The aim of this paper is to investigate Nishida Kitarō’s way of philosophizing in the light of the concept of “transition” in order to deepen our understanding of both Nishida’s philosophy and our thinking about and in transitions, using the concept of “boundary” or “border” (Grenze) as a catalyst. For that purpose, we focus on Nishida’s essay “Place” (「場所」), passing through different parts of the text as if through successive gates on a path of transition between one place and the (...) next, until we reach the final place of “absolute nothingness.” Dwelling on this place, we turn our attention to its internal structure and try to depict it along the outlines of a boundary, following the movements taking place in Nishida’s essay. The second part proposes an interpretation of the place of nothingness as an interminable practice of boundary-crossing that doesn’t come to a halt in a final, all-encompassing place, but dynamically situates itself on countless intersecting planes. After a more or less abstract analysis of the concept of “boundary,” we will apply and concretize this approach by using the example of the skin. To this end, we expose five main features of the skin as boundary: permeability, enclosure, excessiveness, interstitiality and reciprocal self-formation. (shrink)

Review of The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy by Bret W. Davis (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2022.

The tenth volume of the Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy focuses on the theme of “transition,” dealing with transitory and intermediary phenomena and practices such as translation, transmission, and transformation. Written in English, German and Japanese, the contributions explore a wide range of topics, crossing disciplinary borders between phenomenology, linguistics, feminism, epistemology, aesthetics, political history, martial arts, spiritual practice and anthropology, and bringing Japanese philosophy into cross-cultural dialogue with other philosophical traditions. As exercises in “thinking in transition,” the essays reveal novel (...) modes of doing philosophy as a way of boundary crossing that takes transition not only as an object of inquiry, but also as a method of philosophical practice itself. (shrink)

The endeavor of this bibliographical guide is inscribed in the broader effort to reframe the discipline of Philosophy in a global perspective through the account of its history. With the present work readers will gain a broad overview of the materials available in Italian on the histories of philosophy in different regions of the world from the first editions, in the 15th century, to the present. Some of these materials are presented in the extensive introduction to the bibliography, which has (...) been organized according to geographical regions, such as continents and nations, as well as thematic focuses, such as religions, doctrines, or disciplines. Moreover, the introduction discusses two main themes, namely the strong historiographical tradition in Italy and its close connection with political agendas, and the influence of the history of philosophy in the schools. One outcome of the work is the mapping of leading research areas as well as neglected areas, and even the uncovering of some blind spots. (shrink)

This double issue of the journal of hermeneutics and philosophical criticism “Trópos” stems from a workshop held in Padua on November 8th and 9th, 2021, entitled “The Universal and Philosophy,” organized by the Mushin'en Research Group in Intercultural Philosophy (無心円)3, of which the two publishers are founding members.

The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...) person knows is to say that she got things right due to her own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. (shrink)

We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...) believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them. (shrink)

While epistemologists have long debated what it takes for beliefs to be justified, they've devoted much less collective attention to the question of what it takes for beliefs to be excused, and how excuses differ from justifications. This stands in contrast to the state of affairs in legal scholarship, where the contrast between justifications and excuses is a standard topic in introductory criminal law textbooks. My goal in this paper is to extract some lessons from legal theory for epistemologists seeking (...) to distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses. First, I'll provide a brief overview of appeals to the justification/excuse distinction in epistemology, focusing on the internalism/externalism debate. Then, I'll identify some choice points in legal theory for how to think about the function of the justification/excuse distinction, and will in turn correspond to analogous choice points in epistemology. Ultimately, I'll argue that depending on which way we go at some crucial junctures, we can motivate either a traditional, non‐factive, internalist conception of justification, or a purely factive one where truth is all that's required for a belief to be justified. But there's no clear path, via legal theory, to view that only beliefs that amount to knowledge are justified. (shrink)

Function talk is a constant across different life sciences. From macro-evolution to genetics, functions are mentioned everywhere. For example, a limb’s function is to allow movement and RNA polymerases’ function is to transcribe DNA. Biochemistry is not immune from such a characterization; the biochemical world seems to be a chemical world embedded within biological processes. Specifically, biochemists commonly ascribe functions to biomolecules and classify them accordingly, and this has been noted in the recent philosophical literature on biochemical kinds. But while (...) a lot has been written on biological and psychological functions, little has been said explicitly about biochemical functions. Here, I explore functional attribution to biochemical molecules. I argue that if we accept this attribution, then biochemical functions are constituted by chemical dispositional properties that causally contribute to selected biological processes. In section 2, I discuss the controversy concerning the characterization of biochemical functions. In section 3, I consider whether a biological or a chemical understanding of function can be applied to biochemical functions, illustrating the account with the example of vitamin B12. The result is that none of these theories on their own can provide an adequate characterization. In section 4, I present an account of biochemical functions. In section 5, I assess this account, taking into consideration common requirements for a theory of functions and an objection. (shrink)

While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of the view emphasized the possibility of its providing an alternative to both coherentism and traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought, and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian accounts (...) of belief updating with a version of the holist claim that all beliefs are defeasible. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with (...) different conceptions of safety in epistemology. Lastly, and most controversially, there's an attractive choice at this point that will not vindicate some of the most influential applications of the safety-theoretic framework in epistemology, e.g., Williamson's arguments against the KK principle, and luminosity. (shrink)

Almost everyone believes that testimony can transmit knowledge from speaker to hearer. What some philosophers mean by this is ordinary and pedestrian-- they mean only that, in at least some cases, a speaker S knows that p, S testifies that p to a hearer H, and H comes to know that p as a result of believing S's testimony. There is disagreement about how this occurs, but that it does occur is sufficient for the transmission of knowledge in the intended (...) sense. On this understanding of transmission, the natural questions are these: (1) What conditions, in addition to speaker knowledge and speaker testimony, are sufficient for the hearer to gain testimonial knowledge?; and (2) Is speaker knowledge always necessary for testimonial knowledge? That is: Is all testimonial knowledge transmitted knowledge? (shrink)

Biochemical kinds present an interesting case study in the philosophical literature on natural kinds and functions, as they fall between chemical kinds, defined by their intrinsic microstructural properties, and biological kinds, which involve functional and evolutionary considerations. Here we examine how the distinct chemical and functional properties of biochemical kinds are unified, as well as their identity criteria. We contend that unification principles are crucial for explaining the clustering of properties shared by members of natural kinds and for establishing identity (...) criteria for such kinds. We consider whether there are specific properties that characterize biochemical kinds. This entails investigating the relationship between biochemical functions and structure. We focus on proteins, particularly on vitamin B12, as a representative example of a biochemical kind. We conclude that if there are unification principles for biochemical kinds, these principles exist at the level of biochemistry itself. This supports the naturalness of biochemical kinds as genuine categories and provides identity conditions for such kinds. (shrink)

The concept of higher-order evidence—roughly, evidence about what our evidence supports—promises epistemological riches; it has struck many philosophers as necessary for explaining how to rationally respond to disagreement in particular, and to evidence of our own fallibility more generally. But it also threatens paradox. Once we allow higher-order evidence to do non-trivial work—in particular, once we allow that people can be rationally ignorant of what their evidence supports—we seem to be committed to a host of puzzling or even absurd consequences. (...) The aim in this chapter is to have our cake and eat it too; it presents an independently motivated framework that lets us mimic the particular case judgments of those who explain how to accommodate evidence of our fallibility by appeal to higher-order evidence, but without commitment to the absurd consequences. (shrink)

The present thesis explores some metaphysical issues concerning biochemical kinds and the relations between chemical and biological properties and phenomena. The main result of this thesis is that there is something sui generis about biochemical kinds. This result is motivated by two theoretical steps. The first is characterising biochemical functions as weakly emergent from the chemical structure [Chapter 3, Chapter 6]. The second is via an account for which biochemical kinds are natural categories [Chapter 4, Chapter 7]. The thesis comprises (...) four parts. Part I [Chapter 1, Chapter 2] aims to offer the methodological and conceptual tools that underpin this research. Chapter 1 presents the debate on the unity of science and the motivation of the research. Chapter 2 presents the account of natural kinds that will be used throughout the thesis. Part II [Chapter 3, Chapter 4] offers a detailed metaphysical analysis of the molecular gene. Chapter 3 argues that molecular genes are weakly emergent from nucleic acids. Chapter 4 argues that the category "molecular gene" can be deemed a natural kind, following the account presented in Chapter 2. Part III [Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7] explores some of the themes related to biochemical kinds and generalises some of the results from Part II. Chapter 5 considers biochemical functions and how functional attribution should be interpreted for biochemical molecules. Chapter 6 considers the relation between biochemical functions and structure, spelt in terms of weak emergence and explores unity in biochemistry. Chapter 7 considers the topic of biochemical kinds per se and argues that biochemical kinds are natural categories. Part IV [Chapter 8] elucidates the main outcome and the implications that this research can have for future discussion in the philosophy and metaphysics of biochemistry and the unity of science. (shrink)

Part One of the paper argues against evidentialism and individualism in religiousepistemology, and in favor of a “social turn” in the field. The idea here is that humanbelief in general, and religious belief in particular, is largely characterized by epistemicdependence on other persons. An adequate epistemology, it is agued, ought to recognizeand account for social epistemic dependence.Part Two considers a problem that becomes salient when we make such a turn. Inshort, how are we to understand the transmission of knowledge and (...) rational faith in areligious tradition? The problem arises because, by all accounts, even the best traditionstransmit superstitions, self-serving prejudices, and other things that are down right falseon any reasonable view. So how is it that these same traditions can also transmit rationalfaith and even knowledge by means of the very same channels, for example channels ofreligious authority and religious teaching?Part Three offers a tentative solution to this problem. (shrink)

The global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be (...) substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof. In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3, we argue that considerations of virtue should guide the individual and public response to the emergency. (shrink)

Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the way animals navigate using path integration. We applied (...) curved tactile motions to the hands of human volunteers. Participants identified the location midway between the start and end points of each motion path. Their bisection judgements were systematically biased towards the integrated motion path, consistent with the characteristic inward error that occurs in navigation by path integration. We thus showed that integration of continuous sensory inputs across several tactile RFs provides an intrinsic mechanism for spatial perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I interview Francesca De Vecchi (Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) about her qualitative ontology and its social and normative implications. If at the foundation of our lifeworld there are significantly qualitative experiences, phenomenology can investigate the most important contemporary issues, such as gender disparity, socio-virtuality depersonalizations and political urgencies.

The idea that certain philosophical debates are "merely verbal" has historically been raised as a challenge against (large parts of) metaphysics. In this paper, I explore an analogous challenge to large parts of epistemology, which is motivated by recent arguments in experimental philosophy. I argue that, while this challenge may have some limited success, it cannot serve as a wedge case for wide-ranging skepticism about the substantiveness of epistemological debates; most epistemological debates are immune to the worries it raises.

In the paper it is argued that bridging the digital divide may cause a new ethical and social dilemma. Using Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, we show that an improper opening and enlargement of the digital environment (Infosphere) is likely to produce a Tragedy of the Digital Commons (TDC). In the course of the analysis, we explain why Adar and Huberman's previous use of Hardin's Tragedy to interpret certain recent phenomena in the Infosphere (especially peer-to-peer communication) may not be entirely (...) satisfactory. We then seek to provide an improved version of the TDC that avoids the possible shortcomings of their model. Next, we analyse some problems encountered by the application of classical ethics in the resolution of the TDC. In the conclusion, we outline the kind of work that will be required to develop an ethical approach that may bridge the digital divide but avoid the TDC. (shrink)

Pregnancy is a one of the most complex phenomena of life and is essential to the life cycle of mammals. Pregnancy is also a crucial aspect of humans' life and experience. But what is pregnancy? This question has received little attention in philosophy until recently, when it got picked up by metaphysicians and philosophers of science. However, the philosophical discussion is still in its infancy. This article provides a survey of the recent debate on the metaphysics of pregnancy. It explores (...) the relation between the pregnant organism and the gestated one, motivating the further study of pregnancy from a philosophical perspective (§1, §2). It summarises the three main models of pregnancy present in the literature, the containment view (§3), the parthood view (§4) and the splitting process view (§5) with their advantages and shortcomings. Then, it explores a recent debate on whether pregnancy is a disease (§6). Lastly, it considers how one can decide between these models, for instance by favouring a given view of biological individuality over another (§7). The article concludes that none of the views is fully satisfactory, and thus inviting to continue the research on pregnancy from a metaphysical and philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Understanding when it is acceptable to interrupt a joint activity is an important part of understanding what cooperation entails. Philosophical analyses have suggested that we should release our partner from a joint activity anytime the activity conflicts with fulfilling a moral obligation. To probe young children’s understanding of this aspect, we investigated whether 3-year-old children (N = 60) are sensitive to the legitimacy of motives (selfish condition vs. moral condition) leading agents to intentionally interrupt their joint activity. We measured whether (...) children protested or released their partner by scoring their reactions. Our results indicate that children did not manifest different reactions when the motive behind their partner leaving was moral than when the motive was selfish. However, our data showed a stable pattern: regardless of the partner’s motives, some 3-year-olds take initiatives to release their partners from joint activity, suggesting that measuring release is a valuable tool for investigating joint action. (shrink)

Proteins are often defined as the molecules that enable life thanks to the special functions they display. But what are proteins’ functions? Despite their relevance in various debates, the answer to this question is often left implicit. This paper argues that a correct characterisation of proteins’ functions must consider the native structure of the protein, building on the definition of biochemical functions I provided previously: proteins’ functions are dispositions associated to specific chemical and geometrical structural properties relevant for the tertiary (...) and quaternary structure of proteins, and they contribute to specific evolved biological processes (Bellazzi, 2025). Section 1 introduces the problem of protein’s functions. Section 2 unpacks the “structure problem” and the “function problem”, where the former inquiries into the function bearer of proteins’ function and the second into the relevant account of function. Section 3 presents an answer to the structure problem by arguing that the focus should be on native structure. Section 4 and Section 5 focus on the function problem and the account defended. Section 5 also considers two specific case studies, haemoglobin and crystallines, and a critical evaluation of the account. Section 6 concludes . (shrink)

There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of (...) human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. (shrink)

Hermann von Helmholtz’s geometrical papers have been typically deemed to provide an implicitly group-theoretical analysis of space, as articulated later by Felix Klein, Sophus Lie, and Henri Poincaré. However, there is less agreement as to what properties exactly in such a view would pertain to space, as opposed to abstract mathematical structures, on the one hand, and empirical contents, on the other. According to Moritz Schlick, the puzzle can be resolved only by clearly distinguishing the empirical qualities of spatial perception (...) from those describable in terms of axiomatic geometry. This paper offers a partial defense of the group-theoretical reading of Helmholtz along the lines of Ernst Cassirer in the fourth volume of The Problem of Knowledge of 1940. In order to avoid the problem raised by Schlick, Cassirer relied on a Kantian view of space not so much as an object of geometry, but as a precondition for the possibility of measurement. Although the concept of group does not provide a description of space, the modern way to articulate the concept of space in terms of transformation groups reveals something about the structure and the transformation of spatial concepts in mathematical and natural sciences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibilities opened up by radical interventions in public space: is it possible to foster reflection and create a critical methodology for analysing the topic of Commons in the urban context? Presenting the project “Stente: Residual Zones” as an example, the aim is to explore these questions using Umeå as a case study. Through the creation of an art/architectural object, the project seeks to use artistic and architectural practices as tools to engage (...) city residents in an active dialogue about Common spaces. Starting with a theoretical framework for situating the critical potential of art and architectural objects in public spaces, in this paper the project is seen as an example of a temporary critical moving device, gathering and amplifying the voices of the inhabitants through the city: it aims to represent an open-ended invitation to reinterpret the boundaries between nature and the city, posing itself as a radical (from the latin radicalis) form of dissensus (Rancière 2010). The experiment was conducted at the Umeå School of Architecture between March and May 2024 as part of the “Designing the Contemporary City” research group at Umeå University. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a vindication of pride. I start by presenting the Christian condemnation of pride as the cardinal sin. I subsequently examine Mandeville’s line of argument whereby pride is beneficial to society, although remaining a vice for the individual. Finally, I focus on, and endorse, the analysis of pride formulated by Hume, for whom pride qualifies instead as a virtue. This is because pride not only contributes to making society flourish but also stabilizes the virtuous agent by (...) creating a virtuous circle between our desire for self-appraisal and our aspiration to act morally. I conclude by underscoring the (virtuous) connection between pride and modesty, concomitantly arguing that humility should be discarded as vicious. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce three methods to approach philosophical problems informationally: Minimalism, the Method of Abstraction and Constructionism. Minimalism considers the specifications of the starting problems and systems that are tractable for a philosophical analysis. The Method of Abstraction describes the process of making explicit the level of abstraction at which a system is observed and investigated. Constructionism provides a series of principles that the investigation of the problem must fulfil once it has been fully characterised by the previous (...) two methods. For each method, we also provide an application: the problem of visual perception, functionalism, and the Turing Test, respectively. (shrink)

La relazione di Francesca Puccini è stata presentata al seminario di Studio "Il problema anima-corpo alla luce dell'etica. Pomponazzi, Vanini, Helvétius". Roma, Villa Mirafiori, 17 marzo 2014.

In this paper I will take it for granted that Zagzebski's position articulates a broadly Catholic perspective, and that Plantinga's position accurately represents a broadly Calvinist one. But I will argue that so construed, the Catholic and the Calvinist are much closer than Zagzebski implies: both views are person-based in an important sense of that term; both are internalist on Zagzebski's usage and externalist on the standard usage; and Plantinga's position is consistent with the social elements that Zagzebski stresses in (...) her view. In the second part of the paper I will identify what I think is the real issue between Zagzebski and Plantinga. Namely, Zagzebski thinks that knowledge requires epistemic responsibility, in the sense that instances of knowledge must be appropriately praiseworthy. Plantinga thinks that no such condition is required for knowledge or warranted belief. I will argue that on this issue Zagzebski is right, and that her virtue approach gives us resources for seeing why. Finally, I will look at the consequences for religious knowledge. Here I will argue that the consequences are minimal. Even if knowledge requires responsibility, Plantinga can still make a good case that religious belief is properly basic. And even if religious belief is properly basic, natural theology can still have an important role in the justification of religious belief. (shrink)

Can we rethink space and inhabiting from a body-centred perspective that considers the dynamic interaction between humans and the environment as affecting and being affected? This paper explores theoretical concepts in practice, identifying the types of spaces operationalising this idea and the practices necessary to realise it. Humans appear increasingly detached from the physical and material realms. However, it is argued that we are entering a phase characterised by a renewed focus on the body and materially grounded elements. Anthropocene represents (...) a crucial turning point, prompting a reevaluation of human engagement with the world and envisioning new methods to address the social, political and epistemological changes brought about by global warming. A body-centred paradigm is proposed as a solution for embracing the challenges of a transforming world, examining implications on individual (the body), societal (the social body), and cultural levels (the cultural body). This lens thoroughly explores the connection between humans and the environment. The concept of environmental temperature will serve as a tool for applying this worldview, extending beyond scientific definitions to encompass the dynamic between human, non-human, and material bodies. This concept and the methodology proposed for applying it will highlight the significance of residual spaces and art-architectural practices as a starting point for developing new ways of inhabiting our world. The hypothesis is that contemporary practices, such as performative installation and transitory architectures, may be viewed as forms of environmental occupation, revealing possibilities for reusing and reactivating unseen spaces. This approach fosters attunement and an ethic of care, reshaping our understanding of space and habitation. (shrink)

When we read a list of words, are we doing something, or is it something that just happens to us? On the one hand, according to intention-for-action theories, reading can be active only if we do it intentionally, meaning that the action is caused and sustained by the agent’s intention. Many cases of reading seem to be intentional: consider, for instance, when a person is reading a novel, a newspaper article, or an academic paper. Yet, reading often seems to be (...) something that passively happens to us. It is sufficient that a word appears in front of us to make us read it. Numerous studies on the Stroop task – a well-known experimental set-up in the cognitive sciences – make clear that reading is unavoidable, suggesting that reading takes place regardless of the agent’s intention. This tension constitutes the reading puzzle. I argue that if intention is necessary for a process to be active, then intention-for-action theories fail to account for such a distinctive human activity as reading. I conclude that reading represents a real challenge to the intention-for-action theories and shows that what an agent can actively do should not be limited to behaviors that involve intentions. (shrink)

To explain phenomena in the world is a central human activity and one of the main goals of rational inquiry. There are several types of explanation: one can explain by drawing an analogy, as one can explain by dwelling on the causes (see e.g. see [Woodward (2004, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford)]. Amongst these different kinds of explanation, in the last decade, philosophers have become receptive to those explanations that explain by providing the (...) reasons (or the grounds) why a statement is true; these explanations are often called conceptual explanations (e.g. see [Betti (2010, Explanation in metaphysics and Bolzano's theory of ground and consequence. Logique et analyse, 211:281316)]). The main aim of the paper is to propose a logical account of conceptual explanations. We will do so by using the resources of proof theory, in particular sequent rules analogous to deep inferences ([e.g. see Brunnler (2004, Deep Inference and Symmetry in Classical Proofs. Logoc Verlag)]). The results we provide not only shed light on conceptual explanations themselves, but also on the role that logic and logical tools might play in the burgeoning field of inquiry concerning explanations. Indeed, we conclude the paper by underlining interesting links between the present research and some other existing works on explanations and logic that have arise in recent years, e.g. see [Arieli et al. (2022, Explainable logic-based argumentation. Computational Models of Argument, 353:3243); Darwiche and Hirth (2023, On the (complete) reasons behind decisions. Journal of Logic Language and Information, 32:6388); Piazza, Pulcini, and Sabatini (2023, Abduction as deductive saturation: a proof-theoretic inquiry. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52:15751602)]. (shrink)

Black holes represent the most extreme environments in the known universe, characterized by intense gravitational fields and radical distortions of spacetime. This paper explores a speculative but coherent framework in which black holes function as high-density information repositories within a computational cosmology. The central idea is that the extreme temporal dilation near the event horizon — here termed temporal compression — may reflect not only a relativistic effect but also an emergent signature of computational resource allocation within a simulated universe. (...) By comparing black hole behavior to memory-intensive processes in large-scale simulations, the model proposes that the universe may employ localized time-slowing as a mechanism to manage information density, entropy flow, and causal consistency. The theory generates a set of testable predictions involving micro-variations in Hawking radiation, potential discreteness patterns near the event horizon, and observable anomalies in gravitational-wave signals from black-hole mergers. While speculative, the framework integrates concepts from general relativity, quantum gravity, information theory, and simulation-hypothesis literature, offering an interpretive lens that unifies temporal distortion and information storage within a single computational paradigm. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

This book offers fundamental insights into three main fields of education and expertise: phenomenology, neuroscience, and clinical practice. The richness and pluralism of the contributions aim to overcome the reductionist and dualistic approach to mental health and shed new light on clinical practice. Designed as both an education tool for mental health professionals, and a theoretical investigation for philosophers on the use of phenomenology in clinical practice, this book highlights the need for a new direction on mental health, and more (...) general, on human wellbeing. This volume aims to fill the gap between philosophers and mental health professionals on an educational level, in a space unique in its open and transdisciplinary approach. It appeals to students and researchers but also very much to professionals and clinicians in the field. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2023), Embodied Attention. A phenomenological hypothesis, in D. Stoyanov (Ed.), Contemporary Neuropsychiatry: Implications from Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 26-42.

The men’s rights movement (MRM) is often dismissed as inherently misogynistic, yet this label obscures the very real struggles faced by men in today’s society. From soaring suicide rates and educational disparities to family court bias and workplace fatalities, men confront systemic issues that rarely receive mainstream attention. While the rise of the “manosphere” and extremist voices has warped the public image of the MRM into one of hostility and chauvinism, the movement at its core seeks to expose the double (...) standards of gender politics and challenge the myth that gender equality has already been achieved. This paper traces the origins of the MRM, examines how online radicalization has distorted its purpose, and highlights overlooked inequities in health, education, law, and media. By separating legitimate grievances from toxic rhetoric, it argues that caring about men’s issues is not misogyny but an essential step toward true gender parity. The solution is not to pit feminism against masculinism, but to recognize that both movements illuminate different dimensions of inequality and, when pursued in good faith, can work together to create a more just and inclusive society. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2022), «…this phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’». Martin Heidegger’s critique of empathy, in “Bollettino Filosofico”, 37, 243-251, ISSN: 1593 – 7178, E-ISSN 2035 - 2670.