Singular Terms

According to the DP hypothesis, the merger of a determiner and a noun yields a determiner phrase (DP) rather than a noun phrase (nP). Focusing on Spanish, I defend the DP hypothesis but reject the notion that argumenthood is contingent upon a DP layer. Instead, I maintain that arguments can be as small as nP provided that they are c-commanded by a verb or a preposition, in which case the variables that they introduce are bound through a last-resort operation of (...) existential closure. I then consider the ways in which functional projections above nP shape the denotation of nominal arguments and adopt Borer’s (2005) view that a division phrase (DivP) is responsible for countability. Nonplural indefinite expressions can either have mass or singular readings depending on the determiner ("mucho tomate" 'much tomato' versus "un tomate" 'a tomato'), whereas nonplural definite expressions can have both mass and singular readings no matter the determiner ("el/este/mi tomate" 'the/this/my tomato'). I attribute the systematic ambiguity of nonplural definite expressions to the absence of DivP in their structure and the maximality operator that is a component of definiteness. -/- Throughout the thesis, I explore the formal representation of φ-features and how their semantic behaviour is conditioned by their syntactic position. I propose that gender features have consequences for interpretation when they are hosted by Panagiotidis’s (2019) animacy phrase (AnimP) but not by nP and extend this argument to number features on DivP versus nP, thereby eliminating the need for "interpretable" and "uninterpretable" versions of the same feature. As for pronouns, it is not immediately apparent where they are generated in Spanish because they are not mutually exclusive with the definite article ("nosotros los cocineros" 'we the chefs'). After upholding Höhn’s (2016, 2017) claim that pronouns originate in a dedicated person phrase (πP) in languages that use the definite article in pronoun-noun constructions, I address the issue of the third-person gap ("*ellos los cocineros" 'they the chefs') and argue that third-person pronouns are forms that realize π, D, Div, Anim, and n, a configuration that prevents other material from occupying these same heads. (shrink)

Clapp (2023) develops an account for explaining the meaning of later utterances of mythical names called the Conversely Conditional Co-reference proposal (hereinafter cococo-reference proposal for short). According to Clapp, this proposal consists of three components: a complex intention, an intermediary disjunctive content, and a final content. In this essay, I examine the cococo-reference proposal to reveal a flaw in it. I argue that the cococo-reference proposal actually has a fourth component, namely a principle called “the consistency between intention and belief”. (...) This principle is embedded implicitly in Clapp’s argument. Once the consistency principle is uncovered, I combine it with the complex intention and also the intermediary disjunctive content, to reveal that the cococo-reference proposal cannot coherently explain the meaning of a later utterance of sentences such as “Vulcan does not exist”. This is because the explanation offered by this proposal results in a conflict between belief and intention: we will be required to hold intentions that our beliefs prevent us from holdings, and we will be ascribed beliefs that are in conflict with our intentions. Therefore, the explanation of later utterances of sentences such as “Vulcan does not exist” is the Achilles’ heel of Clapp’s cococo-reference proposal. (shrink)

Engrams—physical memory traces resulting from specific experiences—are the central posits of modern memory science. In this paper, I examine engrams through the lens of the theory of mental files. Integrating evidence from a variety of research programs, I argue that engrams exhibit the core functional properties of mental files. I characterize them as discrete informational structures, formed upon individual experiences of events and causally involved in their subsequent recall. Engrams are plausibly structurally complex in a file-like way, consisting of a (...) stable hippocampal index, which may function as an atomic pointer-like component, and a distributed cortical representation of an event’s properties. As such, they afford transmission of content and referential stability during potential content change. Their deployment is constitutive of the capacity for singular reference in episodically remembering particular previously experienced events. This emerging picture of engrams should engender reasonable optimism about the prospects of causal-representational theories of memory. (shrink)

This thesis provides an account of acquaintance with abstract objects. The notion of acquaintance is integral to theorising on reference and singular thought, since it is generally taken to be the relation that must exist between a subject and an object, in order for the subject to refer to, and entertain singular thoughts about the object. The most common way of understanding acquaintance is as a form of causal connection. However, this implies a problem. We seem to be able to (...) refer and have singular thoughts about abstract objects. But given that abstract objects are causally inert, this would mean that we are unable to become acquainted with them. This problem shall be the focus of this thesis. I first argue that these traditional causal interpretations of acquaintance are lacking. Instead, I show that acquaintance is dependent to some degree on factors internal to the subject, namely the skills that they possess. From doctors to sommeliers to mathematicians (and possibly even philosophers!) – these subjects seem to succeed in becoming acquainted with certain objects precisely in virtue of their respective skills. Thus, building off from Evans’ The Varieties of Reference, I present a novel account of acquaintance, which I term as Skill-based Acquaintance (SBA). On SBA, a subject is said to be acquainted with an object when they possess discriminating knowledge of that object, gained through the use of their capacities and skills. The SBA account is applied to virtual (Ch.3), fictional (Ch.4), and mathematical objects (Ch.5), as well as God (Ch.6). SBA is successful in explaining how subjects can indeed become acquainted with these problematic categories of objects - some of which are abstract – thus being able to refer and entertain singular thoughts about them. Overall, then, SBA is shown to have greater explanatory power than competing accounts and should thus be preferred. (shrink)

In a 2019 paper, Hausmann raised a new and interesting problem for Kripke’s account of negative existentials. He argued that Kripke’s account leads to the absurd consequence that anybody who has good reasons to believe that there are no propositions also has good reasons to believe that he or she does not exist. In this paper I propose a modified Kripkean theory, which is invulnerable to a Hausmann-like argument. As will be seen, the modified theory can be squarely justified in (...) light of the key observations behind Kripke’s original proposal. (shrink)

The need for the definite article to express a singular kind ("the cat") in the Germanic languages is predicted by Borer's (2005) structural approach to the mass-count distinction. Chierchia's (1998) "down" operator can apply to nPs to derive mass kinds ("rice") and to DivPs to derive plural kinds ("cats"), but there is no determinerless structure that exclusively denotes properties of atomic individuals to which this same operator can apply to derive singular kinds. The only alternative is the process that Chierchia (...) proposes for plural kinds in Romance, where the definite article returns a maximal individual that can be intensionalized into a kind. In articleless languages like Mandarin, this account allows for a universal property-denoting denotation of nP and simultaneously captures the fact that singular kinds have the same distribution as mass kinds. (shrink)

It is common in contemporary metaphysics to distinguish two levels of ontology: the ontology of ordinary objects and the ontology of fundamental reality. This papers argues that natural language reflects not only the ontology of ordinary objects, but also a language-driven ontology, which is involved in the mass-count distinction and part-structure-sensitive semantic selection, as well as perhaps the light ontology of pleonastic entities. The paper recasts my older theory of situated part structures without situations, making use of a primitive notion (...) of unity. (shrink)

Almost entirely ignored in the linguistic theorising on names and descriptions is a hybrid form of expression which, like definite descriptions, begin with 'the' but which, like proper names, are capitalised and seem to lack descriptive content. These are expressions such as the following, 'the Holy Roman Empire', 'the Mississippi River', or 'the Space Needle'. Such capitalised descriptions are ubiquitous in natural language, but to which linguistic categories do they belong? Are they simply proper names? Or are they definite descriptions (...) with unique orthography? Or are they something else entirely? This paper assesses two obvious assimilation strategies: (i) assimilation to proper names and (ii) assimilation to definite descriptions. It is argued that both of these strategies face major difficulties. The primary goal is to lay the groundwork for a linguistic analysis of capitalised descriptions. Yet, the hope is that clearing the ground on capitalised descriptions may reveal useful insights for the on-going research into the semantics and syntax of their lower-case or 'the'-less relatives. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question whether it is possible to explain the notion of a singular term without invoking the notion of an object or other ontological notions. The framework here is that of Michael Dummett's discussion in Frege: Philosophy of Language. I offer an emended version of Dummett's conditions, accepting but modifying some suggestions made by Bob Hale, and defend the emended conditions against some objections due to Crispin Wright. This paper dates from about 1989. It originally formed part (...) of a very early draft of what became my Ph.D. dissertation. I rediscovered it and began scanning it, when I had nothing better to do, in Fall 2001, making some minor editing changes along the way. Suffice it to say that it no longer represents my current views. I hope, however, that it remains of some small interest. (shrink)