The first is Omri Boehm, who argues convincingly that a) Spinoza was both the single greatest influence on and primary target of Kant's Antinomies, and b) that Spinoza's position is remarkably similar to the first three Antithesis positions (and no other relevant thinker comes close). The second is Michael Steven Green, who argues with equal force that c) Nietzsche's mature philosophy is heavily dependent upon Afrikan Spir's concept of the "fundamental antinomy," and d) that Nietzsche's view of empirical reality amounts to an "antithetic" view of reality. We demonstrate that these two scholars were, independently of one other, pointing to a single historical/philosophical connection between Nietzsche and Spinoza, and begin an exploration of the ramifications of this discovery. (shrink)