We explore our role as researchers and witnesses in the context of an emerging partnership with the Penelakut Tribe, the aim of which is to locate the unmarked graves of children who died while attending the notorious Kuper Island Indian Residential School on their territory (southwest British Columbia). This relationship is in the process of taking shape, so we focus on understanding conditions for developing trust, and the interactional expertise necessary to work well together, with a good heart. We suggest (...) that, in some respects, this may be usefully understood as a practice of witnessing on several dimensions. (shrink)

Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds (...) to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience—two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling. (shrink)

This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.

Eric Olson argues in The Human Animal that thought-experiments involving body-swapping do not in the end offer any support to psychological continuity theories, nor do they pose any threat to his Biological View. I argue that he is mistaken in at least the second claim.

The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for four-dimensionalists, but is it open to three-dimensionalists too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim three-dimensionalists simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. In this paper, I explain how they can.

One relatively neglected challenge in ethical artificial intelligence (AI) design is ensuring that AI systems invite a degree of emotional and moral concern appropriate to their moral standing. Although experts generally agree that current AI chatbots are not sentient to any meaningful degree, these systems can already provoke substantial attachment and sometimes intense emotional responses in users. Furthermore, rapid advances in AI technology could soon create AIs of plausibly debatable sentience and moral standing, at least by some relevant definitions. Morally (...) confusing AI systems create unfortunate ethical dilemmas for the owners and users of those systems, since it is unclear how those systems ethically should be treated. I argue here that, to the extent possible, we should avoid creating AI systems whose sentience or moral standing is unclear and that AI systems should be designed so as to invite appropriate emotional responses in ordinary users. (shrink)

The present work consists of a discussion about the concept of real number in Frege. It is intended to explain how Frege tries to define the real numbers, highlighting the importance that the notion of “magnitude-ratio” plays in this definition. In Part III, in Volume II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903) (from now on only: Grundgesetze), Frege presents his theory of real numbers, which is followed by a long criticism of the real number theories in force at that time, (...) such as by Cantor, Dedekind, Thomae and Weierstrass. In view of this, to fulfill our purpose, we will examine the text only where Frege presents his own theory of real numbers (the informal presentation) (§§156-164). Frege's criticisms of previous theories will not be examined in detail, unless an introduction to his criticism of formalism, in order to elucidate such criticism. Thus, only the part in which the philosopher presents his own conception of real numbers will be analyzed. To support the discussion, authors Peter Simons, Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro will be used. (shrink)

An Artificially Intelligent system (an AI) has debatable moral personhood if it is epistemically possible either that the AI is a moral person or that it falls far short of personhood. Debatable moral personhood is a likely outcome of AI development and might arise soon. Debatable AI personhood throws us into a catastrophic moral dilemma: Either treat the systems as moral persons and risk sacrificing real human interests for the sake of entities without interests worth the sacrifice, or do not (...) treat the systems as moral persons and risk perpetrating grievous moral wrongs against them. The moral issues become even more perplexing if we consider cases of possibly conscious AI that are subhuman, superhuman, or highly divergent from us in their morally relevant properties. (shrink)

PREMISSA No século XIX, ocorreram transformações impulsionadas pela emergência de novas fontes energéticas (água e petróleo), por novos ramos industriais e pela alteração profunda nos processos produtivos, com a introdução de novas máquinas e equipamentos. Depois de 300 anos de exploração por parte das nações europeias, iniciou -se, principalmente nas colônias latino-americanas, um processo intenso de lutas pela independência. É no século XIX, já com a consolidação do sistema capitalista na Europa, que se encontra a herança intelectual mais próxima da (...) qual surgirá a Sociologia como ciência particular. No início desse século, as ideias do Conde de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), de David Ricardo (1772-1823) e de Charles Darwin (1809-1882), entre outros, foram o elo para que Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Karl Marx (1818 -1883) e Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), entre outros, desenvolvessem reflexões sobre a sociedade de seu tempo. Auguste Comte e Karl Marx foram os pensadores que lançaram as bases do pensamento sociológico e de duas grandes tradições – a positivista e a socialista – que muito influenciaram o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. 1 AUGUSTE COMTE E A TRADIÇÃO POSITIVISTA Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte nasceu em Montpellier, na França, em 19 de janeiro de 1798. Com 16 anos de idade, ingressou na Escola Politécnica de Paris, fato que teria significativa influência na orientação posterior de seu pensamento. De 1817 a 1824, foi secretário do Conde de Saint-Simon. Comte declarou que, com Saint -Simon, aprendeu muitas coisas que jamais encontraria nos livros e que, no pouco tempo em que conviveu com o conde, fez mais progressos do que faria em muitos anos, se estivesse sozinho. Toda a obra de Comte está permeada pelos acontecimentos que ocorreram após a Revolução Francesa de 1789. Ele defendeu parte dos princípios revolucionários e criticou a restauração da monarquia, preocupando-se fundamentalmente em reorganizar a sociedade, que, no seu entender, estava em ebulição e mergulhada no caos. Para Comte, a desordem e a anarquia imperavam em virtude da confusão de princípios (metafísicos e teológicos), que não se adequavam à sociedade industrial em expansão. Era, portanto, necessário superar esse estado de coisas, usando a razão como fundamento da nova sociedade. Propôs, então, a mudança da sociedade por meio da reforma intelectual plena das pessoas. De acordo com o pensador, com a modificação do pensamento humano, por meio do método científico, que ele chamava de “filosofia positiva”, haveria uma reforma das instituições. Com a proposta do estudo da sociedade por meio da análise de seus processos e estruturas, e da reforma prática das instituições, Comte criou uma nova ciência, à qual deu o nome de “física social”, passando a chamá-la posteriormente de Sociologia. A Sociologia representava, para Comte, o coroamento da evolução do conhecimento, mediante o emprego de métodos utilizados por outras ciências, que buscavam conhecer os fenômenos constantes e repetitivos da natureza: a observação, a experimentação, a comparação e a classificação. De acordo com esse pensador, a Sociologia, como as ciências naturais, deve sempre procurar a reconciliação entre os aspectos estáticos e os dinâmicos do mundo natural ou, no caso da sociedade humana, entre a ordem e o progresso. O lema da “filosofia positiva” proposta por Comte era “conhecer para prever, prever para prover”, ou seja, o conhecimento é necessário para fazer previsões e também para solucionar possíveis problemas. A influência de Comte no desenvolvimento da Sociologia foi marcante, sobretudo, na escola francesa, evidenciando-se em Émile Durkheim e seus contemporâneos e seguidores. Seu pensamento esteve presente em muitas das tentativas de criar tipologias para explicar a sociedade. Suas principais obras são: Curso de filosofia positiva (1830-1842), Discurso sobre o espírito positivo (1848), Catecismo positivista (1852) e Sistema de política positiva (1854). Para concluirmos, Comte explanava que para a superação da anarquia reinante na nova sociedade industrial, a filosofia positivista defendia a subordinação do progresso à ordem. O mesmo era contra o retorno de Luís XVIII ao trono: em sua concepção, a sociedade industrial que emergia requeria um governo fundado na razão. 2 A TRADIÇÃO SOCIALISTA: KARL MARX E FRIEDRICH ENGELS Karl Heinrich Marx nasceu em Tréveris, na antiga Prússia, hoje Alemanha, em 1818 e, em 1830, ingressou no Liceu Friedrich Wilhelm, nessa mesma cidade. Anos depois, foi cursar Direito na Universidade de Bonn, transferindo-se para Berlim em seguida. Pouco a pouco, entretanto, seus interesses migraram para a Filosofia, área na qual defendeu, em 1841, a tese de doutorado A diferença da filosofia da natureza em Demócrito e Epicuro. Sua vida universitária foi marcada pelo debate político e intelectual influenciado pelo pensamento de Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) e, principalmente, pelo de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770- 1831). Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) nasceu em Barmen (Renânia), na antiga Prússia, hoje Alemanha, filho mais velho de um rico industrial do ramo têxtil. Terminou sua formação secundária em 1837 e a partir de então sua formação intelectual foi por conta própria (autodidata), com alguns cursos universitários esparsos e de curta duração. Desde cedo começou a trabalhar nas empresas de seu pai e foi nessa condição que se deslocou para Bremen por três anos e depois foi enviado pelos pais a Manchester, na Inglaterra, onde trabalhou nas fábricas da família. Engels ficou impressionado com a miséria na qual viviam os trabalhadores das fábricas inglesas. Os dois, Marx e Engels, se encontraram em 1842, quando Marx passou a escrever para A Gazeta Renana, jornal da província de Colônia, do qual Engels era colaborador e mais tarde editor-chefe. O jornal, que criticava o poder prussiano, foi fechado em 1843, e Marx se viu desempregado. Ao perder o emprego, mudou-se para Paris, na França. Ali escreveu, em 1844, os Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos (só publicados em 1932) e, junto com F. Engels, o livro A sagrada família. Por sua vez, F. Engels, em 1844, decidiu voltar para a Alemanha, onde publicou, em 1845, A situação da classe trabalhadora na Inglaterra. Entre 1845 e 1847, Marx exilou-se em Bruxelas, na Bélgica, onde escreveu A ideologia alemã (em parceria com Friedrich Engels) e Miséria da filosofia (1847), obra na qual criticou o filósofo Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). Em 1848, ainda na Bélgica, a parceria com Engels se solidificou ao escreverem juntos o livreto O Manifesto Comunista. Em 1848, Marx foi expulso da Bélgica e retornou a Colônia, na Alemanha (Prússia), sempre pensando na possibilidade de uma mudança estrutural em sua terra natal. Isso, entretanto, não aconteceu e Marx foi expulso da Alemanha em 1849, ano em que migrou para Londres, na Inglaterra, onde permaneceu até o fim da vida. Lá escreveu O 18 Brumário de Luís Bonaparte (1852), sua mais importante obra de reflexão sobre a vida política europeia do século XIX, desenvolveu pesquisas e concluiu seu maior trabalho: O capital: crítica da economia política. O primeiro volume dessa obra foi publicado em 1867; os outros três, em 1885, 1894 e 1905, após a morte de Marx, revisados por F. Engels. 2.1 O contexto histórico e a obra de Marx e Engels Para situar a obra de Marx e Engels, é necessário conhecer um pouco do que acontecia em meados do século XIX. Com as transformações que ocorriam no mundo ocidental, principalmente na esfera da produção industrial, houve um crescimento expressivo no número de trabalhadores industriais urbanos, com uma consequência evidente: precariedade da vida dos operários nas cidades. As condições de trabalho no interior das fábricas eram péssimas. Os empregados eram superexplorados, alimentavam-se mal e trabalhavam em ambientes insalubres. Para enfrentar essa situação e tentar modificá-la, os trabalhadores passaram a se organizar em associações e sindicatos e a promover movimentos de reivindicação. Desenvolveu-se, então, uma discussão das condições sociais, políticas e econômicas para se definirem as possibilidades de intervenção nessa realidade. Desde o início do século XIX, muitos pensadores discutiram essas questões, nas perspectivas socialista e anarquista. Na Inglaterra podem ser citados, entre outros: William Godwin (1756-1836), Thomas Spence (1750-1814), Thomas Paine (1737-1809), Robert Owen (1771-1858) e Thomas Hodgkin (1787-1866). Na França, destacaram-se Étienne Cabet (1788- 1856), Flora Tristan (1803-1844), Charles Fourier (1772-1837) e Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). Marx e Engels levaram em conta esses pensadores, debatendo com alguns contemporâneos e criticando-os. Além disso, incorporaram a tradição da economia clássica inglesa, presente principalmente nas obras de Adam Smith e de David Ricardo. Pode-se dizer, portanto, que Marx e Engels desenvolveram seu trabalho com base na análise crítica da economia política inglesa, do socialismo utópico francês e da filosofia alemã. Esses dois autores não buscavam definir uma ciência específica para estudar a sociedade (como a Sociologia, para Auguste Comte) ou situar seu trabalho em um campo científico particular. Em alguns escritos, Marx afirmou que a História seria a ciência que mais se aproximava de suas preocupações, por abarcar as múltiplas dimensões da sociedade, a qual deveria ser analisada na totalidade, não havendo uma separação rígida entre os aspectos sociais, econômicos, políticos, ideológicos, religiosos, culturais etc. O objetivo de Marx e Engels era estudar criticamente a sociedade capitalista com base em seus princípios constitutivos e em seu desenvolvimento, visando dotar a classe trabalhadora de uma análise política da sociedade de seu tempo. Assim, a tradição socialista nascida da luta dos trabalhadores, muitos anos antes e em situações diferentes, tem como expressão intelectual o pensamento de Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels. Para entender as concepções fundamentais de Marx e Engels é necessário fazer a conexão entre as lutas da classe trabalhadora, suas aspirações e as ideias revolucionárias que estavam presentes no século XIX na Europa. Para eles, o conhecimento científico da realidade só tem sentido quando visa à transformação dessa mesma realidade. A separação entre teoria e prática não é discutida, pois a “verdade histórica” não é algo abstrato e que se define teoricamente; sua verificação está na prática. Apesar de haver algumas diferenças em seus escritos, os elementos essenciais do pensamento de Marx e Engels podem ser assim sintetizados: • historicidade das ações humanas – crítica ao idealismo alemão; • divisão social do trabalho e o surgimento das classes sociais – a luta de classes; • o fetichismo da mercadoria e o processo de alienação; • crítica à economia política e ao capitalismo; • transformação social e revolução; • utopia – sociedade comunista. A obra desses dois autores é muito vasta e não ficou vinculada estritamente aos movimentos sociais dos trabalhadores. Pouco a pouco foi introduzida nas universidades como parte do estudo em diferentes áreas do conhecimento. Estudiosos de Filosofia, Sociologia, Ciência Política, Economia, História e Geografia, entre outras áreas, foram influenciados por ela. Na Sociologia, como afirma Irving M. Zeitlin, no livro Ideología y teoría sociológica, tanto Max Weber quanto Émile Durkheim fizeram, em suas obras, um debate com as ideias de Karl Marx. Pelas análises da sociedade capitalista de seu tempo e a repercussão que tiveram em todo o mundo, principalmente no século XX, nos movimentos sociais e nas universidades, Marx e Engels são considerados autores clássicos da Sociologia. No campo dessa disciplina, porém, o pensamento deles ficou um pouco restrito, pois perdeu aquela relação entre teoria e prática (práxis), ou seja, entre a análise crítica e a prática revolucionária. Essa relação esteve presente, por exemplo, na vida e na obra dos russos Vladimir Ilitch Ulianov, conhecido como Lênin (1870-1924), e Leon D. Bronstein, conhecido como Trotsky (1879-1940), da alemã Rosa Luxemburgo (1871-1919) e do italiano Antonio Gramsci (1891- 1937), que tiveram significativa influência no movimento operário do século XX. Com base no trabalho de Marx e Engels, muitos autores desenvolveram estudos acadêmicos em vários campos do conhecimento. Podemos citar, por exemplo, Georg Lukács (1885-1971), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991), Lucien Goldmanm (1913 -1970), Louis Althusser (1918 -1990), Nikos Poulantzas (1936-1979), Edward P. Thompson (1924-1993) e Eric Hobsbawm (1917 -2012). O pensamento de Marx e Engels continua, assim, presente em todo o mundo, com múltiplas tendências e variações, sempre gerando controvérsias. REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO GEMKOW, H.; PSUA, I. M. L. Marx e Engels: Vida e Obra. São Paulo: Alfa e Ômega, 1984. 232 pp. GIANOTTI, J. A. Comte. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978. 318 pp. (Col. Os Pensadores) KONDER, L. Marx: vida e obra. 7ª ed. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2007. 154 pp. (Col. Vida e Obra). (shrink)

It is often hard to articulate a thought. Why should this be, if not that to have a thought is one thing, and to know it something else? In fact the gap between thought and its articulation is not epistemic. While it’s true that we come to know our thoughts better through articulation, it's not because a thought is already perfectly determinate despite my ignorance of it. Rather, we make the thought determinate through articulation. This connection between the determinacy of (...) the thinker’s knowledge of their thought and the determinacy of the thought itself is a mark of thought’s fundamentally first-personal character: what’s beyond the reach of my current powers of articulation cannot be an object of any attitude of mine. (shrink)

This paper elucidates some features of law that generally go overlooked in collective bargaining. Using examples from collective bargaining agreements at universities in Florida, we unearth how assumptions about the nature of law (championed by the conservative legal movement) may undermine the ability for unions to influence the material working conditions at their universities. We believe negotiators need to reject these assumptions, and embrace an approach to ‘bargaining as pedagogy,’ which emphasizes the need for faculty and administrators alike to arrive (...) at shared understandings of what the law means (be it the collective bargaining agreement, university policy, or state statute). (shrink)

According to the analysis of concessive conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona, a concessive conditional $$p{{\,\mathrm{\hookrightarrow }\,}}q$$ p ↪ q is adequately formalized as a conjunction of conditionals. This paper presents a sound and complete axiomatic system for concessive conditionals so understood. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a method that has been employed by Raidl, Iacona, and Crupi to prove the soundness and completeness of an analogous system for evidential conditionals.

The guiding thread of the paper is the diagnosis that the advanced division of cognitive labor (that is, intellectual specialization) engenders a set of perennial, political and epistemic challenges (Millgram 2015) that, simultaneously, also generate opportunities for philosophy. In this paper, I re-characterize the nature of synthetic philosophy as a means to advance and institutionalize philosophy. For my definition of synthetic philosophy see section 2. In section 1, I treat Plato’s Republic as offering two models to represent philosophy's relationship to (...) the other sciences within the advanced division of labor. I highlight that for Plato intellectual specialization is central not just to economic, but also to political life. And, yet, that the very dispersion of scientific expertise, and its esoteric nature, also generates non-trivial challenges to the recognition and political utilization of knowledge. From Plato we can infer that in imperfect circumstances, philosophy’s self-constitution is, in part, a response to these challenges in political epistemology. However, how philosophy is institutionalized differs through time. In section 2, I re-introduce my conceptualization of synthetic philosophy and restate it. This makes visible that synthetic philosophy is already widely practiced in the profession as philosophy of the special sciences, PPE, formal modelling, public philosophy, etc. I use recent work by Dorst (2023) to illustrate synthetic philosophy and to identify some of the processes that give rise to the need for it. In sections 2-3, I contrast my account with the evolving ways that Philip Kitcher has conceptualized synthetic philosophy in order to make more precise the version promoted here. I do so not just because Kitcher and I use the same term, ‘synthetic philosophy,’ but because the temptations inherent in Kitcher’s approach should be resisted. -/- . (shrink)

Why does Scheler reject the possibility of reconciling phenomenological personalism and Scholastic metaphysics? Mohr claims that Scheler's rejection is in part related to the meaning of moral development. For Scheler, personal value is not grounded in metaphysical capacities of a shared nature, but in the value of individuality. This paper interprets and clarifies Scheler's positions on the content of personal individuality, how this content is value-bearing, and whether this value is original or derivative, absolute or conditional. Traditional ways of attempting (...) to account for personal uniqueness, via either formal or empirical criteria, prove insufficient. If individuality is intrinsic to the person, and individuality is value-bearing, then there is a social responsible for assisting in disclosing personal individuality. (shrink)

While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that thecurse of a compositional mindconstitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.

Ancient sources often use “suspending judgment” (epechein, epochē) to characterize the Stoic practice of “withholding assent” (asunkatathetein, asunkatathesis), and scholars follow along. But this essay argues that we have been misled, because the third-century (BCE) Stoics saw epechein as a characteristically Academic practice, distinct from asunkatathetein. The argument is that a critical look at the evidence allows, and to some extent encourages, attributing to the Stoics a distinction between asunkatathetein and epechein, and the point of taking this possibility seriously is (...) that it refigures the debate between Academics and Stoics. (shrink)

What did Heidegger learn and fail to learn from Laozi and Zhuangzi? This book reconstructs Heidegger's philosophy through its engagement with Daoist and Asian philosophy and offers a Daoist transformation of Heidegger on things, nothingness, and freedom. PDF includes the introduction, bibliography, and index.

Kant wurde oft dafür kritisiert, dass seine Moralphilosophie gegen die Glückseligkeit gerichtet sei. Ich argumentiere gegen dieses Missverständnis und konzentriere die Analyse auf die Idee, dass Glückseligkeit, obwohl es nicht das primäre Motiv moralischen Handelns ist, dennoch in der Moral verankert ist. So kann Glückseligkeit aus der Moral deduziert werden. Zudem betone ich die Differenz zwi­ schen Moral und Glückseligkeit, sowohl in ihren transzendentalen Dimensionen als auch in den engeren und weiteren Bedeutungen kantischer Moral, indem ich darlege, dass Glückseligkeit nur (...) im Rahmen der Moral begriffen werden kann. Ich werde verdeutlichen, dass Glückseligkeit nicht als Gegensatz zur Moral betrachtet wird, sondern vielmehr als eine potenzielle und notwendige Zukunftsperspektive, die durch moralisches Handeln und die Bildung einer Gemeinschaft erreicht werden kann. Dies zeigt, dass Kants Moralphilosophie vielfältig ist und sowohl eudämonistische Aspekte als auch seine Pflichtethik integriert. (shrink)

Through the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and François Laruelle, this paper deconstructs the metaphysics of the sun that undergirds the worlds of the three Dark Souls games developed by FromSoftware, while also identifying the internal critique of this metaphysics that the Dark Souls games successively elaborate. Indeed, as inversions of the western fantasy model, the three Dark Souls games also labour to invert western philosophy, striking at the heart of Platonic idealism and its variations throughout history.

Eduard von Hartmann was one of the most influential public philosophers of his era, known primarily through his Philosophy of the Unconscious. A conservative nationalist in politics, he positioned himself as a cultural and religious reformer and modernist ad­vocate of a “religion of the future” of self-redemption (autosoterism), one that reconciled pessimism and a panpneumatic impersonal unconscious with rationality and individu­al responsibility. This paper traces how Buddhism served as a primary albeit imperfect exemplar in his thought, how his ethical and (...) symbolic interpretative strategy, based on the unconscious, drew him into proximity and conflict with esoteric spiritist discourses, and how this context informed his Daodejing interpretation. German Idealism disclosed the unity of reason, will, and nature, while Buddhist teachings demonstrated the world’s fundamentally contradictory and illusory character through nothingness (emptiness), nir­vāṇa, and objective illusionism and phenomenalism. Hartmann’s secularized moral and symbolic adaptation of Buddhism entailed a resigned yet heroic embrace of suffering life rather than what he deemed ascetic and quietist acquiescence. His hermeneutics reveal his modernizing vision of Buddhism as an exemplary model (if suitably reformed to ac­centuate a heroic response to suffering and karma) for the future. (shrink)

Logical rationalism asserts that we can acquire immediate, non-inferential justification for beliefs in basic logical principles. The intuitions that arise when we consider particular cases of validity can offer justification for our foundational logical beliefs about rules of inference. I motivate rationalism through an argument from the indispensability of intuitions. This argument shows that rationalism is the theory best equipped to solve the problem of background logic. This is the challenge of explaining how we gain justified beliefs in rules of (...) inference without using those rules in a viciously circular way to arrive at the beliefs. As rationalism is the best epistemology which solves this important challenge, it is our best account of logical knowledge. In addition, I argue that a second major motivation for logical rationalism arises from work on logical practice. Recently, it has been claimed that we should attend to the practices of logicians when selecting an epistemology of logic. I argue that these considerations from logical practice also favour the adoption of logical rationalism. (shrink)

Nick Land infamously recasts Immanuel Kant as a philosopher of cybernetics-as-control, arguing that the Kantian transcendental subject imposes rigid a priori forms that domesticate all alterity -- much as capitalist exchange imposes commensuration on difference. In this polemic, I contest Land’s reading and propose that Kant, far from inaugurating a closed regime of control, opens the door to a metadisciplinary, porous cybernetics of the transcendental. By revisiting Kant’s critical philosophy through contemporary category theory and sheaf theory, I argue that the (...) transcendental is not a static apparatus of domination but an evolving, self-correcting system of constraints and feedbacks. This transcendental cybernetics synthesizes diversity into provisional unities without totalizing them, thereby offering a recursive, non-totalizing approach to the subject–object relation. -/- To support this view, I draw on my trilogy of works---Prolegomenon to a Treatise (2022), Critique of Transcendental Structure: Toward a Synthetic Unity of Aesthetics and Collective Intelligence (2025), and Dub Langlands: Art Theory Texts on Cybernetics (2025)---which reframe Kantian critique via category-theoretic structures. My Critique of Transcendental Structure}, my magnum opus, demonstrates how a “transversal” or “synthetic” reason armed with sheaf theory can achieve unity-in-diversity without enforcing uniformity. I further incorporate Noah Chrein’s recent distinction between two approaches to "categorical cybernetics''---(1) modeling systems by categories vs. (2) modeling systems in arbitrary formalisms with a categorical metatheory---to clarify how the latter approach fosters an open-ended, reflexive framework. The result is a vision of critique as an open system of knowledge: one that continually revises its own conditions (akin to Fichte’s self-positing I and Novalis’s transdisciplinary "Romantic Encyclopædia'') rather than a final legislator of truth. This approach stands in contrast to both Hegelian absolute closure and speculative realism’s flat ontologies, preserving a space for novelty ("voids'' of indeterminacy) as the very medium through which rational progress occurs. (shrink)

I argue that Smith proposed a new kind of imperialism, which we would describe as a species of ‘federalism,’ and that his plan influenced Bentham and Kant in their federal projects, although they seem to have been unaware of each other’s proposals. In what follows, I outline Smith’s position. I then describe Kant’s and Bentham’s debts to Smith in turn. This will also allow for greater clarity about the nature of early liberalism.

In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...) think premises together is to attribute those very thoughts to one and the same self. The ability to reason depends on the ability to attribute the thoughts from which one reasons to oneself. Reasoning—at least the sort of reasoning that we do—requires de se thought. (shrink)

The time is nigh to organize the physical landscapes of the United States under a unified land use policy and planning framework. As human populations have steadily grown, so has the urgency for agencies to plan for land uses at broader scales to overcome continued jurisdictional fragmentation and achieve sustainable and environmentally just landscapes. This paper introduces a vision, conceptual approach, and implementation strategy that applies ecoregions and proposes a unified framework for land use planning and regulation in the United (...) States. The Sustainable Ecoregion Program (SEP) is designed to enable local landowners; public stakeholders; other land users; and state, regional, tribal, and national natural resource professionals to set and achieve future desired conditions for sustainable land uses across landscapes. The objective is to outline a comprehensive and sustainably just solution to the recurring problem of managing conflicting land uses in the face of continued degradation and multiple land tenure systems. The SEP will determine how much of the physical landscape will go to developed, agricultural, and natural landcover types. The framework includes recognition of level III ecoregions as primary boundaries, proposed secondary boundaries and shapes to enhance connectivity and movement across landscapes, a proposed structure for the environmental governance and co-management of landscapes, and definitions of physical landscape types. The benefits and challenges of the SEP are discussed. The outcomes of the SEP include ecological integrity, sustainable land use management, deliberative democracy, just sustainability, and improved quality of life for residents of the United States. (shrink)

Emerging single-process propositional perspectives in psychology and philosophy have introduced the key idea that, much like their explicit (deliberately retrieved) counterparts, implicit (automatically retrieved) attitudes should be sensitive to logical operations such as negation. In the present project, we subject this idea to a particularly stringent test by probing not only whether the formation of implicit attitudes is sensitive to negation but also whether such sensitivity additionally reflects the distinction between easy-to-negate bipolar adjectives (those with clear antonyms, e.g., strong) and (...) difficult-to-negate unipolar adjectives (those without clear antonyms, e.g., unique). Across four experiments (three preregistered; total N = 6,707), we found (a) no significant difference in the formation of implicit attitudes in response to affirmed bipolar versus affirmed unipolar adjectives (β = 0.07); (b) modulation of the formation of implicit attitudes by whether adjectives were affirmed or negated (β = 0.67); and, critically, (c) stronger modulation of the formation of implicit attitudes by the negation of bipolar relative to unipolar adjectives (β = 0.23). These results generalized across three sets of adjectives, two implicit attitude measures (the Implicit Association Test and the Affect Misattribution Procedure), and two novel targets (social and nonsocial). Together, these data provide strong evidence to suggest that the formation of implicit attitudes is sensitive to logical operations, including not only whether an adjective is affirmed or negated but even whether adjectives are relatively easy or difficult to negate. We discuss theoretical implications for single-process and dual-process accounts of attitude formation and higher-order human cognition. (shrink)

Susan Schneider’s article (2025) on the epistemology of Chatbots is the start to a much larger conversation scholars and educators need to have about the influence these technologies have on knowledge and knowledge production. To that end, I wish to expand this conversation to an aspect briefly mentioned in her paper; the use of these technologies by bad actors and propagandists to shape the worldview of users. And there is no more pressing example than the movement of X’s Chatbot Grok (...) from mere online bot to a Wikipedia-clone with recent the launch of Grokipedia. (shrink)

Many new psychedelic religious organizations have recently emerged in the United States. These psychedelic churches operate in a legal gray area, which provides job opportunities, not just for lawyers, but also for philosophers of religion. To gain legal permission to use psychedelics, these churches need philosophically well-developed doctrines. Philosophers of religion can help develop these psychedelic doctrines. Looking at the law from a philosophical perspective, I derive six criteria which these psychedelic doctrines should satisfy. As an illustration, I show how (...) a modernized Platonism can satisfy these criteria. Just as bioethicists can help in the practice of medicine, so philosophers of religion can help with the legal proceedings of new psychedelic churches. (shrink)

I argue that central to Aristotle’s account of vice is a distinction between two varieties of vicious person: those for whom character change is possible (the curable), and those for whom it is not (the incurable). Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it shows why Aristotle’s discussions of vice in EN vii and ix 4 are not inconsistent.

FromSoftware’s Dark Souls games (2011, 2014, 2016) and their spiritual successor, Bloodborne (2015), have creatively, and often subversively, utilized insectoid figures as key elements in their worlds, disrupting normative hierarchies of meaning and being throughout the fictional realms of Lordran, Drangleic, Yharnam, and Lothric. Even more obvious is the work undertaken in Team Cherry’s Hollow Knight (2017), an acclaimed “soulslike/metroidvania” that takes place in an entirely subterranean world populated by insects. In games intimately concerned with the status of “humanity,” insects (...) serve as both potent metaphors and actual agents of transformation, presenting us with an alterity that goes beyond the dialectic of same and other, identity and difference, to a real of generic and finite particularity. (shrink)

Abstract: Longtermist Effective Altruists (EAs) aim to mitigate the risk of existential catastrophes. In this paper, I have three goals. First, I identify a catastrophic risk that EAs have completely ignored. I call it religious catastrophe: the threat that (as Christians and Muslims have warned for centuries) billions of people stand in danger of going to hell for all eternity. Second, I argue that, even by secular EA lights, religious catastrophe is at least as bad and at least as probable (...) and, therefore, at least as important as many of the standard EA catastrophic risks (e.g., catastrophic climate change, nuclear winter). Third, I present the following dilemma for secular EAs: either adopt religious catastrophe as an EA cause or ignore religious catastrophe but also ignore catastrophic risks whose mitigation has a similar or lower expected value (i.e., most or all of them). Business as usual—ignoring religious catastrophe while championing the typical EA causes—is not an option consistent with longtermist EA principles. (shrink)

What is the role of play at the end of the world? As reports on the climate crisis become increasingly dire, we must ask ourselves what good it is to talk about games, and particularly those games that operate in a fantastic register. The question inevitably arises: why continue to play at all when the world is on fire around us? Indeed, as Emily Rose recently remarked in an article on RE:BIND, not only is the planet on the brink of (...) collapse, but the game industry, as it currently operates, is complicit in many of the unsustainable human practices that have led us to this point. The “abstract theatre of leisure-crafting,” as Rose phrases it, is not innocent. So, then, why play? This study takes up these urgent questions through close readings of developer FromSoftware’s critically acclaimed Souls series of video games: Dark Souls (2011), Dark Souls II (2014), and Dark Souls III (2016). In these games, the end of the world drives each narrative, but is also the thematic support for the basic gameplay loop that organizes players’ traversals of each gameworld. It is the contention of this paper that the Souls trilogy mounts a radical critique of political, epistemological, and ontological regimes that desperately cling to the status quo, proposing in their stead a myriad of new forms of existence that might be able to thrive in and through the apocalypse. These alternatives are born of affinities and agencies entirely other to, and often directly opposed to, the powers that have led the present world to its doom, and through play, the Souls games invite their players to consider such ‘minor literatures’ as legitimate alternatives to that which claims to be the only legitimate source of authority. In the opening cinematic to Dark Souls, we are told that “the flames will fade, and only dark will remain,” but it is precisely in this darkness that a fecund plurality of potentialities is to be found. (shrink)

The Italian term sprezzatura refers to making what one does appear nonchalant and effortless when it in fact involves calculation and effort. This notion, which comes from Baldassare Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier, captures a practice that permeates many areas of our aesthetic lives, from the performing arts to everyday social interactions, and is useful for criticism and appreciation. However, this concept has received little attention in philosophical aesthetics. By filling out and making more precise Castiglione's casual and indirect (...) remarks about sprezzatura, I show how this concept both points to heretofore underappreciated aesthetic values and helps us see important aesthetic and moral differences between cases that otherwise seem alike. (shrink)

Television shows play a significant role in exposing the realities and societal conditions prevalent in our time. Bridgerton is a Netflix series that spans two seasons. It is a story of love, passion, fashion, and family affairs set during the competitive Regency era in London, where marriageable youth and gentry are introduced into society. This philosophical paper employed an intersectional feminist film and television textual analysis to examine the representation of women in the Netflix series Bridgerton. Additionally, the paper integrates (...) critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis as complementary methods. It also employed Bell Hooks' theory of representation that examined how the issue of gender oppression is prevalent in Bridgerton. The content was organized and analyzed through a set of thematic categories. Hence, one noticeable aspect of the show is the way women are groomed and trained to fit into the social strata, so that they can be pleasing in the eyes of the Queen, who approves them. Another is the way women are viewed as a means to save the family's wealth once they are partnered with a noble husband-to-be, disregarding their agency. Applying hooks' views, this paper underscores that women are not mere commodities. They are persons of dignity whose rights and privileges must be given due recognition equal to those of others. This is true not only among women but also to all. Equality builds justice. Justice diminishes oppression. For it is only when we start doing injustice towards others that oppression rises once again. (shrink)

In developer FromSoftware’s acclaimed Dark Souls trilogy (2011, 2014, 2016), the concept of “hollowing” occupies a central position in the broader thematic landscape of the games. Concerned with the fates of cursed undead in worlds on the brink of collapse, the Dark Souls games present hollowing—a violent, withering insanity—as the doom of all undead who fail to endure their brutal conditions. More than a mere fantasy trope, however, hollowing functions in each game as both a narrative and a mechanical instrument, (...) mobilizing the player-character to participate in the precisely designed ludonarrative circuits that the developers have devised. This study contends that it is this particular gameplay structure that reinforces an evolving theorization on FromSoftware’s part (if tacit) as to what constitutes human being. (shrink)

In this chapter, I identify a distinctive use of ‘sublime’ in Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. I show that for Smith a scientific discipline and its theories can be sublime. I trace this idea back to Malebranche. I show that in Smith it is a way to convey something about the irrational nature of the natural order lurking behind’s science’s intellectual achievements. In section 1, I diagnose and distinguish three uses of ‘sublime’ in Smith. I situate two of these in (...) the early modern discussions of the sublime in the wake of Boileau's and William Smith’s translations of Longinus. 1 I argue that the third in which Smith treats intellectual disciplines as themselves sublime is relatively distinctive, although not wholly unique to Smith. In section 2, I put this notion in context and trace it, somewhat speculatively, back to the reception of Isaac Newton by Smith and Smith’s reading of Malebranche. In the third section I conclude with some reflections on the significance of this discussion for Smith’s conception of the nature of scientific rationality. (shrink)

Yujin Nagasawa’s book, The Problem of Evil for Atheists, aims to show how theists, pantheists, axiarchists, and atheists all share a problem. On the one hand, they posit some cherished entity (God, nature, evolution, etc.). On the other hand, this cherished entity either causes or contains suffering, which is apparently incompatible with their cherishing. To solve their problem, these groups can and have turned to holiness. A holy entity can be cherished even if it causes or contains suffering. Hence, their (...) shared solution revolves around a common core, which I link with John Hick’s Real. Nagasawa adds pantheism, axiarchism, and atheism to Hick’s pluralism. By doing this, he strips the Real of residual monotheistic features which might make it idolatrous. For those who oppose idolatry, Nagasawa opens up a vast new territory of religious opportunities. (shrink)

The incredibly popular Souls games developed by FromSoftware (and their imitators, colloquially referred to as Souls-like games) have followed a fascinating design trajectory since the release of the first game in the franchise, Demon’s Souls, in 2009. In many fantasy roleplaying games, the in-game capacity of the player-character is signified by a ‘level,’ which is typically increased through the acquisition of experience (‘xp’) during gameplay. The more the player plays, the more experience she gains, which increases the player’s level, and (...) thus makes her more powerful in the game-world. This is a common logic of progression, but in such a system the particularities of different play styles, abilities, and tactics are subsumed under an abstract metric of power, hiding the nuances of actual play from view. The Souls games, however, have steadily innovated upon this logic, changing how we play them and so requiring us in turn to think about the ways we navigate game-worlds—and perhaps even our own, by extension. This paper argues that this design trajectory can be schematized as a movement from power to skill, a shifting of player agency from an abstract or ideal domain to a concrete and material one. (shrink)

In his Phenomenology of Perception (2012), Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes bodily existence through the concept of “motricity” (100). The body exists for itself as a “dynamic” posture, a “situational spatiality,” a suite of possibilities that is always already disclosed as the “third term” in the perspectival structure of the world (102, original emphasis). If we apply this concept of the body to the animated bodies we see in contemporary video games—specifically, the bodies of player-characters—we discover video games to be uniquely recursive (...) systems that thematize motricity as a matter of game design. If the body is our “means of insertion” into our “surroundings” and, therefore, the concrete means of disclosure of the world in which we live (106), then the design of animated bodies sees this “means” made explicit as an instrument of play. The “motor project” (113) of the game itself feeds back into the “strange signifying machine” that is my body (114), disclosing the “several ways for the body to be a body” and thus the “several ways for consciousness to be consciousness” (125)—which is to say, the several ways in which I find myself involved in the “movement of existence” (139). To this end, this paper analyzes the character animation (and illustration) in Naughty Dog’s acclaimed The Last of Us (2013), and its prequel graphic novel, The Last of Us: American Dreams (2013), paying special attention to the “original intentionality” of motricity as it is presented in both works, the originary reference that “haunt[s]” every interpretation of the world of The Last of Us that we might offer (139, 140). (shrink)

I frame my argument by way of Hayek's tendency to treat Hume and Smith as central articulations of the rule of law. The rest of the paper explores their defense of clientelism. First, I introduce Hume’s ideas on the utility of patronage in his essay, “Of the Independency of Parliament.” I argue that in Hume clientelism just is a feature of parliamentary business. It seems ineliminable. I then contextualize Hume’s account by comparing it to Montesquieu’s account of this system of (...) patronage in Book XIX, chapter 27 of The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu primarily treats it as a species of bad corruption. However, he also sees some benefits to it. I then turn to Smith and I show that he echoes Hume’s analysis of corruption in an easily ignored passage in Wealth of Nations. I then show that for Smith one argument in favor of a kind of federal parliamentary union between Great Brittain and her American colonies lies in its ability to facilitate and make more efficient the system of patronage by the Crown. While Smith’s account of these matters is quite Humean, one can discern in Smith a distinct cost-benefit argument for the acceptance of the necessity of a system of patronage in the service of the peaceful expansion and entrenchment of the rule of law in his proposal for parliamentary union. (shrink)

Using Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of "motricity" and Alva Noë's concept of "organization," this paper offers a phenomenological and enactive approach to tabletop roleplaying games (ttrpgs) as a form of poiesis, making---both auto-poetic, as defined by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and sym-poietic, as defined by Donna Haraway. This self-making and making-with is not understood in the sense of either self-possession or self-realization, but as a mode of what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten call "fugitive planning," a planning with the potential (...) for direct action at the cosmic scale. This cosmic poetics is a poetics that rejects "the assignation of traits," as Legacy Russell beckons us to do, delighting in the glitched becomings of "generic difference." Bringing this theoretical constellation to ground, this paper examines select examples from the recent boom in independent "lyric" games, situating them in their experimental aesthetic context in order to derive a praxis for the elaboration of the poetics here described. (shrink)

Game development studio FromSoftware's work over the last thirteen years has been much concerned with kingship and rule—what it means to be a lord, and what happens to the land when lordship fails. Demon's Souls (2009), the Dark Souls trilogy (2011, 2014, 2016), Bloodborne (2015), Sekiro: Shadows Die Twice (2019), and now, Elden Ring (2022), each ask these questions in their own way, and each provide distinctly varied answers. But across all of these games—and especially across the 'un-trilogy' of Demon's (...) Souls, Bloodborne, and Elden Ring—the question of the sovereign is always tied to the question of the beast: that which rules over society and that which cannot live within it. This paper uses the discourse of the political animal inaugurated by Aristotle, and taken up by subsequent philosophers Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Derrida, to illuminate the work of deconstruction that FromSoftware's games perform. Through the constant shifting between the figures of the beast and the sovereign, and the torsion and ultimate destruction of this dialectical opposition, FromSoftware seeks to inaugurate a new ethico-political regime, one wherein the cyclical, consumptive violence of power is set aside in favour of a multiplicity of lines of flight beyond. (shrink)

Would an innate Approximate Number System (ANS) vindicate number concept nativism? A natural and widely assumed way to approach to this question is to suppose that the answer turns on whether the ANS’s representations are conceptual—if they are, this would support number concept nativism, but if they aren’t, then an innate ANS wouldn’t provide any support for number concept nativism. As tempting as this approach may be, this chapter argues that it is mistaken. Whether an innate ANS supports number concept (...) nativism doesn’t turn on whether its representations are concepts—or on there being any innate number concepts at all. (shrink)