Modality

I argue that all experiences are my experiences.

This paper defines a typed classification of intelligibility grounded in constraint structure. A claim is intelligible relative to an agent only if it occupies a position in constraint space that supports modal evaluation. A claim receives a type judgment when three conditions are satisfied: it is situated within a nontrivial, consistent norm set that partially determines a law space; this norm set admits a unique, well-posed MaxEnt projection under the symmetry-fixed base measure it entails; and the KL residual to the (...) generating law can be reduced below a task threshold within the shell space constructible by the agent—or else a residual floor persists. This yields three ceilings: first, finite agents construct only finitely many shells, and thus have finite intelligibility images; second, even within intelligibility, finite norm sets generically imply nonzero residuals unless the generating law lies within the family, imposing a structural limit on knowability; third, fragmentation is destructive to constraint closure and can strictly downgrade a claim’s type, eliminating residual control and collapsing knowability under the same epistemic threshold. (shrink)

This essay attempts to answer a simple but largely neglected elemental question: why does Spinoza endorse essences? I begin by delineating three perennial metaphysical problems, namely those of individuation, change, and persistence, after which I analyze the way in which they function as the deeply ingrained backdrop that motivates Spinoza’s essentialism, allowing him to develop a sophisticated conceptual framework on which he builds his ethics proper. I end by discussing the relationship between Spinoza’s essentialism and modality and argue that while (...) Spinoza anticipates certain contemporary lines of thought, giving an account of modality is not high on his agenda: his necessitarianism is a by-product of building a philosophical system motivated by other metaphysical concerns. (shrink)

Nothingness is the most abused word in the human vocabulary. We use it casually, as if nothingness were simply a thin, delicate version of the world. We imagine an empty room, a quiet moment, or a blank canvas. In daily speech, nothingness is just the absence of some particular thing, but the philosophical question of “nothingness” demands something radically different. It demands the absence of all things; all structure, all laws, all time, all possibility, all conditions that could give anything (...) the capacity to exist. True nothingness is not emptiness; it is the collapse of the very framework within which emptiness could be meaningful. Once carried to its proper conclusion, it reveals itself to be an incoherent concept. Something that cannot exist, cannot persist, and cannot even be meaningfully conceived. The task, then, is not to explain why something emerged from nothing, but to understand why nothingness was never a viable alternative in the first place. (shrink)

Kasei-Theory develops a transcendental framework for describing the pre-structural dynamics from which number, space, time, and meaning become possible. It identifies three primordial phases—Fuka (non-generation), Ka (potential substrate), and Danzetsu (structural rupture)—that collectively constitute the minimal ontological strata prior to any mathematical, physical, or semantic determination. Within this system, Ka denotes the pre-geometric field of potentialization, while Ka-trace refers to the stabilized, readable configurations that emerge only within restricted regions of structural coherence. -/- A central contribution of the theory is (...) the replacement of the classical real/imaginary decomposition with a dual pre-structural architecture: Ka-density and Ka-phase. Rather than treating complex numbers as numerical dualities, Kasei-Theory interprets them as the two operational modes through which Ka stabilizes or rotates: difference-update (real-time stabilization) and phase-update (imaginary-time rotation). The imaginary unit i is thereby redefined not as an “unreal number,” but as the minimal directional marker for reading Ka-phase—an invariant of pre-structural orientation rather than an algebraic artifact. -/- Building on this shift, the theory introduces the latent → dec → col hierarchy of density states, which governs the activation, stabilization, and collapse of all structures. -/- latent-density: pre-formal potential without readable difference -/- Kasei-Theory proposes a foundational revision of how mathematical, physical, and semantic structures arise. It identifies three pre-structural phases—Fuka (non-generation), Ka (potential substrate), and Danzetsu (rupture)—from which number, space, time, and meaning first become possible. These phases form the ontological strata beneath any existing formal system. -/- The theory’s core breakthrough is the replacement of the real/imaginary decomposition with the dual architecture of Ka-density and Ka-phase. In this reformulation, complex numbers cease to represent two numerical types; they encode the two fundamental operational modes—difference-update and phase-update—through which structure stabilizes or collapses. The imaginary unit i is reinterpreted as the minimal directional operator of phase-reading, not a number. -/- From this shift follows a three-tiered hierarchy—latent, dec, col—describing how structure activates, stabilizes, and fails. This single mechanism unifies phenomena previously treated as unrelated: continuity, singularities, imaginary time, confinement, mass gaps, phase inversion, and non-perturbative breakdowns. Each arises where dec-density loses stability and Ka-phase or col-density becomes exposed. -/- The theory introduces the Ka-map, a pre-geometric distribution of density and phase from which continuity, metric structure, and temporal flow emerge. From this view, real numbers, spatial manifolds, and physical laws are not fundamental; they are localized readout regimes of dec-density. When this regime fails, imaginary time, collapse dynamics, and non-classical phases appear naturally. -/- As the constructive counterpart to Anti-Semantics, Kasei-Theory provides the generative half of a unified framework for genesis and breakdown across mathematics, physics, and meaning. Together they show that continuity, law, and sense are not primitives but thin, contingent stabilizations between latent and collapsed strata. -/- Key Contributions (2025 Update) -/- Establishes a transcendental ontology of Fuka / Ka / Danzetsu as pre-structural phases. -/- Replaces the real/imaginary distinction with Ka-density / Ka-phase as fundamental operative modes. -/- Reinterprets i as a directional marker of phase-reading, not a numerical entity. -/- Introduces the latent–dec–col hierarchy, providing a unified mechanism for continuity, collapse, and singular behavior. -/- Reconstructs number, space, time, and physical law as localized readout regimes of dec-density. -/- Defines the Ka-map as the global substrate from which geometry and temporality emerge. -/- Provides a common generative model for mathematical continuity, physical law, quantum breakdown, and semantic genesis. -/- Version Note (2025): This manuscript is part of an actively developing theoretical framework. Terminology and structural formulations are periodically refined as the theory advances. (shrink)

This thesis presents a comprehensive critical analysis of Liu Cixin's Dark Forest Theory, one of the most influential proposed solutions to the Fermi Paradox in contemporary science fiction and theoretical astrobiology. Through extensive literature review, mathematical analysis, and empirical evaluation, we identify fundamental limitations in the Dark Forest hypothesis, including technological determinism, static equilibrium assumptions, and oversimplified resource competition models. To address these shortcomings, we propose the Adaptive Equilibrium Theory (AET), a novel theoretical framework that incorporates dynamic game theory, technological (...) transcendence pathways, and spatial heterogeneity to provide a more sophisticated and empirically consistent model of galactic civilization dynamics. -/- Our analysis reveals that while the Dark Forest Theory offers compelling narrative explanations for the apparent absence of detectable alien civilizations, it fails to account for the complex, multi-dimensional nature of technological development, strategic evolution, and resource utilization that would characterize advanced interstellar civilizations. The Adaptive Equilibrium Theory addresses these limitations by proposing that galactic civilizations exist in a dynamic, multi-dimensional strategy space where multiple coexistence mechanisms enable diverse civilization types to survive and thrive without resorting to universal mutual destruction. -/- The implications of this research extend beyond theoretical astrobiology to practical considerations for human civilization's long-term survival strategies, SETI research methodologies, and our understanding of intelligence and cooperation in complex systems. We conclude that the universe, while potentially dangerous, is not necessarily the uniformly hostile "dark forest" envisioned by Liu Cixin, but rather a complex ecosystem where strategic adaptation and niche differentiation may enable peaceful coexistence among diverse forms of intelligence. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness rests on the claim that philosophical zombies—physical duplicates of conscious beings lacking phenomenal consciousness—are conceivable, and therefore metaphysically possible. This paper argues that this conceivability claim fails at the epistemic level, before any metaphysical debate can meaningfully proceed. Genuine first-person conceivability of a zombie would require conceiving of oneself lacking consciousness while retaining all physical and functional properties—a performatively impossible task, since conceiving is itself a conscious act requiring phenomenal presence. Attempts to conceive zombies either (...) (1) smuggle consciousness back in through covert phenomenal characterization (e.g., imagining darkness or emptiness) or (2) retreat to third-person stipulation, which lacks modal force. This failure is explained by the Phenomenal Absence Paradox: phenomenal characterization is defined only over states with phenomenal character, making first-person conception of phenomenal absence a category error. Once conceivability collapses, the hard problem loses its epistemic foundation, along with related arguments from Levine and Nagel. The paper concludes not with a metaphysical solution but with an epistemic dissolution, preserving the reality of consciousness while showing that the hard problem cannot survive scrutiny of what genuine conceivability requires. (shrink)

We explore the view that knowledge of grounding is based on knowledge of essence. We assess different existing accounts of the relation between essence and grounding and identify some of their shortcomings. In response, we propose a novel account that we argue is better suited to explain this relation and show how this can further explain knowledge of grounding. Finally, we examine how one can transition from knowledge of essence to knowledge of grounding. We maintain that, at least in some (...) cases, it is possible to know what grounds what—non-circularly and inferentially—on the basis of knowledge of essence. (shrink)

Several philosophers contend that a theistic multiverse (TM), a collective of all possible universes worthy of divine creation, is the best possible world, and that this fact proves helpful to theism in the face of various objections. Almeida (2017), however, argues that proposed theories of TM are incoherent. After presenting TM, I distinguish three objections Almeida raises against it: God cannot create universes corresponding to other possible worlds, we cannot know whether TM includes only worthwhile universes, and TM violates the (...) principle of plenitude. I show that none of these undermine TM’s potential to address various objections to theism. (shrink)

Can we, in keeping with Fine’s celebrated distinction between essential and merely-necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court, a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account will not deliver the goods on Fine’s celebrated example of Socrates and the set containing him. I argue (...) that, if we have available a notion of intrinsicality which applies to relations in a place-relative way, we avoid the problem. I give independent motivation for the idea that intrinsicality is place-relative, and discuss the philosophical options for understanding place-relative intrinsicality in a way that is suitable for a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account of essence. (shrink)

Modern science—and most theories of laws—are built around regularity (i.e., patterns that repeat or persist). Yet much of what we meet looks irregular. Irregularity Theory (IT) starts there. It asks what irregularity is, and what must be true of a world in which irregularities can appear at all. The answer is strict: even irregularity presupposes persisting order—a minimal structure that endures across neighbouring instants so that we can re-identify items through change and make sense of interactions across moments. From this, (...) a conditional follows wherever anything exists in our universe (or, more generally, in any domain), some persisting order must obtain. In that sense Absolute Irregularity—the total absence of any persisting order—is incompatible with existence. The result is not a theory of law; it is a pre-nomic constraint that any account of laws must respect. It clarifies how widespread irregular appearances can coexist with minimal order, and it sets the groundwork for further papers on Descartes’ cogito, reducing Foundationalism to physics, explaining why anything exists, and comparisons across law-theories (Humean Best-System: Lewis 1986; anti-Humean constraint/governing views: Maudlin 2007; for irregularity context: Miller 2014a). (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic overview of the contemporary debate on the notion of essence, highlighting important connections to classical interpretations. We begin by presenting the modal approach, which understands essence primarily through possible worlds semantics, critically assessing its limitations in capturing the full complexity of the notion. We then turn to the currently dominant primitivist approach, exploring its underlying intuitions and the possibility it opens for defining modalities in terms of essence. Finally, we propose an alternative framework that introduces (...) essence through the notion of numerical identity. By comparing these approaches, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of essence that bridges historical and contemporary philosophical thought, ultimately contributing to ongoing discussions in metaphysics. (shrink)

This thesis addresses a fundamental question in contemporary philosophy: Does ontological instability render intentional action futile, or does it reveal a deeper layer of ethical urgency grounded in participatory becoming? Traditional philosophical frameworks have assumed that effective intentional action requires a stable ontological foundation, leading to the apparent dilemma that either reality is stable enough to ground action or unstable enough to render action futile. This work challenges this binary through the development of Participatory Urgency Theory (PUT), a novel theoretical (...) framework that demonstrates how ontological instability enhances rather than undermines moral agency. -/- Through rigorous philosophical analysis, theoretical synthesis, and empirical modeling, this thesis argues that ontological instability creates the very conditions that make ethical action both possible and urgent. The research integrates insights from contemporary work on fluctuational metaphysics [1], process philosophy [2], intentional action theory [3], and emergency ethics [4] to develop a comprehensive framework that reconceptualizes the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. -/- The key findings demonstrate that: (1) ontological instability generates spaces of possibility where agency can emerge and intervene; (2) participatory becoming provides the foundation for distributed rather than individual agency; (3) ethical urgency arises from our role as co-creators of reality rather than external observers; and (4) fluctuational ethics offers a more responsive and creative approach to moral reasoning than traditional rule-based systems. -/- The thesis contributes to philosophy through the introduction of Participatory Urgency Theory, which bridges metaphysics and ethics in a novel way, provides empirical predictions for testing philosophical claims, and offers practical implications for addressing contemporary global challenges. The work concludes that ontological instability, far from rendering action futile, reveals the fundamental ethical imperative of participating in reality's continuous becoming. (shrink)

As the name suggests, Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) entails the claim that structure is all there is. However, several critics have argued that OSR’s ontology is incomplete. There must be something ontologically significant beyond structure. I will suggest an ontology for these critics, one that invokes what Ladyman and Ross call “Kantian residue”. In doing so, I modify Rae Langton’s Kantian humility thesis to incorporate some extra-structural noumenal “something=x” (as Kant puts it). This involves positing (a) that a mysterious something=x (...) exists and (b) that something=x is responsible for structure (specifically structure’s non-arbitrary properties). Responsibility is a modal relation that is potentially equivalent to some asymmetric relation (causation, explanation, determination, grounding, or the like). Regarding the nature of something=x, I argue in deflationary spirit that we can only know that it is that which is responsible for structure. (shrink)

I argue that John Norton’s notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton’s possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case (...) of Norton’s logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it. (shrink)

The idea that abilities should be understood as a modal tie between one's motivational states and one's actions is at the core of the most prominent views of abilities. I develop a novel challenge against such views of ability arguing that all these accounts cannot properly account for inabilities and compulsions.

The modal ontological argument for God’s existence faces a symmetry problem: a seemingly equally plausible reverse modal ontological argument can be given for God’s non-existence. Here we argue that there are significant asymmetries between the modal ontological argument and its reverse that render the latter more compelling than the former. Specifically, the latter requires a weaker logic than the former and, unlike the former, avoids the symmetry problem. We also explore to what extent these observations represent a new pathway to (...) atheism. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Saul Kripke’s theory of rigid designation and a posteriori necessity through the lens of Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology. The analysis reveals that Kripke’s arguments conflate nomological impossibility (contingent scientific laws) with metaphysical necessity, committing a modal scope fallacy. By dissecting Kripke’s examples—such as rigid designators for singular terms ( this table, Elizabeth’s parents ) and universal terms ( heat is molecular motion, water is H₂O )—we demonstrate that his claims of necessary truths rely on implicit empirical (...) generalizations rather than essentialist metaphysics. Key objections include: 1. The Nomological Fallacy: Kripke mistakes contingent biological/physical laws (e.g., "humans have exactly two parents") for necessary truths, ignoring Popper’s distinction between falsifiable laws and metaphysical necessity. 2. Verbalism in Essentialism: Questions like "What is heat?" are definitional, not ontological; Kripke’s "necessary a posteriori truths" collapse into tautologies when stripped of redundant terminology. 3. Misapplied Modal Logic: Kripke’s inference from "law L prohibits X " to " X is metaphysically impossible" is invalid—a confusion of empirical regularity with logical necessity. The paper concludes that rigid designation, divorced from essentialism, reduces to trivial indexicality (e.g., "water" means H₂O on Earth but H₂SO₄ on Twin Earth), rendering the theory empirically vacuous. Kripke’s framework, while influential, ultimately rests on a category error corrected by Popper’s emphasis on contingent, falsifiable laws over metaphysical finality. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out a new argument for the coherence of indeterministic building and defend its premises. The argument hinges on the underexplored notion of indeterministic supervenience. First, I argue that the logical possibility of an indeterministic supervenience relation entails the coherence of indeterministic building. Second, I argue that indeterministic supervenience is indeed logically possible. I conclude that there is a straightforward argument for the coherence of indeterministic building that has so far gone unnoticed.

This is the final draft of the SEP entry "Branching time" by me and the great Alberto Zanardo. See external links for the published version.

Este trabalho apresenta, em linhas gerais, uma visão esquemática da arquitetura filosófica de um novo Sistema fundada sobre três pilares principais: (1) a formulação de uma condição lógico-metafísica absolutamente necessária — S(Ⓣ(φ)) — que estabelece o Ser como condição universal e intranscendível de toda proposição e fato verdadeiros; (2) a demonstração metafísica, por via de um argumento alético-modal, da impossibilidade do nada absoluto e, por conseguinte, da necessidade de um Ser absoluto, identificado como Deus em sentido estritamente filosófico; (3) a (...) construção de uma ontologia estrutural estratificada unida a uma teoria da verdade, em que Deus é concebido como ultraestrutura da Verdade Transcendente (Verdade Absoluta ⇄ Vida Absoluta ⇄ Vontade Absoluta), fundamento superior da hiperestrutura axial imanente (Verdadeiridade ⇄ Belezidade ⇄ Bonidade), por sua vez fundamento da superestrutura fático-proposicional (T(p) ⇄ F). A tridimensão é unificada por um princípio dialético-ontoeinailógico radical — o da identidade autocontraditada —, pelo qual o sistema propõe uma filosofia do Ser como Verdade, em que o pensamento reencontra a possibilidade de afirmar o absoluto por meio da razão. Trata-se de uma proposta original que reabilita a ambição sistemática e restitui à filosofia a tarefa fundamental de pensar, de forma rigorosa e afirmativa, aquilo que “necessariamente é”, o objeto próprio da einailogia. (shrink)

This work presents, in general terms, a schematic view of the philosophical architecture of a new System based on three main pillars: (1) the formulation of an absolutely necessary logical-metaphysical condition — S((T)(φ)) — which establishes Being as a universal and untranscendable condition of every true proposition and fact; (2) the metaphysical demonstration, by means of an alethical-modal argument, of the impossibility of absolute nothingness and, consequently, of the need for an absolute Being, identified as God in a strictly philosophical (...) sense; (3) the construction of a stratified structural ontology united to a theory of truth, in which God is conceived as the ultrastructure of Transcendent Truth (Absolute Truth ⇄ Absolute Life ⇄ Absolute Will), the superior foundation of the immanent axial hyperstructure (Truthfulness ⇄ Beauty ⇄ Goodness), in turn the foundation of the factual-propositional superstructure (T(p) ⇄ F). The three-dimension is unified by a radical dialectical-ontoeinailogical principle — that of self-contradicted identity — by which the system proposes a philosophy of Being as Truth, in which thought rediscovers the possibility of affirming the absolute by means of reason. It is an original proposal that rehabilitates systematic ambition and restores to philosophy the fundamental task of thinking, in a rigorous and affirmative way, what "necessarily is", the proper object of einailogy. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta o argumento alético-modal como uma demonstração filosófico-conceitual rigorosa da necessidade do Ser Absoluto. Argumenta-se que, se tudo fosse contingente, o nada absoluto seria possível; no entanto, tal hipótese revela-se logicamente e metafisicamente incoerente, pois contradiz as condições de inteligibilidade e de verdade. Conclui-se, portanto, que uma necessidade absoluta deve ser afirmada. O argumento defende que a necessidade, enquanto modalidade alética, pressupõe um fundamento no Ser e não pode ser reduzida à pura formalidade lógica. Assim, a necessidade afirmada (...) não é meramente epistêmica ou formal, mas metafísica - o que justifica a identificação de Deus como o Ser Absoluto e Necessário no passo final decisivo. (shrink)

This paper presents the alethic-modal argument as a rigorous philosophicalconceptual demonstration of the necessity of the Absolute Being. It is argued that if everything were contingent, absolute nothingness would be possible; however, such a hypothesis proves to be logically and metaphysically incoherent, as it contradicts the conditions of intelligibility and truth. It is concluded, therefore, that an absolute necessity must be affirmed. The argument maintains that necessity, as an alethic modality, presupposes a foundation in Being and cannot be reduced to (...) mere logical formality. Thus, the affirmed necessity is not merely epistemic or formal, but metaphysicalwhich justifies identifying God as the Absolute and Necessary Being in the final decisive step. (shrink)

Two approaches to elevating certain laws of nature over others have come to prominence recently. On the one hand, according to the meta-laws approach, there are meta-laws, laws which relate to laws as those laws relate to particular facts. On the other hand, according to the modal, or non-absolutist, approach, some laws are necessary in a stricter sense than others. Both approaches play an important role in current research, questioning the ‘orthodoxy’ represented by the leading philosophical theories of natural laws—Humeanism, (...) the DTA view, dispositional essentialism and primitivism. This paper clarifies the relations between these two emerging approaches, as well as their applicability to physical laws and the status of the challenges they pose for standard theories of laws of nature. We first argue that, despite some significant similarities between the two approaches (especially in the context of Lange’s counterfactual account of laws), they are in general distinct and largely independent of each other. Then, we argue that the support for meta-laws from physical theory and practice is more questionable than usually presented. (shrink)

Quantum theory might make the cosmos more certain than classical physics ever did.

Some definitions of deduction are offered. The first is that deduction is an inference type that is both possibly valid and possibly invalid. No inference can satisfy this definition, because valid inferences are not possibly invalid and invalid inferences are not possibly valid. In the second definition, deduction is understood as an inference that is possibly valid or possibly invalid, but not both. The trouble with this definition is that inductive inferences will have to be considered deductive, since they are (...) possibly invalid. The third definition is of a deduction as an inference that aims for validity. The problem now is that invalid inferences can’t aim for validity since they are not possibly valid. This problem can be overcome by arguing that reasoners will aim for validity with invalid inferences when they resemble valid ones. But being apparently valid is synonymous with being possibly valid. So there are no deductive inferences as such. Only valid inferences. (shrink)

In relation to inferences, there is a tendency to conflate metaphysical with epistemic modalities. Concerning deductive inferences, necessity is conflated with certainty, but deductive inferences can be just likely based on the available evidence. Non-deductive inferences are defined by their uncertainty, but their epistemic status is insufficient to distinguish them from deductive inferences.

This paper responds to Friend’s (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science and the structure of modal space.

Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this paper, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We (...) should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns. (shrink)

Thought experiments feature prominently in both scientific and philosophical methods. In this paper, I investigate two questions surrounding knowledge in the thought experiment process. First, on what implicit knowledge do thought experiments rely? Second, what provides epistemic justification for beliefs acquired through the process? I draw upon neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology to argue that essence is the object of implicit knowledge that anchors the imagined possibilities involved in thought experiments to the actual world, and that this essentialist knowledge enables (...) the possibility of prima facie justification being conferred by the phenomenological givenness of thought experiment scenarios. (shrink)

Šis straipsnis padalintas į tris dalis. Pirmojoje ir antrojoje dalyse pristatau žinomą Ištroškusio keliautojo mintinį eksperimentą ir analizuoju, kaip Carolina Sartorio aiškina jo kauzalinę struktūrą. Teigiu, kad kruopštesnis nagrinėjimas atveria šio aiškinimo spragas. Trečiojoje dalyje nagrinėju Sartorio siūlomą naują moralinės sėkmės rūšį, kurią, jos manymu, Ištroškusio keliautojo atvejis atskleidžia. Toliau išplečiu argumentacijos lauką apžvelgdamas kitas šiuolaikines moralinės sėkmės kategorijas ir darau išvadą, kad visos jos nepakankamai apgalvotos.

This essay defends two theses regarding the explanation, or ground, of modality in the early modern period. First, for philosophers in the period, essences ground a range of important modal facts. Second, as the period progresses, we witness increased skepticism about certain modal facts, due to a growing skepticism about the scope or existence of essences. These theses are supported by examination of three case studies: Descartes’ treatment of substance and mode (which forms the core of his ontology); Malebranche’s treatment (...) of causation (which bears on his defense of occasionalism); and Locke’s treatment of necessary connections among properties (which is related to his accounts of individuals and kinds). It is shown that in each case, claims about necessity and possibility take center stage, and that in each case, the status of these claims hinges on the status of claims about essences. (shrink)

Rozwiązanie paradoksów Rossa i Priora okazało się trudnym zadaniem. Jego pierwsze dwa etapy, obejmujące identyfikację prawdziwych natur implikacji i wartości logicznych, zostały opisane w artykułach "Rozwiązanie paradoksu implikacji materialnej – 2024" i "Rozwiązanie dylematu Jörgensena – 2024". Ten artykuł opisuje trzeci etap, obejmujący odkrycie brakujących funktorów modalnych i Klasycznego Rachunku Modalności. Na zakończenie zostają podane procedury rozwiązania obu paradoksów.

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is only one basic object: the entire cosmos. Priority monists often take this to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. I explore the consequences of modalizing the priority monist thesis. I argue that, modulo some assumptions, the modalized thesis entails the necessary existence of the actual cosmos. I further argue that, if the modalized thesis is true, and the actual cosmos necessarily exists, then the only possible concrete objects are the actually existing ones.

According to First-Person Realism, one's own first-person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged in some way. After clarifying First-Person Realism by reference to parallel debates in the metaphysics of modality and time, I survey eight different arguments in favor of First-Person Realism.

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, (...) and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes. (shrink)

We ordinarily think that we human beings have agency: we have control over our choices and make a difference to our environments. Yet it is not obvious how agency can fit into a physical world that is governed by exceptionless laws of nature. In particular, it is unclear how agency is possible if those laws are deterministic and the universe functions like a mechanical clockwork. In this short paper, I first explain the apparent conflict between agency and physical determinism (referring (...) to recent work by Helen Steward on "agency incompatibilism"), then review some salient responses one might give to this conflict, and finally sketch a response that rests on a distinction between “physical” and “agential possibilities.” Agency, I suggest, is a higher-level phenomenon, which comes with its own level-specific notion of possibility, and it cannot be adequately analyzed in physical terms alone or just through the lens of physical possibility. (The paper was written as an informal position paper for a symposium on "Possibilities".). (shrink)

A model of metaphysics associated with EJ Lowe and Tuomas Tahko sees metaphysics as involving a priori knowledge of possible essences, or at least modal facts, and delimiting the actual ‘ontological categories,’ the ultimate and essential divisions of what exists, based on the results of a posteriori scientific investigation. Their approach to metaphysics has been criticized by those who argue that such metaphysics is unsuitably a priori, disconnected with empirical research in natural science, and ends up failing to provide meaningful (...) constraints on metaphysical theorization. I present different epistemological and semantic worries about these accounts to motivate an alternative perspective on which metaphysics centers on form, rather than possibility. This scholastic perspective is shown to incorporate the skeptical insights as constitutive of its approach to existence, by way of the position that ‘being’ is not a genus. Rather, ‘being’ is a determinable. The scholastic approach can thus provide responses to the skeptics, since it denies that ontological categories – in the Lowe/Tahko sense – are what metaphysicians investigate and proposes a different view of ontological categories as classes of forms. (shrink)

Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts (...) of these authors and their followers onto more pressing foundational issues in the metaphysics of powers. (shrink)

This paper discusses the account of alethic modality as presented by Wilfrid Sellars in his earlier work from 1947 to 1958. Its aim is twofold. First, I discuss Sellars' analysis by exploring its historical relationship to Carnap's account of modality. I argue that Carnap's early syntactic treatment of modality profoundly influenced Sellars' own so-called ‘regulist' account of modality in terms of rules of inference. Furthermore, it is suggested that Sellars' lesser-known possible worlds analysis was influenced by Carnap's later semantic account (...) of modality. The second aim of the paper is a critical one. I raise a number of objections to Sellars’ account of modality and argue that his account confronts some serious limitations. I also argue that Sellars does not provide a satisfying explanation of the relationship between his regulist account and his possible worlds analysis. I offer such an explanation by arguing that his regulist account should be understood as a pragmatic account of what is conveyed by the use of modal sentences, whereas his possible worlds analysis is a semantic account of the asserted content of modal statements. That is, the regulist account and the possible worlds analysis have different explanatory targets. (shrink)

Grounding necessitarianism (GN) is the view that full grounds necessitate what they ground. Although GN has been rather popular among philosophers, it faces important counterexamples: For instance, A=[Socrates died] fully grounds C=[Xanthippe became a widow]. However, A fails to necessitate C: A could have obtained together with B=[Socrates and Xanthippe were never married], without C obtaining. In many cases, the debate essentially reduces to whether A indeed fully grounds C – as the contingentist claims – or if instead C is (...) fully grounded in A+, namely A plus some supplementary fact S (e.g. [Xanthippe was married to Socrates]) – as the necessitarian claims. Both sides typically agree that A+ necessitates C, while A does not; they disagree on whether A or A+ fully grounds C. This paper offers a novel defence of the claim that, in these typical cases, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C – thereby bringing further support to GN. First and foremost, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C because it fails to contain just what is relevant to do so, in two distinct senses – explanatory and generative relevance. Second, going for A, rather than A+, as a full ground undermines not just grounding necessitarianism, but modally weaker views which even contingentists may want to preserve. (shrink)

I argue that it is metaphysically necessary that: (i) every fundamental entity is conscious, and (ii) every fundamental property is a phenomenal property.

A widely debated issue in contemporary metaphysics is whether the modal profile of ordinary objects has to be explained in non-modal terms (that is, Thesis 1). However, how to solve such an issue with respect to occurrences – namely, processes and events – is a question that has been largely neglected in the current metaphysical debate. The general goal of this article is to start filling this gap. As a first result of the article, we make it plausible that, if (...) Thesis 1 holds for objects, then it also holds for processes and events. Then, we develop a metaphysical account of processes derived from Fine’s (1999, 2022) suggestions, according to which a process is a variable embodiment that is manifested by different events at the different times it goes on – namely, Thesis 2. We raised the challenge from the completion of a process that asks the Finean account of processes to explain relevant modal features of processes in non-modal terms. As a second result, we argue that four initially plausible strategies for solving such a challenge fall short of solving it. As a third result, we show that the theory of variable embodiments Fine formulates for objects must differ from the theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. We conclude by investigating some revisions to a theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. (shrink)

In previous works, an ontology of properties for quantum mechanics has been proposed, according to which quantum systems are bundles of properties with no principle of individuality. The aim of the present article is to show that, since quasi-set theory is particularly suited for dealing with aggregates of items that do not belong to the traditional category of individual, it supplies an adequate meta-language to speak of the proposed ontology of properties and its structure.