According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal motivation. Two lines of response (...) to the problem are discussed, and difficulties facing those responses are raised. I close by issuing a challenge: to construe the principal motivation for BM in such a way so as to avoid the problem of paradox. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he (...) also proposes a novel aspect of what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics and general relativity provide incompatible descriptions of time. In QM, states evolve unitarily with respect to an external time parameter; in GR, time is a coordinate in a dynamical spacetime geometry. We propose that both quantum and relativistic time emerge from a pre-geometric structure we call Prototime (PT): represented by an orthomodular lattice of consistency relations with zero von Neumann entropy at the fundamental level. PT has no background time, space, or metric—only algebraic relations of compatibility and orthogonality. (...) We formalize PT using an orthomodular lattice Lequipped with a foliation functor F: I →Ctx(L) that maps orderedi ndices to Boolean sublattices (classical contexts). A spectral redundancy functional Φs measures coherence preservation across embeddings. We show that: 1. Stable foliations satisfying Piron-Solèr conditions admit Hilbert-space representa- tions, recovering standard QM with Schrödinger dynamics via Stone’s theorem; 2. The partial order on decoherence events across foliations, together with a natural volume measure, reconstructs Lorentzian spacetime structure; 3. Time—both quantum (parameter along unitary flows) and relativistic (causal or- der)—supervenes on Φs-monotone decoherence gradients. Critically, we provide a computationally tractable implementation of Φs using spectral graph theory on mutual information networks (Bailey and Schneider, forthcoming). Testing this on simulated multi-agent systems—including combinatorial threshold-linear networks (CTLNs) that model graph-constrained neural dynamics—we demonstrate that Φs exhibits characteristic signatures during basin formation, attractor convergence, and coherence-to-classicality transitions. These results provide the first quantitative bridge between abstract PT formalism and testable physical predictions. We identify concrete empirical tests via quantum biology (photosynthetic complexes), quantum decoherence exper- iments, and neural ensemble dynamics. We also resolve the Wheeler delayed-choice experiment within PT, where apparent retrocausality dissolves because decoherence times vary across system components, creating asymmetric basin formation that only appears backward-causal when projected onto classical time. PT thus provides a kine- matical unification of QM and GR with testable predictions, offering a pre-geometric foundation for both fundamental physics and, potentially, theories of consciousness grounded in informational irreducibility. -/- (This piece is the formalism for our “Superpsychism” piece for our forthcoming target paper at The Journal of Consciousness Studies and our paper on Spectral Phi. Comments are very welcome.). (shrink)

What if Hylas and Philonous had known about the BAL-looping functional framework for conscious perception? This dialogue explores how this new point of view could transform their respective standpoints. When the place of conscious perception in brain function is shifted from input to output, they are pleased to find that they can finally agree. The seemingly irreconcilable differences in the idealist and materialist views vanish once the two interlocutors are disabused of just one age-old mistaken impression, making them collaborators in (...) discovery, rather than staunch antagonists. (shrink)

This foreword provides an overview of the BAL-looping framework in terms that require no previous familiarity. By avoiding the more precise terms defined in the papers, it is accessible to new readers, giving them a rough idea of how the framework works. After discussing the nature of subjective experience and giving a non-technical outline of the framework, the foreword reiterates its central claim: “It is important enough to repeat: incipient activity in the language output channel, suppressed from reaching the brain’s (...) motor area (so it never produces actual speech), can still cause resonance in the language input channel. The brain learns to attend to that resonance, and this attention creates every mode of subjective experience.”. (shrink)

We develop an account of bullshit questions that draws on the literature on bullshit assertions. We distinguish bullshit questions from other sorts of anomalous questions. According to our account, bullshit questions are characterized chiefly by the indifference of the speaker to the truth of any answer she might receive. Instead, the bullshit questioner is up to something else, typically a non-interrogative illocutionary act such as introducing a presupposition, insinuating a derogatory sentiment, implying a proposition, making an accusation, or flirting. If (...) this is right, it naturally raises the normative question of whether and how bullshit questions are wrong and whether and how bullshit questioners are blameworthy and vicious. In the final section, we address these questions, arguing that bullshit questions are pro tanto wrong because they tend to thwart inquiry, manifest the vice of epistemic insouciance (which is a disregard for truth or inquiry), express disrespect for the epistemic agency of the interlocutor, introduce epistemic malaise, and lead to the opening of dangerous inquiries by gullible audiences. We then consider some cases in which the pro tanto wrongness of bullshit questioning is arguably overridden by competing reasons. (shrink)

Recent philosophical interest in interrogatives and inquiry has far outpaced attention to queries—the speech act of asking a question. In response, this paper develops a normative pragmatic account of queries within the Sellars–Brandom tradition. We offer the commitment-disjunction account, which holds that to ask a question is either to undertake an erotetic commitment (a responsibility to put oneself in an appropriate epistemic position with respect to a direct answer) or to address an apokritic commitment to another (making them responsible for (...) putting the asker in that position). The disjunction is inclusive with queries typically involving both undertaking and addressing commitments. This model identifies the role that erotetic inferences among questions play in structuring these commitments and emphasizes the second-personal character of queries. Most importantly, it accommodates a broad range of query types—information-seeking, self-addressed, topic-giving, addressee-testing, and challenging—outperforming familiar rivals such as desire-expressing, imperative-epistemic, illocutionary-force, and QUD-based accounts. Finally, we suggest that integrating queries into the broader framework of deontic scorekeeping strengthens Brandom’s doxastic-commitment account of assertion by providing a non-assertoric mechanism for challenges and expanding the space of reasons beyond its traditional focus on assertion. (shrink)

Commentary on José Eduardo Porcher's Afro-Brazilian Religions (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

Micromanagement, when excessively practiced, evolves into a toxic leadership approach that restricts employee autonomy and undermines organizational performance. This study examined the effects of ten micromanagement archetypes—including "The Control Freak," "The Nitpicker," and "The Idea Thief"—on employee productivity, trust in leadership, and innovation behavior across five major sectors in Metro Cebu, Philippines. Utilizing a descriptive-correlational quantitative design, data were gathered from 400 full-time employees selected through stratified random sampling. Standardized survey instruments revealed moderate employee productivity (M = 3.42, SD = (...) 0.87), innovation behavior (M = 3.26, SD = 0.89), and moderate–low trust in leadership (M = 3.08, SD = 0.93). Pearson correlation results indicated significant negative associations between micromanagement frequency and employee outcomes (e.g., "The Control Freak" and trust: r = –0.49, p < .001; "The Idea Thief" and innovation: r = –0.42, p <.001). Multiple regression analysis confirmed, "The Control Freak" (β = –0.225, p < .001), "The Trust-Phobic" (β = –0.215, p < .001), and "The Idea Thief" (β = –0.211, p < .001) as significant negative predictors across outcomes. One-way ANOVA revealed statistically significant sectoral and managerial differences (e.g., F(4, 395) = 5.94, p < .001 for productivity). These findings underscore the importance of implementing autonomy-supportive leadership development programs, behaviorally anchored feedback mechanisms, and sector-specific policy reforms. (shrink)

David Bentley Hart’s The Light of Tabor proposes a monistic Christology intended to remedy what he regards as the conceptual brittleness and semantic vacuity of post-Nicene “two natures” discourse. This paper argues that Hart’s monism, while motivated by legitimate concerns about extrinsic dualisms, risks collapsing an irreducible, load-bearing Christological twofold: the distinction and inseparable unity of divine and human natures “without confusion” and “without division”. Drawing on a twofoldness framework grounded in Robert Govett’s retrieval of biblical paradox, especially the Explanatory (...) Indispensability Test (EIT) and the relational logics of asymmetric dependence and mutual constitution, this paper offers a constructive alternative: twofoldness-in-differentiated-unity Christology, which retains Hart’s anti-dualistic and asymmetrical insights while preserving Chalcedonian twofoldness as explanatorily indispensable for orthodox confession and soteriological coherence. (shrink)

Maria Clara at Ibarra is one of the telenovelas that depicted the experiences of Filipinos during the Spanish colonization. According to the study by Corona (2023), the show introduced influences, new ideologies, and motivations to viewers, which could offer significant potential for broader educational use and the materialization of the show as a tool for understanding and learning and possible usage as a learning tool. With this in mind, the primary focus of this research is to analyze the perspectives of (...) selected teachers and students on the use of the telenovela Maria Clara at Ibarra as an instructional tool in teaching Filipino, particularly in teaching Noli Me Tangere. The study employs Thematic Content Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) as its method, anchored on Interest Theory (Hidi & Renninger, 2006) to assess its effectiveness as a teaching material in Filipino 9. The research also utilizes Thematic Interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to gather insights from selected teachers and students of the Pasig Catholic College – Junior High School and Senior High School, Filipino Department. Findings from the research indicate that the integration of knowledge among teachers, media, and literature is essential in education. Therefore, the telenovela Maria Clara at Ibarra can only be an effective teaching tool if it is complemented by the appropriate teaching strategies, ensuring its proper application in literature instruction. (shrink)

Provides an overview of Mark Sharlow's philosophical work with summaries of his positions. Includes references and links to his writings.

The best writing of Mark Pettinelli, about cognitive psychology, cognitive science, etc.

Using path-breaking discoveries of cognitive science, Mark Johnson argues that humans are fundamentally imaginative moral animals, challenging the view that morality is simply a system of universal laws dictated by reason. According to the Western moral tradition, we make ethical decisions by applying universal laws to concrete situations. But Johnson shows how research in cognitive science undermines this view and reveals that imagination has an essential role in ethical deliberation. Expanding his innovative studies of human reason in Metaphors We (...) Live By and The Body in the Mind, Johnson provides the tools for more practical, realistic, and constructive moral reflection. (shrink)

An archive of Mark Sharlow's two blogs, "The Unfinishable Scroll" and "Religion: the Next Version." Covers Sharlow's views on metaphysics, epistemology, mind, science, religion, and politics. Includes topics and ideas not found in his papers.

So how can they figure out the rest of the subjects if they understand those three of emotion and cognition, logic and consciousness? Well, if they understand logic then maybe they can reason about ideas right and be intelligent and rational, that could help them figure out information. And rational thinking obviously relates to understanding feeling and thought, the subject of emotion and cognition. But how does the subject of consciousness relate? I would think consciousness would be putting it all (...) together right, how it works completely in the mind to form the person’s awareness of their thoughts and their logic, that seems to make sense. SO those three together, consciousness, emotion and cognition, and logic could help a person think clearly and rationally and intelligently and figure out the other subjects and information in academics. -/- So now I’m trying to make everyone completely logical but I don’t know what to do exactly. SHould i explain that they can isolate all of their thoughts and try to make them logical. How did i do that for my thoughts, well my thoughts were not that complicated and i didn’t have many of them, that is probably why i was the first one to become logical right. But basically that is all there is to it, if all of your thoughts are logical then you can become completely logical i think. I just had a few thoughts that were not logical so it wasn’t too hard to figure out what was going on with them. -/- So how is someone supposed to think clearly right? I mean, if they want to figure something out then what would they do? I need to think, when I think what do I do in order to figure out information, that is a great question. Maybe I can analyze that further. When I think about something, what is the process involved with exactly? It’s involved with stuff lol. -/- I could use an example I suppose, there is verbal intelligence right. That just involves understanding basic language phrases in whatever language the person speaks. I speak and this article is written in English so my verbal ability is in that language. -/- What else does a verbal ability involve anyway. I’m trying to think. The languages are pretty simple, if you think about it most children can speak a language so it couldn’t be too complicated. What would be considered to be more complicated than just speaking a basic language then? There could be more complicated concepts involved right, when I was a child I could speak English with a similar ability to my ability now except I understand a lot more advanced concepts that don’t really relate to the language that I am speaking. -/- Conceptual development continues as I age, but my language ability stayed about the same I think. I could get into more specifics but it seems like you could have a conversation with me when I was 7 years old that would be similar to a conversation you could have with me when I was 40 years old, the language ability stayed about the same however the concepts and my conceptual development became much greater and more sophisticated. Um, so that is just discussing the difference between concepts and language right. Language uses concepts obviously but it might be hard to explain a lot of concepts with language, a lot of academic concepts and even common concepts might be hard to explain with ordinary language I think. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study of perception, taking as its starting point a puzzle in Empedocles' theory of vision: if perception is a mode of material assimilation, how can we perceive colors at a distance? Kalderon argues that the theory of perception offered by Aristotle in answer to the puzzle is both attractive and defensible.

Research notes of Mark Pettinelli about cognitive science, cognitive psychology.

This collection of articles is almost all of the psychological writings of Mark Pettinelli.

Doxastic voluntarism is the thesis that our beliefs are subject to voluntary control. While there’s some controversy as to what “voluntary control” amounts to (see 1.2), it’s often understood as direct control: the ability to bring about a state of affairs “just like that,” without having to do anything else. Most of us have direct control over, for instance, bringing to mind an image of a pine tree. Can one, in like fashion, voluntarily bring it about that one believes a (...) specific proposition? Doxastic voluntarists hold that, at least in some circumstances—such as when the evidence is ambiguous—we can. Doxastic involuntarists, in contrast, maintain that we cannot. Some involuntarists hold that the concept of belief itself precludes the possibility of believing voluntarily. Others hold that the impossibility of voluntary belief is a contingent psychological fact. Historically, the issue of doxastic voluntarism has been connected to how many think about religious commitment: a prominent view of faith is that it is a voluntary decision to believe. Furthermore, the issue of voluntarism has also been viewed as having bearing on fundamental questions in epistemology. For example, are epistemic norms duties to believe in certain ways? Are there practical or moral reasons to believe? If the answer to either question is “yes,” it seems some measure of voluntary doxastic control is required. In section 1, we expand on the definition of doxastic voluntarism, and survey various kinds of control (e.g. direct, indirect, long-range) and the doxastic attitudes we might control (e.g. outright belief, withholding, credences). In section 2, we discuss a number of historical views on doxastic voluntarism. In section 3, we survey motivations for rejecting doxastic voluntarism. There are two general strategies: arguments that appeal to psychological considerations, and conceptual arguments regarding the nature of belief. In section 4, we survey five approaches to defending voluntarism: those that appeal to epistemic permissivism, doxastic compatibilism, skepticism, one-off considerations, and non-standard views of belief. In section 5, we cover empirical work on doxastic voluntarism. The last two sections discuss two implications of voluntarism. In section 6, we discuss voluntarism’s implications for the ethics of belief, and in section 7, we discuss issues at the intersection of voluntarism and religious faith. (shrink)

Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...) belief puzzles (Hesperus, Cicero, Pierre) involve reports about two different notions. So the analysis gets the puzzling truth values right. (shrink)

Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account of the distinction (...) between the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason must allow state-given reasons to be of the right kind. The paper has three main goals, corresponding to its three main parts. In part 1 I set up the problem by introducing the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction, the object-given/state-given distinction, and the object-given/state-given theory, according to which the former distinction simply amounts to the latter. Part 2 presents the main argument of the paper: I argue against the object-given/state-given theory by showing that all of the earmarks of the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason apply to reasons not to intend and not to believe, but that these cases can’t be captured by the object-given/state-given theory. Finally, in part 3 I use these arguments to motivate and explore a more general hypothesis about the rightkind/wrong-kind distinction, and explore some of the consequences of rejecting the object-given/stategiven theory. (shrink)

Most philosophers find it puzzling how beliefs could wrong, and this leads them to conclude that they do not. So there is much philosophical work to be done in sorting out whether I am right to say that they do, as well as how this could be so. But in this paper I will take for granted that beliefs can wrong, and ask instead when beliefs wrong. My answer will be that beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. This answer has (...) three parts: that beliefs wrong only when they are false, that beliefs wrong only when they diminish, and that false diminishment is sufficient for wronging. I will seek to elaborate on and defend all three of these claims, but it is the first to which I will give the most attention. (shrink)

YouTube has been implicated in the transformation of users into extremists and conspiracy theorists. The alleged mechanism for this radicalizing process is YouTube’s recommender system, which is optimized to amplify and promote clips that users are likely to watch through to the end. YouTube optimizes for watch-through for economic reasons: people who watch a video through to the end are likely to then watch the next recommended video as well, which means that more advertisements can be served to them. This (...) is a seemingly innocuous design choice, but it has a troubling side-effect. Critics of YouTube have alleged that the recommender system tends to recommend extremist content and conspiracy theories, as such videos are especially likely to capture and keep users’ attention. To date, the problem of radicalization via the YouTube recommender system has been a matter of speculation. The current study represents the first systematic, pre-registered attempt to establish whether and to what extent the recommender system tends to promote such content. We begin by contextualizing our study in the framework of technological seduction. Next, we explain our methodology. After that, we present our results, which are consistent with the radicalization hypothesis. Finally, we discuss our findings, as well as directions for future research and recommendations for users, industry, and policy-makers. (shrink)

Multi-agent systems often exhibit emergent behavior that appears coordinated, intelligent, and irreducible to the behavior of individual components. Yet quantifying the degree to which such systems form integrated wholes remains a major challenge. While Integrated Information Theory (IIT) was originally developed to explain consciousness, its core concept - measuring how much a system resists decomposition - has broader relevance for understanding informational integration in complex systems. However, the exact computation of IIT’s central quantity, Φ, is intractable for all but the (...) smallest networks. In this paper, we propose a scalable spectral approximation, Φspectral, which estimates system-level irreducibility by applying spectral graph theory to pairwise mutual information networks derived from time-series data. The Fiedler vector of the normalized Laplacian defines a minimal bipartition, across which we sum mutual information to estimate informational disintegration. We interpret this measure as a proxy for epistemic emergence (specifically the diachronic case)—capturing practical, observer-relative irreducibility without invoking ontological claims. We also explore the implications of this metric for measuring emergence and consciousness. We evaluate Φspectral across four classes of simulated systems: random, transitional, and synchronized oscillator networks, as well as a biologically inspired combinatorial threshold-linear network (CTLN) governed by graph-theoretic dynamics. Our results show that Φspectral is sensitive not merely to coordination, but to the emergence of structurally differentiated and functionally integrated behavior. In particular, it detects transient integration in transitional systems and reveals the collapse of complexity in fixed-point–convergent CTLNs. These findings suggest that Φspectral offers a principled and computationally efficient tool for analyzing irreducibility and emergence in distributed systems, with potential applications in AI safety, neural computation, and collective intelligence. (shrink)

Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...) defeating knowledge by defeating epistemic rationality—the very kind of rationality that is entailed by knowledge, and in which Pascalian considerations do not play any role—even though epistemic rationality consists in having adequate evidence. (shrink)

What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when (...) trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been--wrongly--wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) by deriving it from the Parmenidean axiom, ex nihilo nihil fit. Its central innovation is the Equivalence Thesis, which demonstrates that synchronic brute facts instantiate the same ontological arbitrariness as diachronic creation from nothing. I argue that this equivalence reveals brute facts as violations of the Parmenidean prohibition, establishing the PSR as a necessary consequence of this more fundamental principle rather than an independent axiom. The paper develops (...) this argument through detailed engagement with contemporary defenses of brute fundamentality and challenges from grounding theory. (shrink)

Intentions matter. They have some kind of normative impact on our agency. Something goes wrong when an agent intends some end and fails to carry out the means she believes to be necessary for it, and something goes right when, intending the end, she adopts the means she thinks are required. This has even been claimed to be one of the only uncontroversial truths in ethical theory. But not only is there widespread disagreement about why this is so, there is (...) widespread disagreement about in what sense it is so. In this paper I explore an underdeveloped answer to the question of in what sense it is so, and argue that resolving an apparent difficulty with this view leads to an attractive picture about why it is so. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore the prospects of epistemic minimax and related principles. Minimax is a well-known approach to choosing a strategy under conditions of risk and uncertainty. In individual cases, the minimax strategy selects the action that can lead to the least bad outcome for the agent, even if taking that action ensures that expected utility is not maximized and that best-case outcomes are impossible. In social cases, the minimax strategy selects the policy that maximizes the wellbeing of the (...) least-well-off members of the group, even if doing so ensures that the aggregate utility of the group is not maximized and that best-case social outcomes are impossible. While there are many criticisms of minimax at both the individual and the social level, it is a prominent and popular approach at the social level because it prioritizes those at the bottom of the ladder. This chapter focuses on the social case for epistemic minimax and related principles. We develop the notions of epistemic position and epistemic power, both of which are prima facie epistemic goods, and demonstrate that a minimax principle can come apart from principles that would promote aggregate or maximum epistemic position or power. We also point to empirical and computational work that shows that testimonial networks online tend to be characterized by extreme inequalities of epistemic power. Then we extend traditional arguments in favor of social minimax to show that they hold in the epistemic case as well. In light of these arguments, we contend that the epistemic minimax principle should be treated as a heuristic for network interventions in democratic communities, and that it may be attractive for other types of communities as well. We conclude by examining the idea that some communities—especially the scientific community—should probably adopt different principles. Communities vary along different dimensions, and these dimensions may favor or disfavor different epistemic policies and principles, showing the sensitivity of our arguments to particular circumstances. (shrink)

Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...) and truth-making, and in constituting holes and edges. (shrink)

Introduction 1 Précis 2 Methodology: Introducing digital humanities to the history of philosophy 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Core constructs 2.3 Operationalizing the constructs 2.4 Querying the Nietzsche Source 2.5 Cleaning the data 2.6 Visualizations and preliminary analysis 2.6.1 Visualization of the whole corpus 2.6.2 Book visualizations 2.7 Summary Nietzsche’s Socio-Moral Framework 3 From instincts and drives to types 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The state of the art on drives, instincts, and types 3.2.1 Drives 3.2.2 Instincts 3.2.3 Types 3.3 The semantic neighborhood of (...) drive, instinct, and type 3.4 A theory of (the relations among) instincts, drives, and types 3.4.1 Drives are act-directed rather than outcome-directed dispositions 3.4.2 The reflexive turn in Nietzsche’s drive psychology 3.4.3 Triggers of drive-displacement 3.4.4 Instincts are innate drives 3.4.5 Types are constellations of instincts and other drives 3.4.6 To what extent are types, instincts, and drives fixed? 3.5 Summary 4 From types to virtues 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The state of the art on virtues and values 4.2.1 Virtues 4.2.2 Values 4.3 The semantic neighborhood of virtue and value 4.4 On (the relations among) instincts, drives, types, values, virtues, and values 4.4.1 Virtues are well-calibrated drives 4.4.2 Nietzsche’s type-relative unity of virtue thesis 4.4.3 The type of the criminal 4.4.4 Nietzschean exemplarism and his ad hominem attacks 4.5 Summary 5 Socializing Nietzschean virtues 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Higher-order types 5.2.1 Social character construction 5.2.2 Reflexive character construction 5.3 Eponymous trait terms and Nietzschean summoning 5.3.1 Eponymous trait terms 5.3.2 Nietzschean summoning 5.4 Summary Nietzschean virtues 6 Curiosity 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Curiosity in virtue epistemology 6.3 Curiosity and its affiliated emotions 6.4 Curiosity, perspectivism, and inquiry 6.5 Curiosity as a virtue 6.5.1 A preliminary characterization 6.5.2 Curiosity in the middle through late works 6.6 Summary 7 Courage 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Intellectual courage in contemporary virtue epistemology 7.3 Courage as a virtue 7.3.1 A preliminary characterization 7.3.2 Courage in the middle through late works 7.4 Summary 8 Pathos of distance 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Contempt and disgust in contemporary moral psychology 8.3 The semantic neighborhood of contempt, disgust, and the pathos of distance 8.4 Nietzsche on contempt 8.4.1 Spernere mundum 8.4.2 Spernere neminem 8.4.3 Spernere se ipsum 8.4.4 Spernere se sperni 8.4.5 Nietzsche aims to induce what he considers fitting contempt in receptive readers 8.5 Nietzsche on disgust 8.5.1 The use of disgust: detaching from an ideal 8.5.2 The danger of disgust 8.6 The pathos of distance 8.7 Prospects for a Nietzschean democratic ethos 8.8 Summary 9 Sense of humor 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The semantic neighborhood of laughter, humor, and comedy 9.3 The Nietzschean sense of humor and its functions 9.3.1 From episodic laughter to the sense of humor 9.3.2 Affirmation and inquiry 9.3.3 Negation and inquiry 9.3.4 Affiliation with like-minded inquirers 9.4 Summary 10 Solitude 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Solitude in virtue theory and Nietzsche scholarship 10.3 The semantic neighborhood of solitude 10.4 An account of Nietzschean solitude 10.5 Summary Conclusion 11 Conscience & integrity 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Conscience and integrity in contemporary moral psychology and Nietzsche scholarship 11.2.1 Conscience and integrity in contemporary moral psychology 11.2.2 Conscience and integrity in Nietzsche commentary 11.3 The semantic neighborhood of conscience and integrity 11.4 Distinguishing conscience, good conscience, bad conscience, and intellectual conscience 11.4.1 Conscience 11.4.2 Good conscience 11.4.3 Bad conscience 11.4.4 Intellectual conscience and integrity 11.5 Summary 12 Prospectus 12.1 Future directions in moral psychology 12.2 Future directions in Nietzsche scholarship 12.3 Future directions in digital humanities and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...) attention both of defenders of broadly noncognitivist views, and of their critics. In this article I explain Geach and Searle's historical objections, and put the subsequent discussion into dialectical context, paying some attention to the developments along the way and how they have enhanced our overall understanding of the problem. The article covers a lot of territory, so we will only be able to see the highlights, along the way. For further reading, see the Works Cited. (shrink)

Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have (...) dreadful, murderous ends? Ought you to take the means to them? Seemingly not. But fortunately, an assumption made by deontic logics1 comes to the rescue. Since ‘‘ought’’, according to this assumption, is a sentential operator, HI must really be ambiguous. It could be read either as (Narrow) You have the end ! O(you take the means) or as (Wide) O(you have the end ! you take the means). Now if Narrow is true, then you really ought to take the means to your murderous ends. But this doesn’t follow from Wide. All that follows from Wide is that you ought to either take the means to these ends or else give them up. Conclusions: (1) Since HI is on some reading true, but Narrow isn’t, Wide is true. (2) Wide accounts for the relationship between your ends and what you ought to do. This elegant scenario repeats itself in many other domains in which it seems like something can have a bearing on what some particular agent ought to do. Does what you know affect what you ought to do? Do your beliefs about what you ought to do affect what you ought to do? Do your promises affect what you ought to do? Do your beliefs affect what you ought to believe? On each of these counts, the intuitive answer is ‘‘yes’’. And so each of these questions leaves something for the moral philosopher or the epistemologist to investigate. On each count, it seems that what we all know, is that (Account) you ought, if p, to do A. But on each count, the Narrow-scope reading of the ‘‘ought’’ in this claim yields unintuitive consequences. So since Account is true, it must be true on the Wide-scope reading.. (shrink)

In his contribution, Mark Alfano lays out a new (to virtue theory) naturalistic way of determining what the virtues are, what it would take for them to be realized, and what it would take for them to be at least possible. This method is derived in large part from David Lewis’s development of Frank Ramsey’s method of implicit definition. The basic idea is to define a set of terms not individually but in tandem. This is accomplished by assembling all (...) and only the common sense platitudes that involve them (e.g., typically, people want to be virtuous), conjoining those platitudes, and replacing the terms in question by existentially quantified variables. If the resulting sentence is satisfied, then whatever satisfies are the virtues. If it isn’t satisfied, there are a couple of options. First, one could just admit defeat by saying that people can’t be virtuous. More plausibly, one could weaken the conjunction by dropping a small number of the platitudes from it (and potentially adding some others). Alfano suggests that the most attractive way to do this is by dropping the platitudes that deal with cross-situational consistency and replacing them with platitudes that involve social construction: basically, people are virtuous (when they are) at least in part because other people signal their expectations of virtuous conduct, which induces virtuous conduct, which in turn induces further signals of expected virtuous conduct, and so on. (shrink)

Much of the work in the rapidly growing field of computer ethics relies on the concepts and theories of Western philosophy. With this article my aim is to help stimulate conversations that draw on a wider range of ethical perspectives. I build on recent work on the sense in which the regular operations of the attention economy might violate our right to attention, and I do so through looking to a range of Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. As I argue, (...) these texts should inspire us to realize that we have more than just the right to direct our attention as we will and the right to be free from distraction. This is because there is a third right to attention that the recent literature overlooks, namely the right to strengthen our weak capacity to control our attention. (shrink)

Philosophers of psychology debate, among other things, which psychological models, if any, are (or provide) mechanistic explanations. This should seem a little strange given that there is rough consensus on the following two claims: 1) a mechanism is an organized collection of entities and activities that produces, underlies, or maintains a phenomenon, and 2) a mechanistic explanation describes, represents, or provides information about the mechanism producing, underlying, or maintaining the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. the explanandum phenomenon) (Bechtel and Abrahamsen (...) 2005; Craver 2007). If there is a rough consensus on what mechanisms are and that mechanistic explanations describe, represent, or provide information about them, then how is there no consensus on which psychological models are (or provide) mechanistic explanations? Surely the psychological models that are mechanistic explanations are the models that describe, represent, or provide information about mechanisms. That is true, of course; the trouble arises when determining what exactly that involves. Philosophical disagreement over which psychological models are mechanistic explanations is often disagreement about what it means to describe, represent, or provide information about a mechanism, among other things (Hochstein 2016; Levy 2013). In addition, one's position in this debate depends on a host of other seemingly arcane metaphysical issues, such as the nature of mechanisms, computational and functional properties (Piccinini 2016), and realization (Piccinini and Maley 2014), as well as the relation between models, methodologies, and explanations (Craver 2014; Levy 2013; Zednik 2015). Although I inevitably advocate a position, my primary aim in this chapter is to spell out all these relationships and canvas the positions that have been taken (or could be taken) with respect to mechanistic explanation in psychology, using dynamical systems models and cognitive models (or functional analyses) as examples. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to (...) do in order to earn that payoff. (shrink)

This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. -/- Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. (...) When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter lays out a case that with the proper perspective on the place of epistemology within normative inquiry more generally, it is possible to appreciate what was on the right track about some of the early approaches to the analysis of knowledge, and to improve on the obvious failures which led them to be rejected. Drawing on more general principles about reasons, their weight, and their relationship to justification, it offers answers to problems about defeat and the conditional fallacy (...) that plagued early defeasibility analyses of knowledge and offers a sketch of a contemporary alternative that is motivated by the idea that knowledge requires the right kind of “match” between objective and subjective factors. (shrink)

forthcoming in reisner and steglich-peterson, eds., Reasons for Belief If I believe, for no good reason, that P and I infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence that I have. It seems to me that this is a good reason to include an epistemic acceptability constraint on evidence (...) possessed…1 It is a truism that adopting an unjustified belief does not put you in a better evidential position with respect to believing its consequences. This truism has led many philosophers to assume that there must, at a minimum, be a justification condition (and perhaps even a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence. This is the best (or only) possible explanation of the truism, these philosophers have believed. This paper explores an alternative explanation for the truism. According to the alternative explanation that I will offer, unjustified beliefs do not put you in a better evidential position with respect to believing their consequences because any evidence you have in virtue of having an unjustified belief is guaranteed to be defeated. Since the lack of justification for a belief guarantees its defeat, I will suggest, we don't need to postulate a special justification condition (much less a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence. Why is this important? It is important because the assumption that there must be a justification condition (or perhaps a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence places a high bar on what it takes to have evidence - such a high bar that it is difficult to see how this bar could be met in the case of basic, perceptually justified beliefs. As a result, the high bar set by this condition plays a fundamental role, I will claim, in central features of a core dialectic from the epistemology of basic perceptual belief which plays a central role in the debates between internalism and externalism, foundationalism and coherentism, and rationalism and empiricism.. (shrink)

Many scholars agree that the Internet plays a pivotal role in self-radicalization, which can lead to behaviors ranging from lone-wolf terrorism to participation in white nationalist rallies to mundane bigotry and voting for extremist candidates. However, the mechanisms by which the Internet facilitates self-radicalization are disputed; some fault the individuals who end up self-radicalized, while others lay the blame on the technology itself. In this paper, we explore the role played by technological design decisions in online self-radicalization in its myriad (...) guises, encompassing extreme as well as more mundane forms. We begin by characterizing the phenomenon of technological seduction. Next, we distinguish between top-down seduction and bottom-up seduction. We then situate both forms of technological seduction within the theoretical model of dynamical systems theory. We conclude by articulating strategies for combatting online self-radicalization. (shrink)

Causation is one of philosophy's most venerable and thoroughly-analyzed concepts. However, the study of how ordinary people make causal judgments is a much more recent addition to the philosophical arsenal. One of the most prominent views of causal explanation, especially in the realm of harmful or potentially harmful behavior, is that unusual or counternormative events are accorded privileged status in ordinary causal explanations. This is a fundamental assumption in psychological theories of counterfactual reasoning, and has been transported to philosophy by (...) Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). A different view--the basis of the culpable control model of blame (CCM)--is that primary causal status is accorded to behaviors that arouse negative evaluative reactions, including behaviors that stem from nefarious motives, negligence or recklessness, a faulty character, or behaviors that lead to harmful or potentially harmful consequences. This paper describes four empirical studies that show consistent support for the CCM. (shrink)

It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to (...) the rescue on all sides. While consequentialism says that every agent ought always to do that action that will bring about the most good, according to Agent- Relative Teleology. (shrink)

Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects (ELSA) originated in the 4thEuropean Research Framework Programme (1994) andresponsible research and innovation (RRI) from the EC researchagenda in 2010. ELSA has received renewed attention inEuropean funding schemes and research. This raises the questionof how these two approaches to social responsibility relate toone another and if there is the possibility to align. There is aneed to evaluate the relationship/overlap between ELSA and RRIbecause there is a possibility that new ELSA research will reinventthe wheel if it (...) does not engage with the body of literaturealready present in RRI research. This provides unneeded extrabureaucracy, reformulations of research agendas, extrainvestment, and an overabundance of frameworks to implement,and ELSA research does not take advantage of the body ofresearch developed in RRI. This paper evaluates how ELSA andRRI diverge, are complementary, and can be aligned. (shrink)

I develop and defend a truthmaker semantics for the relevant logic R. The approach begins with a simple philosophical idea and develops it in various directions, so as to build a technically adequate relevant semantics. The central philosophical idea is that truths are true in virtue of specific states. Developing the idea formally results in a semantics on which truthmakers are relevant to what they make true. A very natural notion of conditionality is added, giving us relevant implication. I then (...) investigate ways to add conjunction, disjunction, and negation; and I discuss how to justify contraposition and excluded middle within a truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

This paper examines how professionals (N = 32) working on artificial intelligence (AI) view structural AI ethics challenges like injustices and inequalities beyond individual agents' direct intention and control. This paper answers the research question: What are professionals’ perceptions of the structural challenges of AI (in the agri-food sector)? This empirical paper shows that it is essential to broaden the scope of ethics of AI beyond micro- and meso-levels. While ethics guidelines and AI ethics often focus on the responsibility of (...) designers and the competencies and skills of designers to take this responsibility, our results show that many structural challenges are beyond their reach. This result means that while ethics guidelines and AI ethics frameworks are helpful, there is a risk that they overlook more complicated, nuanced, and intersected structural challenges. In addition, it highlights the need to include diverse stakeholders, such as quadruple helix (QH) participants, in discussions around AI ethics rather than solely focusing on the obligations of AI developers and companies. Overall, this paper demonstrates that addressing structural challenges in AI is challenging and requires an approach that considers four requirements: (1) multi-level, (2) multi-faceted, (3) interdisciplinary, and (4) polycentric governance. (shrink)