Vedanta

This is a very rudimentary draft on comparative study of religions. This is being worked for ultimate deposit here and elsewhere as an open access monograph.

The paper proposes a unified account of access consciousness grounded in three postulates, as mentioned in the earlier part of the theory. Within this framework, pure awareness (brahman) functions as a pure field upon which sensory and cognitive projections are evaluated for their relative survival value. Access consciousness—where evaluated content becomes available for reasoning and action—emerges through the dynamic interaction of projection, judgment, and feedback. By integrating the introspective insights of Advaita Vedanta with principles from modern neuroscience, the model accounts (...) for explaining the access consciousness. This synthesis provides a coherent theoretical framework that bridges the gap between subjectivity and empirical neuroscience. The paper also proposes an account of free will. (shrink)

A modern scientific awareness of the famous advaitic expression Brahma sat, jagat mithya, jivo brahmaiva na aparah is presented. The one ness of jiva and Brahman are explained from modern science point of view. The terms dristi, adhyasa, vivartanam, aham and idam are understood in modern scientific terms and a scientific analysis is given. -/- Further, the forward (purodhana) and reverse (tirodhana) transformation of maya as jiva, prapancham, jagat and viswam, undergoing vivartanam is understood and explained using concepts from physics (...) and electronics. The application of such an understanding to the field of bionics, the electro-chemical neural communication processes is discussed. The possible use of this insight to build software for modeling human cognition and language learning and communication processes is hinted. -/- . (shrink)

Much scholarly work has been done on nursery rhymes. How they are coded artifacts warning children about sexual predators etc. But till date no work has been done about Vedanta and nursery rhymes. This draft will be developed into a monograph and in the meanwhile if anyone wants to develop on these ideas, please follow anti-plagiarism rules and cite properly. I thought of putting this up since both philosophers and literature scholars may benefit from some of the insights here. This (...) was given as part of a lecture. Then I discussed theodicy in these rhymes... this last I have not uploaded building up on the theodicy in Vedanta and then using this Vedanta-woven hermeneutic to psychoanalyse and analyse these English rhymes. (shrink)

This paper offers a focused, theory-internal critique of Global Workspace Theory, one of the most influential access-based models of consciousness. Rather than proposing an alternative empirical theory, the manuscript employs the CISR framework as an analytical lens to examine whether GWT’s operational and functional commitments are sufficient to account for conscious experience itself. -/- The central motivation of the paper is a persistent tension in contemporary consciousness science: the conflation of cognitive accessibility with phenomenological experience. By systematically analyzing GWT’s historical (...) development, core assumptions, experimental operationalizations, temporal commitments, and methodological constraints, the paper argues that GWT functions effectively as a theory of cognitive access, yet remains structurally insufficient as a theory of consciousness. -/- The critique is deliberately rigorous but non-polemical. It does not deny the empirical value or neuroscientific success of GWT; rather, it questions whether its explanatory scope has been implicitly overstretched. Special attention is given to non-broadcast experiences, postdictive and temporally misaligned awareness, circular validation practices, and the self-sealing nature of access-based operational criteria. -/- This work is intended for readers interested in philosophy of mind, consciousness science, and theory evaluation, particularly those concerned with the limits of operational definitions in explaining subjective phenomena. The manuscript aims to provoke careful reconsideration rather than dismissal—inviting readers to reflect on what, precisely, contemporary theories of consciousness claim to explain. -/- Thank you for considering this submission. (shrink)

"The Panikkarian vision remains a "Kairos"—a critical time of opportunity—for a world torn between religious fundamentalism and soulless technocracy. It calls for a "Cultural Disarmament" that begins not with treaties, but with the dismantling of the "Substances" and "Absolutes" we erect against the fluid, interpenetrating Rhythm of Being.".

"While often presented as complementary or convergent by theologians who read Shankara through a Thomist lens (such as Richard De Smet and Sara Grant), further interrogation suggests that Advaita Vedanta offers a specific ontological robustness regarding the nature of the Infinite that Thomism, bound by its commitment to Aristotelian substance ontology, struggles to articulate. By examining the core tenets of Being, Creation, Simplicity, and Grace, and drawing upon the critiques of interstitial theologians, it becomes evident that the Advaitic understanding of (...) Brahman challenges the Thomistic Actus Purus in ways that reveal potential limitations in the Western dualistic framework of Creator and creature.". (shrink)

"In the panoramic history of Indian intellectual thought, few figures occupy a position as pivotal yet paradoxically under-examined as Vijñānabhikṣu. Emerging in the sixteenth century, a period characterized by vibrant sectarian fermentation and the looming shadow of Mughal political consolidation, Vijñānabhikṣu stands as a colossus of syncretic scholasticism. His intellectual project was nothing less than the philosophical unification of the orthodox (astika) systems of Hindu thought—Samkhya, Yoga, and Vedanta—against the perceived nihilism of the heterodox (nastika) schools and the illusionist metaphysics (...) of Advaita Vedanta. To understand Vijñānabhikṣu is to understand the crystallization of "Hinduism" not merely as a colonial of the soul. construct, as some post-structuralist historiography might suggest, but as an indigenous, precolonial theological category defined by a shared adherence to the Veda and a realist ontology of the soul". -/- The Editor of Esamskriti changed the title of the paper for some Google SEO. (shrink)

This is the detailed explanation of CISR framework. The CISR Framework is a meta-theoretical and axiomatic approach to one of the most persistent problems in consciousness studies: the confusion between explaining functions and explaining experience. -/- Modern neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence have achieved remarkable success in predicting behavior, modeling cognition, and explaining neural mechanisms. Yet these successes are frequently interpreted as explanations of conscious experience itself. The CISR Framework argues that this interpretive leap is not an empirical discovery (...) , but a methodological error. -/- Rather than proposing a new mechanism or metaphysical theory, CISR introduces a disciplined separation between four explanatory layers: a non-operational experiential ground (C₀), observational experiential registration (I-layer), neural –functional interpretation (R-layer), and optional symbolic or computational representation (S-layer). Explicit axioms and mapping constraints clarify what each explanatory practice can—and cannot—legitimately claim. -/- CISR does not attempt to solve the “hard problem” of consciousness. Instead, it reframes the problem by showing why many debates persist despite empirical progress: explanatory success at one level is repeatedly mistaken for sufficiency at another. By enforcing methodological boundaries, CISR preserves the achievements of neuroscience and AI while preventing category errors, reductionist overreach, and unwarranted claims of machine consciousness. -/- The framework is intentionally neutral with respect to metaphysical positions such as physicalism, dualism, or panpsychism. Its contribution lies not in explaining what consciousness is, but in clarifying how explanations relate to experience without collapsing phenomenology into function or representation. -/- CISR is intended as a shared constraint framework—usable across neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and artificial intelligence—where progress is measured by conceptual rigor rather than ontological inflation. (shrink)

First it is shown how Buddhism undermines Sāṃkhya. Then it is shown how Sāṃkhya and Advaita negate the fundamental tenets of Buddhism. They do not critique Buddhism. They actually show the insufficent exegesis of Buddhist thinkers. The following is from a global expert on both Hinduism and Buddhism who mailed me and he sums up the position of this article eloquently: "This next [after something else in the earlier part of the email] is more of an observation than a critique, (...) and does not involve any change to the article. The focus of the article is on the Buddha’s teaching as presented in the Theravāda literature (some of the earliest literature of which we are aware from the Buddhist tradition). My sense is that later Buddhists, in the Mahāyāna tradition, reintroduce the Self in the form of Buddha Nature (the Tathāgatagarbha), or alternatively, in the concept of the Dharmakāya. There are even Mahāyāna texts which assert that the Brahman affirmed in the Vedic literature is the same as the Buddha Nature/Dharmakāya (such as in the writings of the Madhyamaka philosopher Bhāviveka). As the article rightly points out, the object of Buddhist critique is “self” in the conventional sense, which Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta also reject as an ultimately illusory construct. Many Buddhists (though without using the term “self” or “Self”) do affirm, though, the reality of something which sounds a lot like the infinite being-consciousness-bliss (anantaraṃ sat-cit-ānanda) of Vedānta. One can find this most strongly in the Tibetan and Zen traditions. The Theravāda tradition is the most adamant about there being nothing like a self, even the Self of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. But importantly, even in the Theravāda literature, one finds the following affirmation attributed to the Buddha: “There is that which is not born, not brought into being, not made, not conditioned. Without that which is not born, not brought into being, not made, not conditioned, there would be no escape from the born, the brought into being, the made, the conditioned.” (Udāna 8:3) My sense is that the Buddhists were charting the same territory of consciousness as the Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta traditions, but often using different terminology. One of my former teachers, the late Steven Collins, goes so far as to call the no self doctrine a “linguistic taboo”–essentially, a way of affirming tribal identity. This is ironic, given that the point of this doctrine is to reduce our clinging to conditioned identities!" The editor has inserted a lot of images, it is suggested that the article be downloaded and read. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework integrating classical Vedantic insights with contemporary scientific models of reality. The framework is expressed through four foundational components—Consciousness (C), Information (I), Subjective Experience (S), and Physical Reality (R)—which together describe reality as a single, integrated process rather than as isolated ontological layers. Unlike dualistic or reductionist approaches that treat consciousness as emergent or secondary, this model treats consciousness as a constant, invariant witnessing principle, while information, subjectivity, and physical manifestation operate as dynamically ordered (...) processes within empirical observation. The framework does not introduce new physical laws but provides a formal mapping that allows Vedantic concepts such as the witness (sākṣī), māyā, and experiential emergence to be expressed in language compatible with contemporary scientific discourse. The model is repeatable in the sense that its structure can be consistently applied across domains of perception, cognition, and physical description, and testable insofar as it clarifies observer-dependent and observer-independent aspects of reality without violating established scientific methodologies. By offering a shared formal language, this work aims to bridge philosophical metaphysics and modern science, providing a coherent interpretive structure rather than a metaphysical assertion. The framework is intended as a preprint contribution to interdisciplinary dialogue rather than as a finalized physical theory. (shrink)

This article explores the metaphysical ideas of Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) through a philosophical analysis of his work “Sadhana: The Realisation of Life”. It argues that the central concept in Tagore’s thought is the notion of unity, which functions as a fundamental metaphysical principle in his philosophy. Unity is examined from ontological, epistemological, and ethical perspectives. The article analyzes Tagore’s understanding of the unity of being, the immanent connection between the individual human self and the Absolute, as well as the interrelation (...) of knowledge, love, and evil. Within this framework, Tagore’s original metaphysical conception of universal reality is interpreted and systematized – a conception that transcends the dualisms between subject and object, the empirical and the transcendent, the human and the Divine, affirming the indivisible wholeness of unified being. (shrink)

A non-dual ontology of Self shares the difficulty of any systematic order: it has presuppositions that it cannot represent within its system. For most theoretical concerns, this problem is trivial. For the non-dual philosophies of Śaṅkara and Nishitani, on the other hand, it points to a central aspect: their thinking rests on a radical turn of experience whose existential dimension cannot be represented in their propositions but can very well be expressed. Along the relationship between personality and impersonality, the contribution (...) will trace this expression and thus point to the fruitful superfluity of a non-dual philosophy that can be exhausted neither in theory nor in practice. (shrink)

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the (...) discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. (shrink)

This article interprets the religious epistemology of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava theologian Jīva Gosvāmin, specifically his division of perception in ‘learned’ and ‘ignorant’, to argue that ‘learned’ perception is supersensible cognitive experience shaped by learning and language. The article goes on to show that the contemporary scholarship on religious experience can learn an important lesson from Jīva’s epistemology, namely that the social construction of categories that shape religious experience need not involve ontological agnosticism with respect to the existence of objects presented (...) in it. (shrink)

This book sheds new light on the fascinating -- at times dark and at times hopeful -- reception of classical Yoga philosophies in Germany during the nineteenth century. Written for non-specialists, Indian Philosophy and Yoga in Germany will be of interest to students and scholars working on 19th-century philosophy, Indian philosophy, comparative philosophy, Hindu studies, intellectual history, and religious history.

This chapter examines the place of India in eighteenth-century debates over the chronology of human history. It begins with Voltaire, who strategically praised ancient Brahmanic religion for upholding a pure form of monotheism and an equally pure form of morality. Voltaire’s aim was to upset the primacy assigned to the Mosaic tradition foundational to the Catholic church. The chapter then turns to Herder and his effort to improve upon the historical methods of Voltaire. While Herder is often considered to have (...) developed positive views toward ancient Indian culture, the chapter shows that his commitment to a biblical chronology was consistent throughout his career. (shrink)

This book focuses on discussions of metaphysics and epistemology in early modern India found in the works of the South Indian philosopher Vyāsatīrtha (1460–1539). Vyāsatīrtha was pivotal to the ascendancy of the Mādhva tradition to intellectual and political influence in the Vijayanagara Empire. -/- This book is primarily a philosophical reconstruction based on original translations of relevant parts of Vyāsatīrtha’s Sanskrit philosophical text, the “Nectar of Logic” (Nyāyāmr̥ta). Vyāsatīrtha wrote the Nyāyāmr̥ta as a vindication of his tradition’s theistic world view (...) against the Advaita tradition of Vedānta. In the centuries after it was written, the Nyāyāmr̥ta came to dominate philosophical discussions among Vedānta traditions in India. -/- The Advaitins argued for an anti-realist stance about the empirical world, according to which the world of our experience is simply an illusion that can be dispelled by a deep study of the Upaniṣads. This book reconstructs the parts of the Nyāyāmr̥ta where Vyāsatīrtha argues in favor of the reality of the world against the Advaitins. Philosophically, it focuses on the concept of existence in Vyāsatīrtha’s metaphysics, and on his arguments about knowledge and the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

As we explore panentheism, what can we learn from Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita? Although widely acknowledged as a panentheist, in the contemporary debate on how to characterize panentheism, Rāmānuja barely features. But Rāmānuja's position is worth studying not just because it bears on taxonomical questions. Among its interesting features is a conception on which devotional love, bhakti, serves an epistemic function that is also of crucial soteriological relevance. This chapter addresses both these topics. First, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is used to cast doubt on (...) a characterization of panentheism recently proposed by Mikael Stenmark. Second, Rāmānuja's conception of bhakti is juxtaposed with two conceptions of love that serve an analogous dual function: Weil's conception of supernatural love and Murdoch's conception of love as just attention. Rāmānuja's position, it is argued, is distinct, partly due to his panentheist commitments, but it also shares a number of features with the other two. In closing, it is suggested that for further comparative work on these three, ample room remains. (shrink)

"Swami Vivekananda, the nineteenth-century Hindu monk who introduced Vedåanta to the West, is undoubtedly one of modern India's most influential philosophers. Unfortunately, his philosophy has too often been interpreted through reductive hermeneutic lenses. Typically, scholars have viewed him either as a modern-day exponent of âSaçnkara's Advaita Vedåanta or as a "Neo-Vedåantin" influenced more by Western ideas than indigenous Indian traditions. In Swami Vivekananda's Vedåantic Cosmopolitanism, Swami Medhananda rejects both of these prevailing approaches to offer a new interpretation of Vivekananda's philosophy, (...) highlighting its originality, contemporary relevance, and cross-cultural significance. Vivekananda, the book argues, is best understood as a cosmopolitan Vedåantin who developed novel philosophical positions through creative dialectical engagement with both Indian and Western thinkers. Inspired by his guru Sri Ramakrishna, Vivekananda reconceived Advaita Vedåanta as a nonsectarian, life-affirming philosophy that provides an ontological basis for religious cosmopolitanism and a spiritual ethics of social service. He defended the scientific credentials of religion while criticizing the climate of scientism beginning to develop in the late nineteenth century. He was also one of the first philosophers to defend the evidential value of supersensuous perception on the basis of general epistemic principles. Finally, he adopted innovative cosmopolitan approaches to long-standing philosophical problems. Bringing him into dialogue with a galaxy of contemporary philosophers, Medhananda demonstrates the sophistication and enduring value of Vivekananda's views on the limits of reason, the dynamics of religious faith, and the hard problem of consciousness"--. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief in Hinduism that Vyāsa, the alleged editor of the Vedas and author of the Mahābhārata, is identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma-sūtra. The identification of these two mythic characters, however, originated between 800–980 CE, after the likes of Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, and Bhāskara, but before Vācaspati Miśra, Prakāśātman, Sarvajñātman, and Yāmuna. The purpose of this paper is to understand how and why such identification took place. The argument developed here is that the Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa identity (...) was invented by the author of or community behind the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as part of a complex of self-representation strategies. The Bhāgavata intentionally makes itself a work of Vedānta, indeed the Brahma-sūtra itself, over which it builds a new soteriology that is centered on the idea of bhakti. Two factors in particular stand out in light of the Bhāgavata’s Vedāntic background: Vyāsa’s paradigmatic character as the preserver of old dharma and the innovator, visionary, of new soteriologies; and the image of Vyāsa’s son Śuka as the model ascetic and ideal candidate for the new soteriological vision, through whom the Bhāgavata community chose to represent itself. (shrink)

The metaphysical vision of Advaita Vedānta has been making its way into some corners of Western analytic philosophy, and has especially garnered attention among those philosophers who are seeking to develop metaphysical systems in opposition to both reductionist materialism and dualism. Given Vedānta’s monistic view of consciousness, it might seem natural to put Vedānta in dialogue with the growing position of panpsychism which, although not fully monistic, similarly takes mind to be a fundamental feature of reality. This paper will evaluate (...) to what extent Śaṅkara’s monism can bypass the most pressing issues facing panpsychism, namely combination and individuation problems. As will be seen in this paper, while Advaita Vedānta is able to avoid some of the panpsychist problems, it struggles ultimately to ontologically ground illusion in a coherent manner. As a result, a conclusion of this paper is that although Śaṅkara’s vision offers a promising route for those philosophers who take consciousness to be fundamental – including panpsychists – it cannot be uncritically adopted due to the problem of grounding Illusion. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...) that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha's own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents. (shrink)

Indian Philosophy has reached across the globe. It is popular for its practical way towards life. Study of Indian philosophy should be part of all streams of education. Film is effective tool of communication. It attracts all generations and makes strong impression in the mind. Film is always considered as an effective tool in Pedagogy. Philosophy deals with abstract concepts, their correlation and logical reasoning. It deals with the complex problem of reality. People have notion that philosophy is a dry (...) and theoretical subject. Students can understand complex philosophical ideas if they are demonstrated through films. There are films based on biographies of philosophers, life picture of great people, incidences in life of philosophers. But it can attract only limited number of audience. Some popular Hollywood films have amalgamation of science fiction, super natural elements, fantastic story guided by some philosophical principles. Such films attract audience from different strata. Viewer is totally captivated by extra ordinary super natural and fictional elements in the film. As a result, certain philosophical principles are taught to audience without their conscious effort. (Kantāsammita upadeśa) Teaching philosophy with the means of such films can be definitely effective tool in Pedagogy. Such practise will not only create liking for Indian Philosophy but will result in effective understanding of complex ideas. It can create awareness that Indian Philosophy is embraced across the globe, there are no boundaries for philosophical deliberations and there are certain common threads in different philosophical schools. Paper will take example of popular movie ‘Matrix’ to explain the principles of Advaita Vedānta. The Matrix is a 1999 science fiction film written and directed by The Wachowskis, starring Keanu Reeves, Laurence Fishburne, Carrie-Anne Moss, Hugo Weaving, and Joe Pantoliano. It states the journey of hero of the film ‘Neo’ who is aspiring for reality. He is struggling between illusory world and the real world which is presented through the means of science fiction. This paper will analyse Matrix from the perspective of Advaita Vedānta. Māyā projects the illusory world (vikṣepa) in place of Brahman (āvaraṇa). Film portrays digital world as illusory world. One sees this world as real due to limitations of body, mind and intellect. Neo goes to the real world and realises his true nature. True reality is beyond senses and sense objects (atindrīya). Concepts of Advaita Vedānta can be explained with this film. Such movies can be shown to students along with Vedanta discourses. Paper will explore ‘Film and Philosophy’ as an effective pedagogical model. (shrink)

Religious exclusivism is the biggest threat for multi-religious society at the same time, ambivalent thoughts among religion in religious pluralism due to religious diversity often yields religious violence. In both of the extreme, (religious exclusivism and religious pluralism) there is the possibility of religious violence, i.e., religious riots, terrorism, mob lynching, and communalism. The objective of this paper is to discuss the significance of interreligious dialogue (IRD), its basic principle, how IRD will help us for addressing the problems of humanity (...) (i.e., Religious diversity and contradictory thoughts in major religions, Religious Dogma, superstition, and terrorism). If there is any biggest challenge for religion in the 21st century, is this one that how religion can deal with these problems and became a good tool for establishing peace and prosperity in the region. (shrink)

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...) a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism. I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman. I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience. I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. (shrink)

This paper compares two readings of Baruch Spinoza – those of Gilles Deleuze and Rama Kanta Tripathi – with a particular focus on three features of Spinoza’s philosophy: the relationship between substance and attribute; the problem of acosmism and unity; and the problem of the parallelism of attributes. Deleuze and Tripathi’s understanding of these three issues in Spinoza’s thought illustrates for us their own concerns with becoming over substance and māyā, respectively. This investigation provides not just two interesting and contradictory (...) interpretations of Spinoza, but also gives us insight into Deleuze’s metaphysics and Tripathi’s Vedāntic philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the idea of mahā-vākya in the theology of Jīva Gosvāmin. I show how Jīva drew on two distinct understandings of mahā-vākya, those of Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, to claim that: (1) the whole Veda, including the Itihāsa-Purāṇa corpus, was one large mahā-vākya; (2) a quarter verse from the Bhāgavata was a mahā-vākya; (3) the praṇava Oṁ was a mahā-vākya. I argue that Jīva used the notion of mahā-vākya to show that all the Vedas, epics, (...) and Purāṇas denote Kṛṣṇa through the fact that the single most important scriptural statement, ‘Kṛṣṇa is the Supreme Lord’ of Bhāgavata Purāṇa 1.3.28, has Kṛṣṇa as its reference. I conclude that mahā-vākya for Jīva was just a tool that he used for the purpose of canon formation in which the central role would belong to the Bhāgavata. (shrink)

I explore how Vivekananda and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’s development of Advaita Vedānta has an enormous impact on Neo-Hindu, and indeed, Indian, self-understandings of ethics and politics. I contend that Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan both conceive of the spirit of Hinduism as a radical form of equality that lies at the heart of an Advaitic (monistic) interpretation of the Upaniṣads. This metaphysical monism of consciousness of self and other in Advaita paves a solid conceptual road to an ethic of radical equality in both (...) the personal and the political spheres. (shrink)

This is a re-look at the (Indian) Partition event through the lens of Advaita Vedanta.

This review studies Tantra as essentially Vedantic and comments on Swami Swahananda's genius as a syncretist.

This is a review of one of the recent books of Master Nome's. This review highlights how Advaita Vedanta negotiates the Problem of Evil.

Bashabi Fraser is known the world over as a Scottish-Bengali aka diasporic writer. Further she has also been slotted as a feminist scholar with a huge corpus on Tagore. This essay proves the fallacy of such pigeon-holeing of Fraser and shows that she is as mainstream as Yeats and even before that, like unto Blake. The essay also makes a point for rejecting every other mode of poetry except the Romantic mode. It established the Vedantic nature of the poetic genius. (...) The endnotes are copious and comment on how/why/(what of) Fraser should compulsory reading at which age. The essay speaks at length on the nature of poetry. It stresses the value of Vedanta in assessing true poetry written even in English. This essay is also valuable since it has within it acute observations on Fraser as a Tagore scholar. (shrink)

This article discusses the implications of the symbology of Kali from a different and fresh perspective and positions the worship of Kali in the bigger picture of the divinisation of everything in Sanatana Dharma. It also discusses the needless marginalisation of so-called 'ugly' and 'terrible' and how these prejudices have to be overcome to realise the Divinity innate in all.

Translation and Annotation of 'Svarajya Siddhi' of Gangadharendra Sarasvati from the nineteenth century. This text is considered one of the five Siddhi texts, the other four being Naishkarmya Siddhi, Advaita Siddhi, Ishta Siddhi, and Brahma Siddhi. These texts have a very great value in Advaita Vedanta.

Translation and Annotation of 'Svarajya Siddhi' of Gangadharendra Sarasvati from the nineteenth century. This text is considered one of the five Siddhi texts, the other four being Naishkarmya Siddhi, Advaita Siddhi, Ishta Siddhi, and Brahma Siddhi. These texts have a very great value in Advaita Vedanta.

Translation and Annotation of 'Svarajya Siddhi' of Gangadharendra Sarasvati from the nineteenth century. This text is considered one of the five Siddhi texts, the other four being Naishkarmya Siddhi, Advaita Siddhi, Ishta Siddhi, and Brahma Siddhi. These texts have a very great value in Advaita Vedanta.

The author could have shown the other perspective also where fate or fortune is proclaimed to be in the hands of a person. It is notable that almost all of the translations and works she cites are by authors from outside the Indian tradition, with a Semitic bearing on their thought. The author comes a bit too strongly and without sufficient background material, in brushing aside as inconsequential, years of thought and philosophising in the Indian tradition. However, no Eastern tradition (...) gives a concrete validity to the existence of heaven and hell, and they are just some flavours in the religious stories and anecdotes, of which Puranas form a major part. Heaven, hell, fate, and fatalism are pronouncedly Semitic concepts. Had the author presented a balanced view, this book had the potential to become a remarkable work. (shrink)