In the framework of quantum field theory, one finds multiple load-bearing locality and causality conditions. One of the most important is the cluster decomposition principle, which requires that scattering experiments conducted at large spatial separation have statistically independent results. The principle grounds a number of features of quantum field theory, especially the structure of scattering theory. However, the statistical independence required by cluster decomposition is in tension with the long-range correlations characteristic of entangled states. In this paper, we argue that (...) cluster decomposition is best stated as a condition on the dynamics of a quantum field theory, not directly as a statistical independence condition. This redefinition avoids the tension with entanglement while better capturing the physical significance of cluster decomposition and the role it plays in the structure of quantum field theory. (shrink)

Of the various loci of systematic theology that call for sustained philosophical investigation, the doctrine of sanctification stands out as a prime candidate. In response to that call, William Alston developed three models of the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit: the fiat model, the interpersonal model, and the sharing model. In response to Alston’s argument for the sharing model, this paper offers grounds for a reconsideration of the interpersonal model. We close with a discussion of some of the implications (...) of one’s understanding of the transforming work of the Holy Spirit for practical Christian spirituality. (shrink)

We investigate claims about the frequency of "know" made by philosophers. Our investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of different uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodology, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers would have overlooked if they remained in (...) their "armchairs of an afternoon", to use J.L. Austin’s phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of "know" that so far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing. (shrink)

Large Language Models are built on the so-called distributional semantic approach to linguistic meaning that has the distributional hypothesis at its core. The distributional hypothesis involves a holistic conception of word meaning: the meaning of a word depends upon its relations to other words in the model. A standard objection to holism is the charge of instability: any change in the meaning properties of a linguistic system (a human speaker, for example) would lead to many changes or a complete change (...) in the entire system. We examine whether the instability objection poses a problem for distributional models of meaning. First, we distinguish between distinct forms of instability that these models could exhibit, and argue that only one such form is relevant for understanding the relation between instability and communication: what we call differential instability. Differential instability is variation in the relative distances between points in a space, rather than variation in the absolute position of those points. We distinguish differential and absolute instability by constructing two of our own smaller language models. We demonstrate the two forms of instability by showing these models change as the corpora they are constructed from increase in size. We argue that the instability that these models display is constrained by the structure and scale of relationships between words, such that the resistance to change for a word is roughly proportional to its frequent and consistent use within the language system. The differential instability that language models exhibit allows for productive forms of meaning change while not leading to the problems raised by the instability objection. (shrink)

For many women experiencing motherhood for the first time, the message they receive is clear: mothers who do not breastfeed ought to have good reasons not to; bottle feeding by choice is a failure of maternal duty. We argue that this pressure to breastfeed arises in part from two misconceptions about maternal duty: confusion about the scope of the duty to benefit and conflation between moral reasons and duties. While mothers have a general duty to benefit, we argue that this (...) does not imply a duty to carry out any particular beneficent act. Therefore, the expectation that mothers should breastfeed unless they have sufficient countervailing reasons not to is morally unwarranted. Recognising the difference between reasons and duties can allow us to discuss the benefits of breastfeeding and the importance of supporting mothers who wish to breastfeed without subjecting mothers who bottle feed to guilt, blame and failure. (shrink)

This article’s purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls “Serious Metaphysics” and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what (...) follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis. (shrink)

[Andrew Williams] It is difficult for prioritarians to explain the degree to which justice requires redress for misfortune in a way that avoids imposing unreasonably high costs on more advantaged individuals whilst also economising on intuitionist appeals to judgment. An appeal to hypothetical insurance may be able to solve the problems of cost and judgment more successfully, and can also be defended from critics who claim that resource egalitarianism is best understood to favour the ex post elimination of envy (...) over individual endowments. /// [Michael Otsuka] Inequality is intrinsically bad when and because it is unfair. It follows that the ideal of equality is not necessarily realised by a distribution of resources which is envy-free prior to the resolution of risks against which people have an equal opportunity to insure. Even if the upshot of such an ex ante envyfree distribution is just, it is not necessarily fair. (shrink)

The sense of form that provides the modern poet with a unique experience of the literary object has been crucial to various attempts to compare poetry to other cultural activities. In maintaining similar conceptions of the relationship between poetry and painting, Arthur Rimbaud and W. C. Williams establish a common basis for interpreting their creative work. And yet their poetry is more crucially concerned with the sudden emergence of visible "worlds" containing verbal objects that integrate a new kind of (...) literary text. This paper discusses the emergence of "aesthetic worlds" in the work of both poets and then examines how a common concern with Baroque form unites them in the phenomenological task of overcoming Cartesian dualism. (shrink)

This précis summarizes the main topics, arguments and conclusions of the book. Many interesting arguments and critiques have, of course, been omitted in order to make this summary appropriately brief.

This article presents an overview and critique of current interdisciplinary research on the nature and development of intellectual humility (IH), with the aim of systematically outlining currently debated open questions. We focus on four specific areas of research: (1) theoretical questions regarding the nature of IH, (2) issues with the measurement of IH in development, (3) existing research on the development of IH and related socio- cognitive abilities, and (4) interventions to increase IH in children and adolescents. We critically review (...) the existing empirical and theoretical literature in these areas, identify and articulate open questions, and map out directions for future research that follow from these questions. The main theoretical issues we identify concern the distinction between different features of IH (i.e., internal vs external, self- vs other-directed) and their relation to each other as well as the distinction between IH as a prescriptive virtue as opposed to a descriptive character trait. As we will demonstrate, taking seriously the notion of IH as a virtue raises crucial questions for its empirical study in the contexts of measurement, development, and potential interventions. (shrink)

We must, therefore, make a study of mechanism; but some introduction is advisable, for cybernetics treats the subject from a new, and therefore unusual,...

This series pairs brief “allegorical tales” (寓言) from the enigmatic ancient Chinese classic Zhuangzi (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) with original watercolor paintings. Through this union of word and image, we hope to create a dialogue in which each illuminates the other, offering a fresh path into these ancient stories. (NB: Sharing selected draft 'Parts' from my book manuscript, ZHUANGZI, A HAPPY FAILURE. This is a work in progress, and I welcome any comments or feedback from colleagues.).

This series pairs brief “allegorical tales” (寓言) from the enigmatic ancient Chinese classic Zhuangzi (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) with original watercolor paintings. Through this union of word and image, we hope to create a dialogue in which each illuminates the other, offering a fresh path into these ancient stories. (NB: Sharing selected draft 'Parts' from my book manuscript, ZHUANGZI, A HAPPY FAILURE. This is a work in progress, and I welcome any comments or feedback from colleagues.).

Continuum physics represents states as real- or complex-valued fields and dynamics as operators on infinite-dimensional function spaces. Under an ontic interpretation, however, fundamental evolution must be semantically total: it must take every admissible state specification to a successor state specification in which all admitted magnitudes remain denoting. We make this requirement explicit using standard admissible representations, in which denotation is characterized by bounded finite-precision input dependence on state descriptions. We show that standard continuum dynamics can violate this semantic closure requirement (...) even when the underlying PDE is linear, well posed, and uniquely solvable. The obstruction is forced extensional totalization: a regional readout can require joint control over countably many individually well-behaved contributions in a way that destroys bounded input dependence and hence denotation. Because locality commits a field ontology to treating spatial restrictions on compact regions as single physical magnitudes, this failure mode cannot be avoided by appealing to pointwise readouts or sequential access. Reanalyzed in these terms, the Pour-El and Richards Theorem 2 construction for the three-dimensional wave equation provides a concrete witness: admissible finite energy initial data evolve to states whose regional field restrictions do not admit admissible names in the required function space topology. The obstruction is semantic rather than epistemic: it does not concern what can be computed or observed, but the failure of continuum evolution to preserve denotation under realist locality commitments. The conclusion is eliminative: unrestricted continuum field ontology cannot serve as the basis of a semantically closed fundamental dynamics. (shrink)

William Starr’s chapter explores a dynamic semantics for deontic “must” and “may” which is “expressivist.” The aim of the chapter is to show that the difficulties for such a semantic analysis stem largely from assumptions in truth-conditional semantics that can be relaxed. The key is to adopt a logic of actions, rather than contents, one which surprisingly yields truth-conditional semantics as a special case. Perhaps the most important feature of the analysis is that “Zoyd must share” and “It’s not the (...) case that Zoyd must share” produce entirely different kinds of effects on what’s taken for granted when they are communicated – unlike “Zoyd shared” and “It’s not the case that Zoyd shared” which both convey information. This is motivated by a general discussion of expressivism, where it is argued that the expressivist must offer a positive account of expressive communication that differs from descriptive communication. (shrink)

Can we philosophize about Trust and Safety? This chapter highlights the similarities between trust and safety policy and academic philosophy. First, we argue that trust and safety professionals regularly engage in philosophical thinking as their daily work relates to conceptual analysis, harm mitigation, and freedom of expression. We then suggest that such professionals would benefit from engaging in philosophical efforts to define overarching trust and safety principles and conceptualize the power wielded by social media platforms in contemporary democratic societies. In (...) our view, philosophers, too, can also learn from trust and safety professionals, especially those who craft content moderation policies. By familiarizing themselves with Trust and Safety, they can gain awareness of pressing social issues and edge cases that challenge their intuitive judgments. Lastly, we discuss what we have learned by participating in PhilMod, a community of academic researchers and technology professionals interested in the philosophical implications of content moderation and social media platform policy. (shrink)

Since Cannon, inspired by Bernard’s discussion of the conditions required for free and independent life, introduced the term homeostasis, many have embraced it as the main theoretical principle guiding physiology and medicine. Nonetheless, critics have argued that homeostasis is too limiting and have advanced a variety of alternative concepts such as heterostasis, rheostasis, and allostasis. We argue that the critics target a much narrower understanding of homeostasis put forward by the cyberneticists and that Bernard and Cannon embraced a far broader (...) understanding that can accommodate the alternatives advanced by the critics and provide an integrated theoretical framework for physiology. (shrink)

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) aims to explain how neural networks work by uncovering their underlying causal mechanisms. As the field grows in influence, it is increasingly important to examine not just models themselves, but the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies implicit in MI research. We argue that mechanistic interpretability needs philosophy: not as an afterthought, but as an ongoing partner in clarifying its concepts, refining its methods, and assessing the epistemic and ethical stakes of interpreting AI systems. Taking three open problems (...) from the MI literature as examples, this position paper illustrates the value philosophy can add to MI research, and outlines a path toward deeper interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

A growing chorus of AI researchers and philosophers posit internal representations in large language models (LLMs). But how do these representations relate to the kinds of mental states we routinely ascribe to our fellow humans? While some research has focused on belief- or knowledge- like states in LLMs, there has been comparatively little focus on the question of whether LLMs have intentions. I survey five properties that have been associated with intentions in the philosophical literature, and assess two candidate classes (...) of LLM representations against this set of features. The result is mixed: LLMs have representations that are intention-like in many— perhaps surprising—respects, but they differ from human intentions in important ways. (shrink)

We advance an account that grounds cognition, specifically decision-making, in an activity all organisms as autonomous systems must perform to keep themselves viable—controlling their production mechanisms. Production mechanisms, as we characterize them, perform activities such as procuring resources from their environment, putting these resources to use to construct and repair the organism's body and moving through the environment. Given the variable nature of the environment and the continual degradation of the organism, these production mechanisms must be regulated by control mechanisms (...) that select when a production is required and how it should be carried out. To operate on production mechanisms, control mechanisms need to procure information through measurement processes and evaluate possible actions. They are making decisions. In all organisms, these decisions are made by multiple different control mechanisms that are organized not hierarchically but heterarchically. In many cases, they employ internal models of features of the environment with which the organism must deal. Cognition, in the form of decision-making, is thus fundamental to living systems which must control their production mechanisms. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 produce compelling responses to a wide range of prompts. But their representational capacities are uncertain. Many LLMs have no direct contact with extra-linguistic reality: their inputs, outputs and training data consist solely of text, raising the questions (1) can LLMs represent anything and (2) if so, what? In this paper, I explore what it would take to answer these questions according to a structural-correspondence based account of representation, and make an initial survey of (...) this evidence. I argue that the mere existence of structural correspondences between LLMs and worldly entities is insufficient to ground representation of those entities. However, if these structural correspondences play an appropriate role – they are exploited in a way that explains successful task performance – then they could ground real world contents. This requires overcoming a challenge: the text-boundedness of LLMs appears, on the face of it, to prevent them engaging in the right sorts of tasks. (shrink)

We formalize a general semantic constraint on physically admissible procedures: discrete outcomes must exhibit bounded input dependence, meaning that determinate outcomes are supported by finite stability margins in the underlying state space. We prove that any such procedure can discriminate only properties corresponding to open regions of state space. Properties whose truth sets are topologically thin, having empty interior with dense complement, are operationally unresolvable under admissible physical semantics. This limitation is structural rather than computational. It arises from topological constraints (...) induced by stability at the semantic interface and applies uniformly across continuum ontologies. Stability is shown to be preserved under lawful continuous dynamics, implying that thin distinctions cannot be amplified into operational differences by finite physical evolution followed by admissible readout. Computability provides a canonical representative example. Computable and noncomputable elements form interwoven dense subsets of continuum domains, so computability is not a topological property of states but a property of representation structure. As such, it cannot be operationally extracted by bounded-input-dependent procedures. Restrictions motivated by bounded input dependence thus express ontological parsimony: they eliminate distinctions incapable of supporting stable physical discrimination. The result provides a semantic foundation for aligning ontological commitments with structurally admissible distinctions in realist physical theories. -/- . (shrink)

[This download contains the table of contents and chapter 1.] This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.

Improvising musicians—especially towards the “freer” or more “experimental” end of the spectrum—are often seen as having the space to do just about anything. But actual improvisations are (also) processes of what enactivist philosophers Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo call “participatory sense-making”; musicians’ active choices are both enabled and constrained by musical phenomena, or “autonomous organising principles”, that emerge between them. Here we explore one example of such phenomena: groove. We begin by theorizing groove more broadly as a “grid” (...) and as “participatory discrepancies”, emphasizing how groove shows a form of agency in processes of sense-making. We then analyze sense-making at work in a case of emergent groove performed by the 21-piece experimental improvising ensemble Splitter Orchester. We conclude that collective sense-making is a dynamic process in which individual agents negotiate not only with each other, but also the shared norms and emergent other-than-human processes that they enact. (shrink)

Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines (...) a dutch book, but we only have a partial converse. (shrink)

A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker, Philosophia, 5, 269–286 (1975)) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in the study (...) of conditionals, broader themes in the philosophy of language and formal semantics are also engaged here. This new analysis exploits a dynamic conception of meaning where the meaning of a symbol is its potential to change an agent’s mental state (or the state of a conversation) rather than being the symbol’s content (e.g. the proposition it expresses). The analysis of conditionals is also built on the idea that the contrast between subjunctive and indicative conditionals parallels a contrast between revising and consistently extending some body of information. (shrink)

Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve (...) the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant has a far more communitarian theory of aesthetic life than is usually acknowledged. I focus on two aspects of Kant’s theory that might otherwise be taken to support an individualist reading, namely, Kant’s emphasis on aesthetic autonomy and his characterization of judgments of taste as involving demands for agreement. I argue that the full expression of autonomy in fact requires being a member of an aesthetic community and that within such a community, judgments (...) of taste are issued as invitations to others to engage their faculties towards the goal of shared aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”. Published in Clifford, W.K. “L’ètica de la creença”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 129–150. // Catalan translation, introductory study and notes on William James’s “The Will to Believe”. Published in James, William. “La voluntat de creure”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 151–172. [Introductory study published in Oya, Alberto. “Introducció. El debat entre W. K. Clifford i William James”. Quaderns (...) de Filosofia, vol. III, n. 2 (2016), pp. 123–127]. (shrink)

Might it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be 'metaphysical'? How does the phenomenon relate to 'ontic vagueness', the existence of 'vague objects', 'de re indeterminacy' and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating (...) this distinctive sort of indefiniteness? Conversely, are there reasons for denying that there is indefiniteness of this sort? (shrink)

Continuum physical theories model states as real- or complex-valued fields and dynamics as linear operators on infinite dimensional spaces. Under explanatory realism, an ontic interpretation incurs two semantic commitments: (i) real-valued physical magnitudes must denote relative to the theory’s admissible state interface, and (ii) the theory must be semantically closed under its own evolution and readout rules. Denotation is interface-relative: it requires the existence of a total continuous witness on names. Equivalently, it requires bounded input dependence at each fixed finite (...) precision. Failure of bounded input dependence is captured by forced extensional totalization (FET), in which even coarse output precision cannot be stabilized by any finite prefix of a state name. We give a physics-facing construction of FET for the three dimensional wave equation with Kirchhoff point readout. We construct a countable family of smooth, compactly supported, finite-energy initial states localized on pairwise disjoint shrinking latitude belts on the Huygens sphere, and restrict the admissible domain to states containing at most one localized contingency. Each nonzero belt perturbation is normalized to contribute the same order-one amount to the readout, while the zero state contributes none. Under any non-oracular state interface satisfying a minimal locality-of-access condition, no finite prefix can rule out activation of some sufficiently deep belt. The induced point readout therefore behaves like the existential predicate ``some belt is active'', exhibits FET at the zero state, and fails to denote. Semantic closure fails: the evolution--readout pipeline yields a localized point magnitude that is non-denoting relative to the fixed state interface. The result isolates a semantic obstruction to ontic readings of continuum dynamics. It is independent of computability, predictability, or measurement feasibility, and it holds despite smooth compact support, finite energy, and classical well-posedness. (shrink)

This paper establishes a general semantic constraint on physical ontology in continuum theories under explanatory realism and finite-information access. Working in the framework of represented state spaces, we show that ontic predicates must satisfy bounded input dependence: once true, their truth must persist under sufficiently small perturbations of state. This requirement forces the extension of any ontic predicate to be open in the representation topology. As a consequence, predicates defined by exact equalities, lower-dimensional subspaces, digit-level conditions, or algorithmic properties are (...) structurally non-denoting, even though they are mathematically well defined. Ontic structure in continuum physics must therefore take the form of open stability regions, not sharp boundary conditions. The result is theory-agnostic and applies to any physical framework whose states are modeled in continuum spaces and accessed through finite procedures, including classical field theories, dynamical systems, and quantum models. The theorem clarifies the boundary between mathematical structure and ontological structure in continuum descriptions and connects denotation to operational discrimination constraints. (shrink)

The Analysis of Matter is perhaps best known for marking Russell's rejection of phenomenalism and his development of a variety of Lockean representationalism–-Russell's causal theory of perception. This occupies Part 2 of the work. Part 1, which is certainly less well known, contains many observations on twentieth-century physics. Unfortunately, Russell's discussion of relativity and the foundations of physical geometry is carried out in apparent ignorance of Reichenbach's and Carnap's investigations in the same period. The issue of conventionalism in its then (...) contemporary form is simply not discussed. The only writers of the period who appear to have had any influence on Russell's conception of the philosophical issues raised by relativity were Whitehead and Eddington. Even the work of A. A. Robb fails to receive any extended discussion;1 although Robb's causal theory is certainly relevant to many of Russell's concerns, especially those voiced in Part 3, regarding the construction of points and the topology of space-time. In the case of quantum mechanics, the idiosyncrasy of Russell's selection of topics is more understandable, since the Heisenberg and Schrödinger theories were only just discovered. Nevertheless, it seems bizarre to a contemporary reader that Russell should have given such emphasis2 to G. N. Lewis's suggestion that an atom emits light only when there is another atom to receive it–-a suggestion reminiscent of Leibniz, and one to which Russell frequently returns. In short, the philosophical problems of modern physics with which Russell deals seem remote from the perspective of post-positivist philosophy of physics. (shrink)

Background: The education of medical students necessitates teaching not only the science of medicine but also the skills needed for ethical reflection and moral reasoning as well as professionalism. At the Université de Montréal, starting in 2004, third-year medical students were initiated to ethics and professionalism during a weekly seminar on clinical skills during their surgery rotation. Students had to recognize an ethical dilemma or a professionalism issue that occurred during the rotation and write a case narrative and reflection on (...) the moral issue. Method: Student narratives describing ethical or professionalism incidents were collected between 2004 and 2020. These were analyzed to identify the moral challenges that students experienced, and how they reacted to ethical dilemmas or professionalism issues. Results: Of the 1145 narratives collected, 396 were coded as an ethical dilemma, subdivided into end-of-life decisions, decision for treatment, dilemmas concerning justice and resource allocation, and student educational dilemmas including relationships with residents. Professional issues were more frequently reported (n=749), subdivided into communication of bad news, professional behaviour and attitude, consent, confidentiality, truthful disclosure of sensitive results, errors, professional responsibility and commitment and relationships with colleagues. In 40% of narratives there was a positive opinion about the issues reported, while in 60% students felt the ethical decision or professional attitude or conduct was less than ideal. Conclusion: This seminar was an effective means for medical students to identify and discuss the ethical and professional issues experienced during their clerkship – issues regarding communication were the primary concern followed by professional behaviour. These narratives provide a good picture of the hidden curriculum; and they show that students can reflect meaningfully on issues concerning ethics and professionalism. (shrink)

Computable Wavefunction Realism (CWFR) is a finite-information ontological framework for quantum theory derived from the semantic commitments of explanatory realism. Explanatory realism requires denotation stability of physical magnitudes and closure of admissible states under lawful evolution. Literal continuum ontology challenges these constraints through aggregation instability in the dynamical domain and resolution instability in the range of real-valued magnitudes. CWFR enforces semantic stability via four structural postulates: Lorentz-invariant spectral band-limitation, restriction to computable ontic states, admissible successor dynamics total on the admissible (...) domain, and restriction of physically meaningful predicates to those with open truth sets. The present paper develops the structural consequences of these constraints and establishes non-vacuity via explicit admissible successor constructions. CWFR is not proposed as a replacement for continuum quantum mechanics at the level of mathematical formalism, but as a restriction on ontological interpretation imposed by semantic stability conditions. Macroscopic structure arises from refinement geometry induced by admissible stability predicates, and probability assignments operate on locally finite refinement partitions. Extension to realistic interacting quantum field theories is identified as a programmatic direction rather than a completed result. (shrink)

The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered.

Recently, a version of realism has been offered to address the simplification strategies used in computational neuroscience. According to this view, computational models provide us with knowledge about the brain, but they should not be taken literally in _any_ sense, even rejecting the idea that the brain performs computations (computationalism). I acknowledge the need for considerations regarding simplification strategies in neuroscience and how they contribute to our interpretations of computational models; however, I argue that whether we should accept or reject (...) computationalism about the brain is a separate issue that can be addressed independently by a philosophical theory of physical computation. This takes seriously the idea that the brain performs computations while also taking an analogical stance toward computational models in neuroscience. I call this version of realism “Analogical Computational Realism.” Analogical Computational Realism is a realist view in virtue of being committed to computationalism while taking certain computational models to pick out real patterns that provide a how-possibly explanation without also thinking that the model is literally implemented in the brain. (shrink)

Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘ eligibility ’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but (...) instead flows naturally from three independently motivated elements; and to show that severe limitations afflict the proposal. In conclusion, I pick out the element of the eligibility response that is responsible for the limitations: future work in this area should therefore concentrate on amending this aspect of the overall theory. (shrink)

How do we determine whether individuals accept the actual consistency of a political argument instead of just its rhetorical good looks? This article answers this question by proposing an interpretation of political argument within the constraints of political liberalism. It utilises modern developments in the philosophy of logic and language to reclaim ‘meaningless nonsense’ from use as a partisan war cry and to build up political argument as something more than a power struggle between competing conceptions of the good. Standard (...) solutions for ‘clarifying’ meaning through descriptive definition encounter difficulties with the biases of status quo idioms (long noted by theorists like William Connolly and Quentin Skinner), as well as partisan translations and circularity. Collectively called linguistic gerrymandering, these difficulties threaten political liberalism’s underlying coherency. The proposed interpretation of political argument overcomes this with a new brand of conceptual analysis that can falsifiably determine whether rhetoric has hijacked political argument. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was, famously, not a fan of William Shakespeare. He wrote in 1946 that “Shakespeare's similes are, in the ordinary sense, bad.” But Wittgenstein’s opinion was not only one fueled by aesthetic dislike. This short website article argues that Wittgenstein sees in Shakespeare a fellow explorer of skepticism, but one willing to travel down dark alleys that Wittgenstein himself sought to avoid. (This article is a journalistic version of "To Not Understand, but Not Misunderstand: Wittgenstein on Shakespeare," in Wittgenstein (...) Reading, edited by Sascha Bru, Wolfgang Huemer, and Daniel Steuer [De Gruyter, 2013, 39-53].). (shrink)

Refinement geometry defines a directed subdivision structure over history-prefix spaces generated by admissible stability predicates. This paper analyzes the effective realizability of that structure within represented-space semantics. Stability predicates are formalized in uniformly semi-decidable witness form, yielding certified fact sets that evolve monotonically under refinement. A partitioning functional Pi maps finite-information access to a history into the corresponding directed family of refinement partitions. We prove that Pi is Type-2 computable: every finite portion of refinement structure depends on only finitely many (...) oracle interactions. Refinement asymmetry arises as a direct consequence of witness-based predicate semantics. Certified distinctions accumulate monotonically and are never revoked, establishing irreversibility at the level of refinement structure independent of dynamical assumptions. We further show that the canonical maximal partition induced by admissible predicates is computably generable through directed refinement of finite certification stages. Worlds, defined as blocks of the canonical maximal partition, therefore form a recursively enumerable set. Worldhood need not be decidable, and maximality is not finitely certifiable, yet every world arises through effective generation of finite refinement prefixes. In the effective setting, each refinement stage induces a computably presented equivalence relation on a countable domain of names, and branching corresponds to monotone contraction of indistinguishability rather than enlargement of the underlying history space. These results provide a computability-theoretic classification of refinement geometry, establishing constructive generation of maximal distinction structure under finite-information semantics and clarifying the effective consequences of stability-based refinement. (shrink)

A standard line in the contemporary philosophical literature has it that physical theories are equivalent only when they agree on their empirical content, where this empirical content is often understood as being encoded in the equations of motion of those theories. In this article, we question whether it is indeed the case that the empirical content of a theory is exhausted by its equations of motion, showing that (for example) considerations of boundary conditions play a key role in the empirical (...) equivalence (or otherwise) of theories. Having argued for this, we show that philosophical claims made by Weatherall (2016) that electromagnetism in the Faraday tensor formalism is equivalent to electromagnetism in the vector potential formalism, and by Knox (2011) that general relativity is equivalent to teleparallel gravity, can both be called into question. We then show that properly considering the role of boundary conditions in theory structure can potentially restore these claims of equivalence and close with some remarks on the pragmatics of adjudications on theory identity. (shrink)

This paper investigates a puzzle about commitment. On the one hand, it is natural to hold that agents can be committed to propositions that they do not believe. On the other hand, because they are not logically omniscient, agents often have beliefs which are logically inconsistent. But then, since an inconsistent set of propositions entails every proposition, it seems that we have to hold that most or all agents are committed to every proposition. This consequence threatens to trivialize the idea (...) of commitment. To resolve this puzzle about commitment, this paper draws on a structural similarity between theories of commitment and Robert Stalnaker’s account of belief. Stalnaker holds that agents can have fragmented beliefs: they can be related to multiple internally consistent but jointly incompatible belief states. When this happens, they can believe inconsistent propositions without believing every proposition as long as the inconsistent propositions are located in different fragments. the paper develops a similar strategy for thinking about commitment: beliefs can either be co-believed or not, and an agent is committed to the consequences of a set of beliefs only if those beliefs are co-believed. (shrink)

Christopher Cowie argues that moral error theory is uniquely placed to avoid embracing any of the troubling and counter-intuitive horns of moral paradoxes. Contra Cowie, I argue that moral non-cognitivists can also avoid embracing any such troubling and counter-intuitive horns. Rather than supporting moral error theory, I argue that moral paradoxes more precisely support moral nihilism—a first-order view that is consistent with moral error theory and with moral non-cognitivism. Moreover, I argue that reconstructing the argument from moral paradoxes as an (...) argument for moral nihilism enhances its philosophical significance in two ways. First, the argument from moral paradoxes is the first unified argument in support of moral nihilism. Second, given that the logical space of moral nihilism is greater than the logical space of moral error theory, the threat that the argument from moral paradoxes poses to moral philosophy is more serious than Cowie acknowledges. (shrink)

Since it was inspired by Bernard and developed and named by Cannon, the conceptof homeostasis has been invoked by many as the central theoretical framework for physiology. Ithas also been the target of numerous criticisms that have elicited the introduction of a plethoraof alternative concepts. We argue that many of the criticisms actually target the more restrictiveaccount of homeostasis advanced by the cyberneticists. What was crucial to Bernard and Cannonwas a focus on the maintenance of the organism as the goal (...) of physiological regulation. We analysehow Bernard’s and Cannon’s broad conception of what was required to maintain the organismwas narrowed to negative feedback, characterized in terms of setpoints, by the cyberneticistsand demonstrate how many of the alternative concepts challenge the role of setpoints – treatingthem as variable in light of circumstances or in anticipation of future circumstances, or asdispensable altogether. To support our analysis, we draw on the experimental and theoreticalwork on thermoregulation, a phenomenon that has been considered as a paradigmatic example ofhomeostasis and has been a common focus of those advancing alternative concepts. To integratethe insights advanced by the original proponents of homeostasis and the theorists proposingreplacement notions we advance a framework in which regulation is viewed from the perspectiveof maintaining the organism. (shrink)

Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how more complex mental states (...) emerge from the mental features of the fundamental features. Here I explore the idea that a new form of aggregative emergence, which I call 'combinatorial infusion', could shed light on this problem and bolster the prospects for this form of panpsychism. (shrink)

There are unusual challenges in ethics for RAS. Perhaps the issue can best be summarised as needing to consider “technically informed ethics”. The technology of RAS raises issues that have an ethical dimension, and perhaps uniquely so due to the possibility of moving human decision-making which is implicitly ethically informed to computer systems. Further, if seeking solutions to these problems – ethically aligned design, to use the IEEE’s terminology – then the solutions must be technically meaningful, capable of realisation, capable (...) of assurance, and suitable as a basis for regulation. Thus, ethics for RAS is a rich, complex multi-disciplinary concern, and perhaps more complex than many other ethical issues facing society today. It is also fast-moving. This paper has endeavoured to give an accessible introduction to some of the key issues, noting that many of them are quite subtle, and it is not possible to do them full justice in such a short document. However, we have sought to counterbalance this by giving an extensive list of initiatives, standards, etc. that focus on ethics of RAS and AI, see Annex A. (shrink)

Since the publication of Homo Sacer Giorgio Agamben has become one of the world's most revered and controversial thinkers. His ideas on our current political situation have found many supporters as well as garnering strong criticism from some quarters. While his wider thoughts on topics such as language, potentiality, life, law, messianism, power, and aesthetics have had significant impact on such diverse fields as philosophy, law, theology, history, sociology, politics, cultural and literary studies. Yet although Agamben is much read, his (...) work has often been misunderstood. -/- Agamben and Indifference aims to provide clarity around all the vexing issues that have been associated with Agamben's philosophy over the last two decades or more. The book is the first to fully take into account Agamben's important recent publications, which clarify his method, complete his ideas on power, and finally reveal the role of language in his overall system. Commenting in detail on these recent books alongside re-readings of the central texts from across Agamben's career, William Watkin presents a critical overview of Agamben's work that aims to give a portrait of exactly why this thinker of indifferent and suspensive legal, political, ontological and living states can rightfully be considered one of the most important philosophers in the world today. -/- Table of Contents Introduction / Part One: The Archaeology of Indifference / 1. The Signature of All Things: Paradigms and Signatures / 2. Philosophical Archaeology / 3. The Language of Death: Indifferent Difference as Such in Hegel and Heidegger / 4. The Coming Community: An Essay on Indifferent Singularities / 5. Towards a Deictic Ontology or Being-thus As-such / Part Two: Difference and Indifference / 6. Derrida and Agamben: Différance Makes Indifference Communicable / 7. Potentiality, Virtuality and Impotentiality: Agamben and Deleuze / 8. The Two Bartlebies: Deleuze, Agamben and Immanence / Part Three: The Indifference of Indifference: Politics, Language, Life / 9. Homo Sacer and the Politics of Indifference / 10. The Kingdom and the Glory: The Articulated Inoperativity of Power / 11. The Sacrament of Language: Language as Communicability / Conclusion: The End of Lying and the Birth of Living / Bibliography / Index. (shrink)

[This download includes the table of contents and chapter 1.] -/- When we praise, blame, punish, or reward people for their actions, we are holding them responsible for what they have done. Common sense tells us that what makes human beings responsible has to do with their minds and, in particular, the relationship between their minds and their actions. Yet the empirical connection is not necessarily obvious. The “guilty mind” is a core concept of criminal law, but if a defendant (...) on trial for murder were found to have serious brain damage, which brain parts or processes would have to be damaged for him to be considered not responsible, or less responsible, for the crime? The authors argue that evidence from neuroscience and the other cognitive sciences can illuminate the nature of responsibility and agency. They go on to offer a novel and comprehensive neuroscientific theory of human responsibility. (shrink)