Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source (...) of categorical demands. In this paper, I defend the viability of constitutivism by showing that agency is indeed a special ‘inescapable’ enterprise. Agency has the largest jurisdiction, and it is closed under rational assessment. This inescapability does not exempt constitutivism from raising the question whether agents have reason to be agents, but this question has to be taken up within agency. If this question is answered affirmatively, then—I argue—the criteria of practical correctness are self-ratifying in a non-circular way. This is sufficient to show the viability of the constitutivist strategy. Whether agents have conclusive reasons to be agents, however, is a matter to be addressed in the terms of particular versions of constitutivism. (shrink)

This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of (...) certain normative claims arises from the bare fact that we are agents. This essay explains the constitutivst strategy, surveys the extant attempts to generate constitutivist theories, and considers the problems and prospects for the theory. (shrink)

Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency or rational powers. Ambitious constitutivism aspires to ground the categorical authority of morality and to derive the content of the basic moral norms while avoiding the problems of moral realism. As a general strategy, moral constitutivism faces three serious challenges. First, the shmagency challenge. The worry is that the authority of the norms derived from the nature of agency is only conditional on (...) having a reason to be an agent rather than some other kind of subject, a shmagent or an alienated agent. Constitutivists usually reply by appealing to the inescapability of agency. Second, there is a worry that agency is too thin a basis for the derivation of the substantive content of moral norms. Finally, there is the worry that constitutivism might be unable to make room for bad actions. The entry considers possible responses by moral constitutivism to these concerns and whether, if these responses are unsatisfactory, moral constitutivism might still have some explanatory power but of a less ambitious sort. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant (...) can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately just one instance of a much more general approach to philosophy – which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. (shrink)

Many interpreters have recently defended constitutivist interpretations of Kant's moral theory, but they have largely overlooked the most prominent challenge to constitutivism: the shmagency objection. In this paper, I argue that Kant employs a form of constitutivism in the Groundwork not to vindicate the authority of morality to a sceptic, but rather with the aim of explaining how categorical imperatives can bind rational agents given the nature of practical reason. As such, his view is immune to the challenge (...) posed by the shmagency objection. By distinguishing between normative and explanatory scepticism, this paper shows that the objection only threatens constitutivist views that address the former, thereby shedding light on a fundamental difference between Kant and contemporary constitutivists in terms of their metaethical ambitions. (shrink)

Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many (...) classes of reasons, while also offering a new way of understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The chapter concludes by arguing that the resulting view is best understood, not so much as an alternative to autonomy-first constitutivism, but as a complement to it. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this (...) objection. I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

Constitutivist accounts in metaethics explain the normative standards in a domain by appealing to the constitutive features of its members. The success of these accounts turns on whether they can explain the connection between normative standards and the nature of individuals they authoritatively govern. Many such explanations presuppose that any member of a norm-governed kind must minimally satisfy the norms governing its kind. I call this the Threshold Commitment, and argue that constitutivists should reject it. First, it requires constitutivists to (...) restrict the scope of their explanatory ambitions, because it is not plausibly true of social kinds. Second, despite the frequent reliance on physical artifacts in constitutivists’ illustrations of the Threshold Commitment, it counter-intuitively entails that physical artifacts can cease to exist without being physically destroyed. Third, it misconstrues the normative force of authoritative norms on very defective kind-members because it locates this force not in the norm, but in the threat of non-existence. Fortunately, constitutivism can be decoupled from the Threshold Commitment, and I close by sketching a promising alternative account. (shrink)

A brief explanation and overview of constitutivism.

Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, (...) it uses considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, it offers a response to the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices that hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, it argues that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view. (shrink)

Problemele filosofie sensibile pe care le pune aplicabilitatea matematicii în ştiinţe şi viaţa de zi cu zi au conturat, pe un fond interdisciplinar, o nouă “ramură” a filosofiei ştiinţei, anume filosofia aplicabilităţii matematicii. Aplicarea cu succes a matematicii de-a lungul istoriei ştiinţei necesită reprezentare, încadrare, explicaţie, dar şi o justificare de ordin metateoretic a aplicabilităţii. Între rolurile matematicii în practica ştiinţifică, rolul constitutiv teoriilor ştiinţifice este cel a cărui analiză poate contribui esenţial la această justificare. În lucrarea de faţă, am (...) analizat acest rol constitutiv prin prisma relaţiilor sale cu celelalte roluri importante ale matematicii (descriptiv-semantic-reprezentaţional, inferenţial-explicativ-predictiv), încercând să surprind motivaţia primară a acestui rol relativ la ideea de structură matematică şi epistemică, componente esenţiale ale ştiinţei structurale matematizate. (shrink)

This article attempts a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s metaethics through a constitutivist lens. It examines the relationship between life’s meaningfulness and our distinctive way of valuing to offer a value-based version of constitutivism—a value constitutivism, as it were. For Nietzsche, valuing has a characteristic function or aim, namely, to give life meaning; good values are simply those that perform that function well. This version of Nietzschean constitutivism has both interpretive and substantive upshots. Mainly, it clarifies the general normative (...) structure of Nietzsche’s axiological theory and helps vindicate the kind of revaluation of values he envisioned—with power playing a central normative role. In sum, constitutivism remains a promising approach to Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s writings continue to offer rich insights into the source and nature of normativity. (shrink)

Constitutivists often argue that agency is inescapable. This is supposed to, among other things, explain why norms that are constitutive of agency are forceful. But can some form of inescapability do that? I consider four types of inescapability—psychological, further factor, standpoint, and plight—and evaluate whether they manage to explain four necessary features of normative force: that it does not vary with desire change, that ought-implies-can and can-fail, and that we are criticizable for failing to live up to forceful norms. The (...) former three all fail to explain some of these features, but a version of plight inescapability does, in fact, appear able to explain them all. This is good news for constitutivists. The catch? The plight inescapability explanation generates relativism. This leaves constitutivists at a choice point: accept the plight inescapability explanation of normative force and relativism—or give up the plight inescapability explanation. (shrink)

This paper argues that the structure of agency itself generates categorical moral norms. From the formal conditions of purposive action, it derives the Agency Preservation Principle (APP): agents must not act in ways that destroy the conditions that make valuation and choice possible. Coercion, on this view, is not merely evaluatively objectionable but conceptually incoherent, because it cancels the authorship through which action has meaning. The paper develops a praxeological form of constitutivism that grounds normativity in what it is (...) to act, rather than in intuition, psychology, or social convention. Unlike Kantian or Korsgaardian self-constitution views, this account derives obligation from the conditions of intelligibility of purposeful action itself, not from reflective endorsement. Moral norms are objective because they follow from agency’s structure, authoritative because no agent can coherently deny them while acting, and reciprocal because all agents share that structure. The argument resolves the shmagency objection, reframes the is–ought divide, and establishes non-coercion as the constitutive condition of moral intelligibility. (shrink)

Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the (...) content of one’s will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries. (shrink)

Moral metaethical constitutivists claim that moral reasons can be reduced to the constitutive aims or principles of agency. While such a project promises to secure the universality and conclusiveness of moral reasons, it also threatens to leave insufficient space for acting on other values. In this paper, I argue that moral metaethical constitutivism is unlikely to overcome the burdensomeness objection, according to which a theory is objectionably burdensome if it leaves insufficient space for the agent’s own projects, relationships, and (...) so on. I argue that neither Christine Korsgaard’s reflective endorsement account nor Michael Smith’s capacities account can overcome the objection, and suggest that the problems that they encounter are likely to generalize to any moral metaethical constitutivism. It is unlikely that what is constitutive of agency is sensitive to the unique goods of humanity, and thus unlikely that good moral agents could also live good human lives. (shrink)

Review of Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.

In recent work, Michael Smith argues that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency and draws on his dispositional account of reasons to establish the normative significance of those desires. In a sustained critique, Michael Bukowski objects that Smith’s recent arguments that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency rely on indefensible premises and his dispositional account of reasons is unable to establish the normative significance of such desires. On the contrary, I argue not only that Smith has the resources (...) to respond to these objections but also that the form of Smith’s constitutivist explanation has unappreciated explanatory strengths. (shrink)

Can we rationally choose between philosophical hinge commitments if they resist argument and evidence? At first glance, such choices seem arbitrary. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) and Coliva and Doulas (2022) argue, however, that adopting a constitutivist account of hinges allows for rational choice through what Coliva terms ‘extended rationality’. They claim that accepting the hinge ‘there are physical objects’ is constitutive of epistemic rationality. This paper challenges that view, arguing that the idealist hinge is misrepresented in their work and (...) that this particular hinge may not ground rational belief. The paper shows that constitutivism, though promising, faces a criterion problem in philosophical hinge disagreements. It concludes that while constitutivism and extended rationality can explain belief rationality, they must be supported by independent criteria for selecting between competing hinges. (shrink)

I defend pluralist metaethical constitutivism: practical norms governing an agent are grounded in her kind of rational agency. Kinds of rational agency are defined in terms of reasons explanations: to be a given kind of rational agent is for one’s actions to admit of certain forms of reasons explanation. Unlike extant, ‘monist’ constitutivists, pluralists need not say that there are constitutive standards of rational agency as such—just that there are constitutive standards of our kind of agency. They can thus (...) admit the possibility of ‘minimal’ agents whose agency cannot ground any practical norms, retaining the virtues of monist constitutivism without its costs. (shrink)

Constitutivism explains norms in terms of their being constitutive of agency, actions, or certain propositional attitudes. However, the shmagency objection says that if we can be shmagents – like agents, minus the norm-explaining features of agency – we can avoid the norms, so the explanation fails. This paper extends this objection, arguing that constitutivists about practical norms suffer from it despite their recent attempts to solve it. The standard response to the objection is that it is self-defeating for agents (...) to become shmagents. I agree, but the response ignores the possibility of shmagents who consider whether to be agents while already standing outside agency. Another response says that we ought to be agents because agency is, in some sense, normatively valuable, and if so, we can explain norms in terms of this valuable form of agency. But then the norms that our constitutions are supposed to explain are underdetermined because it is unclear how much we ought to care about this value. I conclude that the shmagency objection has yet to be answered. (shrink)

According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a conditional kind of authority. I then consider David Enoch’s original shmagency challenge and the response in terms of the inescapability of agency. In particular, I revisit the appeal to (...) inescapability in light of Enoch’s restatement of the challenge in 'Shmagency Revisited'. I argue that the revised challenge still fails but that it helps clarify: first, the distinction between external and internal challenges to constitutivism, and, second, the existence of at least different kinds of inescapability of agency (metaphysical, psychological, and dialectical). I argue that only dialectical inescapability is helpful to show that constitutivism is a viable metanormative theory. I conclude by claiming that an internal challenge to constitutivism is still possible in principle but that the burden of proof has shifted once again to the critics of constitutivism. (shrink)

Constitutivists believe that we can derive universally and unconditionally authoritative norms from the conditions of agency. Thus if c is a condition of agency, then you ought to live in conformity with c no matter what your particular ends, projects, or station. Much has been said about the validity of the inference, but that’s not my topic here. I want to assume it is valid and talk about what I take to be the highest ambition of constitutivism: the prospect (...) of grounding moral requirements in the conditions of agency. If this can be done, then we can show that everyone is bound by the demands of morality, and we can do so without the customary entanglements—queer normative entities, an implausibly powerful moral sense, or divine lawgivers. (shrink)

Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in (...) much the same way that the functional natures of artifacts and bodily organs ground normative judgments about those kinds of things. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian conclusions about goodness which follow so straightforwardly from teleological premises are not genuinely normative. Functions are not by their very nature normatively significant. Other constitutivists—notably J. David Velleman and Paul Katsafanas—eschew Aristotelian talk of functions in favor of an approach based on the idea that agency has a constitutive aim. Velleman and Katsafanas both claim that aims are normatively significant. I argue that the fact that agency has a constitutive aim is merely a fact about the motives that produce and regulate actions. And so we are still left with a gap between the teleological and the normative. I conclude by suggesting that constitutivists have failed to find a way to bridge this gap not because none exists, but rather because they have been looking in the wrong place. The constitutivist project can be salvaged, but only if it is supplemented with a reductive metanormative account of reasons for action, an account that links reasons to sound or successful practical reasoning. (shrink)

There is no good human life outside of a state, and the good state enables us to live well together – so says Constitutivism, the theory developed in this book. Reinvigorating Aristotelian ideas, the author asks in what sense citizens of modern, populous and pluralistic societies share a common good. -/- While we can easily find examples of cooperation that benefit each member, such as insurances, the idea that persons could share a common good became puzzling with modernity – (...) a puzzlement epitomised in Margaret Thatcher’s ‘What is society? There is no such thing!’ Aristotle describes the state as the end of human development, both chronologically and normatively, but modern philosophers, from Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmitt, conceive the relation between state and citizen as instrumental. Either the state is a means of advancing each member’s individual good or the individual is a means of advancing some collective good. From both perspectives, the Aristotelian idea that human individuals somehow realise their own good in realising some communal good appears metaphysically puzzling, even nonsensical. -/- This puzzlement, the author argues, results from our profoundly modern understanding of rational actions, which we generally see as means toward outcomes. If we allow that not only outcomes but also histories and identities can be good reasons for actions, then it makes sense to see a person’s good and the common good of their political community as constitutive of one another, as Aristotle thought. Building on this idea, the author argues that individual actions and lives exist only in conjunction with a political community. In designing our institutions, we hence also give ourselves an identity and, in that sense, constitute ourselves as persons. Her arguments shed new light on a range of traditional topics of political theory, such as the justification of state authority or the question of how to justify or challenge the design of social institutions. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a (...) good basis, and argue that RGB has various attractive features: it has intuitive implications, makes good sense of the weights of reasons, and attractively explains the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons. I then briefly defend the view from objections and compare it to rivals. Finally, I sketch two possible implications of RGB: some kind of constitutivism, according to which the norms that govern us are explained by the nature of agency, and second, the claim that agents who do things for reasons generally do them for good reasons. (shrink)

A common feature of all versions of constitutivism is the “simple constitutivist move” to the effect that engagement in any enterprise requires respecting the constitutive standards of the enterpri...

(1) This paper is about how to build an account of the normativity of logic around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. I take the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking to mean that representational activity must tend to conform to logic to count as thinking. (2) I develop a natural line of thought about how to develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity by drawing on constitutivism in metaethics. (3) I argue that, (...) while this line of thought provides some insights, it is importantly incomplete, as it is unable to explain why we should think. I consider two attempts at rescuing the line of thought. The first, unsuccessful response is that it is self-defeating to ask why we ought to think. The second response is that we need to think. But this response secures normativity only if thinking has some connection to human flourishing. (4) I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing. Logic is normative because it is constitutive of this good. (5) I show that the resulting account deals nicely with problems that vex other accounts of logical normativity. (shrink)

Ascriptivists such as H.L.A. Hart, J.L. Austin, and Joel Feinberg defended a conceptual link between agency and normativity by putting forward the thesis that the attribution of an action is also an attribution of responsibility. This thesis has been heavily criticised for not providing an accurate model of what is signified by action statements and attributions of responsibility. In this chapter, I explore two ways of supporting it philosophically. The first is based on the constitutivist view, developed by Philippa Foot (...) and Michael Thompson, according to which the concept of agency is dependent on the concept of life-form. The second is founded on the Hegelian idea of recognition as part of the human form of life. According to this second idea, recognition shows how the sociality of agency creates the conditions for normativity. It is argued that the sum of both strategies makes it possible to explain some basic normative notions. The result is a weak social constitutivism that shows how the interpersonal meaning of our actions makes us responsible for them and allow us to build the normative landscape. (shrink)

One of Elizabeth Anscombe’s most decisive legacies is the rejection of modern legalistic morality, in the name of a rescue of Aristotelian-inspired natural normativity. However, as I will argue in this contribution, this legacy does not seem to have been fully collected, neither by those who, like Philippa Foot, are explicitly inspired by Anscombe’s work, nor by those who, while apparently opposing its assumptions, have also somehow recovered it by different routes, as emblematically does Christine Korsgaard in her constitutivist proposal. (...) In more detail, I aim to explore the relationship between teleology and normativity at the crossroads between neo-Aristotelian naturalism and constitutivism: both theories, though opposed, rest normativity on a link between function (the Aristotelian ergon) and practical reason and fail precisely in declining this relationship convincingly. (shrink)

This chapter offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. It argues that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to, while also explaining why a clear statement of what such authority amounts to has been so elusive in the recent literature. The account given is contrasted with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly shows how (...) it answers “schmagency”-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, the chapter explains how the account offered here can help realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views. (shrink)

Can the question "Why do what morality requires?" be answered in such a way that anyone regardless of their desires or interests has reason to be moral? One strategy for answering this question appeals to constitutive arguments. In general, constitutive arguments attempt to establish the normativity of rational requirements by pointing out that we are already committed to them insofar as we are believers or agents. This study is concerned with the general prospects for such arguments. It starts by explaining (...) the general constitutive argument strategy, followed by an examination of constitutive arguments that have been given regarding theoretical reason and the instrumental principle in practical reason, and concluding with a discussion of some challenges to constitutive arguments in moral philosophy and some possible responses to these challenges. (shrink)

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. (...) We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best. (shrink)

Metaethical constitutivists seek to ground normativity in facts about what is constitutive of agency. One strand of constitutivism locates the foundations of normativity in constitutive aims, which are standardly conceived of in teleological terms. I present three challenges that show that the teleological conception of constitutive aims is inadequate for the constitutivist project. I then sketch an alternative conception of constitutive aims in the form of a commitment-based conception. On the commitment-based conception, actions and attitudes constitutively represent their objects (...) as having certain properties, and their constitutive aims are fixed by the accuracy-conditions of these representations. Because such representations constitutively involve a commitment on the part of the agent to the object’s having the relevant property, they generate authoritative norms for the agent. I conclude that, unlike the teleological conception, the commitment-based conception promises to yield a unified constitutivism that delivers authoritative normative standards for both actions and attitudes. (shrink)

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I (...) argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative (...) judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.RÉSUMÉDans une série d'articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen et Nick Zangwill font valoir que, puisque les jugements d'attribution d'attitude propositionnelle ne se comportent pas comme des jugements normatifs en étant soumis à la survenance normative a priori et à la contrainte du Parce que, les AP ne peuvent être constitutivement normatives. Je soutiens que, pour une version spécifique du normativisme, selon laquelle les AP sont des engagements normatifs, ces arguments échouent. À cette fin, je soutiens d'abord que les engagements et les obligations devraient être séparés. Ensuite, je démontre que les intuitions qui régiraient prétendument tous les jugements normatifs ne prétendent même pas s'appliquer aux jugements attributifs d'un engagement. (shrink)

Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...) norms that allegedly have independent value to be underdetermined by that value. I consider three different kinds of constitutivist theories of the normativity of rationality: first-person-authority views, single-mental-state views, and systems-of-mental-states views. None of the three are able to deal with either of these shmagency objections. There are sophisticated shmagents who escape all these types of constitutivist principles of rationality, so they are modally escapable, and the value of rationality underdetermines all the views. Upshot: constitutivists about structural rationality ought to worry about shmagency. (shrink)

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs (...) in important respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

A prominent tradition in Nietzsche scholarship reads his views about will to power as a psychological thesis and his claims about the value of power as an attempt to derive normativity from psychological necessity. This article shows that these interpretations have failed to articulate a cogent reading faithful to Nietzsche’s texts, and so casts doubt on such an approach. My argument bears not only on how we read Nietzsche, but also on the viability of one recent constitutivist reading. After presenting (...) these critical arguments, I consider an original interpretation of will to power in terms of the motivation to grow. This revised interpretation, however, still fails to support the tradition’s derivation of normativity. Thus, I conclude we should look elsewhere for Nietzsche’s normative argument. (shrink)

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...) building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...) thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. (shrink)

Această lucrare propune o perspectivă filosofico-ontologică radicală asupra Corpului/ Organismului Uman, propunând Teza Ontologic-Agonistică conform căreia acesta nu este un simplu agregat biologic pasiv sau o mașinărie programată genetic, ci un act de Ontificare Agonică Aprigă, o Unitate Tensională smulsă din neant prin confruntare ontologică/ ontogenetică neîncetată. Punctul de plecare in articol este Interogația Radicală asupra ființei, care deconstruiește viziunile clasice pentru a revela organismul ca pe un fenomen de rebeliune ontologică în care viața este definită ca ansamblul funcțiilor ce (...) concurează neîncetat intre ele și ce ripostează în solidar în fața entropiei/ morții. În această viziune, Ontosul Biologic Uman încetează să fie o esență statică și devine o rezultantă a coliziunii dintre Ontoformațiuni Autonome — entități structurale (organe, sisteme, populații celulare) cu caracteristici de ființă care își dispută cu ferocitate spațiul ontic și resursele metabolice. Unitatea întregului nu este o armonie pre-stabilită, ci o stare de asediu gestionată, unde forța de asalt numită Promergență impune o ordine de fier asupra materiei brute, transformând rezistența factică în Vitalitate Radiantă. Ontogeneza este resemnificată ca o Ontificare prin Asediu, unde forma umană se sculptează prin Dismergență și presiune reciprocă, finalizându-se prin Instituirea unui pact de supraviețuire sub presiune. Funcționarea organismului este validată pe două fronturi: Axa Internă, unde se desfășoară lupta contra Facticității și a erorilor structurale prin Autofagie Agonică, și Axa Externă, unde fortăreața biologică ripostează împotriva Nonsensului Entropic al mediului. Această dinamică impune noi interpretări categoriale: Homeostazia devine o Pace Înarmată, un echilibru de coliziune menținut prin micro-confruntări; Temperamentul este definit drept Stilul de Luptă Biologic al individului; Imunitatea reprezintă Forța de Represiune Ontologică ce epurează alteritatea; în timp ce Sănătatea este proclamată ca fiind Triumful Tensional Victorios al sistemului. Boala apare astfel ca o Rupere a Ierarhiei de putere internă, iar Decesul ca o Capitulare Ontologică Definitivă în fața inerției minerale. În starea sa de apogeu, însă, organismul este integrat în arhitectura persoanei ca Motor Energetic Primordial, furnizând tensiunea necesară pentru ca Conștiința — văzută ca Forma Supremă de Veghe Agonică — să poată transforma biologia într-un destin asumat. Lucrarea concluzionează că viața este un Triumf Tensional, o epopee a rezistenței în care ordinea este smulsă secundă de secundă haosului, afirmând demnitatea omului de a fi un pol de putere ce transformă agonia structurală într-o victorie glorioasă a ființei asupra neantului. CUVINTE CHEIE: Ontos Biologic, Ontologie Biologică Agonistică, Ontificare prin Confruntare, Antagonism Constitutiv, Unitate Tensională, Promergență, Dismergență, Echilibru de Coliziune, Confruntare Biologică, Triumf Tensional, Autofagie Agonică. CUPRINS I Introducere II Teza Ontologic-Agonistică: Formare și Ființare prin Confruntare Ontologică/ Ontogenetică III Corpul/ Organismul Uman din Perspectivă Ontologic-Confruntațională/ Agonistică IV Proprietăți și Legități Fundamentale în Formarea și Funcționarea Corpului/ Organismului Uman. Perspectiva Ontologic-Agonistică LV Formarea Corpului/ Organismului Uman din Perspectivă Ontologic-Confruntațională VI Axele Confruntării: Internă și Externă VII Ființarea și Funcționarea Organismului ca Întreg din Perspectivă Ontologic-Confruntațională VIII Re-interpretări Categoriale: Homeostazia, Temperamentul, Imunitatea, Sănătatea, Boala, Decesul IX Organismul Uman în Cadrul Sistemului de Personalitate, în Arhitectura Personală și Comportament din Perspectivă Ontologic-Confruntațională / Agonistică X Concluzii. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self‐mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and (...) have consequently become agents, is that they possess a diachronic or long will and are consequently capable of the rational governance of future behaviour. The possession of a will of this sort is crucial because it is a necessary condition for engaging in temporally unified activities which are a requisite of authorship. Nietzsche, I argue, makes these points in his doctrine of eternal recurrence which provides a test that acts of will must pass to count as laws. In the final section of the paper I argue for the superiority of this interpretation over some of its competitors. (shrink)

Matthew Boyle (2011) has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of (...) knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, but that these disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge, along the lines of that defended by John Hyman (1999/2015). I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, we can jettison (B), as it it left with no explanatory role to play. (shrink)

The paper proposes a radical rethinking of the foundations of morality by developing a conception of freedom as intrinsically obligatory. In contrast to approaches that derive duty from rationality or reduce it to social conventions, it argues that the normative force of moral requirements arises from the distinctive ontological status of freedom. By distinguishing the "natural" freedom to choose means from the "social" freedom to determine one’s ends, the paper shows that the pursuit of the social freedom itself gives rise (...) to universal moral principles. Thus, freedom and morality are interdependent: obligation is a constitutive mode of the free agent’s being, and morality is a necessary condition for the realization of freedom. (shrink)

Marea varietate de materie cu care ne confruntăm în experiența de zi cu zi este formată din atomi. Existența unor astfel de particule a fost propusă pentru prima dată de către filosofii greci, precum Democrit, Leucip, și epicurienii, dar fără niciun argument real, astfel încât conceptul a dispărut. Aristotel argumenta împotriva indivizibililor lui Democrit (care diferă considerabil de utilizarea istorică și modernă a termenului "atom"). Conceptul atomic a fost reînviat de Rudjer Boscovich în secolul XVIII, și apoi aplicat în chimie (...) de John Dalton. Atomul este cel mai mic constitutiv ireductibil al unui sistem chimic. Cuvântul este derivat din limba greacă, atomos, indivizibil, format din particula a-, nu, și tomos, divizare. Acesta reprezintă de obicei atomi chimici, componentele de bază ale moleculelor și materia obișnuită. Acești atomi nu sunt divizibili prin reacții chimice, dar sunt acum cunoscuți a fi compuși din particule subatomice chiar mai mici. Dimensiunile acestor atomi sunt în general în intervalul de la 22 până la 100 pm. (shrink)

The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ (...) and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons wherever it appears. In this article I argue that two recent proposals for solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two kinds of reasons. (shrink)