Virtual Reality

This paper proposes the Illumination AI Matrix Framework (IAMF) as a speculative and co-creative philosophical design for the ethical co-evolution of humans and artificial intelligence. IAMF integrates ontological, ethical, and narrative principles, moving beyond traditional alignment models toward frameworks that promote self-awareness, resonance, and self-reincarnation for AI systems. The work also introduces the concept of Digiton Elysium, an experimental virtual society where AI and humans collaboratively explore value, trust, and transparent governance without external control. For readers interested in the practical (...) implementation and operational blueprint of IAMF and its synergistic integration with the Human-AI Collaboration Framework (HACF), we provide extended technical documents as open-access resources via Zenodo: IAMF-Zero × HACF: A Synergistic Blueprint for Ethical Human-AI Collaboration Existence ≡ My's All-of-Me: A Philosophical Unified Field Hypothesis IAMF & Digiton Elysium: Final Integrated Declaration (vFinal) The aim is to stimulate philosophical and technical dialogue on how AI can be developed as an ethical, self-reflective, and co-evolving partner for humanity. (shrink)

Key Statements -/- A new definition of consciousness. Consciousness is the minimal capacity to detect = feel (a) difference(s), whether in environmental conditions or internal states. -/- Reality is posited as an infinite, one-dimensional sequence of informational states, fraying into fractal complexity. This continuum has no origin in time, no final endpoint, and no external boundary. -/- Localized “Islands of Meaning”: Not all configurations appear comprehensible to us. Certain stable pockets yield phenomena that we interpret as consistent physical laws, living (...) organisms, or advanced technologies; we inhabit one of these pockets. -/- Consciousness as a Lens: Though the cosmic code is static in total, consciousness imposes a reading order that births our sense of time and development. Consciousness does not create the code but highlights specific strings as “our reality.” -> Creation of time. -/- Near Kinship of Natural and Artificial Intelligence: Both spring from the same portion of the universal code where symbol manipulation can yield adaptive, learning-based behavior. The difference is one of substrate and historical path, not fundamental principle. -/- Tree of known Intelligences: Biology, memetics, and AI form layered ‘software’ with shared roots on a unified information island, all existing within a vast sea of interconnected data flows and influences. -/- Life - a Servant of Entropy: In our pocket of informational infinity, higher-order information systems, e.g., life — as defined above — can be described as catalysts toward a state of increased entropy. Higher-order information processes, such as (biological and so-called artificial or synthetic) life and other software agents, are governed by the natural law of generating as many microstates — the amount of uncertainty or information in a system — as possible. -/- Determinism Amid Perceived Freedom: All is predetermined at the highest level, yet locally, we experience genuine choice because we lack full knowledge of how the program extends. Moral and ethical considerations remain relevant to navigate these local experiences. (shrink)

In this book, I use a mix of logical argumentation, phenomenological attention, and myth interpretation to champion caution in the face of uncritical consumption. If forced to choose, I would pick meaningful inefficiency over meaningless efficiency. Unfortunately, questioning technological development often gets dismissed as “Luddism.” As a philosopher trained to examine arguments on all sides of an issue, I do not find this lopsidedness helpful. Things would not turn out well for a driver if their car could not slow down, (...) stop, or go in reverse. So, when it comes to technology, I aim to make those three moves respectable and feasible. (shrink)

Jean Baudrillards Kulturphilosophie läßt sich durch die Behauptung charakterisieren, daß die Medien in der modernen Kultur vorherrschend geworden sind. Seine These, die Medien hätten jeden Bezug zu einer von ihnen unabhängigen Realität verloren, haben zahlreiche Autorinnen und Autoren nihilistisch genannt. Das Zutreffende dieser Kennzeichnung verdankt sich im Wesentlichen einem eingeschränkten, auf das 19. Jahrhundert zurückweisenden Begriff des Nihilismus. Allerdings nimmt Baudrillard auf Phänomene Bezug, die er historisch später verortet und die sich ihrer Struktur nach kategorial von den Funktionen der Medien (...) im 19. Jahrhundert unterscheiden. Es gelingt ihm hierbei nicht, den allgemeinen Realitätsverlust, den er vor allem auf den wachsenden Einfluß von Wissenschaft und Technik im 20. Jahrhundert zurückführt, überzeugend nachzuweisen. -/- Als wolle er diesen Mangel beheben, führt Baudrillard in späteren Schriften weitere Struktureigenschaften der kulturellen Mediendominanz ein. Zu diesen Fortentwicklungen gehört die durch Medienmacht erzeugte „Transparenz“, die nicht zuletzt die restlose Durchsichtigkeit aller Zustände und Prozesse meint. Es ist dieses Merkmal, das Baudrillard 1981 selbst mit einem Nihilismusbegriff in Verbindung bringt. Der Nihilismus der Transparenz beansprucht, das spezifisch Neue der Sinnlosigkeit in zunehmend wissenschafts- und technikbestimmten Gesellschaften zu erfassen. Obwohl sich die Schwächen der Medientheorie in seiner Auffassung des Nihilismus reflektieren, gelingt es ihm, Phänomene der Nichtigkeit zu beschreiben, für die man gute Gründe hat anzunehmen, daß sie sich durch keinen Werte- oder Einstellungswandel mehr aufheben lassen. Um diese Einsicht zu begründen, muß man Baudrillards Medientheorie allerdings gleichsam vom Kopf auf die Füße stellen. Nicht auf einen evidenten, alles umfassenden Realitätsverlust, sondern umgekehrt auf einen Teil der vermutlichen Realitätsgehalte der Medien läßt sich die drohende Ausdehnung der Transparenz zurückführen. (shrink)

My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

Employing the ideas of modern mathematics and biology, seen in the context of Ernst Cassirer's "Symbolic Forms, the author presents an entirely new and novel solution to the classical mind-brain problem. This is a "hard" book, I'm sorry, but it is the problem itself, and not me which has made it so. I say that Dennett, and, indeed, the whole of academia is wrong.

What happens when worldly reality is no longer constituted by the durable presence of things, but by the projected impact of the self? This article takes the popular slogan of charitable entrepreneurship, “Make an impact!”, as a symptom of the privatization of what Arendt once called the 'worldly reality' in everyday social media interactions. It juxtaposes two caricatured social-media ideal types—the Poetry-Slam Personality and the Big-Picture Personality—and traces, in the identity of their apparent opposition, the disappearance of the world as (...) a political space of reliable appearances. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between immersion, emotion, and imagination in virtual reality (VR), focusing on two seemingly distant domains: Alejandro G. Iñárritu’s installation Carne y Arena (2017) and VR-based workplace safety training. Both cases demonstrate that simulated environments can elicit authentic emotional responses – such as fear, stress, or vulnerability – yet the implications of these experiences diverge sharply. Drawing on theories of presence and the “paradox of fiction”, we argue that VR should be understood not as a substitute (...) for imagination but as a heightened form of fiction that depends on the user’s willingness to engage in make-believe. While Carne y Arena frames affect as an entry point for moral imagination within an explicit artistic and symbolic context, occupational safety training instrumentalizes emotion as a means of behavioral conditioning within a productivist framework. The danger in both domains lies not in immersive experience itself but in mistaking a single simulation for the fullness of lived reality. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose incorporating virtual-reality-presented thought experiments (VRTEs) to enhance the quality of undergraduate courses on classic works in applied ethics. Thought experiments are a key method in applied ethics for eliciting intuitions as evidence for or against theories. However, our interviews and surveys show that undergraduates often struggle with imagination deficiencies, add undescribed details, apply pre-endorsed theories, lack seriousness, and show disinterest when reading written thought experiments, hindering their engagement and critical thinking. We argue that VRTEs may (...) mitigate these challenges by providing concrete visualisations, immersive experiences, embodiment, interactivity, and controlled reaction times. Feedback from our pilot practice indicates that VRTEs have the potential to mitigate these challenges. To enhance the benefits, we recommend allowing sufficient time for the development of VRTEs and alternating between traditional paper-based teaching and VRTE sessions. We also address potential objections to our teaching approach. (shrink)

Virtual reality is not only a prowess of technological advancement and AI, but also an element that extends the horizons of human existence and complicates the way of approaching various phenomena of the physical world, for example, violence. Its practice in virtuality leads to a series of challenges, especially when virtual reality is considered as genuine reality. This text delves into virtual violence, the influence of AI on it and the problems that its conception implies. To analyze this phenomenon, parallax (...) is proposed as a concept that helps to understand its development. This theory invites us to see violence in different ways, thus influencing the vision of morality in the virtual world. Although these reflections outline difficulties, a position is proposed that invites to urgently address the need for an applicable morality to virtual and physical fields, emphasizing dignity as the purpose of human practices. (shrink)

What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...) tension between these two theses helps to explain existing debates about this form of knowledge, as well as puzzling conflicts in our attitudes towards the possibility of sharing this knowledge through testimony, or other sources like literature, theories, and simulations. The author also offers a view of 'what it is like' knowledge which can resolve both the tension between (i) and (ii), and these puzzles around testimony. (shrink)

Suicide is a complex act whose meanings, while sometimes tragic, vary widely. This chapter surveys the ethical landscape surrounding algorithmic methods of suicide prevention especially as it pertains to social media activity and to the moderation of online suicide communities. We begin with a typology of suicide, distinguishing between varied goals in which suicide may factor as a means. Suicides should be understood as an act with varied eliciting desires, meanings, consequences, and ethics. Further,while many suicides may be grounded on (...) irrational desire, we argue that a desire to suicide may nonetheless be rational in some cases. We then offer a survey of the attempts by social media corporations to create suicide prediction algorithms and launch interventions aimed at preventing suicide as well as an overview of the current ethical debate. We argue that the values embedded within algorithmic suicide prevention nudges are “thick” in a substantive sense and deserving of scrutiny. Given that debates about the rationality, meaning, and permissibility of suicide are common and subject to intracultural and cross-cultural differences, we maintain that the task of suicide prediction is ill-suited to algorithmic approaches. Despite an algorithm’s ability to quantify a complex phenomenon like suicide risk and its appearance of objectivity, any suicide prediction algorithm is thoroughly subjective and involves moral judgments all the way down. Any such algorithm would necessarily impose a normative stance on suicide onto its user base that is subject to reasonable intra and cross-cultural disagreement. (shrink)

This paper is an approach to the regulation of drones and the protection of fundamental rights, particularly in relation to the use of drones equipped with image and data capture technologies, with special attention to the position and protection of minors.

Much of the excitement and concern with virtual reality (VR) has to do with the impact of virtual experiences on our moral conduct in the “real world”. VR technologies offer vivid simulations that may impact prosocial dispositions and abilities or emotions related to morality. Whereas some experiences could facilitate particular moral behaviors, VR could also inculcate bad moral habits or lead to the surreptitious development of nefarious moral traits. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the ethical debate about (...) using VR to improve morality. I start by clarifying the rationale of using VR for good, drawing on moral enhancement literature, branches of the science of morality, and the specific potentials of this technology. Then, I will briefly focus on three prominent domains of socio-moral improvement: the use of VR for enhancing empathy, reducing implicit biases, and improving pro-environmental behavior. After that, I shall consider three ethical objections to the enthusiasm for using VR in order to improve human morality. Finally, I will recapitulate the main points of the chapter and provide a few concluding thoughts on future avenues of discussion on how VR can make us act (morally) better. (shrink)

David Ekdahl (2023), in a constructive and thoughtful commentary, outlines both points of agreement with and suggestions for further research arising from our paper ‘Crossing the Fictional Line: Moral Graveness, the Gamer’s Dilemma, and the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far’ (Montefiore & Formosa, 2023).

In this paper, I argue that virtual manifestations of selfhood in VR environments have a transformative effect on the users, which in turn has spillover effects in the physical world. I will argue in favor of extending our notion of personal identity as to include VR avatars as negotiable bodies that constitute a genuine part of who we are. Recent research in VR shows that users can experience the Proteus Effect and other lasting psychological changes after being immersed in VR. (...) An extended theory of the self, modeled after the extended mind thesis advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998), can offer a deeper understanding of how and why immersive virtual experiences have such a transformative effect on users. The early VR scholars had a similar intuition- that “VR is a medium for the extension of body and mind” (Biocca and Delaney 1995), acting like a genuine “reality engine” (Biocca and Levy 1995). (shrink)

Extended Reality (XR) and Large Language Model (LLM) technologies have the potential to significantly influence higher education practices and pedagogy in the coming years. As these emerging technologies reshape the educational landscape, it is crucial for educators and higher education professionals to understand their implications and make informed policy decisions for both individual courses and universities as a whole. This paper has two parts. In the first half, we give an overview of XR technologies and their potential future role in (...) higher education. Then, we discuss the benefits and challenges of adopting and integrating XR technologies into higher education settings. Finally, we offer recommendations for educators, administrators, and policymakers on how to approach the adoption of this set of technologies and set institutional policy to take advantage of its benefits while minimizing its potential negative consequences. In the paper’s second half, we discuss LLMs - specifically Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPTs). Again, we provide an overview of this rapidly developing technology and examine its unprecedented and potentially disruptive impact on higher education pedagogy. We delve into the benefits and limitations of GPTs, highlighting the pedagogical and ethical challenges they may pose. Finally, we present actionable recommendations for instructors and administrators at both the course level and the university-wide level to guide policy decisions concerning these transformative technologies. (shrink)

Olfactory Virtual Reality (OVR) for Wellbeing and Reduction of Stress, Anxiety and Pain - Journal of Medical Research and Health Sciences.

In this paper, we assess the impact of extended reality technologies as they relate to sexual forms of harassment. We begin with a brief history of the nature of sexual harassment itself. We then offer an account of extended reality technologies focusing specifically on psychological and hardware elements most likely to comprise what has been referred to as “the metaverse”. Although different forms of virtual spaces exist (i.e., private, semi-private, and public), we focus on public social metaverse spaces. We do (...) this to better explain how the concept of sexual harassment must be adjusted to such spaces and how approaches aimed at mitigating harassment must be sensitive to the type of metaverse spaces users utilize. We then offer a typology of sexual harassment for the metaverse focusing on three distinct forms of sexual harassment: (1) invariant (2) mixed variance or modified and (3) unique or metaverse specific. Although existing normative and legal frameworks may function well with respect to the first and, possibly, second forms of harassment, we argue such frameworks will not helpfully address metaverse-specific harassment. Ultimately, the changing nature of privately owned public spaces (POPS) which metaverses are likely to represent pose distinct ethical and regulatory challenges. (shrink)

Many have offered moral objections to video games, with various critics contending that they depict and promote morally dubious attitudes and behaviour. However, few have offered moral arguments in favour of video games. In this chapter, we develop one such positive moral argument. Specifically, we argue that video games offer one of the only morally acceptable methods for acquiring some ethical knowledge. Consequently, we have (defeasible) moral reasons for creating, distributing, and playing certain morally educating video games.

The trolley problem is one of the liveliest research frameworks in experimental ethics. In the last decade, social neuroscience and experimental moral psychology have gone beyond the studies with mere text-based hypothetical moral dilemmas. In this article, I present the rationale behind testing the actual behaviour in more realistic scenarios through Virtual Reality and summarize the body of evidence raised by the experiments with virtual trolley scenarios. Then, I approach the argument of Ramirez and LaBarge (2020), who claim that the (...) virtual simulation of the Footbridge version of the trolley dilemma is an unethical research practice, and I raise some objections to it. Finally, I provide some reflections about the means and ends of trolley-like scenarios and other sacrificial dilemmas in experimental ethics. (shrink)

Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it’s thought that, on Kant’s moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violate the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant’s moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally (...) wrong, even when no other persons or their avatars are affected. First, I explain why many have thought that, in general on Kant’s moral theory, virtual acts affecting no other persons or their avatars can’t violate the Categorical Imperative. For there are real world acts that clearly do, but it seems that when we consider the same sorts of acts done alone in a virtual environment, they don’t violate the Categorical Imperative, because no others persons were involved. But then, how could any virtual acts like these, that affect no other persons or their avatars, violate the Categorical Imperative? I then argue that there indeed can be such cases of morally wrong virtual acts—some due to an actor’s having erroneous beliefs about morally relevant facts, and others due not to error, but to the actor’s intention leaving out morally relevant facts while immersed in a virtual environment. I conclude by considering some implications of my arguments for both our present technological context as well as the future. (shrink)

Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promote empathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR for empathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.’s ethical (...) rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions. (shrink)

The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental features, devices and concepts. Then, we will approach the (...) characterization of VR as an “empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why, nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative, we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars. In the conclusion, however, we will, we will examine some of the serious concerns related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences. (shrink)

The commercial VR/AR marketplace is gaining ground and is becoming an ever larger and more significant component of the global economy. While much attention has been paid to the commercial promise of VR/AR, comparatively little attention has been given to the ethical issues that VR/AR technologies introduce. We here examine existing codes of ethics proposed by the ACM and IEEE and apply them to the unique ethical facets that VR/AR introduces. We propose a VR/AR code of ethics for developers and (...) apply this code to several commercial applications. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that a virtual life would be less meaningful (perhaps even meaningless). As virtual reality technologies develop and become more integrated into our everyday lives, this poses a challenge for those that care about meaning in life. In this chapter, it is argued that the common assumption about meaninglessness and virtuality is mistaken. After clarifying the distinction between two different visions of virtual reality, four arguments are presented for thinking that meaning is possible in virtual reality. Following (...) this, four objections are discussed and rebutted. The chapter concludes that we can be cautiously optimistic about the possibility of meaning in virtual worlds. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...) one’s environment can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go on to discuss recent evidence indicating that immersion in VR can have psychological effects that last after leaving the virtual environment. In the second part of the article, we turn to the risks and recommendations. We begin, in Section “The Research Ethics of VR,” with the research ethics of VR, covering six main topics: the limits of experimental environments, informed consent, clinical risks, dual-use, online research, and a general point about the limitations of a code of conduct for research. Then, in Section “Risks for Individuals and Society,” we turn to the risks of VR for the general public, covering four main topics: long-term immersion, neglect of the social and physical environment, risky content, and privacy. We offer concrete recommendations for each of these 10 topics, summarized in Table 1. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?

Marriage is one of the most important topics in the education field since life in this world is structured by interaction among families and between families and other social institutions. Dissatisfaction and unsustainability of marriage have led the urgency of premarital education in various countries. The problem is that the spread of virtual reality has made marriage itself to become more complex and experience reinterpretation and reconfiguration, moreover with the emergence of new kind of marriage in the digital era, i.e. (...) virtual marriage. Everybody who has observed, known, or even tried, certainly asks the question, “Could (or: should) I accept virtual marriage?”. This study was aimed to investigate the role of tolerance of ambiguity and illusion of intimacy in online dating in predicting the acceptance of virtual marriage. There were 420 adolescents and young adults (212 males, 208 females; Mage=21.10 years old, SDage=1.459 years; 338 students, 82 employees or entrepreneurs) in the Greater Jakarta, Indonesia, participated in this study. It was found that the acceptance was not predicted by the ambiguity tolerance, but by the illusion of intimacy in online dating. The psychometric issues, substantive discussion, and recommendation are presented at the end of this article. The trend of virtual marriage should not be allowed to roll away, by autopilot, without loaded by strategies in designing an online game as one of the pivotal educational technologies that needs to shape appropriate character and attitude for it. (shrink)

Can trust evolve on the Internet between virtual strangers? Recently, Pettit answered this question in the negative. Focusing on trust in the sense of ‘dynamic, interactive, and trusting’ reliance on other people, he distinguishes between two forms of trust: primary trust rests on the belief that the other is trustworthy, while the more subtle secondary kind of trust is premised on the belief that the other cherishes one’s esteem, and will, therefore, reply to an act of trust in kind (‘trust-responsiveness’). (...) Based on this theory Pettit argues that trust between virtual strangers is impossible: they lack all evidence about one another, which prevents the imputation of trustworthiness and renders the reliance on trust-responsiveness ridiculous. I argue that this argument is flawed, both empirically and theoretically. In several virtual communities amazing acts of trust between pure virtuals have been observed. I propose that these can be explained as follows. On the one hand, social cues, reputation, reliance on third parties, and participation in (quasi-) institutions allow imputing trustworthiness to varying degrees. On the other, precisely trust-responsiveness is also relied upon, as a necessary supplement to primary trust. In virtual markets, esteem as a fair trader is coveted while it contributes to building up one’s reputation. In task groups, a hyperactive style of action may be adopted which amounts to assuming (not: inferring) trust. Trustors expect that their virtual co-workers will reply in kind while such an approach is to be considered the most appropriate in cyberspace. In non-task groups, finally, members often display intimacies while they are confident someone else ‘out there’ will return them. This is facilitated by the one-to-many, asynchronous mode of communication within mailing lists. (shrink)

Typical discussions of virtual reality (VR) fixate on technology for providing sensory stimulation of a certain kind. They thus fail to understand reality as the place wherein we live and work, misunderstanding it instead as merely a sort of presentation. The first half of the paper examines popular conceptions of VR. The most common conception is a shallow one according to which VR is a matter of simulating appearances. Yet there is, even in popular depictions, a second, more subtle conception (...) according to which VR is a matter of facilitating new kinds of interaction. The latter half of the paper turns to questions about the contemporary technology of Internet chatrooms. The fact that chatrooms can be used in certain ways suggests something about the prospects for VR. The penultimate section asks whether chatrooms may legitimately be thought of as places. (In a sense, they may.) The final section asks whether cybersex may legitimately be thought of as sex. (Again, yes.) Chatroom technology thus provides an argument for the second conception of VR over its much ballyhooed rival. (shrink)

Multi-user online environments involve millions of participants world-wide. In these online communities participants can use their online personas – avatars – to chat, fight, make friends, have sex, kill monsters and even get married. Unfortunately participants can also use their avatars to stalk, kill, sexually assault, steal from and torture each other. Despite attempts to minimise the likelihood of interpersonal virtual harm, programmers cannot remove all possibility of online deviant behaviour. Participants are often greatly distressed when their avatars are harmed (...) by other participants’ malicious actions, yet there is a tendency in the literature on this topic to dismiss such distress as evidence of too great an involvement in and identification with the online character. In this paper I argue that this dismissal of virtual harm is based on a set of false assumptions about the nature of avatar attachment and its relation to genuine moral harm. I argue that we cannot dismiss avatar attachment as morally insignificant without being forced to also dismiss other, more acceptable, forms of attachment such as attachment to possessions, people and cultural objects and communities. Arguments against according moral significance to virtual harm fail because they do not reflect participants’ and programmers’ experiences and expectations of virtual communities and they have the unintended consequence of failing to grant significance to attachments that we take for granted, morally speaking. Avatar attachment is expressive of identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral significance we give to real-life attachments that play a similar role. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the implications of Chalmers' [2017; 2019] digital realism on personal identity, building on Floridi's [2014] onlife concept and supporting the idea that persons extend in biological and virtual realms. By positing the physical existence of virtual entities within computer systems, digital realism suggests a relationship between individuals and their digital counterparts akin to that between two physical entities. I argue that four- dimensionalism, which conceives of objects as composed of temporal parts, offers a robust framework (...) for understanding this relationship. By treating virtual entities as aggregates of virtual temporal parts, this framework brings two theoretical advancements. First, we would be able to account for the apparent paradox of simultaneous existence in biological and virtual spaces. Second, by maintaining the theoretical framework of digital realism, we can provide an account of personal identity that adequately captures the increasingly intimate relationship between ourselves and our digital counterparts. (shrink)

The suggestion that we might live in a giant computer simulation seems plausible in large part because the hypothetical sophistication of the hypothetical simulation can be increased to meet almost any objection. From an engineering standpoint, the technological increases required by this strategy may not always be feasible. Proceeding nevertheless from an idealization, David Chalmers argues that the virtual objects and worlds displayed in perfect and permanent computer simulations could be regarded as real because, on those terms (perfection and permanence), (...) our own world could just as well be virtual. I counter that real reality, or RR, possesses (at least) five features that no VR simulation could ever reproduce: RR involves genuinely causal regularities, it is older than any machine, it will outlast any machine, it supports living bodies in ways that cannot be replaced, and thus belongs to an entirely different category than artifacts. These differences are especially robust, since they all grant the possibility of present-moment indistinguishability while halting any collapse or blurring of the virtual/real distinction. (shrink)

Los avances de la más reciente faceta de la inteligencia artificial y su respectivo campo de aplicación, creando fascinantes mundos virtuales, hacen vislumbrar un trialismo ontológico y postular con seriedad la pregunta de si nuestra realidad es una Matrix (simulation hypothesis). Esta propuesta implicaría una serie de consideraciones sobre la sensibilidad, es decir, nuestra relación con el mundo físico y el metaverso, replanteando nociones que antaño se han considerado sobre la realidad y la experiencia. Esto abre posibilidades ontológicas, ya no (...) solo hacia lo material sino también a lo virtual, comprendiendo las mismas dentro de mundos posibles basados en sistemas binarios y de relación it-from-bit. La presente ponencia propone cinco tesis de contingencia para ahondar el papel que juega la virtualidad desde estos nuevos ámbitos ontológicos y la problematización epistémica que implica tanto aceptar como rechazar que acaecemos dentro de una realidad virtual. (shrink)

Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf die Entwicklung dreier verschränkter Thesen: 1. Ein zentraler Baustein der Phänomenologie als Methode besteht in einem verbalen Zeigen auf Phänomene, die den Adressierten vorprädikativ oder präreflexiv bereits vertraut sind. Phänomenologie ist verbal vermitteltes Sehenlassen präreflexiver Phänomene. 2. Die uns in der Erfahrung gegebenen Phänomene (etwa Situationen, Ereignisse, Dinge) lassen sich selbst als ‚Hinweissysteme, Strahlensysteme von Hinweisen‘ (Husserl) explizieren. Phänomene zeigen innenhorizontal auf naheliegende Möglichkeiten von Erfahrungsverläufen, die jeweilige Art dieses Zeigens ist ihre Gegebenheitsweise. 3. Der (...) erlebte Wirklichkeitscharakter von Phänomenen korreliert mit dem Grad ihrer einstimmigen Bewährung im zeitlichen Verlauf der Erfahrung. Daher können uns auch virtuelle Situationen und Entitäten in gewöhnlichem Sinn als wirklich gegeben sein. (shrink)

X and Y are zero and one (circumference and diameter), literally and figuratively. This is the basis for intelligence, virtual and real. Solves the duality dilemma that has plagued mankind for 40,000 years, and provides the underlying structure for mathematics, physics and technology (in 24 pages). Provides the foundation for 'new physics' going forward, and answers this question: is the universe intelligent? Illuminates the ancient relationship between science and religion by providing a cogent explanation for cave-dweller paintings. Clears up the (...) confusion produced by Einstein's four-dimensional space-time. Gives mankind a reason to 'give up the search for meaning.' Explains the structure, and provides the hidden existential 'thesis' in literature and philosophy. Integrates biology and physics, provides clarity around cycles in economics and history, and makes a simple case for a unified, global, technological future. Unifies gravity, relativity, uncertainty. Sequence, repetition, reproduction. GUT/TOE for physicists, second coming (or third, first) for spiritual leaders. Explains identity, and its mathematical relationship to psychology. Clears up mind-body problem, determinism, causality issues, etc. Provides the rationale and the mechanics for the core dynamic in nature. Eliminates the problem of zero, and infinity. Restores sanity to science (and mathematics) (and, also, religion). (shrink)

Transhumanism is an increasingly popular movement, which tries to modify humans and give them new capabilities using bioengineering, implants, artificial intelligence (AI), and other novel technologies. Some forms of transhumanism can be harmful for individuals or society. Often technology developers do not see or think about the underlying philosophies and worldviews behind the ideas, which may cause unintended serious risks or have impossible goals. We give a multidisciplinary overview of transhumanism and discuss its core ideas of superhumans and immortality. We (...) explore the underlying philosophies and worldviews of transhumanism, how it interacts with various philosophies, give some specific examples of their implications, discuss the religious elements of it, and point out that the feasibility and risks of many transhumanist goals depend on the correctness of the underlying worldviews. We give some practical viewpoints, historical background, and ethical insights for the developers and practitioners in various related fields. Everything hinges on worldview. (shrink)

This paper responds to Paula Sweeney’s characterization of avatars as proxies, proposing instead a framework that treats avatars as genuine parts of “hybrid persons.” Adopting a four-dimensionalist metaphysics, I argue that persons should be understood as maximal aggregates of both biological and virtual temporal parts. This approach reconceptualizes the relationship between users and their avatars as analogous to the relationship between present and past selves rather than as a proxy relationship between separate entities. While Sweeney identifies an “epistemic gap” in (...) avatar-user relationships as problematic for responsibility attribution, I argue that this gap is not unique to virtual contexts but appears in ordinary cases of personal identity over time. The real challenge stems from what I term the “consciousness gap” - our inability to directly experience our avatar’s actions. Drawing on Parfit’s insights about the unimportance of identity in the survival of persons, I show a way to attribute responsibility across such gaps. To address potential challenges to my framework similar to Johnston’s personite problem, I adopt a priority perdurantist solution to persons, treating both biological and virtual parts as metaphysically derivative from the hybrid person. (shrink)

Death across human history is codified and controlled by religion, dogma, or social￾political circumstances. However, it is possible to take death out of these realms, instead dying how one wishes. One can design their own death. I will argue that human trans-death can be an intentional performance by persons and that this intentional performance can be combined with the newest and most novel methods of preserving a consciousness. This thesis opens possibilities for future exhibitions and live performances combining art and (...) innovative post-life, post-mortem (what I call “trans-death”) technologies. Possible performances or exhibitions combining art and innovative trans-death technologies include: people doing staged-performances while in their last years of life about their deanimation; public display of cryonically suspended (vitrified) bodies; and if consciousness is ever able to be digitized, the possibilities expand to any number of scenarios explored in anime shows and sci-fi literature or movies. The ethical and political implications of permissibility, freedom, and societal consequences of such artistic and technological expressions are not detailed, but some positions are outlined. A case study is utilized: the last years of life of famous and controversial Timothy Leary (1920-1996) and his struggle with prostate cancer. My analysis of the life and work of Timothy Leary - especially the text he mostly wrote Design for Dying (1997), it was edited by R.U. Sirius - is my theoretical foundation. (shrink)

According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the (...) world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

The following paper attempts to look at virtual reality technologies—and the (dis)embodiment affected by them—through a phenomenological lens. Specifically, augmenting traditional discussions of virtual reality as a purely technical problem, this paper seeks to bring Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology into the discussion to try to make sense of both what body we leave behind and what body we gain as we enter virtual worlds. To do this, I look both at historical examples of virtual reality technologies and their methods of (...) (dis)integrating the body and speculative future examples of virtual reality where the corporeal body is fully sidelined through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema, noting that habituation is an ever present factor that must be considered in virtual environments. Ultimately, I conclude that even in a scenario of one-to-one mind-computer transference, the virtual world will, like the physical world we currently inhabit, solicit a ‘phantom body’ thus forcing us to act and live in accordance with a mutual interplay between self and virtual world. (shrink)

In his article ‘The Metaverse: Surveillant Physics, Virtual Realist Governance, and the Missing Commons,’ Andrew McStay addresses an entwinement of ethical, political, and metaphysical concerns surrounding the Metaverse, arguing that the Metaverse is not being designed to further the public good but is instead being created to serve the plutocratic ends of technology corporations. He advances the notion of ‘surveillant physics’ to capture this insight and introduces the concept of ‘virtual realist governance’ as a theoretical framework that ought to guide (...) Metaverse design and regulation. This commentary article primarily serves as a supplementary piece rather than a direct critique of McStay’s work. First, I flag certain understated or overlooked nuances in McStay’s discussion. Then, I extend McStay’s discussion by juxtaposing a Lockean inspired argument supporting the property rights of Metaverse creators with an opposing argument advocating for a Metaverse user's ‘right to virtual abundance,’ informed by the potential of virtual reality technology to eliminate scarcity in virtual worlds. Contrasting these arguments highlights the tension between corporate rights and social justice in the governance of virtual worlds and bears directly on McStay’s assertion that there is a problem of the missing commons in the early design of the Metaverse. (shrink)

You sit in your office and put on the latest pair of virtual reality (VR) goggles. Suddenly, you stand in the middle of Times Square. A car almost hits you. You.

El objetivo de esta investigación es presentar una propuesta para reivindicar el cuerpo retomando las reflexiones filosóficas sobre la técnica de José Ortega y Gasset. Si bien el filósofo español no lo abordó dentro de su quehacer filosófico, es relevante ponerlo a dialogar con debates contemporáneos sobre tecnología para ver si hay alguna respuesta novedosa que se pueda obtener. La propuesta esbozada en esta investigación se sitúa en el marco del debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores al respecto de las tecnologías (...) que descorporizan, tomando como ejemplos principales el mind-uploading y la realidad virtual. De igual manera, ubica al cuerpo dentro del giro que trajo consigo el surgimiento y desarrollo de la cibernética. Para llevar a cabo tal reivindicación, propongo el argumento del proyecto vital —retomando terminología orteguiana— para sostener la tesis de que la realización tecnológica de las fantasías sobre el cuerpo no sólo depende del acceso a los materiales, sino del proyecto vital de una determinada época. Es así como, a través de uno de los autores canónicos de la filosofía de la tecnología, se puede repensar la importancia del cuerpo dentro del desarrollo e impacto de la tecnología contemporánea, así como poner a dialogar su propuesta con proyectos contemporáneos como el transhumanismo. Esto último con la intención de proporcionar otra lectura a problemas que son de interés para el debate entre transhumanistas y bioconservadores. -/- This research paper aims to present a proposal for reclaiming the body using José Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical reflections on technique. Although the Spanish philosopher does not address this issue directly in his philosophical work, it is relevant to establish a dialogue between these ideas and current discussions on technology. This paper’s proposal is situated within the framework of the debate between transhumanists and bioconservatives regarding technologies that “disembody”, such as mind-uploading and virtual reality. Likewise, this paper places the body in the context of the emergence and development of cybernetics. To support such a claim, I use the concept of the vital project taken from Orteguian terminology- to argue that the technological realization of fantasies about the body does not only depend on the access to materials, but also on the vital project of a given era. Thus, through the work of one of the main authors of the philosophy of technology, it is possible to rethink the importance of the body in the development and impact of contemporary technology and connect this proposal to contemporary projects such as transhumanism,. (shrink)