This paper offers a critical reappraisal of the sport ethic through the lens of psychoanalytic theory. Building on the foundational work of Hughes and Coakley (1991), the sport ethic is defined as a normative framework, which compels athletes to pursue excellence through sacrificial commitment, self-discipline, tolerance, and a refusal to accept limitation. Though celebrated, ultimately, athletic subjectivity is legitimatised through practices that are harmful to an athlete’s health, identity, and social relations. Whereas existing critiques of the sport (...) ethic have focused on its normative demands, this paper shifts the analysis from identity and ideology to the role of desire. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is argued that while athletes, and fans, are socialised into an overconformity with the sport ethic, such adherence is sustained via the subject’s desire for the very sacrifices it requires. This desire is not reducible to rational intention or external coercion but is instead sustained through forms of unconscious enjoyment (jouissance), in the form of self-sabotage, bodily harm, or the pursuit of impossible ideals. On this basis, the paper challenges moralising accounts that treat overconformity as a correctable pathology or failure of awareness, insisting instead that an ongoing adherence to the sport ethic must be conceived in relation to the sacrifices and excesses it posits. The paper concludes by calling for a renewed ethical relation to sport—one that does not seek to eliminate desire or resolve contradiction, but to critically inhabit them. By recognising that desire is not a flaw but constitutive of the subject, the paper opens a space for resisting blind conformity to the sport ethic through confronting the impossible demands that give it meaning. In doing so, a new way of approaching sport, beyond utility, identity, or moral virtue, is provided. (shrink)

Trash-talking holds a contested place in sport, sometimes celebrated for its entertainment value yet often condemned for undermining respect and sportsmanship. This chapter examines trash-talking through the lens of the ethics of influence, situating it between impermissible conduct such as cheating and unproblematic expression such as playful banter. The chapter first clarifies what counts as trash talk and gives examples of its diverse forms. Then it evaluates its moral status. Existing views are critically assessed. The chapter advances an (...) alternative account that frames trash-talking as a form of manipulation, morally troubling insofar as it is simply indifferent to the revealing of reasons. This perspective reveals the practice as ethically troubling and illustrative of the moral tensions at the heart of competitive sport. (shrink)

In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many international sports organisations banned not just athletes from representing Russia, but also their participation in the competitions. I examine the ethical justifiability of such individual-targeting sports sanctions through just war theory and consequentialism. I argue that just war theory judges such individual-targeting sports sanctions as ethically wrong for targeting athletes who are not agents of strategic threat, and for failing to minimise harm when feasible. I argue that consequentialism also judges such (...) sanctions as wrong if quantitative empirical findings about economic sanctions were to be generalised to individual-targeting sports sanctions. When not referring to such evidence, consequentialism is either neutral about such sanctions, or unable to produce useful judgements due to empirical uncertainties. Based on the above considerations, we have stronger reasons to believe that such sanctions are wrong than otherwise. (shrink)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 6, Issue 1, Page 90-94, February 2012.

This paper explores the notion that business calls for an adversarial ethic, akin to that of sport. On this view, because of their competitive structure, both sport and business call for behaviours that are contrary to ‘ordinary morality’, and yet are ultimately justified because of the goods they facilitate. I develop three objections to this analogy. Firstly, there is an important qualitative difference between harms risked voluntarily and harms risked involuntarily. Secondly, the goods achieved by adversarial relationships in (...) sport go beyond the function of sport, i.e. to entertain audiences. Thirdly, the most plausible account of the athlete’s motivational development starts with their love of the sport, which can explain a commitment to the sporting ethics in a way that is not paralleled in business. I close by drawing attention to the ways in which an Aristotelian conception of business ethics may be able to accommodate these objections. (shrink)

In Ancient Greece, the figure of the hero was identified as a demigod, possessed of altruistic and virtuous deeds. When Pierre de Coubertin reinstated the Olympic Games, the athlete was personified as a modern hero. Its antithesis, the anti-hero, has more virtue that defects, no evil but he does not care on the means to achieve his goals. In the eyes of everyone involved in sports competition, these characters captivate and at the same time, create conflicts of ethics and (...) aesthetics. The purpose of this paper is to perform an ethical reflection linked to principles that contribute for the human growth and accomplishment, as well as the aesthetic on the perception of the sensitive, reverberated by sensations and feelings emerging from athletes. Connecting the ethic with the aesthetic spheres, we could have in the sports a phenomenon walking toward a common point between moral and aesthetic, between the good and the beauty. (shrink)

Ethical questions normally arise in sport because its participants are human moral agents and because its practice community entails the observance of rules and responsibilities that humans generally owe one another in a social practice of voluntary competition. Since nature sports are not defined by this kind of inter-agential activity, it would appear that there are no comparable ethical constraints on their pursuit. This paper considers conflicts of preference versus right between humans, how these are resolved, and whether these (...) rights are relevant in assessment of nature sport activity vis-à-vis nonhuman creatures. Relying on a goods perspective instead of a rights framework, via Korsgaard, I argue against an assumption that human preference is sufficient to override consideration of nonhuman animals’ functional goods. (shrink)

It has become increasingly popular for sports fans, pundits, coaches and players to appeal to ideas of ‘sporting integrity’ when voicing their approval or disapproval of some aspect of the sporting world. My goal in this paper will be to examine whether there is any way to understand this idea in a way that both makes sense of the way in which it is used and presents a distinctly ‘sporting’ form of integrity. I will look at three recent high-profile sporting (...) incidents that caused sporting integrity to be called into question. I will then examine three different ways in which philosophers have sought to understand integrity and examine whether any of these accounts can provide us with a plausible account of sporting integrity. I will argue that such an account can be given and show how this helps us to understand the three cases. (shrink)

Throughout one’s career, a professional sports practitioner is confronted with various choices to make, ranging from coaching a fair match or offering opportunities for selected individuals to win; showing true sportsmanship or venturing for a better compensation; to even sticking to one’s home team or accepting a better offer. This is faced by all sports practitioners within the same industry: athletes, coaches, managers, and even team owners. In making these choices, individuals recognize essential ethical considerations. However, a primary factor that (...) influences them—albeit without them knowing—is their alienated state. The preferences of the sports practitioner mirror society’s response to the demands of the Culture Industry. He or she would opt to choose what the Industry is offering and uphold these standards. After all, sports is a social phenomenon that has undergone changes throughout the years, along with other aspects of society. It bears the impact of the Aufklärung, the true question of being enlightened and of being cultured. Thus, sports could be seen as constituting another level in the individual’s (and even society’s) alienated sphere. This paper seeks to shed light on the ethical considerations of the sports practitioner, in particular the heavy influence of the Culture Industry, the individual’s alienated state, and his or her response. I am interested in the play of power-relations among the sports practitioners and society, both dominated by the Industry. The paper does not present an exhaustive claim enlisting all considerations, but merely critiques the present setup. By presenting individuals’ (ultimately social) alienated state, I show that their choices are in fact social, even though they would seem to be solely individualistic in terms of their situated-ness in sporting events. Thus, this paper shows the heavy influence of the Industry in the continuous power relations between sports practitioners and society, as well as the alienated state of both. (shrink)

Trust is a topic of longstanding philosophical interest. It is indispensable to every kind of coordinated human activity, from sport to scientific research. Even more, trust is necessary for the successful dissemination of knowledge, and by extension, for nearly any form of practical deliberation and planning. Without trust, we could achieve few of our goals and would know very little. Despite trust’s fundamental importance in human life, there is substantial philosophical disagreement about what trust is, and further, how trusting (...) is normatively constrained and best theorized about in relation to other things we value. This entry is divided into three sections, which explore key (and sometimes interconnected) ethical and epistemological themes in the philosophy of trust: (1) The Nature of Trust; (2) The Normativity of Trust, and (3) The Value of Trust. (shrink)

This editorial introduction to the special issue, ‘Sport and the Anthropocene’, examines the entanglements between sport, human activity, and the planet’s accelerating ecological crisis. Framing the Anthropocene as a new epoch, marked by irreversible human-induced environmental change, the article highlights the catastrophic consequences of climate disruption, resource depletion, and socio-political instability. Yet, amid collapse, the Anthropocene also offers new beginnings, which can prompt critical reflections on human exceptionalism. In light of the sociology of sport’s delayed engagement with (...) these beginnings, especially important given sport’s material dependence on vulnerable ecologies, the special issue challenges the adequacy of conventional sustainability discourses, which externalize nature and uphold anthropocentric assumptions. Instead, we call for a reorientation towards our ecological entanglement and temporal complexity, examining how objects, surfaces, and environments shape movement, meaning, and our planetary future(s). In doing so, the issue foregrounds diverse theoretical and empirical contributions that position sport as both problem and possibility. Ultimately, we contend that sport must be reimagined through the lens of the Anthropocene, indeed, as a site of contested and contingent relations where ecological, ethical, and existential stakes converge. (shrink)

Is it possible to remain a sports fan when prominent sports teams and events are utilized to “sportswash” human rights abuses and other controversies? Indeed, while there is an abundance of analyses critiquing different instances of sportswashing, the exploration of the role of sportswashing and its connection to the “sports fan” presents an essential and necessary area of investigation and theoretical inquiry. To unpick this dilemma, this article proposes the concept of “fetishistic disavowal” to help theorize the impact of sportswashing, (...) as well as its relation to the sports fan and critical sports academic. This argues that, as spectators and fans of sport—and, moreover, as critical academics—we often acknowledge and accept that sport is used to perpetuate and even maintain a variety of social, economic, and political inequalities. Yet, while we are aware of such knowledge, we nonetheless remain fully capable of disavowing this very knowledge as an accepted part of sport. Given this, it is argued that the fetishization of sport can provide a suitable conduit for the fetishistic disavowal that sportswashing requires, with the concept offering a unique way of approaching sport’s inherent contradictions, while also theorizing how subjects relate to these contradictions as part of their involvement in and with sport. Where sportswashing directly implicates the fan in its implementation—relying upon a level of fetishistic disavowal between the fan and their club and proffering a disavowed acknowledgement of the effects of sportswashing and its interpellation through sport—this article outlines how applications of fetishistic disavowal provide a unique theoretical lens through which analyses of sport, and its ethical significance, can be critiqued. (shrink)

The most plausible line of anti-doping argumentation starts with the fact that performance enhancing substances are harmful and put at considerable risk the health and the life of those who indulge in the overwhelming promises these substances hold. From a liberal point of view, however, this is not a strong reason neither to morally reject doping altogether, nor to put a blanket ban on it; on the contrary, allowing adult, competent and informed athletes to have access to performance enhancement drugs (...) is often showcased as a liberty-related right of noninterference. In this article I will first discuss doping from the liberal point of view, especially in the light of the harm principle as it was introduced by Mill and elaborated by his successors, most notably by Joel Feinberg. Then I will examine whether – and to what degree – one’s decision to receive performance enhancement drugs would mean to use humanity in one’s own person only as a means, which would be self-defeating in the light of Kantian ethics. From this I will move one step backwards to what I consider as the core question concerning the ethics of doping, the one that is logically prior to any other in my view, and concerns the consistency of the thesis that doping may be compatible with sport. I will argue that there is an inherent logical antinomy between doing sport and using performance enhancement drugs, one that presents any argumentation in favor of doping as essentially self-contradictory. (shrink)

Who should be allowed to participate in what category in various sporting contexts is a pressing moral issue, not least of all for youth athletes. Currently there’s significant legal, social, and philosophical pressure to exclude some athletes from competing in the categories that they’d prefer. This paper is specifically concerned with high school sports, although much of the discussion can generalize to other sporting contexts. Specifically, I engage with the argument that high school sports should exclude transgender athletes from participating (...) on the team that best matches their gender identity on the basis that allowing athletes to compete in the gender category that best matches their gender identity would undermine competitive fairness, and so would undermine the purpose of high school sport. But, as I argue, this argument misunderstands sport. Sporting normativity must take into account not only competitive values, most prominently fairness, but also other values relevant to the particular sporting practice at hand. Sport is not simply a competition devoid of normatively relevant context. In this paper, I draw from the philosophy of sport literature to argue that this singular focus on fairness in arguments for exclusive participation policies is misguided from the point of view of high school sport, and, further, that it is in the interest of high school sport to have inclusive gender categories. (shrink)

Scandals in business (such as Volkswagen’s dieselgate and, earlier, the Enron scandal), politics and the public sector (the Petrobas affair in Brazil, for in-stance), sports (think of the corruption charges against fifa’s Sepp Blatter) and the military (Abu Ghraib springs to mind) have brought the matter of ethical leadership to the forefront. But although this increased attention has had the collateral benefit that most handbooks on leadership now pay more attention to the importance of leading ethically, this will generally still (...) be in a separate chapter. To make thing worse, that chapter on leadership is more often than not one the last chapters of the book, perhaps followed by a chapter on, say, diversity. This all testifies to the fact that leadership and ethics are ha-bitually treated as related though separate spheres. It would be much better, of course, if leadership and ethics were treated as belonging to a single domain. Ethics is clearly an aspect of leadership, and not a separate approach that ex-ists alongside other approaches to leadership such as the trait approach, the situational approach, etc.. Interestingly, this thinking and writing about ethical leadership as just one approach among many other leadership styles appears to be a relatively recent invention. In the works of Plato, Plutarch, Machiavelli and Locke, for example, we see (political) leadership and ethics dealt with as a single subject. It was not before the twentieth century that we saw the rise of a separate leadership industry. Its results are largely unimpressive; it has not made leaders necessarily more effective, let alone more ethical. (shrink)

The first of its kind, this anthology in the burgeoning field of technology ethics offers students and other interested readers 32 chapters, each written in an accessible and lively manner specifically for this volume. The chapters are conveniently organized into five sections: I. Perspectives on Technology and its Value II. Technology and the Good Life III. Computer and Information Technology IV. Technology and Business V. Biotechnologies and Enhancement A hallmark of the volume is multidisciplinary contributions both in analytic and (...) continental philosophy and across several hot-button topics of interest to students, including the ethics of autonomous vehicles, psychotherapeutic phone apps, and bio-enhancement of cognition and in sports. The volume editors, both teachers of technology ethics, have compiled a set of original and timely chapters that will advance scholarly debate and stimulate fascinating and lively classroom discussion. An online eResources site provides a glossary of all relevant terms, sample classroom activities/ discussion questions relevant for chapters, and links to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries and other relevant online materials. Key Features: Examines the most pivotal ethical questions around our use of technology, equipping readers to better understand technology's promises and perils Explores throughout a central tension raised by technological progress: maintaining social stability vs. pursuing dynamic social improvements Provides ample coverage of the pressing issues of free speech and productive online discourse. (shrink)

This chapter examines the longstanding philosophical issue of how to define sport. It begins by presenting the challenge that there may be no single set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, which adequately captures the meaning and range of activities commonly grouped under the term, including McBride’s argument that both the intension and extension of ‘sport’ are inherently vague, rendering attempts to produce a classical definition futile. For contrast, the chapter presents Suits’ influential account, according to which sports (...) are goal-directed, rule-bound, voluntarily hindered, physical skill-based activities with stable popularity. To scrutinize Suits’ classical account, the chapter provides an overview of a wide array of “hard cases”, and shows how these cases generate persistent ambiguities for Suits’ conditions, particularly with respect to rule-boundedness, the nature and degree of physical skill, and the relevance of popularity or historical stability. The chapter argues, that some ambiguities and disagreements arise because participants rely on different notions of what it is to define, and distinguishes four types of definitions: idealist, lexical, stipulative, and explicative. It further argues that differences in the approach to defining are often motivated by the practical purposes a definition of sports serves. The chapter concludes that definitions remain useful tools for structuring inquiry and clarifying arguments, but cannot by themselves resolve normative questions concerning how various activities should be labelled or treated. Instead, clarity about the purpose of a definition, and humility regarding its limits, are essential for productive conceptual analysis of sport. (shrink)

In earlier contributions, I have drawn attention to how some people teach their children: do your best in the sport competition and if you lose, that’s life. But other people teach their children something else: if the opponent is overwhelmingly likely to win, do the minimum. I think this is a different social class perhaps, sometimes anyway. I have come upon a R.K. Narayan story in which a boy is being encouraged to complain not necessarily when a person merits (...) complaint but whenever complaining best serves one’s ends: rational actor complaints; economics as rational strategy. I present a discussion of the story as a dialogue, with a character called JKURT. Apologies PhilPapers, I have been doing well and I feel this material is IMPORTANT. (shrink)

Over the last decades we have witnessed a proliferation of new human rights claims (e.g. the ‘human right’ to internet access) . But Milan Kundera (1991) reminds us that not all desires are human rights. Trans women athletes (and their supporters) often claim that there is a human right to sport and they derive a further ‘human right’ from this: the right to compete in the sex category with which they identify (i.e. the female category). The purpose of this (...) article is to critically assess these two claims: 1. every person has a human right to compete in sport; 2. trans women have a human right to compete in the female category in sport. (shrink)

It has been argued that competitive elite sport both (i) reduces the humanity of athletes by turning them into beings whose sole value is determined in relation to others, and (ii) is motivated by a celebration of the genetically superior and humiliation of the weak. This paper argues that while (i) is a morally reproachable attitude to competition, it is not what competitive elite sport revolves around, and that (ii) simply is not the essence of competitive elite (...) class='Hi'>sport. Competitive elite sport is an exploration of the physical and mental demands of sport. Finally, the paper explores a number of consequences of the different views of sport with respect to the problem of intersexual women. (shrink)

Sport is one of the first areas in which enhancement has become commonplace. It is also one of the first areas in which the use of enhancement technologies has been heavily regulated. Some have thus seen sport as a testing ground for arguments about whether to permit enhancement. However, I argue that there are fairness-based objections to enhancement in sport that do not apply as strongly in some other areas of human activity. Thus, I claim that there (...) will often be a stronger case for permitting enhancement outside of sport than for permitting enhancement in sport. I end by considering some methodological implications of this conclusion. (shrink)

This paper discusses two main types of refusal to engage with teams or individuals in sports competitions on the grounds of (1) association with actions of governments or organisations that are deemed by the objector to be unacceptable, as in demands for boycotts or expulsions of specific groups, and (2) where an apparently inappropriate inclusion threatens the coherence of sport or the rights of other participants. The primary concern in this paper is the underlying moral stance of the subject (...) who engages in such actions (rather than those actions themselves), specifically, their understanding of themselves and of others as moral subjects. It is argued that whether we think such actions are morally justified depends to large extent on whether we also think that those whom we boycott, exclude, or include are moral subjects with the right to claim consideration from us, and from whom we too can claim consideration. That is, whether recognition functions as a reciprocal action between moral subjects. This is discussed with particular reference to Darwall's second-person standpoint and de Beauvoir's criticism of abstract ideals as inadequate for an existentialist ethic that respects the autonomy of humans beings as such. It is argued that all participants in sport, as in society, have the same fundamental authority to make claims and to be accountable, and that we commit an important wrong by claiming a superior moral authority to determine action that fails to take into account the subjectivity and authority of others. Yet, at the same time, we also need to take account of the logic of sport as a particular kind of voluntary practice that incorporates critical ethical principles of equal respect through fairness. (shrink)

-/- Violence in Sports and Public Life: A Discourse on the Universal Law of Balance By Angelito Malicse -/- The human experience, whether in the structured environment of sports or the open arena of society, is governed by universal natural laws. Among these, the law of balance holds a central place. It dictates not only the harmony of ecosystems and physical systems but also the inner workings of human thought, emotion, and decision-making. When we compare how violence is treated in (...) sports versus public life, we are not merely observing a cultural or legal distinction—we are witnessing two very different systemic approaches to managing imbalance. -/- In many competitive sports, particularly those involving physical contact like boxing, hockey, or mixed martial arts, certain degrees of aggression and conflict are built into the structure of the game. These activities are bound by rules, referees, safety equipment, and mutual consent. While the public may witness moments of violence—such as a fight on the ice or a punch in the ring—these actions occur within a controlled system. There is a start and an end, boundaries are clear, and consequences are predictable. This kind of conflict, while seemingly chaotic, actually operates within a feedback loop that functions to restore balance—either emotionally, competitively, or interpersonally among players (Coakley, 2009). -/- Here, the law of balance Is honored. Participants and spectators alike recognize that these moments of conflict are not personal but part of the system’s self-correction mechanism. They are expressions of tension release, accountability, or retaliation within limits. Importantly, these systems also include educational components: athletes are trained to control their behavior, accept penalties, and operate within the boundaries of fair play (Shogan, 1999). In this sense, sports act as a microcosm of a balanced society—where temporary imbalance is allowed only to maintain long-term equilibrium. -/- In stark contrast, acts of violence in public life are treated with seriousness and condemnation. Public violence is not bound by a consensual framework; it is unregulated, unanticipated, and often rooted in emotional instability, misinformation, injustice, or oppression. When one individual harms another in public, the action disrupts not just personal safety but the perceived stability of the collective environment. There are no referees, no agreed-upon rules, and no structural mechanism immediately available to restore balance. In such cases, the law of balance is violated, and the system falls into disorder (Rawls, 1971). -/- This is where the importance of police forces and intervention by responsible individuals or institutions becomes vital. The police serve as society’s designated referees in the public arena. They exist to neutralize immediate threats, restore order, and provide a stabilizing feedback mechanism when balance is lost. Their role, when exercised lawfully and ethically, aligns with the natural law of balance: to prevent further escalation, protect innocent lives, and return the environment to a state of peace and security (Goldstein, 1990). -/- Yet intervention alone is not enough. To complete the cycle of restoring balance, society depends on the justice system—a formal structure that examines, judges, and corrects the violations of law and public order. The justice system plays an essential role in ensuring that violent actions are not left unchecked or unresolved. When it functions properly, it acts as a rational and fair feedback mechanism, offering proportionate consequences and opportunities for reform (Becker, 1968; Tyler, 2006). It provides victims with a sense of protection and resolution, and it holds perpetrators accountable in a way that aims not for revenge, but for correction and reintegration into the societal system. -/- A well-functioning justice system honors the universal law of balance by recognizing the interconnectedness of cause and effect. It does not respond with disproportionate punishment or allow impunity; instead, it seeks to restore harmony—not just between individuals, but within the collective consciousness of society. When the justice system fails, either through corruption, delay, or bias, the feedback loop breaks, and public confidence in societal balance erodes. This often leads to further unrest, vigilante justice, or systemic breakdown (Packer, 1968). -/- From the perspective of natural law, particularly my universal formula on the problem of free will, this distinction becomes crucial. Human behavior, whether on the playing field or in daily life, is subject to natural feedback. A person who violates balance—whether through unregulated violence or willful ignorance—disturbs both their internal system (mind, emotion, reason) and the external system (family, society, nation, nature). The result is not only personal suffering but systemic dysfunction. -/- This underscores the need for a holistic educational system—one that does not merely teach skills or memorized facts, but one that programs the individual mind to recognize and operate within the universal law of balance. When individuals are raised with an understanding of how imbalance affects not just themselves but the interconnected systems around them, they develop the inner regulators necessary to live peacefully and responsibly (Noddings, 2013; Freire, 1970). -/- Such an educational system would mirror the structure of organized sports. It would involve feedback mechanisms, critical thinking, emotional self-regulation, and an internal sense of fairness. In this system, violence—whether verbal, emotional, or physical—is never glorified but understood as a sign of imbalance, an alarm that calls for restoration, not retaliation. -/- Leadership plays a vital role here. Leaders, like referees in a game, must understand the natural law of balance and guide their communities accordingly. They must know when to allow constructive conflict and when to intervene. More importantly, they must support both justice and educational reforms that embed the law of balance into the foundation of human development. -/- The end goal Is not the elimination of conflict, but its proper regulation and transformation. Only through this lens—where balance is the ultimate law, and all behavior is subject to feedback—can human society evolve beyond cycles of violence, whether on the field, in public spaces, or within institutions. This is the path to lasting harmony, both within and beyond the boundaries of organized sport. -/- References -/- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy. -/- Coakley, J. (2009). Sports in Society: Issues and Controversies. McGraw-Hill. -/- Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Herder and Herder. -/- Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. McGraw-Hill. -/- Noddings, N. (2013). Education and Democracy in the 21st Century. Teachers College Press. -/- Packer, H. L. (1968). The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. Stanford University Press. -/- Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. -/- Shogan, D. (1999). The Making of High-Performance Athletes: Discipline, Diversity, and Ethics. University of Toronto Press. -/- Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press. -/- . (shrink)

During live sporting events, fans often create intense atmospheres in stadiums, expressing support for their own local players and discouragement for the opposition. Crowd hostility directed at opposition players surprisingly elicits contrasting reactions across different sports. Tennis players, for example, have reported that hostile crowds are hurtful and disrespectful, whereas footballers often praise and encourage such hostility. What explains this tension? Why are hostile atmospheres considered wrong for some athletes, and not for others? We argue that creating hostile atmospheres for (...) opposition players functions as a form of hostile affective scaffolding, as it scaffolds affective states in such a way that harms the interests of the opposition athletes, while promoting the interests of fans. These hostile atmospheres wrong the scaffolded insofar they constitute a form of recognition disrespect, and to the extent that they violate the formal rules and conventional norms internal to the sporting practices. Although the focus is on the sporting context, our analysis reveals significant implications for a more nuanced understanding of what hostile scaffolding is, and how we should understand its normativity. The existing literature views hostile scaffolding as constituted by a setback to the overall interests of the scaffolded, and that the wrong-making feature of this scaffolding is necessarily explained by harm. Instead, we argue that hostile scaffolding should be understood as hostile relative to a set of interests that an agent has, not just their overall interests, and that the wrong-making features of hostile scaffolding are not limited to harms. (shrink)

Sanctions such as those applied by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, or rather the actions of implementing and maintaining them, at the very least implicitly purport to have moral justification. While the rhetoric used to justify sanctions is clearly moralistic, even sanctions themselves, as worded, often include phrases indicating moral implication. On May 30, 1992, United Nation Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockage on all trade and all scientific, cultural and sports exchanges with Serbia and Montenegro. In (...) addition to expressing the usual "concern' and "dismay" regarding various events, the language of this Resolution also includes, on three occasions, unmistakably moral language "deploring" failures in meeting the demands of earlier resolutions.' There is no question that sanctions have political, economic, military and trategic consequences for the sanctioned state, perhaps exactly as desired by the sanctioning party. However, the question raised in this essay is whether in addition to these consequences, sanctions also produce morally reprehensible consequences that undermine their often-cited moral justification. If so, international economic sanctions are an immoral means of achieving primarily political goals. Six morally significant consequences are: 1) The unethical, elevated susceptibility of the sanctioned to olitical (and other forms of) manipulation, 2) the inherent and unjust paternalism in the process of sanctioning, 3) the abandonment of strict moral criteria on virtually all levels of evaluation, primarily inside the sanctioned country, but also in sanctioning states best exhibited in the attitudes toward the sanctioned, 4) the general decline in moral consciousness, 5) the subsequent rise of many forms of violence within the sanctioned state in connection with the increase in lawlessness, and a general decline of expectations in all areas of life, and 6) the continual, arbitrary redefining of conditions for a final lifting of sanctions. In light of this moral phenomenology we shall argue that sanctions, lacking in moral justification, are simply a means for achieving the mentioned immoral goals. Furthermore, the argument will be that sanctions are a form of siege and, as such, an act of war, requiring the sort of justification that would be needed to justify a war. (shrink)

Sports physicians are continuously confronted with new biotechnological innovations. This applies not only to doping in sports, but to all kinds of so-called enhancement methods. One fundamental problem regarding the sports physician's self-image consists in a blurred distinction between therapeutic treatment and non-therapeutic performance enhancement. After a brief inventory of the sports physician's work environment I reject as insufficient the attempts to resolve the conflict of the sports physician by making it a classificatory problem. Followed by a critical assessment of (...) some ideas from the US President's Council on Bioethics, the formulation of ethical codes and attempts regarding a moral topography, it is argued that the sports physician's conflict cannot be resolved by the distinction between therapy and enhancement. Instead, we also have to consider the possibility that the therapy-based paradigm of medicine cannot do justice to the challenges of the continuously increasing technical manipulability of the human body and even our cognitive functions as well. At the same time we should not adhere to transhumanist ideas, because non-therapeutic interventions require clear criteria. Based on assistive technologies an alternative framework can be sketched that allows for the integration of therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes. After a thorough definition of standards and criteria, the role of the sports physician might be defined as that of an assistant for enhancement. Yet the process of defining such an alternative framework is a societal and political task that cannot be accomplished by the sports physicians themselves. Until these questions are answered sports physicians continue to find themselves in a structural dilemma that they partially can come to terms with through personal integrity. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that considering nature different from us, human beings (qua rational, cultural, religious and social actors), is detrimental to our engagement for the preservation of nature. An obvious example is animal rights, a deep concern for all living beings, including non-human living creatures, which is understandable only if we approach nature, without fearing it, as something which should remain outside of our true home. “Walking with the earth” aims at questioning any similar preconceptions in the wide sense, (...) including allegoric-poetic contributions. We invited 14 authors from 4 continents to express all sorts of ways of saying why caring is so important, why togetherness, being-with each others, as a spiritual but also embodied ethics is important in a divided world. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that philosophers of sport should avoid value-laden definitions of sport; that is, they should avoid building into the definition of sport that they are inherently worthwhile activities. Sports may very well often be worthwhile as a contingent matter, but this should not be taken to be a core feature included in the definition of sport. I start by outlining what I call the ‘legitimacy-conferring’ element of the category ‘sport’. I then (...) argue that we ought not to include such a dimension in our definition of sport, on the grounds that it confuses issues of description with issues of definition: the issue of what sport does with what sport is. Following this, I consider a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to defining sport; Kevin Schieman’s argument that sports are necessarily good games; and the oft-cited wide-following and institutional criteria, as arguments for including an evaluative dimension in the definition of sport. I conclude that none succeed, for similar reasons: they either fail to track our common sense intuitions about what does or does not count as a sport; and/or they make it impossible for us to ever describe something a ‘bad’ sport (or instance of sport). Just as a good definition of, say, art, shouldn’t make it impossible for us to describe something as ‘bad art’, I argue that our definition of sport shouldn’t build in a necessarily positive evaluation. I conclude by discussing some of the practical reasons why supporters of activities about which there is currently debate as to their status as sports might want to see those activities included under the sports umbrella, but suggest that this on its own isn’t a good reason for modifying a philosophical definition of sport to include them. (shrink)

Excellence in sport performance is normally taken to be a matter of superior performance of physical movements or quantitative outcomes of movements. This paper considers whether a wider conception can be afforded by certain kinds of nature based sport. The interplay between technical skill and aesthetic experience in nature based sports is explored, and the extent to which it contributes to a distinction between different sport-based approaches to natural environments. The potential for aesthetic appreciation of environmental engagement (...) is found to be strongly dependent on whether or not environmental engagement is exploited for the end of producing a quantifiable result or enhancing technical skill. It is also argued that an existential rather than spectatorial attitude to aesthetic experience is offered by specifically nature oriented sport. Aesthetic experience achieved in this way is therefore neither passive nor detached, but extends Berleant's concept of participatory environmental aesthetics and underpins both an alternate (wide) conception of excellence in sport activity and a richer experience of aesthetic engagement than more objectivised standpoints. (shrink)

Sport provides an arena for human flourishing. For some, this pursuit of a meaningful life through sport involves the use of non-human animals, not least of all through sport hunting. This paper will take seriously that sport – including sport hunting – can provide a meaningful arena for human flourishing. Additionally, it will accept for present purposes that animals are of less moral value than humans. This paper will show that, even accepting these premises, much (...) use of animals for sport – including sport hunting – is unacceptable. Nonetheless it will show that there can be acceptable ways of using animals as part of a human’s meaningful life pursuits through sport, albeit in a more limited fashion than many sportspersons currently accept. (shrink)

This paper is based on the assumption that the high incomes of some professional sports athletes, such as players in professional leagues in the United States and Europe, pose an ethical problem of social justice. I deal with the questions of what should follow from this evaluation and in which ways those incomes should be regulated. I discuss three different options: a) the idea that the incomes of professional athletes should be limited, b) the idea that they should be vastly (...) taxed by the state, and c) the idea that there is a moral obligation for the athletes to spend portions of their incomes on good causes. I will conclude that in today’s circumstances there are good reasons to advocate both option one (limitation) and option two (taxation), but that priority should be given to taxation. (shrink)

This article addresses the question whether skiing as a nature sport enables practitioners to develop a rapport with nature, or rather estranges and insulates them from their mountainous ambiance. To address this question, I analyse a recent skiing movie from a psychoanalytical perspective and from a neuro-scientific perspective. I conclude that Jean-Paul Sartre’s classical but egocentric account of his skiing experiences disavows the technicity involved in contemporary skiing as a sportive practice for the affluent masses, which actually represents an (...) urbanisation of the sublime, symptomatic for the current era. (shrink)

Based on field research in Africa, this essay explores three claims: first, that sport hunting places economic value on wildlife and habitats; second, that this motivates conservation practices in the interest of sustaining revenue sources; and, third, that this benefits human populations. If true, then sport hunting may sometimes be justifiable on utilitarian grounds. While not dismissing objections from the likes of Singer and Regan, we suggest their views – if converted into policy in desperately impoverished places – (...) would destroy animals and the habitats on which they depend. There are empirical verifications of this, which we discuss. (shrink)

This essay seeks to see if one side or the other in the hunting debate gets more purchase if we first ask what gives the state the moral right to promote sport hunting when the practice is in deep decline. We look at the dominant economic and political reasons for state support, none of which settle the moral matter. We then look at various state appeals to moral justification (ethical hunting, the right to hunt, the value of heritage, etc.) (...) and determine that they beg the same prior questions that hunters beg--questions about the new scientific understanding of animal cognition and about the ideal individual and society in the 21st C. Neither side in the philosophical debate is helped by state promotion of hunting, given that anti-hunters also often dispense with the deeper questions and the relevant science. Conclusion: the debate should be based on the new scientific understanding of animals' capacities and on current ideals of the individual and society. State policy should reflect that. -/- thehe state should see that it is on slippery ground when it devises programs to gratify hunters and to encourage the innocent, the reluctant, and the lapsed to take up the practice. (shrink)

This paper responds to Kevin Krein’s claim in that the particular value of nature sports over traditional ones is that they offer intensity of sport experience in dynamic interaction between an athlete and natural features. He denies that this intensity is derived from competitive conflict of individuals and denies that nature sport derives its value from internal conflict within the athlete who carries out the activity. This paper responds directly to Krein by analysing ‘intensity’ in sport in (...) terms of the relationship between attention and reflection and the interaction between self and environment. I reply directly to Krein’s rejection of self-competition as based on a mischaracterisation of internal struggle and argue that the weighing of incompatible desires does not involve a fragmented self. I argue that the unique intensity to which Krein refers is strongly comparable to the Kantian conception of the sublime and explore how sublime experience fits Krein’s account and outline some serious problems that such an ideal of experience poses for nature sport. (shrink)

This article argues that performance enhancing drugs ought to be allowed across all elite sporting competitions for athletes over the age of 16 so long as consuming them does not pose a significant risk to their health. I begin with a brief explanation of the current state of PED use in professional sports before assessing the prospect of allowing PEDs by three widely accepted measures of ethical merit: well-being, autonomy, and justice. I end with a critique of the World Anti-Doping (...) Agency's criteria for banning PEDs, concluding that allowing athletes to use PEDs is a superior alternative to the current prohibitive approach. (shrink)

This is preprint version of a chapter forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Sports Ethics, Thomas Søbirk Petersen, Sebastian Holmen, Jesper Ryberg (eds). New York, Oxford University press -/- This chapter explores fan communities in sports. The first part explores the nature of these communities. By looking at some ultras groups, this chapter suggests that some purported members are not in fact part of the community, because they do not care about the team and are instead focused on their (...) own performances. The chapter goes on to explore how particular behavior by community members might also not reflect on the community, such as when violent or otherwise immoral behavior lacks a robust enough connection to the sporting activities at the center of the community. In the second part, this chapter argues that the reason why the behavior of vicious members of the community matters to virtuous members is not because the virtuous members become complicit in this behavior; by exploring the wrongdoing involved in friendship with bad people, it becomes clear that the same arguments do not clearly apply to sports fans. Rather, the reason why bad behavior by the community affects those who are in the community but opposed to that behavior is because this behavior affects what it means to be a member of that community: it affects the identity of community members because it affects what it means to be a fan of that team. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are a number of ethical issues facing college and professional athletes that admit of a unified treatment: viewing athletes as workers. By worker, I mean an agent who sells their labor for compensation. With this notion of worker in place, I present and discuss arguments for four claims: not paying college athletes is morally wrong; that the N.C.A.A. infringes on the right of college athletes to collectively bargain; that it is prima facie wrong (...) to draft and trade professional athletes; and that fans fail to respect athletes’ right to strike when they complain about labor stoppages in professional leagues. I argue that sports fans and members of sports media should explicitly conceive of athletes as workers to recognize and prevent these wrongs. I conclude by suggesting that all with an interest in the welfare of labor have an interest in conceiving of athletes as workers, as it puts what is owed to all workers into stark relief. (shrink)

Ethics is a skill set. But what skill set is it? An answer to this question would help make progress for both theory and moral agency. I argue that moral performance may best be understood on the model of athletic performance; both moral and athletic performance are rule-structured unions of efficiency and inefficiency, enabling us to engage in the wholehearted and autonomous pursuit of goals subject to constraints. By understanding how athletics demands embodied performance, we better understand moral demand (...) and wrongdoing: less moral psychology, more moral kinesiology. (shrink)

Until recently, the problem of traumatic brain injury in sports and the problem of performance enhancement via hormone replacement have not been seen as related issues. However, recent evidence suggests that these two problems may actually interact in complex and previously underappreciated ways. A body of recent research has shown that traumatic brain injuries, at all ranges of severity, have a negative effect upon pituitary function, which results in diminished levels of several endogenous hormones, such as growth hormone and gonadotropin. (...) This is a cause for concern for many popular sports that have high rates of concussion, a mild form of TBI. Emerging research suggests that hormone replacement therapy is an effective treatment for TBI-related hormone deficiency. However, many athletic organizations ban or severely limit the use of hormone replacing substances because many athletes seek to use them solely for the purposes of performance enhancement. Nevertheless, in the light of the research linking traumatic brain injury to hypopituitarism, this paper argues that athletic organizations’ policies and attitudes towards hormone replacement therapy should change. We defend two claims. First, because of the connection between TBI and pituitary function, it is likely many more athletes than previously acknowledged suffer from hormone deficiency and thus could benefit from hormone replacement therapy. Second, athletes’ hormone levels should be tested more rigorously and frequently with an emphasis on monitoring TBI and TBI-related issues, rather than simply monitoring policy violations. (shrink)

As evidenced in recent literature in moral philosophy, commending actions on their propensity to develop enduring moral traits is not the province of the virtue theorist alone. For however we understand the moral goals of human beings and the nature of right action we recognize that a temperate, just or beneficent person is more likely to conform to the demands of morality than one lacking in these virtues. If this idea is used as a standard for assessing the worth of (...) activities generally and engaging in sporting activity particularly it becomes clear that the highest level of athletic engagement, that is, professional sports, is often morally problematic. The not uncommon phenomenon of athletic underperformance once a sizable, secure contract has been achieved, the expanding quantity and severity of verbal abuse directed at officials and other athletes, as well as the increasing incidence of on-field violence, raise concern that developing moral virtues is no longer a goal of professional sporting activities. This conclusion, however, is not a result of the concept of sport itself or even the idea of professional sport. Both amateur and professional sport are capable of promoting moral development in their participants by making possession of certain virtues a condition for success in that activity. So the problem lies not in the conceptual details of sporting activity but rather in the formulation or prosecution of the rules and expectations governing the sport in question. The essay argues that not only is sport capable of being a worthwhile activity but that there is a sport that in fact generally meets the conditions for being a worthwhile activity, namely professional cricket. In defending this claim it is shown that it is not an essential feature of professional cricket that garners our moral commendation but rather a complex set of contingent features: the Laws of Cricket, the enforcement of those laws and the historico-social context in which the game is set. (shrink)

An abundance of data unequivocally shows that exercise can be an effective tool in the fight against obesity and its associated co-morbidities. Indeed, physical activity can be more effective than widely-used pharmaceutical interventions. Whilst metformin reduces the incidence of diabetes by 31% (as compared with a placebo) in both men and women across different racial and ethnic groups, lifestyle intervention (including exercise) reduces the incidence by 58%. In this context, it is notable that a group of prominent medics and exercise (...) scientists recently sent a well-publicised letter to the General Medical Council and Medical Schools Council calling for the introduction of evidence-based lifestyle education into all medical curricula. The letter warns that there is a lack of understanding of the impact that exercise and nutrition can have on physical health amongst doctors. In the absence of an educational overhaul, the signatories warn that the government is likely to fail to reach its goal of preventing tens of thousands of premature deaths from heart disease and cancer by 2020. Whilst we agree with the need to address this apparent lack of understanding, we argue that the ethical justification of doing so is not limited to this broadly beneficence-based justification. There is also a justification grounded in the duty of non-maleficence, that is, the duty to avoid unreasonably harming patients. This duty requires that doctors refrain from (i) preventing patients from undergoing beneficial treatment without good reason, (ii) exposing patients to unreasonable risks and (iii) reducing the therapeutic effect of an effective medical intervention. This requires an understanding of the physical impact of exercise. (shrink)

Many of the items that humans consume are produced in ways that involve serious harms to persons. Familiar examples include the harms involved in the extraction and trade of conflict minerals (e.g. coltan, diamonds), the acquisition and import of non- fair trade produce (e.g. coffee, chocolate, bananas, rice), and the manufacture of goods in sweatshops (e.g. clothing, sporting equipment). In addition, consumption of certain goods (significantly fossil fuels and the products of the agricultural industry) involves harm to the environment, to (...) future persons, and to current persons in low-lying and developing countries, by way of their impacts on climate change. When it comes to such large-scale harms, it's easy for the individual to feel helpless. Even if she sincerely wishes things were otherwise, she may wonder what she could possibly do to make them so. In this paper I briefly explore several promising avenues for generating duties in individuals to consume ethically, and develop one in particular: that an individual ought to signal her commitments to others, as a first step in collectivizing to act against unjust global labour practices. (shrink)

Biomedical technologies can increasingly be used not only to combat disease, but also to augment the capacities or traits of normal, healthy people – a practice commonly referred to as biomedical enhancement. Perhaps the best‐established examples of biomedical enhancement are cosmetic surgery and doping in sports. But most recent scientific attention and ethical debate focuses on extending lifespan, lifting mood, and augmenting cognitive capacities.

Strategic fouls can be defined as deliberate rule violations undertaken for tactical advantage in circumstances where sanction is anticipated and treated as a cost of action. They are distinguished from cheating not by moral innocence but by their structural relation to enforcement. Whereas cheating depends upon clandestine evasion, the strategic foul remains intelligible, and can still ‘work’, even when detected and punished, precisely because it presupposes the continuing authority of the rule-system it exploits. This article examines the phenomenon of strategic (...) fouling by offering a critical analysis of its moral, regulatory, and psychoanalytic dimensions. In particular, it explores how such actions are embedded within the logic of competitive play, revealing a tacit legitimacy, despite their formal illegality. Drawing on the work of J.S. Russell, the article situates strategic fouling within a broader category of tolerated transgression, which, enhances, rather than undermines, the experience of play. Coupled with a psychoanalytic perspective, it is argued that strategic fouls exemplify the creative potential of self-limitation. That is, rules and constraints do not inhibit freedom but serve as conditions for inventive action and ethical deliberation. With regard to relevant examples, such as Luis Suárez’s 2010 handball, the article concludes that strategic fouling reveals sport as a site of moral ambiguity and creative agency, where the subject confronts and constitutes itself through the contradictions of rule-bound play. (shrink)

The value of up-hill skiing is double, it is first a sport and artistic expression, second it incorporates functional dependencies related to the natural obstacles which the individual aims to overcome. On the artistic side, M. Dufrenne shows the importance of living movement in dance, and we can compare puppets with dancers in order to grasp the lack of intentional spiritual qualities in the former. The expressivity of dance, as for, Chi Gong, ice skating or ski mountaineering is a (...) particular innocence and lightness which is called grace. It is life without the burden of worries. Grace, in slow progression uphill on snow, is as dance for Dufrenne, it has the most central and specific aesthetical quality of life. Others compared dance to a landscape, a landscape is for the sight, what dance is for life, a symbolical space, different from a usual space, where utility and dependency are present. A mountain can be a space of experience of natural beauty. Aesthetical qualities can be closely related to function related qualities as when a climber needs to adjust his movements to the natural convex inclination of the rocks, and avoid slippery forms of inclination, present on the other side of the mountain. The natural object, the quality of the snow or the rock differ from the aesthetical quality of the style of ascent by the absence of neutralization of the object, in case of a purely instrumental approach. On the contrary, grace in the rhythm of the progression of ski climbers needs a difference of attitude, which is not only proper to the playing, and delimited by the conditions of that play, but as a contingency driven attitude, without signification as radical alterity, without any finality. First ascent of the Matterhorn succeeded from the Swiss side, and not from the Italian side because of the different inclination of the rock on both sides. Grace in dance as in martial art or mountaineering is allowing to perceive an autonomy of the expression, as the truth of the perceived object, it puts away a cognitive and practical orientation and replaces it by a new meaning as movement in the whole set of movements done by the climber. This replacement of the functional expression resembles that operated by the painter who chooses a color in the whole set of colors in a painting, or a shape in the whole set of possible existing shapes. -/- Ref. Dufrenne, Mikel, (1989): The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, trans. by Edward S. Casey, 1st publ. in 1953, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. (shrink)

Games have a complex, and seemingly paradoxical structure: they are both competitive and cooperative, and the competitive element is required for the cooperative element to work out. They are mechanisms for transforming competition into cooperation. Several contemporary philosophers of sport have located the primary mechanism of conversion in the mental attitudes of the players. I argue that these views cannot capture the phenomenological complexity of game-play, nor the difficulty and moral complexity of achieving cooperation through game-play. In this paper, (...) I present a different account of the relationship between competition and cooperation. My view is a distributed view of the conversion: success depends on a large number of features. First, the players must achieve the right motivational state: playing for the sake of the struggle, rather than to win. Second, successful transformation depends on a large number of extra-mental features, including good game design, and social and institutional features. (shrink)

This paper explores the visualization of unconscious human be- havior and qualia to examine the universality of ethics and morality, and to suggest the possibility of an ideal law system. The subjects include individuals in intoxication states, high-immersion states (e.g., flow in sports, runner’s high), and gambling behaviors. By observing physical traces and interactions with others, unconscious ethical judg- ments and qualia can be indirectly inferred. Analysis across multiple models suggests commonalities in unconscious morality, highlighting the theoretical potential for (...) ideal law structures. Additional aspects of qualia, including sensory integration and emotional valence, are also discussed in relation to unconscious ethical behavior. (shrink)