This paper argues that the dominant Western epistemological-metaphysical framework—here termed the logocentric-causal paradigm—rests upon two entwined assumptions: that truth is accessible only through the rational structures of language, and that reality is bound exclusively by causal relations among discrete entities. These twin commitments, while foundational to scientific modernity, have constrained the scope of what may be considered real or knowable. Drawing on the critiques of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jung, as well as insights from Taoist, Vedāntic, and phenomenological traditions, the paper (...) demonstrates how this paradigm systematically excludes non-discursive, acausal, and mystical forms of insight. Jung’s notion of synchronicity serves as a case study in rethinking connection beyond causality, revealing a universe structured by meaning as much as by mechanism. The essay concludes by proposing a post-logocentric epistemology—one that situates reason as a provisional mode within a wider field of participation, intuition, and direct apprehension. What emerges is not irrationalism, but a restored vision of reality as both intelligible and ineffable: a world where consciousness and cosmos are mutually implicating expressions of a single order. (shrink)

This paper critiques the Western epistemological framework grounded in logocentrism and causal absolutism, which restricts truth to what can be linguistically expressed and causally explained. It argues that this dual commitment produces an ontological reductionism that equates language with reality and causality with necessity. Drawing on Carl Jung’s theory of synchronicity, William James’s radical empiricism, and insights from Taoism, Advaita Vedānta, and quantum nonlocality, I propose an expanded model of knowledge that recognizes acausal and non-linguistic modes of apprehension. Mystical experience, (...) near-death phenomena, and synchronistic events are reframed not as subjective anomalies but as epistemic traces of a transcendent order that eludes propositional articulation. Through a synthesis of psychological, metaphysical, and phenomenological perspectives, the paper argues for a post-logocentric epistemology in which rational analysis is re-situated within a plural field of knowing that includes intuition, symbol, and direct participation. The aim is not to reject reason or science but to restore proportion—to acknowledge that reality reveals itself through meaning and correspondence as much as through measurement and causation. In doing so, the study challenges the monopoly of the logocentric-causal paradigm and gestures toward a more inclusive metaphysics of consciousness. (shrink)

The nonverbal cues that accompany speech (for example, facial expressions, gestures, and eye gaze) can be as communicatively significant as the content of the speech itself. I identify what I argue is a very common—but largely philosophically unexamined—phenomenon: our tendency to allocate nonverbal cues in ways that are sensitive to conversational participants' levels of respective social power such that people with more power receive comparatively more positive and affirming nonverbal cues than people with less power. I call this ‘nonverbal marginalization’ (...) and argue that it reflects and reinforces harmful social prejudices. In this paper, I introduce and empirically situate nonverbal marginalization within a broader account of nonverbal communication, showing how implicit and explicit biases are subtly reflected in automatic patterns of nonverbal behavior. I go on to propose a new conceptual resource and intervention strategy to identify and address the various ethical, psychological, and epistemic harms of nonverbal marginalization. (shrink)

As there is currently a neo-Aristotelian revival currently taking place within contemporary metaphysics and dispositions, or causal powers are now being routinely utilised in theories of causality and modality, more attention is beginning to be paid to a central Aristotelian concern: the metaphysics of substantial unity, and the doctrine of hylomorphism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of hylomorphism present in the contemporary literature and argue that not only does each engender unique conceptual difficulties, but neither adequately captures the (...) metaphysics of Aristotelian hylomorphism. Thus both strands of contemporary hylomorphism, I argue, fundamentally misunderstand what substantial unity amounts to in the hylomorphic framework – namely, the metaphysical inseparability of matter and form. (shrink)

Side effects are ubiquitous in medicine and they often play a role in treatment decisions for patients and clinicians alike. Philosophers and health researchers often use side effects to illustrate issues with contemporary medical research and practice. However, technical definitions of ‘side effect’ differ among health authorities. Thus, determining the side effects of an intervention can differ depending on whose definition we assume. Here I review some of the common definitions of side effect and highlight their issues. In response, I (...) offer an account of side effects as jointly (i) unintended and (ii) effects due to the causal capacities or invariances of an intervention. I discuss (i) by examining the intentions or reasons behind therapeutic interventions, and I discuss (ii) by appealing to a manipulationist model of causation. The analysis here highlights that side effects are conceptually distinct from related outcomes like adverse events, adverse drug reactions, and placebo effects. The analysis also allows for reflection on the utility of ‘side effect’ as a technical term in medical research and practice. (shrink)

Although they are continually compositionally reconstituted and reconfigured, organisms nonetheless persist as ontologically unified beings over time – but in virtue of what? A common answer is: in virtue of their continued possession of the capacity for morphological invariance which persists through, and in spite of, their mereological alteration. While we acknowledge that organisms‟ capacity for the “stability of form” – homeostasis - is an important aspect of their diachronic unity, we argue that this capacity is derived from, and grounded (...) in a more primitive one – namely, the homeodynamic capacity for the “specified variation of form”. In introducing a novel type of causal power – a „structural power‟ – we claim that it is the persistence of their dynamic potential to produce a specified series of structurally adaptive morphologies which grounds organisms‟ privileged status as metaphysically “one over many” over time. (shrink)

The underreporting of suspected adverse drug reactions hinders pharmacovigilance. Solutions to underreporting are oftentimes directed at clinicians and health care professionals. However, given the recent rise of public inclusion in medical science, solutions may soon begin more actively involving patients. I aim to offer an evaluative framework for future possible proposals that would engage patients with the aim of mitigating underreporting. The framework may also have value in evaluating current reporting practices. The offered framework is composed of three criteria that (...) are bioethical, social-epistemic, and pragmatic: (i) patients should not be exposed to undue harms, e.g., nocebo effects; (ii) data should be collected, analyzed, and communicated prioritizing pharmacovigilance’s aims, i.e., free from industry bias; and (iii) proposals should account for existing and foreseeable pragmatic constraints like clinician ‘buy in’ and existing reporting infrastructure. Proposals to engage patients in pharmacovigilance that fulfil or address these criteria are preferable to those that do not. (shrink)

Though the realm of biology has long been under the philosophical rule of the mechanistic magisterium, recent years have seen a surprisingly steady rise in the usurping prowess of process ontology. According to its proponents, theoretical advances in the contemporary science of evo-devo have afforded that ontology a particularly powerful claim to the throne: in that increasingly empirically confirmed discipline, emergently autonomous, higher-order entities are the reigning explanantia. If we are to accept the election of evo-devo as our best conceptualisation (...) of the biological realm with metaphysical rigour, must we depose our mechanistic ontology for failing to properly “carve at the joints” of organisms? In this paper, I challenge the legitimacy of that claim: not only can the theoretical benefits offered by a process ontology be had without it, they cannot be sufficiently grounded without the metaphysical underpinning of the very mechanisms which processes purport to replace. The biological realm, I argue, remains one best understood as under the governance of mechanistic principles. (shrink)

According to contemporary ‘process ontology’, organisms are best conceptualised as spatio-temporally extended entities whose mereological composition is fundamentally contingent and whose essence consists in changeability. In contrast to the Aristotelian precepts of classical ‘substance ontology’, from the four-dimensional perspective of this framework, the identity of an organism is grounded not in certain collections of privileged properties, or features which it could not fail to possess, but in the succession of diachronic relations by which it persists, or ‘perdures’ as one entity (...) over time. In this paper, I offer a novel defence of substance ontology by arguing that the coherency and plausibility of the radical reconceptualisation of organisms proffered by process ontology ultimately depends upon its making use of the ‘substantial’ principles it purports to replace. (shrink)

The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ) – for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework (...) of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of Æ offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution. (shrink)

Although contemporary metaphysics has recently undergone a neo-Aristotelian revival wherein dispositions, or capacities are now commonplace in empirically grounded ontologies, being routinely utilised in theories of causality and modality, a central Aristotelian concept has yet to be given serious attention – the doctrine of hylomorphism. The reason for this is clear: while the Aristotelian ontological distinction between actuality and potentiality has proven to be a fruitful conceptual framework with which to model the operation of the natural world, the distinction between (...) form and matter has yet to similarly earn its keep. In this chapter, I offer a first step toward showing that the hylomorphic framework is up to that task. To do so, I return to the birthplace of that doctrine - the biological realm. Utilising recent advances in developmental biology, I argue that the hylomorphic framework is an empirically adequate and conceptually rich explanatory schema with which to model the nature of organisms. (shrink)

Evolutionary developmental biology represents a paradigm shift in the understanding of the ontogenesis and evolutionary progression of the denizens of the natural world. Given the empirical successes of the evo-devo framework, and its now widespread acceptance, a timely and important task for the philosophy of biology is to critically discern the ontological commitments of that framework and assess whether and to what extent our current metaphysical models are able to accommodate them. In this paper, I argue that one particular model (...) is a natural fit: an ontology of dispositional properties coherently and adequately captures the crucial casual-cum-explanatory role that the fundamental elements of evo-devo play within that framework. (shrink)

The underreporting of suspected adverse drug reactions remains a primary issue for contemporary post-market drug surveillance or ‘pharmacovigilance.’ Pharmacovigilance pioneer W.H.W. Inman argued that ‘deadly sins’ committed by clinicians are to blame for underreporting. Of these ‘sins,’ ignorance and lethargy are the most obvious and impactful in causing underreporting. However, recent analyses show that diffidence, insecurity, and indifference additionally play a major role. I aim to augment our understanding of diffidence, insecurity, and indifference by arguing these sins are underwritten by (...) value judgments arising via epistemic risk. I contend that ‘evidence-based’ medicine codifies these sins. (shrink)

The phrase “legal name” appears everywhere, often justifying discrimination against transgender people. And wherever it appears, it seems to come with an assumption that it picks out one, clear such name for each person. So, do “legal” names as the phrase is commonly understood really exist? As far as federal and most state law is concerned, it turns out the answer is a clear 'no'. This article seeks to highlight the legal, moral, and philosophical wrongness of the notion that people (...) have one uniquely identifying legal name. To do that, we survey the status of names in various legal domains, highlighting that legal consensus tends to be that there is no one “correct legal name” for individuals (if anything, people often have many “legal” names). We argue this common notion that every person has a single, clearly defined “legal name” is a kind of collective delusion we all seem to share (emerging somewhere in the late twentieth century), but is not grounded in legal or social reality. To address this harmful delusion, we present a series of ready-to-cite conclusions about the current state of the law and introduce a normative framework for how institutions and individuals ought to choose between people’s various legal names when referring to them. Engaging with legal theory, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of language, we discuss the social function of names and argue that names enable people to communicate important social information about themselves—which can include their gender, religion, and familial relations. Thus, we conclude by arguing that individuals and legal institutions have a normative responsibility to respect peoples’ preferred legal names, thereby allowing them to authentically represent these facets of their social identities. (shrink)

According to the proponents of Developmental Systems Theory and the Causal Parity Thesis, the privileging of the genome as “first among equals” with respect to the development of phenotypic traits is more a reflection of our own heuristic prejudice than of ontology - the underlying causal structures responsible for that specified development no more single out the genome as primary than they do other broadly “environmental” factors. Parting with the methodology of the popular responses to the Thesis, this paper offers (...) a novel criterion for ‘causal primacy’, one that is grounded in the ontology of the unique causal role of dispositional properties. This paper argues that, if the genome is conceptualised as realising dispositional properties that are “directed toward” phenotypic traits, the parity of ‘causal roles’ between genetic and extra-genetic factors is no longer apparent, and further, that the causal primacy of the genome is both plausible and defensible. (shrink)

Dispositional properties are often referred to as ‘causal powers’, but what does dispositional causation amount to? Any viable theory must account for two fundamental aspects of the metaphysics of causation – the causal complexity and context sensitivity of causal interactions. The theory of mutual manifestations attempts to do so by locating the complexity and context sensitivity within the nature of dispositions themselves. But is this theory an acceptable first step towards a viable theory of dispositional causation? This paper argues that (...) the reconceptualization that the theory entails comes at too high a price, and is an unnecessary step in the wrong direction: these two central aspects concerning the metaphysics of causation can and should be accounted for in a dispositional account of causation without it. (shrink)

In this chapter, we posit and explore the existence of a right to transgender identity, understood as the right for transgender people to enjoy equal protections under the law such that they are not excluded from normal social and political practices due to their transgender status. Within the context of American constitutional law, we ask what level of judicial scrutiny ought to be applied to cases involving transgender discrimination as transgender discrimination (as opposed to as a sub-category of sex discrimination), (...) a particularly pressing (and still unanswered) question given the recent explosion of anti- transgender legislation. We argue that transgender people constitute a suspect class — a designation reserved for insular minority groups that have been established to be particularly vulnerable to discrimination — which would trigger the highest level of constitutional protection. With the methodologies of experimental jurisprudence, we approach suspect classification from a distinctly empirical perspective, reviewing the available data and concluding that transgender people unambiguously meet the criteria for suspect classification on empirical grounds. Suspect classification typically triggers strict judicial scrutiny, so our finding requires that transgender discrimination cases receive strict judicial scrutiny, calling into question the both the legality of many recent anti-transgender laws nation-wide, as well the (limited) benefit of the doubt judges have offered such laws under the traditional sex discrimination rubric. (shrink)

Exploratory experiments are widely characterized as experiments that do not test hypotheses. Experiments that do test hypotheses are characterized as confirmatory experiments. Philosophers have pointed out that research programmes can be both confirmatory and exploratory. However, these definitions preclude single experiments being characterized as both exploratory and confirmatory; how can an experiment test and not test a hypothesis? Given the intuition that some experiments are exploratory, some are confirmatory, and some are both, a recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and (...) confirmatory experimentation is needed. I discuss ‘phase IV’ trials to show what this recharacterization could look like. Phase IV trials can be exploratory and confirmatory insofar as they concurrently test hypotheses and explore for unforeseen phenomena. Even if it is uncontroversial that a single experiment can have multiple aims, the recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation is still required for these aims to be held together coherently. I offer an alternative characterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation where the former remains a distinct kind of experimentation but is not characterized as non-hypothesis-testing. (shrink)

A common criticism of medicine is that there is often too much focus on treating symptoms instead of treating patients. This criticism and its sentiment - among other factors – have motivated many 'humanistic' or 'non-reductionist' approaches to medicine. My aim here is not to detail or defend any of these approaches, but rather to better understand what is at the heart of the 'common criticism.' I contend that this criticism is best understood as a criticism of a kind of (...) bias I here introduce: symptom bias. Symptom bias occurs when treating symptoms becomes the ends of intervening instead of the means towards health or well-being. Without naming and understanding this bias, even the 'non-reductionist' approaches to medicine may perpetuate it. (shrink)

According to dispositionalism, de re modality is grounded in the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties. Those properties are able to serve as the ground of de re modal truths, it is said, because they bear a special relation to counterfactual conditionals, one of truthmaking. However, because dispositionalism purports to ground de re modality only on the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties, it had better be the case that they do not play that truthmaking role merely in virtue of their being (...) embedded in some particular, extrinsic causal context. This paper examines a recent argument against dispositionalism that purports to show that the intrinsicality of that relation cannot be maintained, due to the ceteris paribus nature of the counterfactuals that dispositions make-true. When two prominent responses are examined, both are found wanting: at best, they require unjustified special pleading, and at worst, they amount to little more than ad hoc conceptual trickery. (shrink)

Post-market pharmaceutical surveillance or ‘pharmacovigilance’ relies on the reporting of suspected adverse drug reactions to regulatory databases. Recently, more ‘active’ methods that directly involve patients in identifying and reporting suspected adverse drug reactions have been suggested. This is different than traditional ‘passive’ methods, e.g., using databases without contacting patients directly. Though there are benefits to active pharmacovigilance, it is not without its potential risks. Here I highlight one of those risks – the nocebo effect. Nocebo effects are harms that are (...) thought to arise by conditioning or negative expectation. If a patient engaged in active pharmacovigilance is improperly motivated to seek out and report suspected adverse drug reactions, nocebo harms can occur. Not only is this a bioethical concern about harm, but it is also an epistemic or data-quality problem. Since nocebo effects are not due to the pharmacological properties of the drugs under investigation, nocebo effects reported as suspected adverse drug reactions constitute false positives in these databases. (shrink)

In identifying intrinsic molecular chance and extrinsic adaptive pressures as the only causally relevant factors in the process of evolution, the theoretical perspective of the Modern Synthesis had a major impact on the perceived tenability of an ontology of dispositional properties. However, since the late 1970s, an increasing number of evolutionary biologists have challenged the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of this “chance alone, extrinsic only” understanding of evolutionary change. Because morphological studies of homology, convergence, and teratology have revealed a space (...) of possible forms and phylogenetic trajectories that is considerably more restricted than expected, evo-devo has focused on the causal contribution of intrinsic developmental processes to the course of evolution. Evo-devo’s investigation into the developmental structure of the modality of morphology – including both the possibility and impossibility of organismal form – has led to the utilisation of a number of dispositional concepts that emphasise the tendency of the evolutionary process to change along certain routes. In this sense, and in contrast to the perspective of the Modern Synthesis, evo-devo can be described as a “science of dispositions.” This chapter discusses the recent philosophical literature on dispositional properties in evo-devo, exploring debates about both the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the central dispositional concepts utilised in contemporary evo-devo and addressing the epistemological question of how dispositional properties challenge existing explanatory models in evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Precision medicine functions by grouping patients along genetic, molecular, and related ‘-omics’ factors. This stratification relies on large, growing databases of patient-volunteered information. Both private companies and government bodies incentivize patients to volunteer this genetic information appealing to the creation of collaborative patient partnerships and the concept of empowerment. This paper aims to address two related questions: (1) what is the actual nature of patient participation in precision medicine research? And (2) is this participation in precision medicine research really that (...) empowering for the average patient? I contend that firstly, the nature of this participation is best conceived of as merely contributory. Contributory participation, as it will be shown, falls short of collaboration. The partnership created by participation in precision medicine research is not one of sharing values, equal say in decisions, or shared benefit. Secondly, I contend that there are important caveats to claims that patient participation in precision medicine is empowering. Empowerment is hindered by the type of participation, the practical use or actionability of genetic data, genetic literacy, the cost of precision drugs for patients that qualify for them, and bioethical considerations of informed consent. (shrink)

The biological sciences have always proven a fertile ground for philosophical analysis, one from which has grown a rich tradition stemming from Aristotle and flowering with Darwin. And although contemporary philosophy is increasingly becoming conceptually entwined with the study of the empirical sciences with the data of the latter now being regularly utilised in the establishment and defence of the frameworks of the former, a practice especially prominent in the philosophy of physics, the development of that tradition hasn’t received the (...) wider attention it so thoroughly deserves. This review will briefly introduce some recent significant topics of debate within the philosophy of biology, focusing on those whose metaphysical themes (in everything from composition to causation) are likely to be of wide-reaching, cross-disciplinary interest. (shrink)

Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo: Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 310pp, £29.99 HB.

This paper takes up the question of knowing one's general mental traits, including one's goals, beliefs, and motives. One conclusion is that this is a difficult project. The issue of attributing to oneself ulterior or hidden motives is considered.

While there is considerable disagreement on the precise nature of material objecthood, it is standardly assumed that material objects must be spatial. In this paper, I provide two arguments against this assumption. The first argument is made from largely a priori considerations about modal plenitude. The possibility of non-spatial material objects follows from commitment to certain plausible principles governing material objecthood and plausible principles regarding modal plenitude. The second argument draws from current philosophical discussions regarding theories of quantum gravity and (...) the emergence of spacetime. When it is appreciated what possible worlds these current theories commit us to, the possibility of non-spatial material objects will follow. Thus, either route will lead us to the possibility of non-spatial material objects. The significance of this result is that we need to revise our accounts of material objecthood to both accommodate these possibilities and the theories that lead to them. (shrink)

This essay critiques the return to objects posited by certain new materialisms, most specifically the speculative realism of Harman, Meillassoux and Brassier. It argues that their “non-relational” and “autonomous” ontology represents a neo-positivist conception of reality. In place of such an atomistic ontology, I will suggest that the new materialisms develop a more productive, “non-reductive materialism”—a term drawn from analytic philosophy of mind. I will interpret Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Luc Nancy as crucial examples of such a materialism on the continental side. (...) Rather than being based on the non-relational innerness of an object, this position instead takes into account matter’s fundamentally extended nature. Confirmed by examples such as the growing evidence for neuroplasticity, the externalist, non-reductive view advances the new materialist argument that matter is “agentive” and “active” rather than “mechanic” and “passive,” without slipping into an anti-social-constructionist biologism or behaviorism. (shrink)

Here I review the recent edited volume "Richard Kearney's Anatheistic Wager: Philosophy, Theology, Poetics.".

Here I review Richard Kearney and Matthew Clemente's edited volume "The Art of Anatheism.".

Here I review the edited volume "Kierkegaard's God and the Good Life." I attempt to highlight the various contributions while locating the book's significance within the broader scholarship surrounding Kierkegaard.

This paper criticises the two prominent interpretations of utopianism in Plato's Republic. The traditional argues that it is mere utopianism, seriously proposing that Kallipolis is, in fact, the ideal city. The ironic argues that the Republic is a critique of the ability for reason to reconstruct human nature and is, therefore, a dire warning against utopian thinking in politics. I oppose these two interpretations and instead argue that the Republic implies a paradoxical necessity in the nature of utopianism: The ideal (...) cannot be theorised without itself being conditioned by the politics of theorising, and yet the politics of theorising is immanently motivated by the ideal. I locate this seemingly antonymic dynamic within the education of the learner/citizen in the Republic. Although this is centred on the notion of self-governance, it cannot be imposed and instead depends on the philosophical development of one's soul that is inextricably linked to justice in the city. Therefore, the utopianism of the Republic ought to be thought of as dialectical, being simultaneously situated and yet normatively transcending. (shrink)

Supersubstantivalists identify material objects with regions of spacetime. Accordingly, they take their view to be both more ideologically parsimonious than other substantivalists (dualists) because they can reduce location to identity with a region and they can explain why the mereological structure of objects mirrors the mereological structure of their locations (henceforth, “harmony”). However, I argue that these motivations for supersubstantivalism don’t hold water. Specifically, I argue that supersubstantivalists can only claim the aforementioned advantages just so long as they stand in (...) a unique position to reduce location. But this depends on the illicit assumption that no possible spacetime structures have co-located regions – something falsified by the possibility of merely pseudo-metric spaces. Further, any alternative reduction is equally available to the dualist. Accordingly, this allows dualists to have the same explanation of harmony as the supersubstantivalist. As such, these considerations level the dialectical playing field between dualists and supersubstantivalists. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

In any sense of "being good" consequences are of utmost importance.

This participatory study, conducted in an introductory psychology class, recounts self-reflections of 22 undergraduate students and their instructor engaging in a GenAI-mediated storyboard generation process. It relies on Gordon Pask’s conversation theory, structuring out the nature of interactions between students, instructor, and GenAI, and then uses a qualitative narrative to describe these conversational feedback loops constituting the creation of draft and final storyboards. Results suggest students engaged in cyclical feedback driven processes to master their creations, used elements of photography related (...) to the relationships between objects in frame, image processing, and cultural objects/themes to generate narratives. Issues were faced with generating text on images, and the consistency and style of generated frames as they interacted with GenAI tools. This study provides guidelines to university teaching professionals to design effective activities mediated by text-to-image GenAI. (shrink)

The central pillar of Austin’s theory of speech acts is the three-way distinction between locutionary acts like saying, illocutionary acts like asserting, and perlocutionary acts like persuading (Austin 1962: VIII-IX). While the latter distinction has been widely accepted, the former distinction has been frequently rejected due to Searle’s objections, who argued that since Austin’s locutionary acts are supposed to be forceful in the sense contrasting with neutral expression of a content and all force is by Austin’s (...) own definition illocutionary, the notion of a locutionary act collapses into that of an illocutionary act (Searle 1968). In this paper, I provide an interpretation of Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts and defend it against Searle’s objections. I argue that Searle’s main objection relies on mistakenly running together two notions of ‘force’: the Fregean notion of representational force as presentation-as-true and the Austinian notion of illocutionary force as the social-communicative significance of the speech act. Once we distinguish these we can see that although Searle is correct that Austin’s locutionary acts are forceful in the former sense, he’s mistaken in thinking that such force is illocutionary. Given this, his objection that locutionary acts collapse into illocutionary acts misses its mark. (shrink)

Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962) generates wildly different reactions among philosophers. Interpreting Austin on perception starts with a reading of this text, and this in turn requires reading into the lectures key ideas from Austin’s work on natural language and the theory of knowledge. The lectures paint a methodological agenda, and a sketch of some first-order philosophy, done the way Austin thinks it should be done. Crucially, Austin calls for philosophers to bring a deeper understanding (...) of natural language meaning to bear as they do their tasks. In consequence Austin’s lectures provide a fascinating start—but only a start—on a number of key questions in the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a di erent character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot de ne it in a satisfactory way. (...) Quine’s criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious om the scienti c point of view. this general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for di erent reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion — a model which is based on false analogies. In my text, I compare these two approaches and point out that they have di erent metaphilosophical sources. the main di erence lies in the fact that, according to Austin, statements about linguistic meaning usually have a descriptive character, whereas Quine claims that linguistic meanings are theoretical entities. In the last part of my article, I discuss the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and assess its credibility, as it plays a key role in Quine’s criticism of the notion of meaning. (shrink)

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that (...) what Austin says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception. (shrink)

Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary (...) attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning. (shrink)

One of the central figures of philosophy of language- John Langshaw Austin, attributes principles of causation to the mere pragmatic language. Conversely, Kant tried to construct a “free human act” which is independent from any physical determination except its innate motivations via his well-known the phenomenal / noumenal distinction. That kind of Kantian metaphysical ground which addresses to the noumenal field, he obviously tries to establish this behavioral causation again by denying Austinian style pragmatic propositions or illocutionary acts. I (...) claimed that sort of duality between Austin and Kant, creates an epistemological problem with how propositions and actions relate. From a Kantian position, it (indetermination) is overlooked by Austin's propositional doctrine, without being grounded on any universal principle, but only with propositions that embraced by speech act theory. (shrink)

भाषा केवल संप्रेषण का माध्यम नहीं है बल्कि कार्य संपादन का साधन भी है। इसी मान्यता के आधार पर जे०एल० आस्टिन (J.L. Austin) ने सर्वप्रथम वाक्-क्रिया सिद्धांत (Speech Act Theory) का प्रतिपादन किया। कालांतर में एक शिष्य जॉन रोजर्स सर्ल (John Rogers Searle) ने उनके वाक्-क्रिया सिद्धांत को अधिक विकसित एवं संशोधित किया, जिससे क्रियाओं को संपादित करने में भाषा कैसे कार्य करती है, इसका अधिक तार्किक एवं औपचारिक विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत किया गया। सर्ल के संशोधनों ने लोगों द्वारा भाषा (...) के साथ संपादित किए जाने वाली क्रियाओं के प्रकारों एवं सफल संप्रेषण को नियंत्रित करने वाले नियमों को सुस्पष्ट रूप से समझने हेतु अधिक व्यवस्थित रूपरेखा को प्रस्तुत किया।. (shrink)

Interpreting J.L. Austin: Critical Essays Edited by TsohatzidisSavas L.Oxford University Press, 2018. xii + 238 pp.

In this paper, I transcend the abstract engagement of J. L. Austin's Speech Acts theory and explore their sociopolitical advantages, using the Nigerian social space as my primary experimental field. Nigerian social space is quite hierarchical and progresses along apparently asymmetrical lines of social relationship (in most cases). This in turn, accentuates some sort of power dynamics. In every communication, there is an implicit reinforcement of the social fabric as well as the power dynamic, either through one person's percep6of (...) the social status of the other or, of one's emphasis of power dynamic over the other. Austin's theory comes to the fore as a very laudable framework to map this interesting sociological facts. This work then, offers a philosophical contribution to an otherwise, sociological/anthropological fact. My job in this paper, is to explore a sociopolitical negotiation of Austin's theory in a multiethnic nation-state as Nigeria where hierarchy and power dynamics are heavily emphasized. This paper thus highlights the importance of the perlocutionary acts and the felicity conditions, and also accentuates their implications for social interactions and power dynamics in the Nigerian social space. (shrink)

What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. In this paper, I compare Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions, and show that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. I then examine (...) Austin and Wittgenstein’s respective takes on the problem of other minds and the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Interestingly, we find Wittgenstein employing methods more frequently associated Austin and vice versa. Moreover, we find that a variety of defenses of common sense beliefs are compatible with ‘ordinary language philosophy.’. (shrink)