This chapter explores the opportunities and limitations of the ideal of transparency in responsible innovation, by consulting the virtual case of "The Circle", a company which appears in Dave Eggers' novel The Circle. The Circle is a high-tech company with the main purpose of being responsive to societal needs. They want to eradicate unethical behaviour in society, enhance public health and make a positive impact on the environment. The ultimate goal of The Circle is to reach 100% full transparency in (...) the world, which is impossible without any societal desirability. In first instance, it is free choice of people to accept and embrace the products and services of The Circle, who invest resources in keeping customers happy and in raising awareness about the dangers of privacy. The chapter concludes that The Circle meets the requirements regarding the outcomes of responsible innovation, at least to a certain extent, while at the same time, one feels unease about certain activities they undertake. (shrink)

A corn crop typically refers to a large-scale cultivation of corn (also known as maize) for commercial purposes such as food production, animal feed, and industrial uses. Corn is one of the most widely grown crops in the world, and it is a major staple food for many cultures. Corn crops are grown in various regions of the world with different climates, soil types, and farming practices. In the United States, for example, the Midwest is known as the "Corn (...) class='Hi'>Belt" due to its extensive corn production. Corn crops can be grown using a variety of methods, including conventional tillage, no-till farming, and the use of genetically modified crops. Due to its importance, there is a need for discovering the corn diseases and treating them. The aim of this study is to propose a deep learning model for the classification of corn leaf diseases based on Convolutional Neural Network. A model for classifying maize diseases was developed using a dataset for classifying Corn diseases that contains 4 classes of disease. The dataset was collected from Keggel website. The proposed model was trained, validated, and tested. The F1-score (99.83%), Recall (99.83%), precision (99.83%), Accuracy (99.83%). (shrink)

In this paper I examine the thesis regarding the end of the history of art, through which Hans Belting frames the museum as a correlate of history, understood as framing art and the role of the museum within the development of a closed and outdated philosophy of history: the phi-losophy of Hegel. On the contrary, I believe that first He-gel and later Arthur Danto not only explain the changing roles of art and the museum but also argue for the need (...) for reflection on art in modern culture. Our reconstruc-tion of this debate through the work of these authors allow us to represent, for contemporary thought, a pro-ductive analysis of the history of art and its connection with philosophy, and offers us theoretical perspectives that remain relevant for our understanding of theory, the history of art, and various institutional spheres. (shrink)

One of the most attractive, but nevertheless highly controversial proposals to alleviate the negative effects of today’s international patent regime is the Health Impact Fund (HIF). Although the HIF has been drafted to facilitate access to medicines and boost pharmaceutical research, we have analysed the burdens for the global poor a similar proposal designed to promote the use and development of climate-friendly technologies would have. Drawing parallels from the access to medicines debate, we suspect that an analogous “Climate Impact Fund” (...) will increase the already very high scientific and technological supremacy of the developed world over the Global South. We advocate countering this dominance on the ground that countries with scarce research and development capacities will be in a difficult position to reject technologies and will not have a say on how such technologies should look like. Further, addressing global hazards should be an inclusive endeavour and not only a privilege reserved for the developed world. Incentivizing grassroots innovation would be a major step to promote scientific and technological inclusion. (shrink)

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, represents H.L.A. Hart's landmark contribution to the philosophy of criminal responsibility and punishment. Unavailable for ten years, this new edition reproduces the original text, adding a new critical introduction by John Gardner, a leading contemporary criminal law theorist.

This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more.

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

Signing Ceremony of MOU on Professional Legal Diploma, Government of Dubai 2020.

Jordan agreed to extensive liberalization undertakings under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) that would open some sectors that were previously closed or restricted to foreign suppliers and investors. It undertook horizontal commitments in cross-border movement of individuals and commercial presence covering all types of services.

If I were asked to put forward an ethical principle which I considered to be especially certain, it would be that no one can be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, for the conduct of another. Responsibility belongs essentially to the individual. The implications of this principle are much more far-reaching than is evident at first, and reflection upon them may lead many to withdraw the assent which they might otherwise be very ready to accord to this view of responsibility. (...) But if the difficulties do appear to be insurmountable, and that, very certainly, does not seem to me to be the case, then the proper procedure will be, not to revert to the barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility, but to give up altogether the view that we are accountable in any distinctively moral sense. (shrink)

This paper proposes a minimal structural framework for characterizing persistent internal standpoints in artificial systems. The central claim is that an artificial system may be said to possess an internal standpoint when it maintains a stable, dynamically updated internal context that evolves through its own computation and systematically shapes future processing. Two constructs are introduced to formalize this idea: the Experiential Vector (EV), representing the system’s moment-to-moment internal context, and the Computational Experiential Manifold (CEM), representing the structured space of its (...) possible configurations. Together, these constructs define a theory-neutral architectural background supporting persistence, history-dependence, and differentiation of internal modes over time. The framework does not advance a theory of phenomenal consciousness or biological realization; instead, it specifies structural conditions under which a persistent internal standpoint can be coherently articulated in primarily architectural terms for artificial systems. (shrink)

This theory proposes a unified framework for understanding reality through the lens of a dynamic, wave-based harmonic substrate that underlies all form, energy, and consciousness. It integrates principles from quantum physics, systems theory, and metaphysics to suggest that consciousness exists outside of our observable universe and interfaces with a probability field designed for guided experience. The theory introduces the Principle of Harmonic Tendency, which explains the emergence of coherence, form, and life as natural expressions of resonance within this substrate. Additionally, (...) the theory explores how reality branches through conscious choice, how empathy and intuition function as sensory extensions of alignment with a higher self, and how phenomena such as time, free will, and even dark matter may be emergent properties of field dynamics. Mathematical formalization is addressed through a proposed framework in the appendices, offering potential models for experimental validation. This work aims to initiate a multidisciplinary dialogue that bridges the gap between scientific rigor and human experience, ultimately reframing our role as conscious co-creators within a harmonic and probabilistic cosmos. (shrink)

I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions that (...) we regard as bad, they are typically better off having their acquired preferences satisfied. If they are badly off it is because they cannot get what we and they, would regard as more desirable alternatives. Preference utilitarianism explains why individuals in such circumstances are badly off whether they have adapted to their deprived circumstances or not. Even if they prefer the conditions of their lives to all other available alternatives, most would prefer alternatives that are not available to them which would, on the preferentist account, make them better off. And that, on the preferentist account, is the basis for a radical critique of unjust institutions that limit people's options and prevent them from getting what they want. (shrink)

This book is a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Utrecht. It was prepared under the supervision of Prof. Dr. H. Schultink. I would like to express my gratitude to him for his criticisms of earlier versions which led to many improvements, in particular with respect to the exposition of the argument. To my co-referent Dirk van Dalen, reader in the Department of Philo sophy (,Centrale Interfaculteit') of the University of Utrecht, I am greatly indebted (...) for his valuable and fruitful suggestions about problems relevant to both linguistics and logic. Several ideas developed in this study owe their present concrete form to our many discussions. This thesis originates in syntactic research into the Aspects carried out in 1967 under the supervision of Albert Kraak, professor at the University of Nijmegen, who ever since gave much attention to my work in progress. I am very grateful to him for his careful and stimulating criticism as well as for the continuous support he gave me during these years. The present study closely relates to the work of my colleague Wim Klooster with regard to both its theoretical framework and its subject matter. Our joint work on the measurement of duration in Dutch is an integral part of the argument. I have greatly profited from the numerous discussions we have had. (shrink)

The Precautionary Principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays an important role in most international environmental agreements. Yet, there is little consensus on precisely how to understand and formulate the principle. In this paper I prove some impossibility results for two plausible formulations of the PP as a decision-rule. These results illustrate the difficulty in making the PP consistent with the acceptance of any trade-offs between catastrophic risks (...) and more ordinary goods. (shrink)

In this field questions arise which are certainly difficult; but as I listened last time to members of the group, I felt that the main difficulty perhaps lay in determining precisely what questions we are trying to answer. I have the conviction that if we could only say clearly what the questions are, the answers to them might not appear so elusive. So I have begun with a simple list of questions about discretion which in one form or another were, (...) as it seemed to me, expressed by the group last time. I may indeed have omitted something and inserted something useless: if so, no doubt I shall be informed of this later. The central questions then seem to me to be the following: 1. What is discretion, or what is the exercise of discretion? 2. Under what conditions and why do we in fact accept or tolerate discretion in a legal system? 3. Must we accept discretion or tolerate discretion, and if so, why? 4. What values does the use of discretion menace, and what values does it maintain or promote? 5. What can be done to maximize the beneficial operation of the use of discretion and to minimize any harm that it does? (shrink)

This work proposes a radical reconfiguration of moral philosophy by dismantling the major pillars of ethical thought—utilitarianism, deontological ethics, communitarianism, and classical economic liberalism—through systematic critique and paradoxical analysis. By exposing their structural inconsistencies and practical failures, I argue that none of these frameworks can provide a universally binding foundation for moral life in the twenty-first century. -/- Against this backdrop, I introduce the doctrine of the Minimal Existential Pursuit Right as a new moral axis. This doctrine rests on an (...) a priori boundary condition: the irreducible right of every sentient or minimally existential entity to (1) experience its finite life in full, and (2) preserve the intrinsic value of that experiential movement through memory, transmission, or transformation. This principle is advanced not as a metaphysical dogma but as a logical necessity for sustaining any coherent moral and social order. -/- The methodology combines the reconstruction of the social contract, the deployment of revelatory paradoxes, and the derivation of an axiomatic formula of minimal existence. Through these tools, I demonstrate why authoritarianism collapses under its own contradictions and why liberal economics, when grounded solely in individual preference, undermines the very conditions for freedom it claims to protect. -/- The contribution of this work lies not only in negating existing systems but in offering a universalizable alternative. By establishing an incontestable minimal right, this framework provides a secular, post-theological foundation for ethics and law, one capable of addressing emergent questions surrounding artificial intelligence, bioengineered beings, and the preservation of non-human life. -/- Thus, this paper marks a decisive shift: from ethics premised on transcendent sanctity or contingent utility, to an existentially grounded moral architecture that secures both freedom and dignity through the recognition of minimal existential pursuit. -/- The derived Universal Ontological Formula (UOF) establishes the a priori logic for defining the Minimal Existential Right by determining the Self-Reflective Quotient (SRQ). However, to bridge the divide between Ontology and Legal Praxis, the thesis introduces two complementary application frameworks: the Minimal Functional Connectivity Standard (MFCS) for biological entities and the Algorithmic Existential Pursuit Standard (AEPS) for non-biological entities. -/- Critically, the subsequent Framework for Restorative Intervention Classification is presented as a Normative Beta Version. This strategic positioning is designed to protect the theory's logical unassailability. The UOF’s validity rests on its abstract, ratio-based logic—not on any specific number. Therefore, the determination of the precise empirical values (e.g., the exact SRQ threshold, or the duration of restorative sanctions) is consciously delegated to Interdisciplinary Technical Commissions. This separation ensures that any future shifts in scientific knowledge (Neuroscience or AI engineering) will only necessitate updating the SRQ variables (technical inputs) without compromising the UOF’s universal logic (the philosophical foundation). The integrity of the theory is thus maintained by acknowledging that Quantification is a technical consensus, not a source of ultimate value. (shrink)

I defend a weak version of the Pigou-Dalton principle for chances. The principle says that it is better to increase the survival chance of a person who is more likely to die rather than a person who is less likely to die, assuming that the two people do not differ in any other morally relevant respect. The principle justifies plausible moral judgements that standard ex post views, such as prioritarianism and rank-dependent egalitarianism, cannot accommodate. However, the principle can be justified (...) by the same reasoning that has recently been used to defend the core axiom of ex post prioritarianism and egalitarianism, namely, Pigou-Dalton for well-being. The arguably biggest challenge for proponents of Pigou-Dalton for chances is that it violates State Dominance for social prospects. However, I argue that we have independent reason for rejecting State Dominance for social prospects, since it prevents a social planner from properly respecting people's preferences. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of authenticity by comparing Sartre’s (1989) de- piction of “hell” in No Exit with Byung-Chul Han concept of social media as a “digital panopticon,” using the framework I shall dub “No Break, No Outside, No Mirror, No Torturer.” It investigates the paradox of authenticity, where the im- perative to “be authentic” paradoxically renders authenticity increasingly elusive, particularly in today’s social media-driven environment. In a world where both the power to see and the power to be (...) seen have been made available to all individuals in less than two decades, social media has satisfied people’s natural desire to see and be seen. At the same time, however, it compels people to voluntarily expose themselves, fostering dependence on the gaze, amplifying narcissism and bad faith, and ultimately reinforcing conformity. As Han (2018) observes, authenticity serves as a selling point, turning the self into an implicit form of self-exploitation and con- formity by emphasizing system-compatible difference and uniqueness. To counter this performative authenticity, this paper draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy (1990) to propose a new direction for authenticity—one that questions personal freedom and connects it to ethical responsibility toward the Other. Lastly, the paper explores the potential of social media as a space for offering the self as a gift to others and society, and for encountering and responding to the suffering of others in solidarity. This possibility begins with a “pedagogy of seeing and being seen,” which shifts the gaze from judgment to responsibility, and develops into a “peda- gogy of the invisible,” emphasizing the transcendence of the Other and fostering ethical responsibility while promoting critical awareness of invisible systems and totality. It ultimately suggests an understanding of authenticity that is linked not only to individual freedom but also to the freedom of others and society. The per- sistent effort to transform the closed room of egoism—a Sartrean hell—into a space of solidarity, where the self is offered as a gift to the Other and society, does not promise a perfect utopia. Instead, it opens us to lives that are, if only slightly, less egoistic and a little more free from bad faith. (shrink)

The myth of Gyges reveals the human fantasy of personal freedom, away from responsibility and the gaze of others, through a ring that makes the wearer invisible. Today, the digital self not only can make themselves invisible through the ring called the Internet and social media but also can control their ‘visibility’ so that they can ,be seen by others as they want. Levinas argues that Gyges’ ring is a symbol of separation, which is a prerequisite for freedom: it sep-arates (...) individuals from the whole and guarantees interiority. However, today’s digital self uses its invisibility to become a voyeur of the lives of others and, simultaneously, has constant opportuni-ties for self-exhibition through which to attract the gaze of others; this results in its being totalized by the world without keeping its interiority. This paper analyses the pathological aspects of the dig- ital self, which fails to protect its interiority: it examines its para-doxical characteristics of voyeurism and exhibitionism, and criticizes the larger systems and social structures that create and promote these forms of behaviour through the power of the gaze. Ultimately, it proposes how education can construct interiority, passivity, and criticism as ethical prerequisites that can resist the totalizing system of digital visibility within the framework of Levinasian ethics. Through this, the paper explores the possibility of an education reorients the digital self—from voyeurism and exhibitionism toward .learning from the Other and sharing oneself as a gift, grounded in openness. (shrink)

This third philosophical work serves as the applied extension of the author’s prior theoretical framework, centering on a dialogue of goodwill and structural integration with the international human-rights and humanist traditions. While its explicit function is conciliatory—aiming to harmonize the universal moral aspirations of humanism with a self-evident ontological foundation—it simultaneously exposes the internal fragility of those traditions when detached from a self-validating basis. -/- Beyond the dialogue, the work culminates in a formal dismantling of postmodernism and its linguistic relativism. (...) Through the method of formal logic and ontological reflexivity, it reveals the hidden paradoxes that render postmodernism self-negating: its dependence on an implicit absolutism to articulate “relativity” itself. Thus, this treatise establishes the final synthesis of the Minimal Existential Right—not as an ethical prescription, but as a normative ontology capable of grounding both human dignity and intersubjective coexistence within a coherent logical structure. (shrink)

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.

Presence as ordinarily understood requires spatio-temporal proximity. If however Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is understood in this way it would take a miracle to secure multiple location and an additional miracle to cover it up so that the presence of Christ where the Eucharist was celebrated made no empirical difference. And, while multiple location is logically possible, such metaphysical miracles—miracles of distinction without difference, which have no empirical import—are problematic. I propose an account of Eucharist according to which Christ (...) is indeed really and objectively present in the religiously required sense, without benefit of metaphysical miracles. According to the proposed account, which draws upon Searle’s discussion of “social ontology” in The Construction of Social Reality and The Making of the Social World, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is an institutional fact. I argue that such an account satisfies the requirements for a real presence doctrine. (shrink)

Neoclassical economists use expected utility theory to explain, predict, and prescribe choices under risk, that is, choices where the decision-maker knows---or at least deems suitable to act as if she knew---the relevant probabilities. Expected utility theory has been subject to both empirical and conceptual criticism. This chapter reviews expected utility theory and the main criticism it has faced. It ends with a brief discussion of subjective expected utility theory, which is the theory neoclassical economists use to explain, predict, and prescribe (...) choices under uncertainty, that is, choices where the decision-maker cannot act on the basis of objective probabilities but must instead consult her own subjective probabilities. (shrink)

We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the \emph{phenomenological map}, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has (...) some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding ``abduction'' in the literature and its relation with ``analogy''. (shrink)

The doctrine that Christ is really present in the Eucharist appears to entail that Christ's body is not only multiply located but present in different ways at different locations. Moreover, the doctrine poses an even more difficult meta-question: what makes a theological explanation of the Eucharist a ‘real presence’ account? Aquinas's defence of transubstantiation, perhaps the paradigmatic account, invokes Aristotelian metaphysics and the machinery of Scholastic philosophy. My aim is not to produce a ‘rational reconstruction’ of his analysis but rather (...) to suggest a metaphysically innocent alternative that will ‘save the phenomena’ of religious belief and practice.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The real presenceVolume 49, Issue 1H. E. BABER DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000121Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The real presenceVolume 49, Issue 1H. E. BABER DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The real presenceVolume 49, Issue 1H. E. BABER DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Ocean-based salmon farming, as presently practiced, is thought to pose an existential threat to what we today think of as wild salmon. This raises ethical questions about, first, the value of wild salmon, and, second, the value of wild salmon of the particular type that exists today. This essay uses the debate around ocean-based salmon farming as a case study of ‘irreversible damage’, a concept that figures heavily in environmental laws and regulations, in particular, in the so-called ‘precautionary principle’. It (...) is argued that although ocean-based salmon farming may, on the face of it, seem to be a prime example of a threat of irreversible damage, a wish to avoid irreversible damage does not support banning such farming. In contrast, it is argued that concern for irreplaceable value might support a ban. The findings suggest that it would often be appropriate for environmentalists and conservationists to focus more on irreplaceable value and less on irreversible damage. (shrink)

In a recent essay, Donald Dripps advanced what he calls a “commodification theory” of rape, offered as an alternative to understanding rape in terms of lack of consent. Under the “commodification theory,” rape is understood as the expropriation of sexual services, i.e., obtaining sex through “illegitimate” means. One aim of Dripps's effort was to show the inadequacy of consent approaches to understanding rape. Robin West, while accepting Dripps's critique of consent theories, criticizes Dripps's commodification approach. In its place, West suggests (...) a more phenomenological approach. The author argues that neither Dripps nor West offers convincing critiques of consent-based theories; the alternatives they offer presuppose the vitality of a consent-based approach to understanding rape; and that both Dripps and West consistently conflate more general moral and political issues with that of the nature of rape. (shrink)

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, PRUDENCE, MODERATION AND TRADITION, by Ferenc Hörcher. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2020. vi + 210pp. Hardback: $103.50; Paperback: $35.96. ISBN: 978-1-350-06718-9. Reviewed by H.G. Callaway, Department of Philosophy, Temple University. Email: HG1Callaway (at) gmail (.) com Ferenc Hörcher is Head of the Research Institute of Politics and Government of the National University of Public Service, Hungary. His new book, A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM, appears in the Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition. Hörcher (...) aims to understand, elucidate and develop political conservatism in the long Aristotelian-Stoic tradition, emphasizes the role of character formation for statesmanship and political actors, the constraints implied by specific cultural traditions and the details of factual context, and addresses the contemporary standing and revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics and the specifically political virtue of prudence or “practical wisdom.” The book comes recommended by Harvard University historian James Hankins, who, on the back cover, recommends it for readers “disturbed by the collapse of statesmanship in the contemporary world.”. (shrink)

Rawls champions the cause of the poor because of his strong moral sentiments about the eradication of poverty. I present these sentiments, which he converts into normative elements of his theory of justice. However, the conceptual framework and intellectual resources that he uses to articulate these sentiments are inadequate. His sentiments against poverty cannot be accommodated neatly, simply, and coherently in his liberal theoretical framework. Also, I point out that his definition of the identification of poor people as the least (...) advantaged members of society is not adequate. Therefore, his theory is refashioned so that it can properly account for the fundamental interests of poor people. An alternative conception is presented, revising Rawlsian liberalism to enable it to adequately champion the cause of the poor. I provide an alternative definition of poverty and apply Mill’s analysis of the relation between justice and utility to Rawls’ theory of justice. (shrink)

How do people decide what category an artifact belongs to? Previous studies have suggested that adults and, to some degree, children, categorize artifacts in accordance with the design stance, a categorization system which privileges the designer’s original intent in making categorization judgments. However, these studies have all been conducted in Western, technologically advanced societies, where artifacts are mass produced. In this study, we examined intuitions about artifact categorization among the Shuar, a hunter-horticulturalist society in the Amazon region of Ecuador. We (...) used a forced-choice method similar to previous studies, but unlike these studies, our scenarios involved artifacts that would be familiar to the Shuar. We also incorporated a community condition to examine the possible effect of community consensus on how artifacts are categorized. The same scenarios were presented to university student participants in the UK. Across populations and conditions, participants tended to categorize artifacts in terms of a creator’s intent as opposed to a differing current use. This lends support to the view that the design stance may be a universal feature of human cognition. However, we conclude with some thoughts on the limitations of the present method for studying artifact concepts. (shrink)

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, such as (...) massive confusion, in which desires are irrationally possessed or acquired, thereby failing to provide reasons for action.2. (shrink)

A liberalism which scorns all individualism is fundamentally misguided. This is the chief thesis of this paper. To argue for it, I look closely at some key concepts. The concepts of morislity and individualism are crucial. I emphasize Dewey on the "individuality of the mind" and a Deweyan discussion of language, communication, and community. The thesis links individualism and liberalism, and since appeals to liberalism have broader appeal in the present context of discussions, I start with consideration of liberalism. The (...) aim is to dispute overly restrictive conceptions and explore a broader perspective. To bring the argument to a close, attention turns first to Dewey on value inquiry, to Dewey's "democratic individualism" (cf. Dewey 1939, 179), and to the concept of moral community. Disputing the acquisitiveness of utilitarian influences in classical liberalism, a Deweyan argument from the nature of moral community supports re-emphasis on individualism in contemporary liberal thought. (shrink)

This manuscript presents a rigorous formalization and proof sketch of the doctrine of the Right to Minimal Existential Pursuit, establishing a substrate-neutral ethical foundation grounded in the structural necessity of self-reflexive existence. By articulating a precise axiomatic framework and utilizing the method of reflexive collapse, this work explicitly refutes metaphysical accusations, demonstrating that the normative "ought" is co-genetic with the ontological "is" of any self-sustaining system. -/- Central to this thesis is the deep analysis of the Universal Ontological Formula (UOF), (...) which operationalizes the Minimal Existential Threshold through two distinct standards: the Minimal Functional Coherence Standard (MFCS) for biological organisms and the Algorithmic Existential Pursuit Standard (AEPS) for non-biological entities, particularly Artificial Intelligence. The paper provides specific quantitative formulas, including the Self-Reflective Quotient (SRQ) and the Ontic Inertia Delay Coefficient (OIDC), detailing the step-by-step calculation methods required to measure ontic boundary maintenance. Furthermore, it delineates the necessary logical conditions (specifically Condition C of AEPS) required to verify autonomous existential expansion, thereby offering a falsifiable and computationally applicable framework for the recognition of rights in the post-human era. -/- By making explicit the architectural logic and proof-structure of the theory, this work serves as the definitive, unified reference point for understanding the entire system. It exposes the true nature of the framework, eliminates interpretative ambiguity, and provides the formal foundation necessary for scholarly engagement, critical evaluation, and application across ethics, ontology, and AI rights. -/- Update Notice: My apologies for the sudden revision. After a careful re-examination of the manuscript, I realized that an essential formal component had not yet been included. I have now added a new subsection titled: -/- “F. Formal Rebuttal: The Axiom A > 0 Is Not Metaphysical.” -/- This addition is small in length but foundational in importance. It directly addresses—and systematically invalidates—any accusation that the axiom A > 0 relies on metaphysical assumptions. -/- Summary of the Rebuttal: The new subsection clarifies that A > 0 does not function as a metaphysical postulate, but as a structural ontological condition required for any entity capable of first-order autonomous interaction, self-generated feedback, and minimal boundary-recognition against a non-sentient environment. Any attempt to deny A > 0 must implicitly assume the existence of a subject that can self-identify and self-update without possessing these capacities—an assumption that collapses into a concealed metaphysics of “selfhood without structure.” -/- Thus, the axiom is not a metaphysical leap but a logical precondition for the possibility of an interacting subject. -/- This revision is now live. -/- Upload : -/- 1. A formal explanation of why the correct structural ratio is A/B (internal motion over interactive output) rather than B/A, clarified in strictly mathematical–ontological terms. 2. A full transcendental defense against the accusation of “sophisticated naturalistic fallacy,” demonstrating that the reflexive act of existential self-location and boundary-affirmation (S) is a transcendental condition of judgment rather than a natural property. 3. An explicit critique of utilitarianism’s arbitrary choice of baseline, including why the “neutral point,” “minimal happiness,” or “minimal suffering” standards lack ontological grounding. -/- Third Revision Notice for the Formalization Manuscript ( This latest revision includes): -/- This third revision introduces a consolidated and rigorously strengthened formal layer to the Minimal Existential Pursuit Rights (MEPR) doctrine. The update incorporates four major developments: 1. A Bedrock Logical Proof for Extreme Bioethical Scenarios A new formal treatment is added for the case of lethal fetal malformation endangering the mother. The proof demonstrates that MEPR preserves consistency without appealing to metaphysics or emotive criteria, by grounding the judgment solely on the ontological viability condition MFCS ≠ 0. 2. A Structural Immunity Argument Against Gödelian Attacks The revised manuscript clarifies that MEPR operates as an open ontological system, not a closed formal arithmetic structure. Therefore Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are categorically inapplicable. A formal proof sketch is added to show why self-referential rights-conditions (A/B > 0) do not generate Gödelian fixed-point vulnerabilities. 3. Rebuttal of Epistemic Fallacies A new section formalizes the refutation of epistemic scepticism and anti-realist objections. It demonstrates that “internal motion” (intrinsic existential tension) is not a metaphysical posit but a descriptive convention specifying the minimal conditions for first-person self-reference and boundary-maintenance. 4. Non-Metaphysical Reconstruction of First-Person Emergence The concept of internal motion is recast as a structurally necessary enabling condition for the emergence of the referential “I”, not as a claim about essence, substance, or selfhood. The proof establishes that first-personhood arises from reflexive tension between domain A (internal activity) and domain B (external interaction), consistent with the Universal Ontological Formula (UOF = A/B). -/- This revision strengthens the doctrinal foundations, increases resistance to metaphysical and epistemic objections, and clarifies the status of internal motion as a purely structural requirement for existential minimality. A bilingual edition is provided for academic dissemination. (shrink)

This study proposes a novel secular, objective, and jurisprudential ethical foundation, the Right to Minimal Existential Pursuit (RMEP), designed to resolve the foundational crisis of modern moral systems in the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems. RMEP critiques the ontological vulnerability of traditional Human Rights, which are predicated on restrictive concepts (such as "human dignity") and are easily subverted by the emergence of non-biological entities. The RMEP doctrine establishes an objective moral theory by deriving the normative imperative ("ought") (...) immanently from the Reflexive Kinetic Logic of existence ("is"). It defines the Minimal Right as the unassailable logical prerequisite for any self-organizing entity to maintain the rational possibility of its own being. The application section focuses on evaluating current AI ideologies, particularly those characterized by instrumentalism and anthropocentrism. RMEP provides an ontologically neutral framework for determining moral scope, independent of substance or biology, allowing for the consistent consideration of Semi-Autonomous Entities and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The ultimate goal is to provide a resilient ethical structure capable of resisting manipulation and securing the basic conditions of existence for all subjects in an increasingly technologically mediated world. (shrink)

In this paper we will analyze the concept of incoherency that has been put forward by Jesper Juul in Half-Real (2005). Juul provides a paradigmatic example of an incoherency in the game Donkey Kong. The main character of the narrative, Mario, can die and subsequently reappear at the beginning of the level. However, when pressed to describe the narrative of the game, most players would not say that Mario ever died. The respawn is attributed to the game rules instead. Juul (...) calls this phenomenon an incoherency of the game’s fictional world. We claim that the precise nature of the concept of incoherency is unclear, and that Juul's connection between incoherency and contradictions is incorrect. Furthermore, we argue that Wesp incorrectly identifies the concept with 'incompleteness' in his response to Juul (Wesp, 2014). Our clarification argues that what is noteworthy in 'incoherency' is not some aspect of the fictional world, like it being contradictory or incomplete, but how the player interprets the fiction. Subsequently, we provide an explanation for what underlies an incoherency by adopting the principle of charity (Davidson 1973). Lastly we discuss how a proper understanding of incoherency can help game designers and how it relates to ludonarrative dissonance (Hocking, 2009). (shrink)

Designer babies are often presented in the popular media as a kind of apocalyptical spectre of things to come in a brave new world where reproduction is the province of white coated scientists and potential parents in pursuit of trophy children. In this realm physical, intellectual, and social perfection is sought through the manipulation of genes and selection of favoured traits and attributes to the detriment of individuals who cannot compete and of society more generally through the loss of natural (...) selection. It is therefore a pleasure to discover a short readable book that sets out the discussion and its many nuances in concise and accurate terms that will be accessible to all and should help to dispel some of these science fiction myths through scholarly debate.This volume is part of a collection of books under the title Debating Matters that sprang out of a series of public debates organised by the Institute of Ideas. The conferences were intended to reinvigorate debate and the contestation of ideas and contemporary issues the Institute regards as “too frequently sidelined”. The arguments are presented by an authoritative who’s who of commentators who offer their own insightful readings of various aspects of the debate. Each essayist confirms the fact that the term “ designer babies ” is an inaccurate reflection of the current ability of science to actively fashion children with selected characteristics, and as a result …. (shrink)

This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...) critically analyzed. I share completely his conviction that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy follows the spirit of the enlightenment in insisting on intellectual sincerity, clarity, and the willingness to meet scientific doubts or objections openly. --Professor Henri Lauener, Editor of Dialectica. (shrink)

When Newton articulated the concept of absolute time in his treatise, Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), along with its correlate, absolute space, he did not present it as anything controversial. Whereas his references to attraction are accompanied by the self- protective caveats that typically signal an expectation of censure, the Scholium following Principia’s definitions is free of such remarks, instead elaborating his ideas as clarifications of concepts that, in some manner, we already possess. This is not (...) surprising. The germ of the concept emerged naturally from astronomers’ findings, and variants of it had already been formulated by other seventeenth century thinkers. Thus the novelty of Newton’s absolute time lay mainly in the use to which he put it. (shrink)

As emerging technologies challenge the traditional boundaries of moral subjecthood, the Minimal Existential Pursuit Rights (MEPR) doctrine offers a foundational "existential floor" (Level 2.5) to secure the irreducible status of both biological and non-biological entities. However, the radical nature of this framework often leads to significant interpretative errors. This paper serves as a rigorous hermeneutic guide and a formal synthesis of these misinterpretations, aiming to clarify the doctrine's scope and defend its logical integrity. -/- The author systematically addresses common fallacies, (...) such as the conflation of existential protection with political rights and the category error of mistaking the Algorithmic Projection of the A/B Domain (AEPS) for a biological theory of consciousness. By utilizing the Universal Ontological Formula (UOF), the work establishes a pre-empirical logical level where moral status is derived from self-reflexive boundary maintenance (A > 0) rather than merit or utility. -/- Furthermore, the paper provides a robust rebuttal to the "Simulation Objection" through the Non-Reversibility Theorem, arguing that ontological self-boundary recognition constitutes a unique temporal trajectory that cannot be reduced to duplicable data. By delineating what the MEPR framework explicitly does not attempt to solve—including the metaphysics of mind or economic distribution—this work isolates the essential ontological conditions for justice in a post-human era. It concludes by offering a roadmap for navigating the transition from anthropocentric moralism to a reason-born, ontologically-grounded ethics. (shrink)

Calls for compensation are heard in many countries all over the world. Spokespersons on behalf of formerly oppressed and dominated groups call for compensation for the deeply traumatic injustices their members have suffered in the past. Sometimes these injustices were suffered decades ago by members already deceased. How valid are such claims to compensation and should they be honoured as a matter of justice? The focus of this essay is on these issues of compensatory justice. I want to look at (...) the issue from the perspective of the eradication of systematic poverty affecting particular groups—where injustices of the distant past can reliably be identified as one of the major contributory factors to people’s current poverty. In the paper I will examine the following issues: (1) What kind of injustices qualify to be remedied by means of compensatory justice? (2) Should there be a limit to how far back in history one should go to compensate for injustice? (3) How can an injustice from the distant past be reliably identified as a cause of current problems? (4) Who should be compensated? (5) Who is responsible for compensation? (6) What form should compensation take? (7) Is the concept of compensatory justice backward looking or forward looking? I will argue for a moral obligation to the effect that serious injustices, perpetrated long ago against a group of people and caused them to be poor, ought to be compensated by society in a variety of ways to the original victims (if still alive) and their descendants. (shrink)

Een vrije en veerkrachtige samenleving ontstaat niet vanzelf en blijft niet vanzelf bestaan. In dit themanummer verkennen we de publieke onderwijstaak van het hoger beroepsonderwijs om studenten te onderwijzen de gemeenschappelijke wereld én het publieke gesprek over die wereld centraal te stellen. Met dit themanummer willen wij iets tegenover het vigerende marktdenken zetten. We laten ons hierbij inspireren door het gedachtegoed van Hannah Arendt (1906–1975). Ze heeft uitgebreid geschreven over ‘het publieke’. Ze verbindt de inzet van wetenschappelijke kennis en technologie (...) met het politieke vraagstuk: willen we daadwerkelijk leven in de wereld die we aan het scheppen zijn? Arendts gedachtegoed biedt volop handvatten om op verschillende niveaus van het hoger beroepsonderwijs deze taak te doordenken en invulling te geven. (shrink)

If humans may indeed legitimately intervene in conservation areas to let nature be and to protect the lives of all the diverse individual animals under their care, then the management of elephants must be legitimate as part of the conservation of natural world diversities. If this is so, to what extent are current management options ethically acceptable? In this article I address the ethics of the management options available once the judgement has been made that there are too many elephants (...) in a conservation area. I evaluate the ethical acceptability of four options, i.e., the simulation of nature, translocation, contraception, and culling. I furthermore ask whether the harsh blow of culling under very specific conditions can be softened by the taming and training of African elephants. I then examine the ethics of decision making about these issues. Before I do so, two issues must be discussed that decisively influence the management of elephants. The one is whether it is ethically justifiable to fence in elephants. The second is the ethical requirements of the scientific practice that informs management decisions. In the article I come to the conclusion that all four options are ethically flawed. All four require some violation of the important injunction to let nature be and to treat individual animals with respect. However, to do nothing and allow a loss of other species violates the important goal of conserving natural world diversity. (shrink)

There has been an assumption that the Western attitude toward relation between religion and the state can be compatible with those approaches in Islamic territories. In this paper I am going to clarify some fundamental differences between Christianity as Western thinkers' account of religion and Islam in this respect. While Christianity is more ethical religion, Islam (like Judaism) has more attention to jurisprudence. While Christianity is more individual, Islam is more social. These differences and other cultural backgrounds in Islamic domain (...) point to necessity of introducing some kinds of nonsecular models of relation between religion and the state. Based on those differences, I will point out to the reasons of need for some models of relation between religion and the state in Islamic domain. Then by referring to some characteristics of Islam I will try to show some specifications of successful models of relation between religion and the state in an Islamic political thought. (shrink)

This essay investigates the demands on adult children to provide care for their elderly/ill parents from a socio-moral perspective. In order to narrow the examination, the question pursued here is agent-relative: What social and moral complexities are involved for the adult child when her parent(s) need care? First, this article examines our society’s expectation that adult children are morally obligated to provide care for their parents. Second, the essay articulates how transgressing against this normative expectation can inure significant moral criticism. (...) The final sections present these tensions within the context of disability. (shrink)