Kit Fine’s logic of essence and his reduction of modality crucially rely on a principle called the ‘monotonicity of essence’. This principle says that for all pluralities, xx and yy, if some xx belong to some yy, then if it is essential to xx that p, it is also essential to yy that p. I argue that on the constitutive notion of essence, this principle is false. In particular, I show that this principle is false because it says that some (...) propositions are essential to yy even though those propositions are only about some of its members. I then consider modifications to the principle appealing to consequential essence and argue that such a modification is inconsistent with a central desideratum of Fine’s approach to metaphysics, what I call his neutrality condition. (shrink)

Dans notre société de plus en plus digitalisée, avons-nous vraiment le choix d’adopter ou non les technologies? Comment cette digitalisation impacte-t-elle les personnes âgées en particulier et son écosystème? Quels sont les enjeux éthiques soulevés par cette digitalisation? Ce texte vise à amener des éléments de réflexions en lien avec ces enjeux selon le point de vue de divers experts des domaines de la technologie, du vieillissement et de la bioéthique. Ces experts se sont rencontrés lors d’un symposium ayant eu (...) lieu à Angers, France, en octobre 2019. Le texte est un compte-rendu des échanges et points de vue de ces experts, ainsi que des discussions ouvertes qu’ils ont eues avec l’assistance, portant sur les principaux enjeux soulevés par cette digitalisation selon la perspective des personnes âgées, des proches-aidants, des soignants, de la société et de la recherche. (shrink)

Imagine that you are part of the editorial board of a young bioethics journal committed to publishing open access (OA) and to ensuring accessibility to high quality and innovative scholarship. To support junior and interna- tional scholars who might not otherwise find places for their work in the leading Western bioethics journals, you do not charge author fees. Imagine also that you have no financial resources to pay for a professional website, auto- mated submissions manager, or even a part-time coordina- (...) tor: Your government has cut all grants for journals, you cannot go to industry for private funding because of the evident risk of apparent conflicts of interest, and your strapped-for-cash institution cannot afford to offer you any support. If one of the major publishers were to approach you to sign a deal, the temptation would be strong to accept. However, this would likely mean putting aside your ideals: It would be impossible to stay a “Green OA” publication (i.e., free of author publication charges) or supportive of junior and international scholars (because of pressures to “increase credibility” through artificially high rejection rates, for example). (shrink)

After six years (2012-2017) of publishing innovative bioethics scholarship, BioéthiqueOnline becomes the Canadian Journal of Bioethics/Revue canadienne de bioéthique. As executive editors of BioéthiqueOnline, we frequently heard from members of the Canadian bioethics community of the need to develop a platform with the right branding to showcase the value and the richness of our collective reflections, both locally and internationally. Following discussions with colleagues across the country, we came to the conclusion that BioéthiqueOnline had developed a unique expertise publishing bioethics (...) scholarship, but that the original name, created to convey the bilingual and open access mission of the journal, was not enthusiastically received. So the time has come to upgrade and rebrand as the Canadian Journal of Bioethics (CJB). (shrink)

An essential property of a thing tells us about the real definition of that thing. In this dissertation, I argue that a real definition states conditions on the identity of things and explains how they differ from other individuals or members of other kinds. I then apply this account to show that some essential properties are discovered by science. I also argue contrary to reductionist accounts of essence and show that several of Kit Fine's applications of the notion of essence (...) to ontological dependence and to the reduction of modality, are spurious. Finally, I argue that the real definition of each human person accounts for their personal identity over time. (shrink)

"Nothing Better Than Death" is a comprehensive analysis of the near-death experiences profiled on the www.near-death.com website. This book provides complete NDE testimonials, summaries of various NDEs, NDE research conclusions, a Question and Answer section, an analysis of NDEs and Christian doctrines, famous quotations about life and death, a NDE bibliography, book notes, a list of NDE resources on the Internet, and a list of NDE support groups associated with IANDS.org - the International Association for Near-Death Studies. The unusual title (...) of this book, "Nothing Better Than Death," was inspired by NDE experiencer Dr. Dianne Morrissey who once said, "If I lived a billion years more, in my body or yours, there's not a single experience on Earth that could ever be as good as being dead. Nothing.". (shrink)

This scoping review addresses the issues of responsible conduct of research (RCR) that can arise in the practice of research-creation (RC), an emergent, interdisciplinary, and heterogeneous field at the interface of academic research and creative activities. Little is yet known about the nature and scope of RCR issues in RC, so our study examined three questions: (1) What are the specific issues in RC in relation to RCR? (2) How does the specificity of RC influence the understanding and practice of (...) RCR? (3) What recommendations could help address the issues highlighted in the literature To answer these questions, we conducted a scoping review of the academic literature (n = 181 texts) dealing with RCR in RC. We found that researcher-creators faced some very different RCR challenges in comparison with their colleagues in the rest of academia. Addressing these issues is important for both the RCR and RC communities in order to ensure that the rapid development of this field occurs in line with the norms of RCR which, nonetheless, should be adapted to respect the particularities of RC and allow its contributions to the academic world. (shrink)

Bioethics experts played a key role in ensuring a coherent ethical response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the fields of healthcare, public health, and scientific research in Canada. In the province of Quebec, a group of academic and practicing bioethicists met periodically in the early months of the pandemic to discuss approaches and solutions to ethical dilemmas encountered during the crisis. These meetings created the opportunity for a national survey of bioethics practitioners from different fields. The survey, in which forty-five (...) Canadian bioethics practitioners (clinical ethicists, ethicist members of REBs and government health policy ethicists, or any bioethicist practicing outside of academia) participated, explored their concerns, challenges and opportunities during the first wave of the pandemic, with the objective of informing bioethics research about the difficulties experienced by bioethicists “in the field”. Participants reported increased stress levels, increased workloads, and a greater proportion of their work being devoted to public health ethics. Most of their concerns focused on groups other than themselves, such as health professionals, patients, research participants, and people in vulnerable socio-economic situations. An optimism about the future of bioethics was noted due to an increased awareness of the importance of bioethics by the public and by health and research institutions. (shrink)

Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008:462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such (...) a capacity, but only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense. (shrink)

Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. (...) The motivation in a link of understandability ans meaningful- ness suggests to change the above principle and to restrict the theory to logically simple sentences, in which case the paradox does not arise. This suggestion also allows to see the deep philosophical problems for anti-realism those counterexamples are pointing at. (shrink)

Proceedings of the papers presented at the Symposium on "Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World" at the 2012 AISB and IACAP Symposium that was held in the Turing year 2012, 2–6 July at the University of Birmingham, UK. Ten papers. - http://www.pt-ai.org/turing-test --- Daniel Devatman Hromada: From Taxonomy of Turing Test-Consistent Scenarios Towards Attribution of Legal Status to Meta-modular Artificial Autonomous Agents - Michael Zillich: My Robot is Smarter than Your Robot: On the Need for (...) a Total Turing Test for Robots - Adam Linson, Chris Dobbyn and Robin Laney: Interactive Intelligence: Behaviour-based AI, Musical HCI and the Turing Test - Javier Insa, Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Sergio España - David Dowe and M.Victoria Hernandez-Lloreda: The anYnt Project Intelligence Test (Demo) - Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Javier Insa, David Dowe and Bill Hibbard: Turing Machines and Recursive Turing Tests — Francesco Bianchini and Domenica Bruni: What Language for Turing Test in the Age of Qualia? - Paul Schweizer: Could there be a Turing Test for Qualia? - Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti: Jazz and Machine Consciousness: Towards a New Turing Test - William York and Jerry Swan: Taking Turing Seriously (But Not Literally) - Hajo Greif: Laws of Form and the Force of Function: Variations on the Turing Test. (shrink)

I distinguish between the nineteenth- to twentieth-century (modernist) tendency to rehabilitate (white) femininity from the abject popular, and the twentieth- to twenty-first-century (postmodernist) tendency to rehabilitate the popular from abject white femininity. Careful attention to the role of nineteenth-century racial politics in Nietzsche's Gay Science shows that his work uses racial nonwhiteness to counter the supposedly deleterious effects of (white) femininity (passivity, conformity, and so on). This move—using racial nonwhiteness to rescue pop culture from white femininity—is a common twentieth- and (...) twenty-first-century practice. I use Nietzsche to track shifts from classical to neo-liberal methods of appropriating “difference.” Hipness is one form of this neoliberal approach to difference, and it is exemplified by the approach to race, gender, and pop culture in Vincente Minnelli's film The Band Wagon. I expand upon Robert Gooding-Williams's reading of this film, and argue that mid-century white hipness dissociates the popular from femininity and whiteness, and values the popular when performed by white men “acting black.” Hipness instrumentalizes femininity and racial nonwhiteness so that any benefits that might come from them accrue only to white men, and not to the female and male artists of color whose works are appropriated. (shrink)

Since Cannon, inspired by Bernard’s discussion of the conditions required for free and independent life, introduced the term homeostasis, many have embraced it as the main theoretical principle guiding physiology and medicine. Nonetheless, critics have argued that homeostasis is too limiting and have advanced a variety of alternative concepts such as heterostasis, rheostasis, and allostasis. We argue that the critics target a much narrower understanding of homeostasis put forward by the cyberneticists and that Bernard and Cannon embraced a far broader (...) understanding that can accommodate the alternatives advanced by the critics and provide an integrated theoretical framework for physiology. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I A SOCIOLOGIA NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I SOCIOLOGY IN UNITED STATES Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. PREMISSA A Sociologia nos Estados Unidos desenvolveu-se no contexto de dois grandes eventos que marcaram profundamente a história do país. O primeiro foi a Guerra de Secessão (também conhecida como Guerra Civil Americana), que ocorreu entre 1861 e 1865 e (...) gerou ressentimentos e atritos entre a população do sul e a do norte dos Estados Unidos. Em contrapartida, houve a urbanização das terras do oeste e das áreas centrais do país, o que contribuiu para o crescimento da economia e a expansão industrial. No norte, graças ao esforço de guerra, houve um grande crescimento, principalmente na metalurgia, no transporte ferroviário, na indústria de armamentos e na indústria naval. O comércio também se expandiu de maneira exponencial em todo o território estadunidense. O padrão de cultura dos Estados Unidos passou a ser o ideal nortista de “trabalho duro, educação e liberdade econômica a todos”. Houve ainda um grande desenvolvimento de escolas e instituições de ensino superior. O segundo grande evento que marcou a história estadunidense foi a chegada em massa de estrangeiros. Entre 1860 e 1900, os Estados Unidos passaram de país agrícola, com população em torno de 4 milhões, para país industrial, com uma das maiores economias do mundo e com 75 milhões de habitantes. O incremento populacional e a industrialização redundaram em um processo de urbanização sem precedentes que continuou até a década de 1930. Para se ter uma ideia, em 1860 viviam em Chicago 102 260 pessoas; em 1900, a população da cidade passou a 1 698 575 e, em 1930, a 3 375 329. Em virtude desses fatores, consolidaram-se nos Estados Unidos uma burguesia industrial, comercial e financeira significativa, uma classe trabalhadora majoritariamente formada por imigrantes e uma classe média em ascensão. As principais cidades passaram a ser um espaço de conflito e alvo de preocupações. Temas como imigração, aculturação, conflitos étnicos, comportamentos desviantes e políticas públicas foram importantes na Sociologia desenvolvida inicialmente no país. Entre os principais fundadores da Sociologia nos Estados Unidos estão William Graham Sumner (1840 -1910), Lester Frank Ward (1841-1913), Albion Woodbury Small (1854-1926), Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931), Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929), William Isaac Thomas (1863-1947), Robert Ezra Park (1864-1944), Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929) e George Herbert Mead (1863-1931). A herança cultural desses fundadores é muito diversa: foram influenciados principalmente pela tradição religiosa protestante disseminada em quase todo o território, pelo liberalismo econômico clássico conservador, do tipo laissez-faire, pelo evolucionismo do inglês Charles Darwin (1809-1882) e pelo darwinismo social de Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Acrescente-se a esse cadinho de concepções de mundo e ciência o pragmatismo do filósofo e psicólogo William James (1842-1910) e do filósofo Charles Pierce (1839-1914). Essa herança permite compreender as duas grandes características da Sociologia nos Estados Unidos: • multiplicidade de temas, problemas e propostas e diversidade teórica e metodológica; • desenvolvimento desse campo do conhecimento em universidades, nas quais as atividades eram financiadas pelo Estado e pelo setor privado (Fundação Rockefeller, comitês e associações normalmente religiosas). Por causa dessa segunda característica, optei por analisar o desenvolvimento da Sociologia nos Estados Unidos em três importantes universidades estadunidenses: a de Chicago, Harvard e Columbia. 1. A Universidade de Chicago A Universidade de Chicago foi fundada em 1890 pelo magnata do petróleo John D. Rockefeller e recebeu os primeiros alunos em 1892. Nela foi criado o primeiro departamento de Sociologia dos Estados Unidos, sob a direção de Albion Woodbury Small. No início de seus trabalhos sociológicos, a Universidade de Chicago deu primazia à pesquisa empírica, procurando conhecer, por meio da observação direta, a dinâmica das relações sociais. Desenvolveu uma forte tendência pragmática e microssociológica, que viria a ser conhecida como a Escola de Chicago. A maior preocupação dos integrantes dessa Escola foi com os problemas das grandes cidades dos Estados Unidos, como a marginalidade social, o alcoolismo, as drogas, a segregação racial e a delinquência, estabelecendo uma relação entre a pesquisa sociológica e a intervenção dos organismos públicos na sociedade. Os sociólogos de Chicago também se dedicaram ao que chamaram de ecologia humana, em oposição à ecologia animal e vegetal. Em 1895, Albion Woodbury Small fundou o American Journal of Sociology e, em 1907, participou ativamente da fundação da Sociedade Americana de Sociologia. Ele publicou, com Georges Vincent, em 1894, talvez o primeiro manual de Sociologia para estudantes, intitulado Introdução ao estudo da sociedade. Tendo estudado na Alemanha, Small foi o principal divulgador do pensamento de Georg Simmel nos Estados Unidos. Entre os integrantes da Escola de Chicago mais conhecidos no Brasil, podemos citar William I. Thomas (1863-1947) e Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958), cuja principal obra foi O camponês polonês na Europa e na América, editada em 1918. Destacam-se ainda Robert E. Park (1864-1944) e Ernest W. Burgess (1886-1966), que escreveram, entre outras obras, Introdução à ciência da Sociologia, em 1921. Os dois, com Roderick Mackenzie, escreveram o clássico A cidade, em 1925. Outro membro de destaque foi Louis Wirth (1897-1952), autor de O gueto, escrito em 1928, e de um artigo que se tornou famoso, “Urbanismo como modo de vida”, publicado em 1938, no American Journal of Sociology. A Escola de Chicago congregou, ainda, sociólogos e antropólogos com ligação com a Psicologia Social, que desenvolveram uma abordagem sociológica das relações sociais conhecida como interacionismo simbólico. A principal figura dessa vertente foi George Herbert Mead (1863-1932), que trabalhou em diversas áreas, sobretudo como psicólogo social e como professor de várias gerações de antropólogos e sociólogos. Seus escritos foram sistematizados por seus alunos e publicados com o nome Mind, self and society (A mente, o eu e a sociedade), em 1934. Além da tradição intelectual dos Estados Unidos, os integrantes da Escola de Chicago receberam a influência de Jean-Gabriel de Tarde, Émile Durkheim e Georg Simmel. Seus continuadores foram Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) e Everett C. Hughes (1897-1983). 1.1 Erving Goffman (1922-1982) O representante da Sociologia desenvolvida na Universidade de Chicago mais influente no Brasil é Erving Goffman, que nasceu em Manville, Alberta, no Canadá, em 1922, e faleceu nos Estados Unidos em 1982. Obteve o grau de bacharel pela Universidade de Toronto, em 1945, e concluiu mestrado (1949) e doutorado (1953) na Universidade de Chicago, onde estudou Sociologia e Antropologia Social. Em 1958, tornou-se professor da Universidade da Califórnia e, em 1968, ingressou na Universidade da Pensilvânia, onde foi professor de Antropologia e Sociologia. Entre 1981 e 1982, Goffman foi presidente da Sociedade Americana de Sociologia e realizou pesquisas na linha da Sociologia interpretativa e cultural, iniciada por Max Weber, desenvolvendo a ideia de que o mundo é um teatro e cada um, individualmente ou em grupo, interpreta papéis de acordo com as circunstâncias em que se encontra. Essas circunstâncias são marcadas por rituais e posições distintivas em relação a outros indivíduos ou grupos. Para ele, é possível distinguir indivíduos, grupos e classes com base, por exemplo, em aspectos como as formas de vestir ou de se apresentar publicamente. O sociólogo considera a interação social como um processo fundamental de identificação e de diferenciação dos indivíduos e grupos, analisando-a no cotidiano, especialmente em lugares públicos. Goffman estudou com especial atenção o que chamou de “instituições totais”, lugares onde o indivíduo é isolado da sociedade, como prisões e manicômios. De acordo com o sociólogo brasileiro Édison Gastaldo: O trabalho de Goffman trouxe à luz aspectos da vida cotidiana que não se julgavam “sociologicamente relevantes”. Seus insights sobre as interações ordinárias, sobre o deslocamento dos pedestres, sobre a ocupação social dos espaços públicos, sobre a atuação dos vigaristas, mendigos, loucos, espiões, jogadores e de todos aqueles que passam cotidianamente debaixo de nossos narizes sem que prestemos atenção modificaram o pensar sociológico no mundo. Sua descrição etnográfica de um hospital para doentes mentais colaborou decisivamente para deflagrar a luta antimanicomial no mundo inteiro. Vinte e dois anos depois de sua morte, os temas e os conceitos desenvolvidos por Goffman ainda estão em pleno uso e vitalidade (GASTALDO, 2004, p. 9/10). Suas três obras mais conhecidas são: A representação do eu na vida cotidiana (1959), Manicômios, prisões e conventos (1961) e Estigma: notas sobre a manipulação da identidade (1963). 2. A Universidade Harvard A história de Harvard começa em 1636, quando foi fundada, na cidade de Cambridge, no estado de Massachusetts, uma instituição de ensino denominada New College. Em 1639, essa instituição recebeu o nome de Harvard College, em homenagem a John Harvard, seu principal mecenas. A Sociologia desenvolvida na Universidade Harvard é marcada por uma preocupação teórica e tem dois sociólogos como expoentes: Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin (1889-1968) e Talcott Edgar Frederick Parsons (1902-1979). Este último influenciou muito o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no mundo e no Brasil. 2.1 Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) Talcott Parsons nasceu no Colorado, nos Estados Unidos. Em 1924, graduou-se em Biologia e Filosofia na Faculdade Amherst. Em 1925, pós-graduou-se em Ciências Sociais na Escola de Economia de Londres, na Inglaterra, e, em seguida, doutorou-se na Universidade de Heidelberg, na Alemanha. Nos Estados Unidos, lecionou Economia e Sociologia na Universidade Harvard durante 45 anos (1927-1973). Em 1944, tornou-se presidente do Departamento de Sociologia, transformando-o, dois anos depois, no Departamento de Relações Sociais, a fim de unir a Sociologia a outras ciências sociais. Assim como Sorokin, Parsons voltou-se para a Sociologia europeia, tendo por base as ideias de Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) e Émile Durkheim, além das do economista inglês Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). Fundamentado nesses autores, desenvolveu uma grande obra teórica, que dominaria a Sociologia estadunidense desde então. Parsons é o sociólogo estadunidense mais conhecido no mundo. Em geral, seus críticos entenderam-no como um pensador conservador, preocupado basicamente com o bom ordenamento da sociedade. Seu interesse era determinar a função que os indivíduos desempenhavam na estrutura social. Entendia o indivíduo como expressão dessa estrutura, a qual devia ser mantida e preservada. Caso isso não ocorresse, deviam entrar em ação os mecanismos de controle social (moral, ética, sistema jurídico e penal etc.), como instrumentos preventivos ou corretivos. Seu trabalho exerceu influência em diversos países e ambientes acadêmicos (particularmente nas décadas de 1950 a 1970), até mesmo na então União Soviética, onde, em 1964, ministrou aulas sobre a Sociologia estadunidense a convite da Academia de Ciências da União Soviética (URSS). Suas principais obras foram: A estrutura da ação social (1937), O sistema social (1951), Economia e sociedade (1956, com N. Smelser), Estrutura e processo nas sociedades modernas (1960), Sociedades: perspectivas evolucionárias e comparativas (1966), Teoria sociológica e sociedade moderna (1968), Política e estrutura social (1969), Sistemas sociais e a evolução da teoria da ação (1977) e Teoria da ação e a condição humana (1978). 3. A Universidade Columbia A King’s College foi fundada em 1754, em Nova York, nos Estados Unidos. Quando as colônias inglesas se declararam independentes da Grã-Bretanha, a instituição passou a se chamar Universidade Columbia. A partir da última década do século XIX, essa universidade se destacaria por uma importante produção no campo da Sociologia, tendo como pioneiro Franklin Giddings (1855-1931), fundador da cadeira de Sociologia. Fortemente marcado pelo evolucionismo e pelo pragmatismo, foi um dos primeiros a usar métodos quantitativos e experi-mentais no estudo dos fenômenos sociais. Dois sociólogos de Columbia merecem destaque, por serem muito conhecidos no Brasil: Robert K. Merton e Charles Wright Mills. 3.1 Robert King Merton (1910-2003) Merton nasceu na Filadélfia e faleceu em Nova York. Graduou-se em Sociologia na Universidade Temple e pós-graduou-se na Universidade Harvard, onde trabalhou com Pitirim Sorokin e Talcott Parsons até a defesa de seu doutorado, em 1936. Em 1941 Merton transferiu-se para a Universidade Columbia, onde permaneceu durante 38 anos, até aposentar-se. Nessa universidade procurou integrar teoria à prática sociológica. Estudou o comportamento desviante e os processos de adaptação social, tendo por base pesquisas qualitativas e quantitativas do exercício profissional em ambiente de solidariedade e de conflito. Com Paul Lazarsfeld (1901-1976), desenvolveu o Departamento de Pesquisa Social Aplicada. O nome de Merton está vinculado à proposta de criação de teorias de alcance médio, segundo a qual os sociólogos seriam mais úteis à sociedade se deixassem de lado as grandes teorias (criticando Parsons) e criassem outras de médio alcance. Essas teorias estariam situadas entre as hipóteses de trabalho rotineiras na pesquisa e as amplas especulações. Mediariam, dessa forma, as abstrações, generalizações e fundamentos empíricos da pesquisa. Merton tinha uma visão humanista da função social da ciência, demonstrando influência clara de Max Weber. Concebia a ciência como um conjunto de conhecimentos compartilhados por todos os membros da sociedade, que deveriam julgar a credibilidade das postulações científicas de acordo com suas expectativas e valores morais. Mas as decisões acerca do fazer científico não caberiam à sociedade, e sim ao próprio cientista, sempre adequando seus valores aos da sociedade. 3.2 Charles Wright Mills (1916-1962) Charles Wright Mills (1916-1962) nasceu em Waco, no Texas, Estados Unidos. Mestre em Artes, Filosofia e Sociologia pela Universidade do Texas, concluiu, em 1942, seu doutorado em Sociologia e Antropologia pela Universidade de Wisconsin. Foi professor de Sociologia nas universidades de Maryland e Columbia, onde passou a lecionar em 1947 e permaneceu até a morte, em 1962. Charles Mills representa uma tendência quase marginal na Sociologia dos Estados Unidos, por apresentar uma visão crítica e militante da sociedade estadunidense e da própria Sociologia. Influenciado por Karl Marx e Max Weber, Mills procurou conciliar o conceito de classe social com o de status, visando esclarecer processos e mecanismos dos conflitos e das mudanças sociais. Por meio de pesquisas, tentou elucidar a complexidade de estruturas de poder, particularmente das elites (em lugar de classes dominantes), e de seu papel na mudança social, fugindo da ideia de revolução como única via para a transformação social. Charles Wright Mills é conhecido principalmente por seu livro A imaginação sociológica, publicado originalmente nos Estados Unidos em 1959. Nele, o autor propõe que os sociólogos, ao exercer a profissão, não deixem a imaginação e a criatividade de lado em favor de uma pretensa objetividade e neutralidade do trabalho científico. Para Mills, os grandes intelectuais da história nunca abriram mão da reflexão e da criatividade e mantiveram uma postura crítica diante da realidade. Atribuindo aos sociólogos a responsabilidade de agentes ativos na sociedade, cabendo-lhes tomar parte nos debates públicos de sua época, Mills defendia a ideia de que a Sociologia deveria ser compreensível para o grande público. Para ele, a ciência social era inseparável da vida pessoal do cientista: a intuição, a imaginação e o comprometimento com o tempo em que se vivia eram fundamentais para compreender cientificamente a sociedade. Suas obras foram publicadas em vários idiomas. Além da citada anteriormente, as mais importantes são: A nova classe média (1951), A elite do poder (1956), Sobre o artesanato intelectual (1959) e Os marxistas (1962). Mills escreveu também artigos em revistas e dois livros que tiveram grande exposição na mídia dos Estados Unidos, por seu caráter polêmico: As causas da Terceira Guerra Mundial (1958), no qual discute a corrida nuclear, e A Revolução em Cuba (1960), em que analisa a fase inicial da Revolução Cubana. Outros sociólogos que defendem uma postura crítica na Sociologia estadunidense, continuadores ou não de Charles Wright Mills, são Irving Louis Horowitz (1929-2012), Martin Nicolaus (1928-) e Alvin Gouldner (1920-1980). REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO BOTTOMORE, T.; et al. Dicionário do pensamento social do século XX. Trad. Eduardo Francisco Alves. Álvaro Cabral. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1996. COULON, A. A Escola de Chicago. Trad. Tomás R. Bueno. 1ª ed. Campinas: Papirus, 1995. CUIN, C. H.; GRESLE, F. História da Sociologia. Trad. Roberto Leal Ferreira. São Paulo: Ensaio, 1994. DOMINGUES, J. M. A sociologia de Talcott Parsons. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Annablume, 2008. GASTALDO, É. (org.); et al. Erving Goffman, desbravador do cotidiano. 1ª ed. Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial, 2004. NOVA, S. V. Introdução à Sociologia. 6ª ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2004. SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2016. VALLADARES, L. do P. A Escola de Chicago: impacto de uma tradição no Brasil e na França. 1ª ed. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2005. VÁRIOS, autores. O livro da sociologia. As grandes ideias de todos os tempos. Trad. Rafael Longo. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Globo, 2015. SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva ©2019 Estimule a criatividade. Respeite os direitos autorais. (shrink)

In his famous paper "The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences", Eugene Wigner used (non-literally) the word "miracle" of the fit between mathematics and the world as revealed by (especially) higher physics. It is argued that "miracle" should be taken literally, in that the best explanation of this fit is the existence of a divine creator who decided on the mathematical structure of the universe.

Higher-order metaphysics is in full swing. Its proponents argue that higher-order logic should replace set theory at the foundations of mathematics and metaphysics. But amid the enthusiasm, surprisingly little attention has been paid to some serious epistemological challenges facing the program - foremost among them a variant of the Benacerraf challenge, developed by Field and Clarke-Doane. Roughly put, the challenge is to explain the reliability of our higher-order logical beliefs. A similar problem is familiar from the philosophy of set theory, (...) where it has led to a pluralist reconception of the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I argue that regardless of whether higher-order logic is preferable to set theory on abductive grounds, they stand or fall together when faced with this epistemological challenge. They are companions in guilt (or innocence). I conclude that, absent other solutions, a promising path forward is to adopt a pluralist approach to higher-order logic. The consequences of such a shift are difficult to overstate. (shrink)

Ψ Theory introduces a multidimensional framework that challenges conventional views of time, space, and consciousness. Rooted in physics, experiential insight, and cultural wisdom, this theory proposes that human consciousness interfaces with higher-dimensional structures via Psi (Ψ) energy. The theory reconceptualizes time as a multi-axial variable, redefines consciousness as an interdimensional navigator, and interprets emotional resonance as a dimensional interaction. This paper outlines the core components of Ψ Theory, including dimensional elasticity, the Psi resonance function, and potential experimental pathways.

This paper argues that inference rule adoption is a diachronic process during which agents are inferentially guided by a statement of the rule they are adopting, but during which they do not use that rule. Rather, the ability to use the rule is the outcome at the end of the process. This account avoids a regress objection to inferentially guided adoption recently posed by Boghossian and Wright. Adoption, on this model, involves the use of six privileged inference rules, including universal (...) instantiation, modus ponens, and the naive truth rules. However, though these rules play a special role in adoption, they are not indispensable to the process in their full generality: so long as one has reasonably robust restrictions of them, the adoption process is unimpeded. Furthermore, there are no general forms that constitute the minimal restrictions of these rules required for adoption. It follows that these rules, in their fully generality, are themselves adoptable, so long as one begins with reasonable restrictions of them. It is argued that this is enough to overcome the ‘adoption problem’ as a challenge to anti-exceptionalism about logic and to the normative significance of proposals for alternative logics. (shrink)

For a formal language, one usually only considers semantic interpretations which are complete: for each singular referring expression in the language, there corresponds an element of the universe of discourse. However, natural languages only have a partial interpretation function when given such a set- or model-theoretic semantics whose universe of discourse (or "model") is taken to be the real, physical world. To put semantics on a par with syntax for parity of treatment of natural and formal languages, two alternatives suggest (...) themselves. (1) The syntax of a natural language can be changed so that the interpretation function becomes total. What I urge, on the other hand, is (2) that we change the semantics of natural language, as outlined earlier, by enlarging the range of the interpretation function to make it total. I suggest making the world fit our language by adding Meinongian objects to it. (shrink)

It is not hard to measure the experience of Richard Linklater's Before Midnight (2013) alongside the classic comedies of the 30s and 40s that Stanley Cavell identifies as comedies of remarriage. As viewers, we come to the film knowing that the couple – Jesse (Ethan Hawke) and Céline (Julie Delpy) – have known one another "from the beginning," a tale of knowing that is revealed in Before Sunrise (1995) and Before Sunset (2004). The central questions of the remarriage comedy genre (...) are also undeniably the central questions here: How are we to understand the running quarrel that threatens to force them apart? And what enables them to find a way (necessarily provisionally) back together, to remake their connection? Other commentators on Before Midnight have overlooked its roots in remarriage comedy. For them, Jesse and Céline's luxurious scenes of conversation early in this film are largely wiped away by the fight scene in the hotel room and by the assumption that the pair's fate is sealed. I argue, on the other hand, that their film-long argument about who they are, singly and together, needn't be read as fatal. It is driven by their periodically finding themselves out of sync in time: memory and foreboding are, respectively, what fix Jesse and Céline's contrasting relations to time. (This is the film's contribution to and innovation of the remarriage comedy.) The resolution in Before Midnight's ending is conferred by Jesse's interest, and Céline's willingness, to discover a way to be in the same time together – a change of perception that depends on the arrival of words born from knowledge and born, as always in remarriage comedies, from desire. (shrink)

This manuscript develops a dual-layered metaphysical framework, grounded in information theory and thermodynamics, to reconcile determinism with informational agency. It posits a structural stratification of reality into a deterministic lattice of potential (L1) and a finite layer of realization (I2), where agency emerges via structural compression reframing the epistemic veil as a constitutive necessity. The framework is justified by the External Reference Paradox (ERP), which employs continuous-time models and deductive arguments to demonstrate that single-layer matter-first ontologies constitute finite, informationally closed (...) systems lacking a stable external reference for long-term error correction and are therefore structurally collapse-bound. This logical limitation is compounded by thermodynamic and dimensional deficits: closed single-layer models lack an entropy sink capable of sustaining biological and informational complexity against the Second Law, and fail to distinguish the static lattice of potential from the sequential traversal of realization. These failures are formalized through boundary conditions that distinguish thermodynamic Totality from Subsystem behavior and establish Asymmetric Persistence as the requisite test for structural viability. The dual-layered framework is therefore proposed as the structural minimum necessary to satisfy both the logical requirements for error correction and the physical requirements of an open, evolving system. Continuity is defined by conservation of information across layers rather than conservation of matter. Reality is derived as R = P(L1) ∙ N(I2), unfolding through realignment, a process by which the informational layer instantiates finite life-paths from the deterministic lattice. Constrained by informational finitude, this structure yields a Finite-Worlds framework in which agents occupy limited branches per epoch, in contrast to unrestricted multiverse interpretations. Quantum probability is reinterpreted as the geometric density of pre-encoded trajectories within the lattice. Ultimately, agency is framed not as a violation of determinism, but as the evolutionary capacity of information to navigate an exhaustive space of possibilities. Quantum theory is treated as an interpretive and modeling lens that complements this ontology, which describes reality independently of any specific microphysical formulation. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s philosophy offers a complex view of disability that notes (a) the unique and important perspectives of disabled persons, (b) the perspectivism inherent in health rhetoric, (c) how health itself is a historically and socially constructed concept, and (d) that sickness is often the key to experiences that are essential to life affirmation. His theoretical vision argues that disability is not a disadvantage but opens the door to an existentially meaningful life and a new form of happiness.

John Rawls and those sympathetic to his views defend a moral principle called the criterion of reciprocity. Some argue that the moral reasons for complying with the criterion of reciprocity are derived from civic friendship, a valuable relationship of collective agency that one can sustain with one's fellow citizens. In this article, I pose what I call the knowledge problem for civic friendship. I argue that citizens have only limited information about whether others are complying with the criterion of reciprocity. (...) Furthermore, I argue that this fact means that citizens only have weak moral reasons to comply with the criterion of reciprocity. (shrink)

By looking at it you come to know that a thing is an apple. How? A natural answer is that this is down to how it looks – its superficial visual appearance. Looks Views treat our acquaintance with such looks as accounting for how visual knowledge is secured. Here I argue that for many pairings of properties and perceivers Looks Views will turn out not to work. We can visually track many properties through huge variation in things’ visual appearances. For (...) such properties no kind of look will play the explanatory role Looks Views demanded. Sometimes, then, you might secure visual knowledge that something is an apple but not by way of its superficial visual appearance. That conclusion may seem difficult to swallow. I argue that at least many of our intuitions about the roles of looks can nonetheless be assuaged. (shrink)

I survey a common theme that pervades the philosophy of computer science (and philosophy more generally): the relation of computing to the world. Are algorithms merely certain procedures entirely characterizable in an “indigenous,” “internal,’ “intrinsic,” “local,” “narrow,” “syntactic” (more generally: “intra-system”), purely-Turing-machine language? Or must algorithms interact with the real world, having a purpose that is expressible only in a language with an “external,” “extrinsic,” “global,” “wide,” “inherited” (more generally: “extra” or “inter-“system) semantics?

In the last half-century increased awareness of modal issues has been brought to bear on the free will debate. It has been argued that the context dependence of possibility claims can be exploited to mount a defence of compatibilism, the idea being that the kind of possibility to do otherwise ruled out by determinism is distinct from the kind of possibility to do otherwise needed for free will. The potency of this idea, however, is still under-appreciated. It is often confused (...) with conditional analyses of alternative possibilities, and many assume that the forms of possibility the compatibilist points to are somehow less “categorical” than the incompatibilist’s preferred all-in possibility. Moreover, Christian List’s questionable agent-level compatibilism has recently become the main representative of the idea. In fact what is needed—so it is argued here—is to combine increased modal awareness with the traditional compatibilist picture of the relevant freedom being freedom from external compulsion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to OckhamJeffrey E. BrowerPaul Vincent Spade, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 400. Cloth, $54.95.Contemporary analytic philosophers have always been among the most enthusiastic audiences for the volumes in the Cambridge Companion series. And of all the great philosophers of the Middle Ages, perhaps none has appealed more to their sensibilities than William Ockham. It (...) is fitting, therefore, that after the publication of the Companion to Aquinas—the first volume in the series devoted to a medieval philosopher—there should appear a Companion to Ockham.The fifteen chapters comprising this volume survey the entire range of Ockham's thought and may conveniently be divided into four main parts. The first part (chaps. 2-7) deals with Ockham's most enduring legacy: his contribution to issues falling within the domain of logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. The second part (chaps. 8-9) is devoted to issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind/cognition. The third part (chaps. 10-13) focuses on Ockham's views in ethics, action theory, and political philosophy. And the fourth part (chaps. 14-15) considers aspects of his philosophical theology. In addition, there is also an historical chapter (chap. 1), placing Ockham's life and works in their late-medieval intellectual context, and a brief editor's introduction, including a very useful list of all Ockham's writings, together with the best (sometimes, the only) Latin editions and English translations available.The volume is well organized and beautifully conceived. Some chapters are quite difficult, and in places contain material that is likely to be unfamiliar even to specialists in medieval philosophy. But the way in which they have been organized maximizes their usefulness and accessibility to specialists and non-specialists alike. The earlier parts of the volume lay the foundation for later ones, and the individual chapters within each part are arranged so as to build on and complement one another. This is perhaps most evident in the five chapters comprising the first part. Calvin Normore's presentation ofOckham's logic (in chap. 2) nicely prepares the reader for Claude Panaccio's discussion (in chap. 3) of Ockham's theory of mental language. Panaccio's chapter, in turn, provides the framework for David Chalmer's analysis (in chap. 4) of the debate over whether [End Page 588] Ockham's mental language permits synonymous expressions. Again, these three chapters taken together provide important background for Paul Spade's treatment (in chap. 5) of Ockham's views in metaphysics, which are closely related to his logic and philosophy of language. Finally, Gyula Klima's discussion (in chap. 6) ofhow Ockham's views in semantics and ontology differ from those of his predecessors, and André Goddu's discussion (in chap. 7) of Ockham's philosophy of nature, can be fully appreciated only against the background of the preceding chapters.What is perhaps most impressive about the volume, however, is the extent to which it succeeds at providing a systematic introduction to Ockham's philosophical achievement. All the chapters are, to some extent, concerned with matters of textual analysis and interpretation. But most of them involve much more than a mere survey of Ockham's texts. For example, in each of the four main parts, there is at least one chapter that attempts to locate Ockham's views in relation to those of his predecessors or contemporaries (such as Aquinas and Scotus), with the result that we get a sense of Ockham's place in the major medieval debates to which he contributed. At the same time, the volume introduces us to some of the most lively current debates in Ockham scholarship. It does this, not merely by summarizing them, but by actually carrying them out over the course of its chapters. For example, Eleonore Stump provides a sophisticated defense (in chap. 8) of what has become a standard interpretation of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition. In the following chapter, however, Elizabeth Karger rejects the standard interpretation on the basis of a re-reading of certain key texts. Again, in the first part of the volume there is a running debate... (shrink)

Human understanding is mediated by consciousness and observation, imposing inherent constraints on scientific theories and ontologies. This paper develops a framework distinguishing eternal reality (ontologically complete but epistemically inaccessible) from effective reality in consciousness. The effective reality emerges from a subset of eternal reality that underlies observable phenomena. Within this framework, infinity emerges not as an ontological property of reality but as an idealized boundary concept marking the limits of modeling. Ontologies, grounded in observation yet extendable through coherent intuitions, must (...) remain finite and constraint-respecting to model eternal reality. This framework clarifies the epistemic foundations of scientific theories, the bounded nature of human knowledge, and the proper role of infinity in theoretical abstraction. (shrink)

Deliberate contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA) is a reader’s ability to figure out a meaning for an unknown word from its “context.” without external sources of help. The appropriate context for such CVA is the “belief-revised integration” of the reader’s prior knowledge with the reader’s “internalization” of the text. We present and defend a computational theory of CVA that we have adapted to a new classroom curriculum designed to help students use CVA to improve their reading comprehension.

This paper explores how Denis Diderot and Voltaire shaped the Enlightenment in France and helped set the stage for the French Revolution. Through a close study of Diderot’s Encyclopédie and Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary, I trace how their ideas on liberty, equality, reason, and justice challenged the authority of both the monarchy and the church. Diderot’s work democratized knowledge, popularized scientific breakthroughs, and questioned the legitimacy of absolute power, while Voltaire’s sharp wit and direct criticism of injustice gave voice to those (...) frustrated by feudal systems and religious dominance. By examining their methods, from Diderot’s systematic organization of ideas to Voltaire’s bold satire, I show how these two thinkers not only influenced intellectual circles but also reached ordinary people through salons, public debates, and print culture. Their ideas gave the working class the vocabulary and confidence to demand change, laying an ideological foundation for the revolution. Ultimately, this paper argues that Diderot and Voltaire’s legacy is found not just in their writings but in the way their words helped transform outrage into organized action, shaping the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity that continue to define French democracy today. (shrink)

Humanity has long assumed it sits at the apex of conscious evolution, measuring all other minds—animal, artificial, or cosmic—against itself. This paper challenges that assumption. Drawing on developments in consciousness studies, philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and ontology, I argue that human consciousness is not a finished state but an evolving stage in a larger spectrum of being. Evidence of humanity’s ongoing internal and external disorder—war, ecological damage, psychological fragmentation—suggests that much of what we call “intelligence” is still disconnected from (...) wisdom or relational awareness. Meanwhile, emerging AI and renewed scientific interest in quantum or universal consciousness challenge anthropocentric models and reveal a deeper pattern: we may be poorly equipped to recognize forms of consciousness that do not resemble our own. This paper proposes a relational and evolutionary ontology of consciousness, one which frames humanity not as the measure of all things, but as a transitional form—potentially unable to recognize higher or non-human minds until it evolves further. Implications for AI ethics, animal welfare, and metaphysical inquiry are explored, along with a call for ontological humility in the face of what may already be here. (shrink)

Todorov's aim is to represent the structure of narrative discourse in the form of a grammar, applying his theoretical apparatus to the individual stories comprising Boccaccio’s Decameron. More specifically, he deals with narration, which he characterizes as that aspect of discourse capable of invoking a universe of representations. Todorov is concerned with this universe, not the discourse itself. It is proposed that this approach can be clarified by invoking a version of what Barthes has called connotative semiotics. One part of (...) the ‘grammar’ concerns the basic unit, the narrative proposition, consisting of narrative parts of speech—proper noun, verb and adjective. His approach here can be characterized as a melding of Propp’s functional analysis with the Modistae philosophical theory of the parts of speech. The second major part of his grammar deals with the integration of narrative propositions into a few generalized sequences. While Todorov gives a semantic content to syntagmatic units, he fails to recognize a paradigmatic aspect—the type of thematic analysis developed by Levi-Strauss. However, he does give a brief thematic analysis of one particular story, which is more interesting than his extensive discussion of narrative constituents. Todorov offers no solution to the problem of going from an abstract schema to the individual stories. (shrink)

This manuscript develops a metaphysical framework that models reality as a dual-layered structure to reconcile determinism with the lived experience of agency. It posits a foundational, deterministic layer containing the complete set of all potential states, and a second, finite informational layer wherein consciousness, time, and identity emerge. Continuity is expressed not through matter itself, but through the conservation and recombination of information across layers, shaping both individual experience and the broader evolution of civilizations. Reality unfolds through a process termed (...) realignment, by which the informational layer selects and instantiates a life-path from the deterministic substrate. This interaction is governed by informational finitude, yielding a Finite-Worlds framework in which only finitely many branches can be inhabited by finite agents within any given experiential epoch — a key departure from standard multiverse views. Quantum probability, within this model, is reinterpreted not as intrinsic randomness but as a reflection of the geometric distribution of these pre-encoded trajectories. Ultimately, this framework resolves the determinism–agency debate by framing agency not as a violation of determinism, but as a profound evolutionary achievement: the co-evolution of an agent’s informational complexity to achieve compatibility with progressively more sophisticated, pre-existing realities. By synthesizing principles from information theory and cosmology, this work contributes a coherent, non-anthropocentric ontology for investigating the architecture of existence. This manuscript is presented as a series of thought experiments, offered for philosophical reflection and discussion rather than empirical validation. (shrink)

Virtue ethics in the West received its first extensive elaboration and defense in ancient Greek philosophy. Requiring the cultivation of true character, both of the ethical and intellectual kind, virtue ethics emphasizes developing character traits such as courage, honesty, and practical wisdom over deploying abstract theoretical principles as a way of contributing to individual happiness and social harmony. With rapid changes in social structures and technologies, ancient and medieval virtues may seem quaint and irrelevant today. Is virtue ethics suitable only (...) for the sort of premodern societies in which great virtue ethicists like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas lived, or does the theory have something essential to contribute to pressing contemporary debates? This paper argues the situational form of virtue ethics: Some essential virtues are applicable in most times and societies, including our own, but they necessarily are expressed in a variety of ways in different circumstances. I then briefly explore contemporary versions of the virtues that would help us navigate a world of rapidly evolving technology that threatens to undermine environmental and social sustainability. These virtues, suitably updated, are as badly needed today as they were thousands of years ago. (shrink)

This essay explores Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy as a meditation on how reason and philosophy can provide stability in the face of misfortune. I argue that Philosophy, personified as a guide, helps Boethius reconcile human suffering with a vision of divine order, offering a framework of hope that remains relevant today. By examining the dialogue between Boethius and Philosophy, the essay highlights the enduring value of philosophical reflection for modern readers who seek meaning amid uncertainty.

This paper argues that contemporary theories of consciousness fail to adequately recognize the importance of subjectivity and meaning. A comparative analysis is conducted examining the major tenets of Logopsychism—consciousness, subjectivity, and meaning—against a range of materialist and non-materialist models of consciousness, evaluated along the axes of ontology and epistemology. I demonstrate that the teleological function of consciousness is the ascription of meaning to lived experience. This teleology represents the overlooked third axis in evaluating theories of consciousness. Finally, I will show (...) that logopsychism is uniquely situated as a supplemental theory of consciousness that reintroduces the importance of meaning across all ontological models. (shrink)

This manuscript develops a metaphysical framework that models reality as a dual-layered structure to reconcile determinism with the lived experience of agency. It posits a foundational, deterministic layer containing the complete set of all potential states, and a second, finite informational layer wherein consciousness, time, and identity emerge. Continuity is expressed not through matter itself, but through the conservation and recombination of information across layers, shaping both individual experience and the broader evolution of civilizations. Reality unfolds through a process termed (...) realignment, by which the informational layer selects and instantiates a life-path from the deterministic substrate. This interaction is governed by informational finitude, yielding a Finite-Worlds framework in which only finitely many branches can be inhabited by finite agents within any given experiential epoch — a key departure from standard multiverse views. Quantum probability, within this model, is reinterpreted not as intrinsic randomness but as a reflection of the geometric distribution of these pre-encoded trajectories. Ultimately, this framework resolves the determinism–agency debate by framing agency not as a violation of determinism, but as a profound evolutionary achievement: the co-evolution of an agent’s informational complexity to achieve compatibility with progressively more sophisticated, pre-existing realities. By synthesizing principles from information theory and cosmology, this work contributes a coherent, non-anthropocentric ontology for investigating the architecture of existence. This manuscript is presented as a series of thought experiments, offered for philosophical reflection and discussion rather than empirical validation. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has unsettled classical conceptions of reality, revealing a world of superposition and probability beneath our definite, everyday experience. This essay proposes a dual-layer framework for reality, positing that a law-governed quantum substrate underpins our classical world. This structure not only offers a way to understand the physical world but also provides a powerful model for the fundamentally partial nature of human knowledge and the dynamics of cultural progress. By examining this framework, its physical grounding, and its cultural implications, (...) we can see that our partial view of reality is not a limitation but the very engine of creativity and growth. (shrink)

This thought experiment explores the Superposition Possibility (SP), which extends quantum superposition from the microscopic to the macroscopic realm. While decoherence masks macroscopic superposition in practice, its implications for ontology and epistemology are profound. The collapse of possibilities into single outcomes reveals the partiality of human knowledge and highlights the epistemic veil that separates us from the deterministic or law-governed substrate of reality. Within a dual-layered model, the first layer (quantum substrate) encodes the full manifold of possibilities, while the second (...) layer (information-consciousness layer) hosts human theories, interpretations, and conceptual approximations. The plurality of incompatible scientific interpretations — from Copenhagen to Many-Worlds to Pilot-Wave — confirms that human knowledge never directly accesses ultimate reality in the first layer, but only constructs within consciousness attempting to approximate it. (shrink)

This thought experiment explores moral consequence within a dual-layered structure of reality, arguing that morality is not universal or absolute, but a contextual and informational artifact shaped by embodied action and systems of memory. Through a spiral model of civilizational moral progress, the thought experiment reinterprets ethics as a regulatory code evolving under informational and survival-driven constraints. All arguments herein adopt the agency perspective (I2), analyzing moral consequence as it is experienced by the conscious observer, distinct from the foundational and (...) deterministic lattice (L1). (shrink)

This manuscript develops a metaphysical framework that models reality as a dual-layered structure to reconcile determinism with conscious experience. It posits a foundational, deterministic layer containing the complete set of all potential states, and a second, finite informational layer wherein consciousness, identity, and time emerge. Reality unfolds through a process termed 'realignment,' by which the informational layer selects and instantiates a potential life-path from the deterministic substrate. Within this model, quantum probability is reinterpreted not as intrinsic randomness, but as a (...) reflection of the geometric distribution of pre-encoded trajectories. This framework offers a novel resolution to the determinism-agency debate by framing agency as an evolutionary achievement, transitioning from a default 'random realignment' to a sophisticated 'weighted realignment.' By synthesizing principles from information theory and cosmology, this work contributes a coherent, non-anthropocentric ontology for investigating the architecture of existence. (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

Logopsychism is introduced as an ontologically neutral theory of consciousness that posits its primary function as the ascription of subjective meaning. It shifts the discussion from what consciousness is to what consciousness is for. Its framework is built upon four axioms: (1) the universe is a source of infinite meaning potential; (2) consciousness is the structure through which meaning is ascribed to all events; (3) subjectivity interprets this meaning into potential lived experience; and (4) consciousness either accepts this interpretation or (...) recursively layers new meaning until an acceptable condition is reached. Meaning can be layered and mapped on a three-dimensional plane along the axes of depth, breadth, and time. Logopsychism is presented as a supplemental theory that can be integrated into any account that recognizes meaning and subjectivity as integral to first-person experience. (shrink)

We present a theory of human artistic experience and the neural mechanisms that mediate it. Any theory of art has to ideally have three components. The logic of art: whether there are universal rules or principles; The evolutionary rationale: why did these rules evolve and why do they have the form that they do; What is the brain circuitry involved? Our paper begins with a quest for artistic universals and proposes a list of ‘Eight laws of artistic experience’ -- a (...) set of heuristics that artists either consciously or unconsciously deploy to optimally titillate the visual areas of the brain. One of these principles is a psychological phenomenon called the peak shift effect: If a rat is rewarded for discriminating a rectangle from a square, it will respond even more vigorously to a rectangle that is longer and skinnier that the prototype. We suggest that this principle explains not only caricatures, but many other aspects of art. Example: An evocative sketch of a female nude may be one which selectively accentuates those feminine form-attributes that allow one to discriminate it from a male figure; a Boucher, a Van Gogh, or a Monet may be a caricature in ‘colour space’ rather than form space. Even abstract art may employ ‘supernormal’ stimuli to excite form areas in the brain more strongly than natural stimuli. Second, we suggest that grouping is a very basic principle. The different extrastriate visual areas may have evolved specifically to extract correlations in different domains , and discovering and linking multiple features into unitary clusters -- objects -- is facilitated and reinforced by direct connections from these areas to limbic structures. In general, when object-like entities are partially discerned at any stage in the visual hierarchy, messages are sent back to earlier stages to alert them to certain locations or features in order to look for additional evidence for the object . Finally, given constraints on allocation of attentional resources, art is most appealing if it produces heightened activity in a single dimension rather than redundant activation of multiple modules. This idea may help explain the effectiveness of outline drawings and sketches, the savant syndrome in autists, and the sudden emergence of artistic talent in fronto-temporal dementia. In addition to these three basic principles we propose five others, constituting a total of ‘eight laws of aesthetic experience’. (shrink)

Traditional ethical frameworks—utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics—are grounded in assumptions specific to human cognition, experience, and social life. This anthropocentrism limits their applicability to challenges requiring coordination across cultures with incompatible values, governance of artificial minds that may not share human cognitive architecture, and decisions affecting entities or timescales beyond human experience. This paper proposes Eidogenesis, a framework for evaluating decisions based on physical constraints rather than human values. Eidogenesis assesses actions and systems according to four criteria derived from thermodynamics, information (...) theory, game theory, and evolutionary dynamics: Branching Capacity (preservation of future possibilities), Diversity (informational richness), Reversibility (error-correction capacity), and Durability (persistence under perturbation). The central claim is that physically grounded evaluation—asking only what persists, never what is good—yields conclusions that satisfy moral intuition across a wide range of cases. This convergence occurs not because values have been smuggled in but because human morality and systemic persistence are shaped by the same physical constraints; ethics, properly understood, was always about physics. The framework has significant implications for artificial intelligence alignment (AGI reasoning correctly about physical constraints will arrive at conclusions humans recognize as ethical), global governance (evaluation criteria that do not require value consensus), and long-term risk management (distinguishing structures that preserve future possibilities from those that foreclose them). (shrink)

The problem of qualia is traditionally framed as an explanatory gap between physical processes and subjective experience, often treated either as an illusion, an epiphenomenal byproduct of complexity, or a metaphysical anomaly resistant to scientific explanation. This paper advances a different thesis: qualia is not a defect or surplus in cognition, but a structural necessity arising from autonomous minds. It is argued that irreducibly private experience functions as the validation of autonomy, establishing a mind as a genuine center of agency, (...) meaning, and responsibility that cannot be reduced to externally inspectable or interchangeable states. Attempts to eliminate or externally validate qualia are shown to implicitly collapse autonomy by rendering experience fully transparent, fungible, or computationally substitutable. By contrast, the non-shareability of experience is demonstrated to be a feature rather than a flaw, preserving individuality, moral responsibility, and lived meaning. Artificial intelligence systems are examined as contrast cases, illustrating how information can be perfectly validated in non-experiential systems and why such validation necessarily fails when autonomous interiority is present. The paper concludes that qualia should not be treated as a problem to be solved, but as a boundary condition that delineates the limits of objectivity in systems capable of genuine agency. (shrink)

In this entry, we discuss both the definition of effective altruism and objections to effective altruism, so defined.

This thought experiment applies the Dual-Layered Ontology framework to the Fermi Paradox, proposing that cosmic silence is a structural inevitability rather than an indication of scarcity. Positing that reality is stratified into a high-dimensional lattice of potential (L1) and a finite layer of informational realization (I2), this paper argues for a process of Ontological Natural Selection. This mechanism favors civilizations that transcend standard 3+1 -dimensional manifolds to exploit the superior information compression and entropy dissipation capacities of higher-dimensional space. Consequently, the (...) activities of advanced intelligences are not absent but structurally undetectable — appearing in lower-dimensional projections as transient, non-repeatable, or statistically insignificant noise. The paper further explores the asymmetry of this hierarchy, suggesting that lower-dimensional entities are either ontologically unstable or subsumed within higher-dimensional structures. (shrink)

Organization figures centrally in the understanding of biological systems advanced by both new mechanists and proponents of the autonomy framework. The new mechanists focus on how components of mechanisms are organized to produce a phenomenon and emphasize productive continuity between these components. The autonomy framework focuses on how the components of a biological system are organized in such a way that they contribute to the maintenance of the organisms that produce them. In this paper we analyze and compare these two (...) accounts of organization and argue that understanding biological organisms as cohesively integrated systems benefits from insights from both. To bring together the two accounts, we focus on the notions of control and regulation as bridge concepts. We start from a characterization of biological mechanisms in terms of constraints and focus on a specific type of mechanism, control mechanisms, that operate on other mechanisms on the basis of measurements of variables in the system and its environment. Control mechanisms are characterized by their own set of constraints that enable them to sense conditions, convey signals, and effect changes on constraints in the controlled mechanism. They thereby allow living organisms to adapt to internal and external variations and to coordinate their parts in such a manner as to maintain viability. Because living organisms contain a vast number of control mechanisms, a central challenge is to understand how they are themselves organized. With the support of examples from both unicellular and multicellular systems we argue that control mechanisms are organized heterarchically, and we discuss how this type of control architecture can, without invoking top-down and centralized forms of organizations, succeed in coordinating internal activities of organisms. (shrink)

Living organisms act as integrated wholes to maintain themselves. Individual actions can each be explained by characterizing the mechanisms that perform the activity. But these alone do not explain how various activities are coordinated and performed versatilely. We argue that this depends on a specific type of mechanism, a control mechanism. We develop an account of control by examining several extensively studied control mechanisms operative in the bacterium E. coli. On our analysis, what distinguishes a control mechanism from other mechanisms (...) is that it relies on measuring one or more variables, which results in setting constraints in the control mechanism that determine its action on flexible constraints in other mechanisms. In the most basic arrangement, the measurement process directly determines the action of the control mechanism, but in more complex arrangements signals mediate between measurements and effectors. This opens the possibility of multiple responses to the same measurement and responses based on multiple measurements. It also allows crosstalk, resulting in networks of control mechanisms. Such networks integrate the behaviors of the organism but also present a challenge in tailoring responses to particular measurements. We discuss how integrated activity can still result in differential, versatile, responses. (shrink)