Judgment, Trust, and Common Sense is a full-length philosophical work by Jacob S. Oliver, Ph.D., developed over nearly a decade to clarify how judgment works—how it forms, how it fails, and why it matters. Drawing on literature, political theory, and cultural history, the book recovers common sense not as cliché or consensus, but as a shared capacity for reasoning in public. It argues that trust is not given—it’s built through demonstrable judgment, and that a functioning civic life depends (...) on the maintenance of that trust across time. This public release makes the complete manuscript permanently available, not as a product for sale but as a node in the commons: a durable, indexed reference point for those working to restore coherence in a disoriented age. (shrink)

For a number of gay critics, one of Call Me by Your Name's most troubling features was its purportedly explicit depiction of sex between men and women, and its alleged concealment of sex between men. For D. A. Miller among others, this phenomenon is symptomatic of a closeting of homosex and an appeal to the sensibilities of a heterosexual audience. These critics, however, miss the bisexual character of the film's engagement with Elio and Oliver's desires, which cannot be discerned (...) by the monosexual hermeneutic to which they are wedded. We can also observe these critics' valuing of anal sex as queer sex par excellence, and their critical frustration around polysemous significations. I conclude that such approaches limit queer film studies' scope, and that attention to queer yet nongay cinematic spaces — like those of Call Me by Your Name — widen the scope of what queer film might be. (shrink)

Seeing with Ears, Hearing with Eyes. How Technology Molds Synesthesia Within Us -/- The subject of consideration within this lecture is the contribution of existing scientific discoveries on the visual and musical connection within the perceptual plane. Points of reference are the studies of Amir Amedi, Jacob Jolij and Maaieke Meurs, Harry McGurk, as well as, the works of Iwona Sowińska, Roger Scruton, Oliver Sacks, and a cultural analysis of Joshua Bell’s performance. I will also consider how the (...) senses effect each other, pursuing the diversified reception of vision, which consists of the sense of hearing [sic!], on which I would like to focus attention. -/- Paper structure:  Introduction to key concepts in the fields of research and development,  The visual outlook on hearing,  The aural perspective on vision,  Relationships to related sciences,  Summary of multimedia examples,  An attempt to extend the “techno-view” to the auditory senses within synesthesia. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.16269768. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents Reflective Epistemology, a metatheoretical model that offers a fundamental reorientation for knowledge acquisition. Based on an analysis of fundamental mental structures and their semantic dimensions, a formal framework for integrating subjective and objective aspects of cognition is developed. The (...) model identifies fundamental epistemological categories—such as entity relations and modal qualities—as elements of a ``Proto-Grammar of the Mind.'' Through the introduction of multidimensional epistemic assessment criteria (consistency, truth of premises, belief, degree of recognition), a typology of epistemic biases is derived. The core thesis states that robust knowledge results from the conscious reflection and integration of subjective factors, whereby ``True Objectivity'' is redefined as an intersubjectively validated, coherent, and bias-reflected subjective understanding. The paper concludes with implications for scientific methodology, education, and personal epistemic practice. (shrink)

This paper reviews the hole argument as an argument against spacetime substantivalism. After a careful presentation of the argument itself, I critically review possible responses.

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.16276131. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents a novel approach to the foundation of ethical systems, based on the concept of Ontological Symmetry Breaking. Starting from the observation that a fundamental asymmetry arises in the transition from an objective reality to the subjective experience of reality, (...) a formal framework is developed that derives the emergence of fundamental ethical stances directly from the structure of this asymmetry. Through the analysis of varying degrees of I-Thou-It projection, a typology of fundamental ethical stances is created, ranging from solipsistic to deeply empathic worldviews. In contrast to existing ethical theories, which are often based on external normative assumptions, this approach offers a derivation of ethical systems from the intrinsic structure of subjective experience itself. The theory is supported by references to empirical findings from moral psychology and comparative ethics. Furthermore, an extended notational system is developed that captures differentiated projection intensities (dominant vs. suppressed) and is applied to various social constellations---from hierarchical social structures and group conflicts to personal relationships. These application perspectives demonstrate the potential of the approach to integrate and reinterpret existing theories from power research, conflict theory, and relationship psychology. The work thus opens up new perspectives for understanding ethical and social dynamics at both individual and societal levels. (shrink)

We make some remarks on the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument, in response to a recent article in this journal by Weatherall ([2018]). Broadly speaking, we defend the mainstream philosophical literature from the claim that correct usage of the mathematics of general relativity `blocks' the argument.

Ontologies, as the term is used in informatics, are structured vocabularies comprised of human- and computer-interpretable terms and relations that represent entities and relationships. Within informatics fields, ontologies play an important role in knowledge and data standardization, representation, integra- tion, sharing and analysis. They have also become a foundation of artificial intelligence (AI) research. In what follows, we outline the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO), which covers multiple areas in the domain of coronavirus diseases, including etiology, transmission, epidemiology, pathogenesis, diagnosis, (...) prevention, and treatment. We emphasize CIDO development relevant to COVID-19. (shrink)

Empirical philosophers of science aim to base their philosophical theories on observations of scientific practice. But since there is far too much science to observe it all, how can we form and test hypotheses about science that are sufficiently rigorous and broad in scope, while avoiding the pitfalls of bias and subjectivity in our methods? Part of the answer, we claim, lies in the computational tools of the digital humanities, which allow us to analyze large volumes of scientific literature. Here (...) we advocate for the use of these methods by addressing a number of large-scale, justificatory concerns—specifically, about the epistemic value of journal articles as evidence for what happens elsewhere in science, and about the ability of DH tools to extract this evidence. Far from ignoring the gap between scientific literature and the rest of scientific practice, effective use of DH tools requires critical reflection about these relationships. (shrink)

Binding specificity is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept’s role in drug design, where it is highly prized and hence directly studied. From a causal perspective, understanding why binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of causal selection—of how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes from (...) noncauses. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their value as experimental interventions on biological processes. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.16276211. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents the Epistemic Focus Shift as a fundamental mechanism of human reality construction that explains the persistent illusion of objectivity in science and everyday life. While empirical science since Descartes has attempted to eliminate subjective factors, it systematically overlooks the (...) constitutive role of the subject in generating its experienced reality. The mechanism identified here describes how consciousness shifts its focus from immediate, phenomenological perception to a secondary, interpretive level---the worldview or 'internal map'. This Epistemic Focus Shift towards an unconditional belief in one's own worldview is triggered by acts of belief and reinforced by emotions and identity needs. It leads to the subjectively constructed ``reality'' being mistakenly taken for objective ``actuality''. The paper expands on previous works on the structure of heuristic and reflective worldviews, on multidimensional epistemic qualities (C/T/B/R model), and on ontological symmetry breaking to form an integrated model of reality construction. It is shown how Reflective Empiricism can serve as a methodological path to overcoming this epistemic illusion---a process of the conscious refocusing of attention onto immediate experience, which leads to a more authentic understanding of the world. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an argument against one important version of panentheism, that is, mereological panentheism. Although panentheism has proven difficult to define, I provide a working definition of the view, and proceed to argue that given this way of thinking about the doctrine, mereological accounts of panentheism have serious theological drawbacks. I then explore some of these theological drawbacks. In a concluding section I give some reasons for thinking that the classical theistic alternative to panentheism is preferable, all (...) things considered. (shrink)

This chapter defends the claim that Spinoza had a theory of consciousness against Garber (2021). The claim that Spinoza’s idea of the idea is the form of the idea, not because it represents the formal reality of the lower-order idea (Bennett 1984), but rather because it refers to the way in which a subject’s mind takes a representation of some modification of her body as representing something external, is defended by a comparative close reading of E2p21s in the context of (...) Descartes’s definition of idea. This reading can account for the apparently different uses of the term ‘consciousness’ in Spinoza’s Ethics identified by LeBuffe (2010). Following Newlands (2020), it is argued that consciousness plays a constitutive role in Spinoza’s theory of the self. If Spinoza’s philosophy is a philosophy for humans, then it is a philosophy of consciousness rather than a philosophy of being. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on arXiv and can be found under the DOI 10.48550/arXiv.2504.12310. Please use the arXiv version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper introduces Reflective Empiricism, an extension of empirical science that incorporates subjective perception and consciousness processes as equally valid sources of knowledge. It views reality as an interplay of subjective experience and objective laws, comprehensible only through systematic introspection, bias reflection, (...) and premise-based logical-explorative modeling. This approach overcomes paradigmatic blindness arising from unreflected subjective filters in established paradigms, promoting an adaptable science. Innovations include a method for bias recognition, premise-based models grounded in observed phenomena to unlock new conceptual spaces, and Heureka moments---intuitive insights---as starting points for hypotheses, subsequently tested empirically. The author’s self-observation, such as analyzing belief formation, demonstrates its application and transformative power. Rooted in philosophical and scientific-historical references (e.g., Archimedes’ intuition, quantum observer effect), Reflective Empiricism connects physics, psychology, and philosophy, enhancing interdisciplinary synthesis and accelerating knowledge creation by leveraging anomalies and subjective depth. It does not seek to replace empirical research but to enrich it, enabling a more holistic understanding of complex phenomena like consciousness and advancing 21st-century science. (shrink)

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.15682919. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents a mathematically formalized model for describing and analyzing worldview dynamics, distinguishing between heuristic and reflective worldviews. It formalizes the psychological mechanisms of authority-based belief and cognitive dissonance, demonstrating how humans evaluate new information through the filter of their existing (...) worldview, with authority, social acceptance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance playing central roles. A key contribution is the mathematical operationalization of cognitive dissonance as a measurable quantity D, which emerges from the interplay between consonant and dissonant beliefs in relation to correlation C. By explicitly considering belief relationships, multidimensional evaluation systems, and consistency metrics, implicit heuristic thought processes are transformed into an explicit, traceable form. The paper also introduces the concept of reflective worldview refinement---a process that enables progression from an unreflective, inconsistent worldview to a more differentiated, consistent understanding. The work builds upon the method of reflective empiricism and extends it through a concrete model that makes unconscious distortion mechanisms and subjective filters visible. The model primarily serves for structural clarification rather than quantitative prediction, functioning as a conceptual bridge between subjective experience and scientific analysis. Beyond psychological and epistemological implications, applications in artificial intelligence are discussed, particularly the development of a reflective learning method for Large Language Models. The paper provides a valuable contribution to a deeper understanding of human cognitive processes and demonstrates how the supposed objectivity of science can be transcended through conscious reflection on one's own subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper uses a schema for infinite regress arguments to provide a solution to the problem of the infinite regress of justification. The solution turns on the falsity of two claims: that a belief is justified only if some belief is a reason for it, and that the reason relation is transitive.

The Seidel–Bostrom Event Horizon Bound (SBEB) establishes a physical upper limit on computational intervention within simulated universes. Any external simulator G that attempts to realize polynomial–time solutions to NP–complete problems inside a simulated universe U must inject an exponentially growing amount of energy into a finite causal region. Once the corresponding energy density exceeds the Schwarzschild threshold, a gravitational horizon forms, isolating or destroying the computation. This framework unites Landauer’s principle, relativistic causality, and Hawking evaporation into a single gravitational–computational limit. (...) The SEHB implies that simulation hypotheses are empirically unfalsifiable from within U, and that physical law itself prohibits computational omnipotence. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza's and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it does not need the assumption that I (...) misinterpret my otherwise correct ideas as the interpretation reading would have it. In the first section I will provide a brief overview of the notion of inherence and its role in Spinoza‟s discussion of the status of finite minds. Then by examining the relation between Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟ distinction of representations and attitudes, I show that affirmation can be identified with beliefs in Spinoza. Next, I will take a closer look at the identification of intellect and will and argue that Spinoza's identification of the two is based on the fact that Spinoza sees both as the active aspect of the mind. After that, I analyze Spinoza‟s comments on the different scopes of will and intellect, and argue that beliefs are affirmations of the imaginative content of the idea. Finally, through Spinoza‟s example of the utterance of mathematical error, I present my solution to the problem of inherence of false beliefs. (shrink)

Jacques Monod (1971) argued that certain molecular processes rely critically on the property of chemical arbitrariness, which he claimed allows those processes to “transcend the laws of chemistry”. It seems natural, as some philosophers have done, to interpret this in modal terms: a biological relationship is chemically arbitrary if it is possible, within the constraints of chemical “law”, for that relationship to have been otherwise than it is. But while modality is certainly important for understanding chemical arbitrariness, understanding its biological (...) role also requires an account of the concrete causal-functional features that distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary phenomena. In this paper I elaborate on this under-emphasised aspect by offering a general account of these features: arbitrary relations are instantiated by mechanisms that involve molecular adapters, which causally couple two properties or processes which would otherwise be uncorrelated. Additionally, adapters work by acting as intermediate rather than cooperating causes. (shrink)

This paper examines freedom and the determination of the will in §4 of Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in light of Aristotle’s concept of leading arts (architektonikē technē) from Metaphysics A.1–2. Traditionally, intellect determines truth, while will determines action—a distinction central to Aristotle’s differentiation between theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel, however, challenges this division, arguing that will is an extension of intelligence, integrating insight and goal-setting into a unified self-determination. By engaging with contemporary interpretations—Fulda, Pippin, and Pinkard—this paper explores (...) the tension between theory and practice. While Fulda defends philosophy’s indirect political relevance, Pippin argues it lacks practical justification. Pinkard links philosophy to institutional self-understanding, grounding practical reasoning in human biology. Reassessing Hegel’s implicit use of Aristotle’s leading arts, this paper argues that freedom of the will in §4 should be understood as intersubjective self-determination—not a mere choice among possibilities, but an identification with a politically and normatively determined highest practical ground. This reading reconciles theory and practice while emphasizing the institutional and social dimensions of self-determination. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate whether Spinoza theory of intellect can be considered as an Averroistic, Themistian or Alexandrian theory of intellect. I identify key doctrines of these theories that are argumentatively and theoretically independent from Aristotelian hylomorphism and thus can be accepted by someone rejecting hylomorphism. Next, I argue that the textual evidence is inconclusive: depending on the reading of Spinoza's philosophy accepted, Spinoza's theory of intellect can or cannot be considered as an Averroistic theory.

Spinoza’s account of memory has not received enough attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent literature has studied the “pancreas problem.” This paper argues that there is an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza’s account of memory can be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes’s account to show that Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation (...) of memories by holding that they are brain states without corresponding mental states, and that the mind is able to interpret perception either as new experience or as memory. Spinoza has none of these conceptual resources because of his substance monism. Spinoza accounts for memories as the mind’s ability to generate ideas according to the order of images. This ability consists in the connection of ideas, which is not an actual property, but only a dispositional one and thus not conscious. It is, however, grounded in the actual property of parts of the body, of which ideas are conscious. (shrink)

I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect (...) to propositional unity. (shrink)

The current form of the Seidel–Bostrom Event Horizon Bound (SBEB, Seidel 2025b; DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17505947) demonstrates that the physical realization of polynomial-time NP interventions inevitably leads, beyond a specific threshold, to the formation of an event horizon that causally isolates the computation. This paper derives a direct consequence for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Artificial Superintelligence (ASI): Even in distributed architectures, the coherence and synchronization required for global computation enforce an effective localization of energy within the causal diamond of the final (...) reduction. Once the Schwarzschild condition is satisfied, an event horizon forms and isolates the computation. Therefore, AGI/ASI systems are not indefinitely scalable; gravitation imposes a hard, system-specific upper limit on computational growth. We formulate the assumptions, sketch the derivation (local density condition, causal volumes, synchronization energy), and discuss implications for both real and simulated universes. (shrink)

In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...) that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a novel reading of Spinoza’s position in his exchange with Boyle about Boyle’s experiment with nitre. Boyle claimed to have shown through experiments that nitre ceased to be nitre after heating. Spinoza disagreed and proposed the alternative hypothesis that nitre has changed its state and not its nature. Spinoza’s position was construed in the literature as rational scepticism denying that experiments can yield knowledge of essences because all sensory experience is underdetermined and open to (...) multiple interpretations. I argue for an alternative reading of Spinoza’s position which focuses on Bacon’s notion of crucial instance. According to this reading, Spinoza did not deny the possibility of knowing by experimentation whether nitre has changed its nature, he asked for a crucial instance, i.e. an experiment that would refute the hypothesis that nitre has changed merely its state. Spinoza’s argumentative strategy shows that, contrary to the mainstream reading, the representational content of sensory ideas can be determined even if it does not represent the essence of the object: we can know with absolute, rather than merely moral, certainty whether nitre ceased to be nitre without knowing what nitre is. (shrink)

Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...) we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad’s work on temporal experience. -/- The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ‘Overlap’, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye’s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment (...) to the kind of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The immediate occasion for this special issue was Christia Mercer’s influential paper “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy”. In her paper, Mercer clearly demarcates two methodologies of the history of early modern philosophy. She argues that there has been a silent contextualist revolution in the past decades, and the reconstructivist methodology has been abandoned. One can easily get the impression that ‘reconstructivist’ has become a pejorative label that everyone outright rejects. Mercer’s examples of reconstructivist historians of philosophy are deceased (...) (P. F. Strawson, Margaret J. Osler, Richard Watson, and Bernard Williams), anonymous (the fans of philosopher* mentioned by Lisa Downing), or authors whose more recent work followed a contextualist methodology (Jonathan Bennett). The reconstructivist camp seems to have turned into a shadowy group, largely extinct by now, not unlike the Death Eaters in the fictional universe of Harry Potter. There are some figures who previously belonged to this group, but they have since reformed their ways – or so it seems. Sometimes it is rumoured that certain people may still have secret allegiance to it, but no one dares to fly its banner openly. We decided to create this special issue because we believe that reconstructivist methodology does not deserve this shadowy existence. (shrink)

I argue that notions of relative fundamentality need to be invoked if there is to be something substantive at stake in the debate between proponents of Harvey Brown's dynamical approach to relativity and defenders of a more traditional interpretation of spacetime. I will review some problems that stand in the way of the advocate of the dynamical approach making good on their claim that dynamical symmetries are more fundamental than spacetime symmetries.

Knowledge is a real process instantiated in time, matter, and energy. Real processes operate under resource constraints. Any epistemology that ignores these constraints is therefore structurally incomplete. This paper argues that the economic principle understood as allocation under scarity is not a domain-specific assumption imported from economics, but a foundational condition of any physically realized epistemic system. Once epistemic activity is treated as a cost-bearing process, ideals such as completeness, unlimited recursion, and maximal rationality are shown to be structurally incoherent (...) rather than merely impractical. The argument is strictly descriptive: scarcity is not invoked as a normative criterion, but as a constraint delimiting which epistemic norms can be meaningfully instantiated at all. The implications are illustrated for scientific inquiry as an institutional epistemic system and for artificial intelligence as a limit case of epistemic compression, where diminishing returns and instability expose the consequences of ignored epistemic budgets. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.

Lack of consent is valorized within popular culture to the point that sexual assault has become a spectator sport and creepshot entertainment on social media. Indeed, the valorization of nonconsensual sex has reached the extreme where sex with unconscious girls, especially accompanied by photographs as trophies, has become a goal of some boys and men.

In this paper, through a close reading of Spinoza's use of common notions I argue for the role of experiential and experimental knowledge in Spinoza's epistemology.

The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...) paper, after distinguishing various conceptions of a norm, of validity and of justification, argues for the following position. (I) is true. (II) is false for legislative justification and true for epistemic justification. (III) is true for legislative and false for epistemic justification. (IV) is true for legislative justification; for epistemic justification (IV) is true or false depending on the conception taken of a norm. Our intuition in favour of (II) must therefore be abandoned where justification is conceived legislatively. Our intuition in favour of (III) must be abandoned, and our intuition in favour of (IV) qualified, where justification is conceived epistemically. (shrink)

Large-scale generative models display characteristic structural failure modes whenever they are forced into excessive semantic, logical, or computational coherence. Contemporary Transformer-based architectures lack intrinsic mechanisms to manage conflict, undecidability, and paradox; instead, they tend to smooth or collapse contradictions away. This leads to brittle behaviour in tasks that require sustained global inconsistency, such as impossible Escher-like objects or high-context humour, and exposes deeper limitations for any claim of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Olympus-Q is a quantum-inspired, multi-stage reasoning architecture that treats (...) controlled incompleteness as a design principle rather than a defect. The system combines three core components: (i) a superpositional routing layer that maintains a distributed field of competing hypotheses, (ii) a semantic interference operator that detects and modulates regions of conflict and Gödel-style undecidability, and (iii) a toroidal cellular automaton meta-layer that implements thermodynamically motivated entropy regulation and stabilises the hypothesis space at the edge of collapse. Safety is embedded as an intrinsic attenuation process within the CA dynamics, rather than delegated to external post-hoc filters. The architecture is grounded in the Seidel–Bostrom Event Horizon Bound (SBEB), which establishes a gravitational upper limit on coherent information concentration, and in a system-theoretic framework of collapse principles for complex, self-organising systems. This paper develops the theoretical motivation, formal structure, and expected dynamical properties of Olympus-Q, and outlines how it can serve as a physically consistent blueprint for future AGI research, including potential hybrid classical–quantum implementations. (shrink)

In adversarial machine learning, attackers add carefully crafted perturbations to input, where the perturbations are almost imperceptible to humans, but can cause models to make wrong predictions. In this paper, we did comprehensive review of some of the most recent research, advancement and discoveries on adversarial attack, adversarial sampling generation, the potency or effectiveness of each of the existing attack methods, we also did comprehensive review on some of the most recent research, advancement and discoveries on adversarial defense strategies, the (...) effectiveness of each defense methods, and finally we did comparison on effectiveness and potency of different adversarial attack and defense methods. We came to conclusion that adversarial attack will mainly be blackbox for the foreseeable future since attacker has limited or no knowledge of gradient use for NN model, we also concluded that as dataset becomes more complex, so will be increase in demand for scalable adversarial defense strategy to mitigate or combat attack, and we strongly recommended that any neural network model with or without defense strategy should regularly be revisited, with the source code continuously updated at regular interval to check for any vulnerability against newer attack. (shrink)

This article argues that we can construct a complex interpretation of the nature of time by linking Aciman’s gnostic thread to aspects of twentieth century theory, from philosophy and psychoanalysis. In brief, it attempts to demonstrate the roles of dislocation, deferral, and Otherness in constituting human temporality. The essay begins by surmising the conceptual history of time, touching on key ideas put forward by Augustine and Bergson. The second section takes a psychoanalytic turn after exploring Homo Irrealis to describe the (...) significance of desire and fantasy. Thirdly, we develop a unique and temporal application of difference and deferral, building off of Deleuze and Derrida. The fourth section will consider how the psychoanalytic concept of the Other is inhered within time. We conclude that an Acimanic analysis of time is the means by which we can understand existence not as a series of moments, but a rich progression of dissimilitude and Otherness defined moreso by its lack of cohesion and directness of being than by a unified and self-identifying subject. (shrink)

On 25 December 1991 Alaa Hamed must for his literary work to the "Emergency Court for National Security" in Cairo. The judge read out the verdict: 2,300 egyptian pounds fine and eight years in prison for violating of state security and social peace. - A shock not only for egyptian intellectuals! The Arabic Department of BBC London placed the sentence in second place in the news, immediately after the notification of the resignation of Michail Gorbachev. Even in Germany the message (...) arrived in the media (FAZ, 30 December 1991). The egyptian journalist Jusif El Kaid spoke of the "most dangerous convicted of the 20 century" (Almussawar. No. 3508, 3 January 1992). The human rights organization of Egypt criticized the verdict as a violation of the right to freedom of expression and artistic innovation. It was the first time in modern history (after the 1952 revolution), that an author should because of his literary work in prison. (shrink)

Methodological critique of the sociological theory "spontaneous cooperation" to explain the revolution in Germany in 1989. This approach represented the german sociologists Dieter Opp and Detlef Pollack. The author reconstructs the two statements. Opp's approach is logically inconsistent. This approach is also unfit for scientific prediction, but Opp says the possibility of prediction is a necessary criterion for a scientific theory. Pollack's systemtheoretical approach ignores the really existing organized resistance of the subversive groups in Leipzig, for example the "Working group (...) for human rights" or the "Working group for Justice". Miracle or surprise chance are scientifically anacceptable models to explain a revolution. Both economically and politically offered the capitalist welfare state more for the workers than the socialism. So people noticed socialism as a system with more work for less prosperity and without civil rights, as a system of "exploitation by inefficiency" (Elsenhans). The author describes the revolution as a result of very effective collaboration between people, who willing to take risks and wanted to emigrate from the GDR to West, and the subversive groups, that could organize the revolutionary resistance. - This is a possible interpretation of the revolution from the interaction of transition-theory and voice-and-exit-theory (Hirschman). (shrink)

1. Kulturkomparatistik / 2. Physis als Gewissheit / 3. Kultur und Wertungskriterium / 4. Genealogie als Methode der Entbindung aus Tradition / 5. Genealogie der Ahnenkultur am Beispiel der Inuit / 6. Zwei Errungenschaften Europas: Liberaler Universalismus und individualistische Vernunftkritik / 7. Theorie der Notgemeinschaft und die Psychologie des Ressentiments zur Lösung von Isaiah Berlins "Paradoxon kollektiver Selbstbestimmung" / 8. Konflikt-Transformationen nach Albert O. Hirschman / 9. Der Wille zur Anthropodiversität übersteigt die Toleranz.

This paper argues that the structure of agency itself generates categorical moral norms. From the formal conditions of purposive action, it derives the Agency Preservation Principle (APP): agents must not act in ways that destroy the conditions that make valuation and choice possible. Coercion, on this view, is not merely evaluatively objectionable but conceptually incoherent, because it cancels the authorship through which action has meaning. The paper develops a praxeological form of constitutivism that grounds normativity in what it is to (...) act, rather than in intuition, psychology, or social convention. Unlike Kantian or Korsgaardian self-constitution views, this account derives obligation from the conditions of intelligibility of purposeful action itself, not from reflective endorsement. Moral norms are objective because they follow from agency’s structure, authoritative because no agent can coherently deny them while acting, and reciprocal because all agents share that structure. The argument resolves the shmagency objection, reframes the is–ought divide, and establishes non-coercion as the constitutive condition of moral intelligibility. (shrink)

Während in griechisch-römischer Antike Arbeit und Freiheit einander ausschlossen, gilt heute den Nicht-Wohlhabenden der Ausschluss aus der Erwerbsarbeit als Verlust von Selbstbestimmung. Funktion und Wert von Arbeit sind abhängig von der Machtstreuung vs. -konzentration der jeweiligen Gesellschaften. Nicht-kapitalistische Machtstrukturen erzwingen Arbeit durch materielle Not bzw. außerökonomisch zum Zwecke der Sozialdisziplinierung. Kapitalismus ist zum Siege gelangt, wo Arbeit knapp und daher teuer – für die Armen zum Modus der Teilhabe am Wohlstand – werden konnte. Zuerst erkannten Nietzsche und Lafargue, dass die (...) aus Not zur Tugend gelogene „Arbeitsmoral“ die Arbeitenden in ihrem Kampfe um die Preissteigerung für Arbeit nie mehr als hindern kann. -/- Seit Keynes ist die Funktionsweise des Kapitalismus bekannt: Vollbeschäftigung ist Bedingung der Möglichkeit, damit Arbeit im Konflikt mit dem Kapital zu Verhandlungsmacht gelangen kann. Die von Marxisten ersehnten Krisen des Kapitalismus sind durch staatliche Maßnahmen und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Umverteilung prinzipiell politisch regulierbar. Aber wer öffentlich der politökonomischen Aufklärung dient, befähigt auch deren Widersacher dazu, sich an ihr zu bilden, die Konter-Strategie entlang ihrer Erkenntnisse gegenläufig auszurichten. -/- Neoliberalismus lässt sich als politischer Anti-Liberalismus verstehen, offensiv gegen den Sozialstaat wie den gesamten Kulturbereich gerichtet, der mehr als nur boulevardeske Unterhaltung ist. Ob Schrumpfung des öffentlichen Dienstes, Privatisierung kollektiver Güter oder Steuersenkungen für Vermögende, letztlich geht es um die Steigerung ungleicher Verteilung finanzieller Verfügungsrechte. Dem korrespondiert die Zersetzung demokratischer Steuerung durch Entpolitisierung: Wenn es gelingt vermeintliche Sachzwänge politisch glaubwürdig zu inszenieren, erscheint gleichgültig, welche Regierung angeblich nichts mehr zu entscheiden hat, weil sie den Haushalt konsolidieren müsse etc. etc. Hohe Arbeitslosigkeit ist für den Erfolg neoliberaler Strategie entscheidend. Sie spaltet die abhängig Beschäftigten in realiter machtlose Arbeitslose (sie können nicht einmal streiken) und angesichts der Arbeitslosigkeit verängstigte Arbeitende (die sich aller Forderungen enthalten). Arbeit und Lohn bleiben Verteilungsprobleme. Die Zukunft bietet die Alternativen, hinter den bewussten kapitalistischen Fortschritt zurückzufallen oder auf dessen Grundlage das Otium der Edlen für alle zu erkämpfen. (shrink)

Einer der traditionell gegen den Utilitarismus erhobenen Vorwürfe besagt, Utilitarismus sei mit der Konzeption unveräußerlicher Individualrechte unvereinbar, er könne die Menschenrechte entweder nicht begründen oder schlösse deren Gebotensein schlicht aus. Der Berechtigung dieser Behauptung wird zuerst bei den klassischen Utilitaristen Jeremy Bentham und John Stuart Mill nachgegangen. Der Einwand von Bernhard Williams gegen den Utilitarismus, er würdige den Wert von Integrität der Persönlichkeit nicht, wird anhand seines von ihm selbst gebotenen Beispiels erwogen. Unter den nicht-klassischen Utilitarismen wird die Theorie von (...) Rainer W. Trapp auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit unveräußerlichen Rechten geprüft. Das Resümee ist uneindeutig: Nicht alle Utilitarismen schließen die Rechtsinhalte unveräußerlicher Individualrechte aus. Nicht alle der uns heute bekannten und als unveräußerlich postulierten Individualrechte lassen sich inhaltlich utilitaristisch begründen. Im Paralipomenon wird das Verhältnis der utilitaristischen Methode zu moralischen Intuitionen überdacht und ein weiterer Einwand Bernard Williams gegen den Utilitarismus geprüft: Ist der Utilitarismus konformistisch? Ein Plädoyer für einen freiheitlichen Utilitarismus in der Tradition Mills bildet den Abschluss. -/- 1. Klassischer Utilitarismus und unveräußerliche Individualrechte / 1.1. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832): Utilitarismus im Sicherheitsinteresse der Gemeinschaft / 1.2. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873): Utilitarismus der Freiheit als Lebenskunst der Individuen / 2. Zu Bernard Williams` Utilitarismus-Kritik: Integrität oder „Hier steh` ich und ich kann nicht anders!“ / 2.1. Das Jim-Pedro-Beispiel / 2.2. Negative Verantwortlichkeit: „Verhindere das größere Übel!“ / 3. Nicht-klassischer Utilitarismus und unveräusserliche Individualrechte / 3.1. Rainer W. Trapp: Gerechtigkeitsutilitarismus / 3.2. Utilitaristen und deontologische Rigoristen / 4. Resümee: Utilitarismus und unveräusserliche Individualrechte - 5. Paralipomenon: Plädoyer für Utilitarismus als Lebenskunst / 5.1. Ist der Utilitarismus konformistisch? / 5.2. Utilitarismus im Sinne John Stuart Mills als freiheitliche Lebenskunst, als „Art of Life“. (shrink)