Macaques, commonly classified as wild animals, are often excluded from consideration as companion animals due to prevailing prejudices and institutional frameworks. However, newly emerging observations reveal that some individuals have formed deep, reciprocal emotional bonds with macaques, integrating them, not merely as pets, but as genuine members of the family. This lifestyle appears to bring greater psychological, intellectual and social fulfillment for the macaques, surpassing the well-being of both their wild and captive counterparts, thus contributing to the emergence of more (...) evolved profiles. These cases challenge among others, the dominant long-standing paradigm that macaques “cannot be pets” or “belong only in the wild” rooted in earlier observations of captive macaques suffering neglect and psychological distress, observations which have shaped current legal and ethical assumptions. They highlight a quiet revolution in human-macaque relationships, rooted in mutual understanding, enrichment and fulfillment, deep emotional reciprocity, and argue for distinguishing macaques integrated into families from the conventional notion of “captivity” which fails to reflect their lived experience. Despite growing evidence of healthy, enriched, and mutually fulfilling human-primate relationships, many regulatory bodies, continue to operate under conventional non-inclusive convictions, instead of exhibiting scientific curiosity and ethical reflection. As a result, they would intervene in the name of the law to confiscate well-cared-for macaques, sometimes selectively and without conducting any behavioral or welfare assessments, disrupting their lives, causing trauma, withdrawal, and even fatal outcomes, to which authorities nonetheless remain indifferent and unaccountable. This paper examines the ethical and scientific shortcomings of rigid legal applications and critiques how institutional bias and the unchecked enforcement, particularly through the story of monkeys Kaka, Mit and Puka, can become a mechanism of harm in the name of conservation and the law, no longer serving an intent to protect, but to punish, deriving the law from its original purpose. This is especially problematic when authority is delegated to NGOs or agencies driven by personal or political agendas rather than genuine concern for animal welfare. This review challenges assumptions, urges case-by-case welfare assessments prioritizing bonds and quality of life over rigid legal classification, thus advocates for policy reform that incorporates behavioral indicators into legal processes, highlighting the need to distinguish between fulfillment and distress, as confiscation affects abused and emotionally-bonded macaques differently. It calls for making ethics a legal duty to protect animals from being victimized by punitive practices, It also encourages transparency and recognizes that some human-primate relationships are profoundly beneficial. (shrink)

Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘ eligibility ’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but (...) instead flows naturally from three independently motivated elements; and to show that severe limitations afflict the proposal. In conclusion, I pick out the element of the eligibility response that is responsible for the limitations: future work in this area should therefore concentrate on amending this aspect of the overall theory. (shrink)

One of the buzzwords of today is ‘inclusion’. But the idea that everyone should be ‘included’ is a mistake, thoughtlessly reproduced by many. This holds in the private sphere, as well as in the institutional settings of the public sphere. There is very little conceptual analysis of the term, although there is plenty of literature on ‘social inclusion’ and the political vision of including the marginalized. My aim is to show that there are constraints on inclusion – particularly in institutional (...) settings. Participation in social life is a kaleidoscope of inclusion and exclusion practices; this actually makes social life possible. Without inclusion/exclusion practices social life would be chaotic – if not impossible. Even philosophy journals have submission criteria which permit exclusion: e.g. the paper must not be under consideration by any other journal. Thus, exclusion is not per se a denial of someone’s dignity or a failure to recognize them as a fellow human being. The aim of this short essay is to raise awareness about inclusion and two of its constraints (eligibility and forfeiture), thereby starting a long overdue debate in the humanities. [open access]. (shrink)

Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call (...) the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology. (shrink)

This paper proposes "Resonance Ethics" as a structurally grounded normative ethical framework derived from Judgemental Philosophy (JP). It challenges the Kantian assumption that ethical judgement can be universally justified through the formalizability of maxims, arguing instead that such universality misinterprets the underlying structure of meaning attribution. In contrast, Resonance Ethics asserts that the ethical legitimacy of a judgement arises not from its abstract generalizability, but from its resonance eligibility—that is, the structural capacity of a subject to receive, process, and meaningfully (...) attribute a judgement within their lived configuration of affectivity, constructivity (C1), and coherence (C2). This reorientation fundamentally redefines what makes a judgement “justifiable,” situating ethical responsibility not in the abstraction of the will, but in the possibility of structurally grounded meaning return. The paper outlines the architecture of Resonance Eligibility, critiques Kantian deontology as a misapplication of resonance logic, and offers a structural reconstruction of normative ethics grounded in the subject’s attributional capacity. It further explores implications for medical ethics, AI, and social coercion, positioning Resonance Ethics as a framework capable of addressing when judgement is possible, premature, coercive, or must be ethically suspended. (shrink)

This paper outlines Lewis’s favoured foundational account of linguistic representation, and outlines and briefly evaluates variations and modifications. Section 1 gives an opinionated exegesis of Lewis’ work on the foundations of reference—his interpretationism. I look at the way that the metaphysical distinction between natural and non-natural properties came to play a central role in his thinking about language. Lewis’s own deployment of this notion has implausible commitments, so in section 2 I consider variations and alternatives. Section 3 briefly considers a (...) buck-passing strategy involving fine-grained linguistic conventions. (shrink)

This paper investigates the structural basis for the ethical inclusion of non-human entities—such as animals, artificial intelligences, and ecosystems—within the framework of moral judgement. Utilizing the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), we argue that moral considerability should not be primarily based on anthropocentric criteria like species, sentience, or similarity to human traits, but on Resonance eligibility: the structural possibility for an entity to participate in, or be the subject of, a meaningful judgement loop involving the return of meaning. We assess (...) how various non-human entities differently satisfy or challenge the conditions of Constructivity, Coherence, and especially Resonance. The analysis reveals that ethical boundaries are often drawn based on the perceived possibility of this structural return. We conclude by proposing a shift from anthropocentrism towards a framework grounded in structural Resonance, suggesting that where Resonance is structurally possible, ethical inclusion must be considered. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the general thesis that the death of the human organism is what constitutes the death of a person. All admit that when the death of a human organism occurs, in some form or another, this normally does result in the death of a person. But, some maintain, organismic death is not the same thing as personal death. Why? Because, they maintain, despite the fact that persons are associated with a human organism (‘their organism’), they (...) are not identical with their organism, and so they can, at least in principle and perhaps in actuality, die before or after their organism dies. The thesis described above I shall call ‘the two-deaths thesis’ in virtue of the fact that its proponents believe that there are two kinds of death, viz. organismic death and personal death. The opposing thesis, according to which the death of a human organism does constitute the death of a person, I call the ‘one death thesis’. After giving some background remarks in section 2 of this paper, in section 3 I argue that, if we take linguistic usage seriously, neither the two-deaths thesis nor the one-death thesis is true. I argue, rather, that so far as linguistic usage goes it is indeterminate which of them is true. In section 4 I go further and argue that if one accepts a widely held metaphysical view, viz. that the world itself partially determines reference and the extensions of our concepts, then it is plausible that the one-death thesis is true despite the facts about linguistic usage. (shrink)

Debates in epistemology and philosophy of science often proceed as if any well-formed claim were, in principle, eligible for empirical confirmation or refutation. Disagreements are then framed in terms of evidence, interpretation, or methodology. This paper argues that such debates presuppose a logically prior condition that is rarely made explicit: not all claims qualify as candidates for empirical or epistemic evaluation at all. The central thesis is that if a purported epistemic claim does not admit of conditions under which it (...) could count as confirmed, disconfirmed, or mistaken, then empirical inquiry into that claim is logically excluded. This is not an empirical failure, but a structural one. The paper distinguishes between empirical falsification and structural ineligibility, and argues that the latter precedes and constrains the former. Building on a minimal, non-metaphysical analysis, the paper identifies basic logical preconditions that any epistemic claim must satisfy in order to enter empirical assessment. Claims that fail to meet these conditions are not rejected as false; they are excluded as epistemically ineligible. In this sense, the analysis is eliminative rather than constructive: it does not defend a particular theory of cognition, but articulates criteria for determining what can meaningfully be discussed, tested, or disputed within empirical inquiry. The reference to Kant in the title is methodological rather than doctrinal. Whereas Kant investigated the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present work examines the logical conditions under which claims qualify as candidates for cognition in the first place. The result is a criterion of epistemic eligibility that applies prior to empirical testing and independent of substantive metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

This paper reexamines irony by shifting the focus from ironic utterances or effects to the structural conditions of understanding itself. Rather than treating irony as a phenomenon defined by semantic reversal, speaker intention, or reader response, the paper argues that the persistent instability of irony as a concept arises from a deeper source: understanding does not operate from a single, uniform viewing position. Instead, it unfolds through structurally distinct positions whose consequences are not equivalent. On this basis, the paper proposes (...) a threefold distinction according to how understanding is structurally constrained: (A) Structural irony, in which understanding can only be achieved through a non-optional reversal of the viewing position; (B) Value-tension narratives, in which understanding can be completed within a single viewing position, but only by sustaining evaluative tension across multiple axes; (C) Critical or de-subjectivizing structures, in which understanding no longer targets the issue at hand but is redirected toward determining who remains eligible to count as a subject of understanding. This classification is not grounded in psychological states, affective tone, or ethical outcomes. Instead, it relies on structural criteria: whether understanding must be reconfigured, whether it can reach completion, and whether it remains open as a revisitable activity among participants. Through an analysis of boundary cases and structural transitions, the paper shows that A-type irony is characterized by a triggered reversal of the viewing position that preserves the intelligibility of the relation under consideration, rather than collapsing understanding into a terminal position of subject adjudication. By clearly distinguishing types A, B, and C, the paper prevents the concept of irony from being expanded to cover all forms of discomfort, aggression, or evaluative conflict. In closing, it suggests that this framework also illuminates an asymmetry in risk sensitivity between human understanding and certain analytical or computational classification systems. Human interpretation typically assigns a higher cost to prematurely withdrawing eligibility for understanding than to sustaining unresolved tension, whereas some classificatory systems prioritize output consistency and reproducibility. The paper does not seek to reconcile these priorities, but argues that different systems of understanding operate under different structural goals and error-cost configurations, and are therefore sensitive to different risk trajectories. (shrink)

Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and (...) ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the statutory language was originally adopted in 1795, it was apparently read to address all children born outside of the United States proper, which would include those born in the Canal Zone. Patterns of historical usage, early interpretations of the citizenship statutes, contemporaneous expressions of the statutes' purpose, and the actual application of the statutes to cases analogous to McCain's all confirm this understanding. More recently, the acquisition of America's outlying possessions lent plausibility to new interpretations of the law. But because the key language was never altered between 1795 and 1936, its original meaning was preserved intact, making John McCain a U.S. citizen at birth. (This paper is still a work in progress; comments and suggestions are greatly appreciated.). (shrink)

In order to be eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. A major problem with this condition for refugee status is that it leaves significant protection gaps, for it is generally agreed that individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence or generalized harm do not satisfy this requirement. In this paper, I evaluate existing arguments both defending and (...) critiquing the persecution condition, and then outline my own account of the criteria that should replace it. I argue that my view is preferable to alternatives suggested in the literature because it satisfies three key desiderata: 1) it eliminates protection gaps; 2) it is feasible to implement in a world like ours; and 3) it preserves the importantly political nature of the institution of refugeehood. (shrink)

This chapter describes the attributionist approach to moral responsibility. Works by Pamela Hieronymi, T.M. Scanlon, Angela Smith, and Matthew Talbert are taken to representative of this approach. On the interpretation given here, attributionism is committed to the following: assessments of moral responsibility are, and ought to be, centrally concerned with the morally significant features of an agent’s orientation toward others that are attributable to her, and an agent is eligible for moral praise or blame solely on the basis of these (...) attributions. Attributionism is presented as rejecting the claim that agents are morally responsible only for what is under their voluntary control, as well as the claim that agents are responsible for wrongdoing only if they could have responded to the moral considerations that spoke against your behavior. These supposed conditions on moral responsibility are rejected for the same reason: agents may reveal features of their selves, in a way that is sufficient for moral responsibility, even in cases in which these conditions are not met. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of AI, particularly LLMs, presents a profound challenge to human judgement and meaning-making processes. This paper revisits the Judgemental Philosophical concept of "The End of Resonance" arguing that the pervasive temptation to delegate complex judgement to AI can lead to an abdication of personal responsibility, fostering ethical deskilling and cognitive atrophy. Drawing upon Judgemental Philosophy (JP) and its normative extension, Resonance Ethics, this inquiry analyzes how such delegation bypasses the essential human judgemental cycle of Constructivity (C1), Coherence (...) (C2), and Resonance (R). This risks cultivating a societal "thoughtlessness" analogous to Arendt's "banality of evil" or "Eichmannization," where individuals uncritically comply with systemic directives without engaging in resonant moral deliberation. The paper critically examines these risks, informed by Bernard Stiegler's concept of technology as a "pharmakon" and established principles of neuroplasticity. It concludes by proposing human-centric AI governance principles derived from R Ethics. These principles aim to protect human R Eligibility, mandate transparency about AI's non-human nature and its outputs as non-judgemental, and advocate for designing AI to augment rather than replace human judgement, thereby fostering the reclamation of human agency, R, and responsibility in an increasingly AI-mediated world. (shrink)

Background Implicit biases are present in the general population and among professionals in various domains, where they can lead to discrimination. Many interventions are used to reduce implicit bias. However, uncertainties remain as to their effectiveness. -/- Methods We conducted a systematic review by searching ERIC, PUBMED and PSYCHINFO for peer-reviewed studies conducted on adults between May 2005 and April 2015, testing interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, with results measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or sufficiently similar methods. (...) -/- Results 30 articles were identified as eligible. Some techniques, such as engaging with others’ perspective, appear unfruitful, at least in short term implicit bias reduction, while other techniques, such as exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars, are more promising. Robust data is lacking for many of these interventions. -/- Conclusions Caution is thus advised when it comes to programs aiming at reducing biases. This does not weaken the case for implementing widespread structural and institutional changes that are multiply justified. (shrink)

Introduced is a single, pre-registered coherence ratio τ = S/(D+ε) and we test its falsifiable predictions across language models and EEG, running all eligible public datasets and benchmarks under a frozen configuration. We specify hard failure modes (ICC, ∆AUC/∆R2, equivalence via TOST) and include an exploratory sleep add-on (REM “corridor”) with separate inclusion criteria. Importantly, null and equivalence results are reported as central outcomes, not secondary omissions, underscoring the falsifiability of the framework. This paper reports the full protocol, preregistration, results, (...) null distributions, and implications for falsifiability in cognitive and symbolic systems. Stage-1 denotes the first preregistered baseline test of ENT, not universality. -/- Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) is a structural framework that proposes coherence in complex systems emerges as a necessity once containment forces (synchrony) and dispersive forces (entropy) reach a measurable balance. Its central object is the coherence ratio τ = S/(D+ε), a domain-agnostic, falsifiable metric. (shrink)

Folk and philosophers alike argue whether particular emotions are rational. However, these debates presuppose that emotions are eligible for rationality. Drawing on examples of how we manage our own emotions through strategies such as taking medication, I argue that the general permissibility of such management demonstrates that emotions are ineligible for rationality. It follows that emotions are never irrational or rational. Because neither perception nor emotion is eligible for rationality, this reveals a significant epistemic continuity between them, lending support to (...) perceptual views of emotion. (shrink)

As a response to climate change, geoengineering with solar radiation management has the potential to result in unjust harm. Potentially, this injustice could be ameliorated by providing compensation to victims of SRM. However, establishing a just SRM compensation system faces severe challenges. First, there is scientific uncertainty in detecting particular harmful impacts and causally attributing them to SRM. Second, there is ethical uncertainty regarding what principles should be used to determine responsibility and eligibility for compensation, as well as determining how (...) much compensation ought to be paid. Significant challenges loom for crafting a just SRM compensation system. (shrink)

Goal: To assess public knowledge and attitudes towards the family’s role in deceased organ donation in Europe. -/- Methods: A systematic search was conducted in CINHAL, MEDLINE, PAIS Index, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science on December 15th, 2017. Eligibility criteria were socio-empirical studies conducted in Europe from 2008 to 2017 addressing either knowledge or attitudes by the public towards the consent system, including the involvement of the family in the decision-making process, for post-mortem organ retrieval. Screening and data collection (...) were performed by two or more independent reviewers for each record. -/- Results: Of the 1482 results, 467 studies were assessed in full-text form, and 33 were included in this synthesis. When the deceased has not expressed any preference, a majority of the public support the family's role as a surrogate decision-maker. When the deceased expressly consented, the respondents' answers depend on whether they see themselves as potential donors or as a deceased's next-of-kin. Answers also depend on the relationship between the deceased and the decision-maker(s) within the family, and on their ethnic or cultural background. -/- Conclusions: Public views on the authority of the family in organ donation decision-making require further research. A common conceptual framework and validated well-designed questionnaires are needed for future studies. The findings should be considered in the development of Government policy and guidance regarding the role of families in deceased organ donation. (shrink)

According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only (...) holds people responsible for creating disadvantage. This revision enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to those who are disadvantaged by preventing disadvantage to others, like dependent caretakers, without compromising the responsibility–sensitivity at the heart of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in public services where decisions implicate rights, benefits, and burdens. This article proposes a practical lifecycle for responsible public‑sector AI spanning procurement, pilot, monitoring, and redress, with ethical checkpoints and governance artifacts at each phase. Using concrete examples and visuals, we distill lessons from applications such as predictive policing, welfare eligibility, and school placement. We define metrics that go beyond accuracy to include equity, participation, service quality, trust, and cost‑benefit, and we outline implementation guidance aligned (...) to Technology in Society criteria. We conclude with recommendations for dignified, accountable digital public services. (shrink)

Twin-earth thought experiments, standardly construed, support the externalist doctrine that the content of propositional attitudes involving natural-kind terms supervenes upon properties external to those who entertain them. But this doctrine in conjunction with a common view of self-knowledge might have the intolerable consequence that substantial propositions concerning the environment could be knowable a priori. Since both doctrines, externalism and privileged self-knowledge, appear independently plausible, there is then a paradox facing the attempt to hold them concurrently. I shall argue, however, that (...) externalist claims about the dependence of content on environmental factors presuppose certain theses about the semantics of natural-kind terms that, if sound, would make those claims eligible for empirical justification instead. In fact, that is the only interpretation of their epistemic status that could square with the standard conclusion from twin-earth cases. Furthermore, it can be shown to solve the paradox of externalism and self-knowledge in a more doxastically conservative way--accommodating precisely each of the well-accepted intuitions about knowledge, closure and the individuation of content given up by available competitors. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the (...) view that shame is a reactive attitude in the sense that concerns moral accountability. The discussion thereby challenges both the view that shame is not a reactive attitude at all, suggested by philosophers such as R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, and the view that shame is a reactive attitude but does not concern moral accountability, recently defended by Andreas Carlsson and Douglas Portmore. (shrink)

Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are two necessary conditions for refugeehood: a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and alienage – that is, being outside of one’s country of nationality or habitual residence. In 1985 Andrew Shacknove famously argued that both of these conditions should be rejected. Shacknove’s paper prompted much debate about the suitability of the persecution condition, but his rejection of the alienage requirement has (...) received significantly less attention. In this paper I argue, against some recent defenders of the Convention, that Shacknove was right to claim that the alienage condition should be rejected. On my view, people who would be granted refugee status if they crossed a border, but who remain in their country of nationality, should also be eligible for refugee status. (shrink)

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

By 20 October 2021, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had amended its Emergency Use Authorizations for immunocompetent adults who previously received the Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, or Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccines. For the 2-dose Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines, the FDA permitted a single booster dose for adults aged 65 years or older and adults aged 18 to 64 years at high-risk for severe COVID-19 or at high risk for occupational or institutional COVID-19 exposure. For the single-dose Johnson & Johnson (...) vaccine, the FDA permitted a single booster dose for all adults aged 18 or older. These eligibility schemes were endorsed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shortly after FDA approval. (shrink)

Background: Use of patients’ medical data for secondary purposes such as health research, audit, and service planning is well established in the UK. However, the governance environment, as well as public understanding about this work, have lagged behind. We aimed to systematically review the literature on UK and Irish public views of patient data used in research, critically analysing such views though an established biomedical ethics framework, to draw out potential strategies for future good practice guidance and inform ethical and (...) privacy debates. Methods: We searched three databases using terms such as patient, public, opinion, and electronic health records. Empirical studies were eligible for inclusion if they surveyed healthcare users, patients or the public in UK and Ireland and examined attitudes, opinions or beliefs about the use of patient data for medical research. Results were synthesised into broad themes using a framework analysis. Results: Out of 13,492 papers and reports screened, 20 papers or reports were eligible. While there was a widespread willingness to share patient data for research for the common good, this very rarely led to unqualified support. The public expressed two generalised concerns about the potential risks to their privacy. The first of these concerns related to a party’s competence in keeping data secure, while the second was associated with the motivation a party might have to use the data. Conclusions: The public evaluates trustworthiness of research organisations by assessing their competence in data-handling and motivation for accessing the data. Public attitudes around data-sharing exemplified several principles which are also widely accepted in biomedical ethics. This provides a framework for understanding public attitudes, which should be considered in the development in any guidance for regulators and data custodians. We propose four salient questions which decision makers should address when evaluating proposals for the secondary use of data. (shrink)

Sex determines much about one's life, but what determines one's sex? The answer is complicated and incomplete: on close examination, ordinary notions of female and male are vague. In 2012, the International Olympic Committee further specified what they mean by woman in response to questions about who, exactly, is eligible to compete in women's Olympic events. I argue, first, that their stipulation is evidence that the use of vague terms is better described by semantic approaches to vagueness than by epistemic (...) approaches. In addition, the IOC's 2012 stipulation was made with sensitivity to its practical consequences. Linguistic actions often have morally relevant consequences, and I contend that, other things equal, we should adopt theories about language that acknowledge the responsibility we bear for what we say. Taking vagueness to be an epistemic phenomenon precludes the sense of agency needed for moral responsibility; taking it to be semantic does not. Thus I advance two arguments for semantic approaches to vagueness, as against epistemic approaches: one descriptive and one normative. (shrink)

The growing demand for uterus transplantation (UTx) invites continued philosophical evaluation of the function of UTx (and what constitutes its ‘success’), as well as the recipient eligibility for UTx. Currently, UTx caters to partnered, cisgender women of childbearing age looking to get pregnant and give birth to a biogenetically related child. The medical justification for this—the treatment of uterine infertility—explains the primacy of this practice. However, this dominant conceptualization of UTx does not necessarily capture the diverse needs for which both (...) cis‐ and transgender women might take interest in UTx that are not strictly procreative, such as bodily integrity and gender identity reasons. In this paper, I argue that non‐procreative motivations for uterus acquisition ought to be taken seriously as a matter of non‐discrimination and consistency. (shrink)

Background: The internationalization of medical education is essential for preparing healthcare professionals to address global health challenges. In Iran, while this initiative has become a strategic priority, a systematic understanding of research trends in this area remains elusive. Therefore, we quantified the trend of research outputs in this domain by identifying publication trends, influential contributors, and key thematic developments. Methods: This scientometric study was conducted based on a systematic analysis through the international databases PubMed and Scopus, without time limitation. Using (...) validated strategies, duplicate records were removed, and eligible publications were analyzed using scientometric indicators: publication growth, citation impact, and collaboration networks. Data visualization was performed with VOSviewer to map co-authorship and thematic networks. Results: A total of 94 publications were analyzed, revealing a significant upward trend in research over the past decade. The average number of citations per publication was 2.32. Thematically, the core research areas included “internationalisation,” “faculty mobility,” and “higher education,” while emerging topics highlighted “artificial intelligence” and “digital entrepreneurship.” Tehran and Kerman universities of Medical Sciences emerged as leading contributors, although international collaborations accounted for only 4.3% of the publications. Conclusion: While research on the internationalisation of medical education in Iran is growing, it is still in its nascent and developmental stage. Strengthening global partnerships, enhancing interdisciplinary collaborations, and prioritizing publications in high-impact journals are critical to increasing the field’s global influence. Future research should integrate Iranian initiatives into international networks and focus on cross-regional comparisons to address the existing gaps. (shrink)

Bringing a unique perspective to the burgeoning ethical and legal issues surrounding the presence of artificial intelligence in our daily lives, the book uses theory and practice on animal rights and the rights of nature to assess the status of robots. -/- Through extensive philosophical and legal analyses, the book explores how rights can be applied to nonhuman entities. This task is completed by developing a framework useful for determining the kinds of personhood for which a nonhuman entity might be (...) eligible, and a critical environmental ethic that extends moral and legal consideration to nonhumans. The framework and ethic are then applied to two hypothetical situations involving real-world technology—animal-like robot companions and humanoid sex robots. Additionally, the book approaches the subject from multiple perspectives, providing a comparative study of legal cases on animal rights and the rights of nature from around the world and insights from structured interviews with leading experts in the field of robotics. Ending with a call to rethink the concept of rights in the Anthropocene, suggestions for further research are made. -/- An essential read for scholars and students interested in robot, animal and environmental law, as well as those interested in technology more generally, the book is a ground-breaking study of an increasingly relevant topic, as robots become ubiquitous in modern society. (shrink)

Military doctors and nurses, working neither as pure soldiers nor as merely doctors or nurses, may face a ‘role conflict between the clinical professional duties to a patient and obligations, express or implied, real or perceived, to the interests of a third party such as an employer, an insurer, the state, or in this context, military command’. This conflict is commonly called dual loyalty. This chapter gives an overview of the military and the medical ethic and of the resulting dual (...) loyalty problem for medical personnel working in the military. It considers how dual loyalties relate to being a professional, something medical personnel are the paradigmatic examples of, but also something military personnel claim to be. Against that background, the chapter elaborates on the medical rules of eligibility used in Afghanistan, and on the policies concerning military involvement in local healthcare, to see what the existing rules and policies are, and whose interests they serve. (shrink)

In this paper, I endorse the idea that age is a defensible criterion for eligibility to vote, where age is itself a proxy for having a broad set of cognitive and motivational capacities. Given the current (and defeasible) state of developmental research, I suggest that the age of 16 is a good proxy for such capacities. In defending this thesis, I consider alternative and narrower capacity conditions while drawing on insights from a parallel debate about capacities and age requirements in (...) the criminal law. I also argue that the expansive capacity condition I adopt satisfies a number of powerful and complementary rationales for voting eligibility, and conclude by addressing challenging arguments that, on the one hand, capacity should not underlie voting eligibility in the first place, and, on the other, that capacity should do so directly and not via any sort of proxy, including age. (shrink)

Because many involuntarily childless people have equal interests in benefitting from assisted reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization as a mode of treatment, we have normative reasons to ensure inclusive access to such interventions for as many of these people as is reasonable and possible. However, the prevailing eligibility criterion for access to assisted reproductive technologies—'infertility'—is inadequate to serve the goal of inclusive access. This is because the prevailing frameworks of infertility, which include medical and social infertility, fail to precisely (...) capture and unify the relevance of certain involuntarily childless experiences as warranting assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment. I argue that the least we can do for those who have an interest in accessing ARTs is to conceptualize involuntarily childless experiences in dialogue with interactionist and ecological models of disability, to outline a unified and more inclusive eligibility criterion. (shrink)

In mid-2019, the controversy regarding South African runner Caster Semenya’s eligibility to participate in competitions against other female runners culminated in a Court of Arbitration for Sport judgement. Semenya possessed high endogenous testosterone levels (arguably a performance advantage), secondary to a disorder of sexual development. In this commentary, Aristotelean teleology is used to defend the existence of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as discrete categories. It is argued that once the athlete’s sex is established, they should be allowed to compete in the (...) category of their sex without obligatory medical treatment. Indeed, other athletes who possess advantageous genetic or phenotypic traits that fall outside of the human norm have been allowed to compete as humans without restraint. In both cases, if an athlete possesses the essential attributes of being a human or being male or female they should be permitted to compete in those respective categories; athletes’ eligibilities should not be based upon accidental attributes. (shrink)

The goal of the OBO (Open Biomedical Ontologies) Foundry initiative is to create and maintain an evolving collection of non-overlapping interoperable ontologies that will offer unambiguous representations of the types of entities in biological and biomedical reality. These ontologies are designed to serve non-redundant annotation of data and scientific text. To achieve these ends, the Foundry imposes strict requirements upon the ontologies eligible for inclusion. While these requirements are not met by most existing biomedical terminologies, the latter may nonetheless support (...) the Foundry’s goal of consistent and non-redundant annotation if appropriate mappings of data annotated with their aid can be achieved. To construct such mappings in reliable fashion, however, it is necessary to analyze terminological resources from an ontologically realistic perspective in such a way as to identify the exact import of the ‘concepts’ and associated terms which they contain. We propose a framework for such analysis that is designed to maximize the degree to which legacy terminologies and the data coded with their aid can be successfully used for information-driven clinical and translational research. (shrink)

Foucault’s disciplinary society and his notion of panopticism are often invoked in discussions regarding electronic surveillance. Against this use of Foucault, I argue that contemporary trends in surveillance technology abstract human bodies from their territorial settings, separating them into a series of discrete flows through what Deleuze will term, the surveillant assemblage. The surveillant assemblage and its product, the socially sorted body, aim less at molding, punishing and controlling the body and more at triggering events of in- and ex-clusion from (...) life opportunities. The meaning of the body as monitored by latest generation vision technologies formed from machine only surveillance has been transformed. Such a body is no longer disciplinary in the Foucauldian sense. It is a virtual/flesh interface broken into discrete data flows whose comparison and breakage generate bodies as both legible and eligible (or illegible). (shrink)

Shortages of new therapeutics to treat coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have forced clinicians, public health officials, and health systems to grapple with difficult questions about how to fairly allocate potentially life-saving treatments when there are not enough for all patients in need (1). Shortages have occurred with remdesivir, tocilizumab, monoclonal antibodies, and the oral antiviral Paxlovid (2) -/- Ensuring equitable allocation is especially important in light of the disproportionate burden experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic by disadvantaged groups, including Black, Hispanic/Latino and (...) Indigenous communities, individuals with certain disabilities, and low-income persons. However, many health systems have resorted to first-come, first-served approaches to allocation, which tend to disadvantage individuals with barriers in access to care (3). There is mounting evidence of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in access to medications for COVID-19 (4, 5). -/- One potential method to promote equitable allocation is to use a weighted lottery, which is an allocation strategy that gives all eligible patients a chance to receive the scarce treatment while also allowing the assignment of higher or lower chances according to other ethical considerations (6). We sought to assess the feasibility of implementing a weighted lottery to allocate scarce COVID-19 medications in a large U.S. health system and to determine whether the weighted lottery promotes equitable allocation. (shrink)

In this Article, I will argue that a person may be deserving of criminal punishment even in certain situations where she is not necessarily morally responsible for her criminal act. What these situations share in common are two things: the psychological factors that motivate the individual’s behavior are environmentally determined and her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy and therefore less likely to be acquitted. -/- To get to this conclusion, I will proceed in four steps. In (...) Part II, I will offer the first two of these steps. First, I will argue that our foundational assumption that moral responsibility is necessary for just blame and punishment is not self-evident and is actually rather difficult to explain and justify. Second, I will offer an explanation and justification that appeals to our moral psychology. Specifically, I will argue that we subscribe to this assumption ultimately because we sympathize with agents who lack responsibility for their actions. -/- Third, in Part IV, I aim to show that even if moral responsibility is not conceptually — only “emotionally” — necessary for just blame and punishment, the traditionally recognized criminal excuses are not at risk because, contrary to popular wisdom, they do not really rely on this assumption to begin with. Instead, they stand less for the metaphysical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing the non-responsible and more for the normative/ethical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing those whom we cannot reasonably expect to have acted better. I will further argue that the latter proposition does not necessarily reduce to the former. -/- Fourth, once I have defended my account of the excuses, I will question in Parts V and VI the increasingly popular notion that we should add certain conditions or circumstances to the list of recognized excuses. I will focus on one in particular — the psychological theory of “situationism” — and will argue that, despite its initial plausibility, it should be kept off the list. While situationism arguably does negate moral responsibility, it does not negate criminal responsibility. -/- Of course, this is a controversial point. Criminal responsibility is almost universally thought to require moral responsibility. But in a previous article, "Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention," 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1299, I used personality psychology to drive a wedge between the two. In this article, I will use the opposite end of the psychological spectrum — social psychology — to drive the same important wedge. (shrink)

Some intentional attitudes (beliefs, fears, desires, etc.) have a common focus in spite of there being no object at that focus. For example, two beliefs may be about the same witch even when there are no witches, different astronomers had beliefs directed at Vulcan, even though there is no such planet. This relation of having a common focus, whether or not there is an actual concrete object at that focus, is called intentional identity. In the first part of this thesis (...) I develop a new theory of intentional identity, the triangulation theory, and argue that it has significant advantages over the extant theories of intentional identity in the literature. Empty attitudes (attitudes that are not, prima facie, about anything that exists) will serve as useful cases for testing theories of intentional identity. -/- In the second part, I put the theory developed in the first part to work. I use triangulation theoretic tools to shed light on other debates about intentional attitudes. Some issues to which intentional identity are relevant are the debate about the content of intentional attitudes, the issue of whether or not we need to appeal to external constraints on the content of intentional attitudes, how we should understand the agreement and disagreement of attitudes, how we should construe communication and how we ought to solve Kripke’s puzzle about belief. The second part of this thesis also motivates a broadly internalist and individualistic approach to the con-tent of intentional attitudes; it turns out that if we take a closer look at the narrowly construed psychological states of agents we find materials that allow us to make sense of phenomena usually associated with externalist constraints on the content of attitudes (such as causal constraints and eligibility constraints) in a new way. (shrink)

The teaching of Confucius, one of the doctrines built Chinese philosophy, is the movement of thought that has penetrated politics, education, manners and customs in East Asia for centuries. Reading the principles that advise wisdom and virtue through classical texts, we can find out normative moral knowledge. This teaching, in which ethical standards guiding human relations are regulative, promotes hierarchy as required by patriarchal and patrimonial regime. Social structure is grounded on discrimination between nobles and commons. Since the rights and (...) privileges granted to the aristocracy and bureaucracy humiliate citizens and force compliance, social inequality becomes obvious. Just as Confucius cites the idea of spiritual supremacy of rulers, he also bestows a privilege upon the noble class due to their eligibility. It is the people who are actively industrious in serve, deference and obedience. The problem of nepotism, which favors the closer and excludes the farther in relational words and actions, extends all areas from familial to managerial. Consequently, justice, the main canon of virtue, has been disregarded. In this paper, it firstly will be argued that Confucius practices hypocrisy by his paradoxical statements about behavioral norms. Secondly, positional duties, which subjugate people for the interests of the dynasty, does not correspond to liberal humanism, will be confirmed. (shrink)

I argue in this dissertation that natural properties play a central role in David Lewis' modal realism. To argue in favor of this thesis I present: a bottom-up explanation of a top-down possible world metaphysics; a new definition of natural properties and natural fusion, a new mereological operation. To achieve these aims, in the first chapter, I contextualize the discussion, in the second I resume the discussion about universals in contemporary philosophy and argue that, considering the distinct formulations of the (...) problem, class nominalism combined with modal realism might be the best solution. Furthermore, I discuss Devitt's solution in which he defends that the problem about universals is, in fact, a pseudo problem. In the third chapter, I introduce a minimal ontology of properties, regarding natural properties, I discuss the existing definitions, present a new one and discuss some theories of similarity, a notion that is in the core of the definition I propose. Besides, I present how natural properties benefit the definition of terms of nomological package, linked to its fundamentality role. I also present some applications related to the rationality role that encompass some well-known philosophical problems of the second half of 20th century. In the fourth chapter, I present some varieties of philosophical realism, I consider the theoretical advantages of taking scientific realism as background and I discuss one more utility of natural properties, the solution to the problem of eligibility of reference or, the Putnam's paradox. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how mereology is important to link several aspects of Lewis' modal realism. For such, I discuss the relation between composition as identity and ontological innocence of mereology and I present the natural fusion mereology, a new mereological operation that aims to minimize the problems of unrestricted composition. (shrink)

This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort (...) law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations. On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect no- fault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits. (shrink)

The central topic of this article is (the possibility of) de re knowledge about natural numbers and its relation with names for numbers. It is held by several prominent philosophers that (Peano) numerals are eligible for existential quantification in epistemic contexts (‘canonical’), whereas other names for natural numbers are not. In other words, (Peano) numerals are intimately linked with de re knowledge about natural numbers, whereas the other names for natural numbers are not. In this article I am looking for (...) an explanation of this phenomenon. It is argued that the standard induction scheme plays a key role. (shrink)

Food insecurity and poor eating habits are becoming concerns in college education, particularly for low-income and international students. In this narrative literature review, the effect of campus design on access and consumption of nutritious food is presented, synthesizing evidence from 2000 to 2025. Reviewing was done through a systematic five-phase protocol: identification, screening, eligibility, inclusion, and synthesis. From this process, 58 peerreviewed articles were chosen for full-text screening, with an emphasis on barriers to healthy eating and the role of campus (...) environments in food access contribution. Findings indicate that students experience disproportionately high rates of food insecurity compared to the general population, with dire implications for academic attainment, health, and well-being. Financial and logistical challenges affect low-income students, while international students face additional barriers such as dietary acculturation, cultural adjustment, and limited familiarity with local food systems. Campus settings have significant impacts on dietary patterns. Inhibitors like poor affordability of healthy food, poor kitchen facilities, and limited access to transportation enhance dependence on cheap, unhealthy food. Effective interventions such as food pantries, community gardens, and cooking classes have shown promise to promote food literacy and nutrition but are applied unevenly and culturally restrictive currently. This review conveys that intentional campus planning with affordability, accessibility, and inclusion offers possibilities to improve the food security, health, and equity of college students. (shrink)

This essay examines whether euthanasia should be legal. The ethical debate surrounding euthanasia is quite controversial due to concerns regarding major critics like slippery slope of euthanasia, religious views, disturbed judgment during decision making etc. I argue that active voluntary euthanasia should be legalized when policies and eligibility criteria are strict enough. The argumentative essay proceeds in 5 parts first three will be me critically analyzing my arguments for legalization of euthanasia while the second two will be the major criticisms (...) and my response to those criticisms against legalization of euthanasia. I don’t aim to settle the dispute once and for all and I can’t as well though this essay aims to provide ethical clarification of my stance. (shrink)

This paper presents a concise eliminative argument against strong solipsism understood as an epistemic foundation. The target is not solipsism as a private mood, introspective stance, or phenomenological report, but a specific epistemic claim: that only one mind truly exists and that this fact is absolutely certain. The argument is structural rather than empirical. It proceeds by identifying minimal functional conditions that any claim must satisfy in order to qualify as epistemic truth at all—namely distinguishability, relational assessability, and the possibility (...) of error and correction. It is shown that strong solipsism attempts to occupy two incompatible roles simultane- ously. On the one hand, it claims absoluteness, independence from relations and criteria. On the other, it seeks to function as a foundational epistemic truth. These commitments jointly entail contradiction: a claim cannot be both epistemically assessable and absolutely detached from all criteria and relations. Independent of this contradiction, the paper identifies a re- cursive collapse of absolute certainty: any attempt to assert final, self-sufficient certainty generates an infinite hierarchy of higher-order certainty claims, preventing epistemic closure. The paper further argues that attempts to rescue solipsism by retreating to private inner certainty constitute an epistemic surrender rather than a solution. Such a retreat reclassifies solipsism from epistemology to a non-epistemic description of subjective experience, inca- pable of grounding knowledge. Finally, the argument shows that solipsism is performatively incompatible with epistemic practice itself: reasoning, communication, and justification pre- suppose stable relational structures that solipsism denies while simultaneously relying on them. The conclusion is eliminative. Strong solipsism does not fail because it is empirically false, but because it is structurally incapable of serving the epistemic role it assigns to itself. The analysis complements a broader program concerned with epistemic eligibility and structural limits of foundational claims, developed in earlier work on the logical conditions of cognition and the relational character of information. (shrink)

This paper examines what may be described as “paper genocide”: the systematic erasure of Black and Black–Indigenous lineage through vital records, racial reclassification, census practices, and administrative documentation in the United States. Drawing on historical records from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—including birth certificates, census schedules, and tribal rolls—the analysis shows how identity was actively produced, revised, and dissolved through bureaucratic systems rather than merely recorded. While the primary documents originate in earlier periods, this paper prioritizes twenty-first-century Black scholarship that (...) has reexamined these materials using historical, legal, and statistical methods, revealing how administrative erasure functioned as a form of structural violence with lasting consequences. Situating archival manipulation as an ongoing governance problem rather than a closed historical episode, the paper argues that justice efforts remain constrained so long as the records that define recognition, eligibility, and repair are treated as neutral rather than as instruments of power. Publication Note This paper is part of Series — What America Changed About Black History, a Black History Month research project examining how U.S. institutions reshaped Black lineage, visibility, and legal existence through administrative systems rather than overt violence alone. Building on prior analyses of conditional belonging and naming as governance, this paper centers historical records from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while prioritizing twenty-first-century Black scholarship that reexamines those documents through statistical, legal, and archival analysis. By foregrounding contemporary interpretations of historical records, the series situates bureaucratic erasure as a modern, ongoing problem rather than a closed historical episode. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, although Kant argues that morality is independent of God (and hence, agrees with the Euthyphro), and rejects Divine Command Theory (or Theological Voluntarism), he believes that all moral duties are also the commands of God, who is a moral being, and who is morally required to punish those who transgress the moral law: "God’s justice is the precise allocation of punishments and rewards in accordance with men’s good or bad behavior." However, since we lack (...) a strict proof of God's existence, we can still fulfill our duties from the motive of duty. if we did know that God exists, then this would undermine our pure moral motivation to do our duty, since we would have an even stronger interest in pleasing God through our good conduct. The effect of undermining our pure moral motivation would be to make us less eligible for divine reward, since God rewards us for doing our duty from the motive of duty. (shrink)

Sometimes, people who are otherwise eligible to donate blood are unduly deferred from donating. “Unduly” indicates a gap where a deferral policy misstates what exposes potential donors to risk and so defers more donors than is justified. Since the error is at the policy-level, it’s natural and understandable to focus criticism on reformulating or eliminating the offending policies. Policy change is undoubtedly the right goal because the policy is what prevents otherwise safe eligible donors from donating needed blood. But focusing (...) exclusively at the policy-level passes over a largely undiscussed question: if policy change takes time and there is an urgent need for blood now, then what should unduly deferred donors do in the meanwhile? Blood banks and federal agencies recommend that deferred donors donate their time or money until they become eligible, but blood is a non-fungible good: donated cash or volunteered time cannot replace a transfusion. Further, this request ignores that otherwise eligible donors could safely donate their blood in addition to their time and money. Here is the central question I will focus on in this paper: is a donor morally justified in lying on a questionnaire to donate blood if they justifiably believe that their blood poses no risk to a recipient and knows that honestly answering a donor questionnaire would unduly defer them from donating? (shrink)