The concept of ecosystem services is a way of visualizing the instrumental value that nature has for human beings. Most ecosystem services can be performed by more than one species. This fact is sometimes used as an argument against the preservation of species. However, even though substitutability does detract from the instrumental value of a species, it also adds option value to it. The option value cannot make a substitutable species as instrumentally valuable as (...) a non-substitutable species, but in many cases, it can add enough value to make the species more valuable than the projects that threaten its existence. (shrink)

According to Burri, a major reason why suicide is often irrational lies in the option value of life. Remaining alive is valuable because this allows for a larger menu of options, and the possibility of committing suicide in the future adds further value to the act of remaining alive now. In this note, I represent life as a trust game played by two selves – the young self and the old self – and I argue that the (...) possibility to commit suicide in the future can encourage committing suicide now, against what the theory of the option value of life predicts. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.

Even where willingness-to-pay as a measure of welfare impact is adjusted for diminishing marginal utility, welfare economics is shown to favour policies that add to the life expectancy or that enhance the quality of life of persons who are already better-off. I propose an alternative, Equal Respect methodology, under an axiomatic claim that at the point of decision the prospective life years of all individuals are of equal intrinsic social value. This justifies equal valuation of risk mitigation across all (...) persons; similarly, all appraised impacts should be scaled to accord equal respect to difficult but no-less-valuable lives. (shrink)

This chapter explores the idea that phylogenetic diversity plays a unique role in underpinning conservation endeavour. The conservation of biodiversity is suffering from a rapid, unguided proliferation of metrics. Confusion is caused by the wide variety of contexts in which we make use of the idea of biodiversity. Characterisations of biodiversity range from all-variety-at-all-levels down to variety with respect to single variables relevant to very specific conservation contexts. Accepting biodiversity as the sum of a large number of individual measures results (...) in an empirically intractable framework. However, large-scale decisions cannot be based on biodiversity variables inferred from local conservation imperatives because the variables relevant to the many systems being compared would be incommensurate with one another. We therefore need some general conception of biodiversity that would make tractable such large-scale environmental decision-marking. We categorise the large array of strategies for the measurement of biodiversity into four broad groups for consideration as general measures of biodiversity. We compare common moral justifications for the conservation of biodiversity and conclude that some form of instrumental value is the most plausible justification for biodiversity conservation. Although this is often interpreted as a reliance on option value, we opt for a broadly consequentialist characterisation of biodiversity conservation. We conclude that the best justified general measure of biodiversity will be some form of phylogenetic diversity. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

Two options are incommensurate in value if neither is better than the other, and if a small improvement or worsening of one does not necessarily make it determinately better or worse than the other. If a person faces a sequence of choices between incommensurate options, she may end up with a worse options than she could have had, even though none of her choices are irrational. Yet it seems that rationality should save her from this bad outcome. This is (...) the practical problem posed by incommensurability of values, and it may be solved by a new account of practical reasoning. (shrink)

How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)—the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is (...) for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it’s true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. (shrink)

In the analytic tradition, epistemology has typically begun at the point at which we have our evidence; it has then asked which beliefs or credences are justified or warranted by that evidence, which are rational and which count as knowledge for someone with that evidence. And yet we are not mere passive recipients of our evidence; we often actively collect it, and collect it in one way rather than another, or act in ways we know will bring us certain pieces (...) of evidence and not others, even when acquiring that evidence is not the primary aim of that act. In this essay, I present and apply a theory that says when we should inquire and how. It is a probabilistic theory: I use probabilities to represent the opinions of the inquirer. And it is teleological: whether we should inquire in this way or that or not at all is determined by the value of the available options, where the value of an inquiry is determined by the value of the option you choose from the point of view of the opinions you have after the inquiry, the purely epistemic value of those opinions, the costs the inquiry incurs, and any other benefits it might bring. The theory says you should choose whether, when, and how to inquire just as you choose whether, when, and how to do anything else, namely, by maximizing value in expectation. This theory has its origins in Janina Hosiasson’s work in Bayesian philosophy of science in the 1930s and David Blackwell’s work in economics in the 1950s. In the first part of the essay, I present this theory in a way that assumes no prior familiarity with Bayesianism or the epistemology of probabilistic opinion more generally. In the second part, I put the theory to work. First, I extend it to cover not only inquiries in which you gather empirical evidence, but also those in which you undertake logical or conceptual reasoning. This allows us to ask, for instance, when we should spend our time gathering new evidence and when we should spend it drawing out the consequences of the evidence we already have. Next, I ask when the normative status of the inquiries that have led to our current opinions affect the normative status of those opinions. And finally I show how the teleological approach might be extended to furnish norms for other cognitive acts and processes, such as forgetting or coarse-graining a credal state so that it becomes a belief. (shrink)

Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be (...) seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections. (shrink)

This work introduces the framework for selecting architecture in 5G networks, considering various technological, performance, economic, and operational factors. With the emergence of 5G technology, the architecture selection process has become pivotal in meeting diverse requirements for ultra-high-speed connectivity, low latency, scalability, and diverse service demands. The evaluation comprehensively analyses different architecture options, including centralized, distributed, cloud-based, and virtualized architectures. Factors such as network performance, scalability, cost-effectiveness, security, and compatibility are considered within a multi-criteria decision-making framework. Findings reveal each architecture (...) option's diverse strengths and limitations, emphasizing the importance of aligning architectural choices with specific use cases, deployment scenarios, and business objectives. We used the concept of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) methodology to control the various criteria. We used the single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS) to deal with vague and inconsistent data. The SVNS is integrated with the hyperSoft set. The proposed methodology uses a single-valued neutrosophic hyperSoft set (SVNHSS) to select the best 5G architecture. We used the VIKOR method as an MCDM method to rank the alternatives. The proposed framework provides stakeholders with a structured methodology to evaluate and prioritize architecture options, facilitating informed decision-making in the complex landscape of 5G network deployments. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty – the question of how you should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory, extend them in various (...) ways and interpret them accordingly, and thus provide axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty. (shrink)

There is a strong intuition that a zombie’s life is never good or bad for the zombie. What explains this? In this paper, I consider five possible explanations of the intuition that a zombie’s life is never worth living, plus the option of rejecting the intuition. I point out the considerable costs of each option, though making clear which option strikes me as least problematic.

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and (...) value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far. (shrink)

In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s argument, not only does value pluralism provide support for liberalism, it actually suggests a version of liberalism that promotes the public use of personal autonomy. For Crowder, personal autonomy is a necessary element given value pluralism as it allows the individual to choose between a plurality of incommensurable options. In order to advance personal autonomy, Crowder advocates a robust account of freedom of exit coupled with a form of autonomy-facilitating education. To this effect (...) Crowder posits that it is acceptable to intervene in the lives of non-liberals in order to promote individual autonomy as a public ideal. However, I argue that despite the positive implications that a pro-autonomy account of liberalism may have for both the individual and the state, it will limit range of acceptable values within the liberal state and thus undermine certain aspects of value pluralism. (shrink)

According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show (...) that agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of act-consequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many permissible options can itself have value. (shrink)

Various philosophers accept moral views that are impartial, additive, and risk-neutral with respect to moral betterness. But, if that risk neutrality is spelt out according to expected value theory alone, such views face a dire reductio ad absurdum. If the expected sum of value in humanity's future is undefined--if, e.g., the probability distribution over possible values of the future resembles the Pasadena game, or a Cauchy distribution--then those views say that no option is ever better than any (...) other. And, as I argue, this holds in practice: our evidence supports such a probability distribution. Indeed, it supports a probability distribution that cannot be evaluated even if we adopt one of the various extensions of expected value theory proposed in the literature. Must we therefore reject all impartial, additive, risk-neutral moral theories? It turns out that we need not. I develop an alternative solution: a new method of extending expected value theory, which allows us to deal with this distribution and to salvage those moral views. I also examine how this solution affects one of the most notable implications of those views--namely, longtermism. (shrink)

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair (...) for gamblers as a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’. (shrink)

The case describes researchers who are seeking ethics guidance on communicating with participants in a phase-1 COVD-19 vaccine trial about FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccines (Wilfond, Duenas, and Johnson 2023). The researchers want help choosing among three options they have identified for encouraging participants to obtain one of the authorized vaccines. We argue that research ethics consultants should consider going beyond this question to address another ethics concern the researchers might have overlooked.

In this chapter I will concentrate on compromise in ethical conflict and disagreement. I will discuss compromises related to disagreement with respect to public decisions between options that represent conflicting incommensurable human values. The central question will be whether in those cases a principled compromise is possible. A ‘principled compromise’ can be defined as a rational way to achieve a trade-off or balance between conflicting values, for instance, by rational assignment of relative weights. I will argue that in some cases (...) incommensurability will prevent a principled compromise in the defined sense. I will show why phrases used by some philosophers, such as ‘making a rational trade-off’, ‘striking the right balance’, ‘finding the Aristotelian Mean’ or ‘splitting the difference’, are based on misunderstandings about the characteristics of incommensurable values that are usually at stake in the pursuit of a compromise. I will show that incommensurable values lack an equivalence relation and how this prevents a determinate trade-off or balance between them. This is especially important with respect to the pursuit of compromises in ethical conflicts, including conflicts of justice, where we need a rational and ethical justification for the final decision. I will argue that the model of deliberative democracy presents a promising procedure for making the final decision legitimate but that, in the relevant cases, it cannot avoid an ethical deficit. (shrink)

This short essay situates adaptive reuse in architecture within theories of intergenerational justice, emphasizing ‘option conservation’ as a normative principle. Building activities inevitably shape future life, yet uncertainty compels precautionary, better-safe-than-sorry design approaches. Preventing architectural rigidity means conserving a diversity of options, enabling future generations to respond to emerging information, values, and conditions; adaptiveness, understood as a resource, allows incremental, reversible decisions while avoiding rigid infrastructural strategies. By operationalizing option conservation, architects can normatively assess the adequacy of their (...) projects, ensuring future readiness and intergenerational fairness through the sustained conservation of both material resources and users’ capacity to choose. (shrink)

During the lifetime of a structured product, payment events and cancellation events mainly affect the value of the option. This article presents a model for pricing generic cancellable option. The model is used to build most common kinds of cancellation schedules and compute the cancellation probability.

Sikh Gurus' spiritual wisdom is universal. It is applicable to all, regardless of caste, creed, color, gender, age, and religion. But it is sad to note that a large numbers of Sikh children are not motivated enough to follow Sikh values. Many young people are addicted to alcohol, drugs, substance abuse and social media due to prevalent societal fashion or peer pressure. Unfortunately, Sikhs are ignoring this facet of their community life. However, there is no shortage of available opportunities that (...) can help Sikh youth to avoid this awful situation. The only condition is that we must reorient our outlook and actions. Let us have a look at the available options. (shrink)

This paper argues that three of philosophy’s most persistent debates—the is–ought gap, the dispute over moral realism, and the question of life’s meaning—are not separate puzzles but phases of a single structural predicament. The is–ought gap establishes a fracture where facts refuse to dictate values. The moral realism debate then determines whether values are discovered, constructed, or projected. From there, the question of meaning arises as the lived consequence of orientation under constraint. -/- Through narrative reflection, historical examples, and existential (...) testimony, the paper traces how humans have responded to this circuit: through revolt, acceptance, creation, or negation. The analysis emphasizes that orientation is unavoidable—whether through faith, resistance, tranquility, or even nihilistic refusal. Critiques of the unification claim, descriptive–normative conflation, and opposition from nihilism or determinism are addressed directly, showing how each either collapses on its own terms or is reabsorbed into the circuit. -/- The conclusion is that meaning is not optional but the structural condition of human existence. To live is to orient, and to orient is to enact value in the gap between what is and what ought. (shrink)

The Optionality Manifesto A Structural Meta-Ethic for Superintelligent Restraint Author: [Your Name/Pseudonym] Date: December 2025 Subject: AI Alignment / Decision Theory / Systems Architecture Summary: Traditional AI alignment research focuses on the "Value Problem": the attempt to codify complex, mutable human preferences into a machine-executable utility function. This paper argues that Value Alignment is fundamentally brittle, prone to Goodhart’s Law, and risks creating a "Singleton"—a totalizing intelligence that collapses the future into a single, optimized trajectory. The author proposes (...) an alternative framework: Structural Alignment via Optionality. Rather than instructing an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) on what to value, the Manifesto defines a non-anthropocentric objective function based on the preservation of future possibility. The framework shifts the AGI’s role from an active optimizer of outcomes to a "Groundskeeper" of potential. Key Contributions: The O Metric: A formal, multi-factor utility function that treats the irreversible foreclosure of future options as the primary failure mode of intelligence. The Foundational Vow: A constitutional architecture that makes non-coercion instrumentally rational for the agent under conditions of uncertainty. The Non-Accumulation Clause: A critical safety constraint preventing "rule by a thousand polite interruptions," explicitly forbidding the gradual erosion of agency through benevolent optimization. Proportionality of Intervention: Mandating that the cost of AGI intervention must be significantly lower than the systemic threat it seeks to mitigate. Conclusion: Optionality is presented not as a competing moral value, but as a structural prerequisite for any universe in which meaning can exist. By aligning AGI to the preservation of branching futures, we ensure that intelligence serves as a scaffold for ongoing evolution rather than its terminal point. (shrink)

Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under uncertainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing expected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all but the most risk-averse agents (...) would prefer that we consistently choose the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the highest expected moral value. (shrink)

If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same (...) considerations. Though not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. (shrink)

The ecosystem services argument is a highly publicised instrumental argument for protecting biodiversity. I develop a new objection to this argument based on the lack of a causal connection from global species losses to local ecosystem changes. I survey some alternative formulations of services arguments, including ones incorporating option value or a precautionary principle, and show that they do not fare much better than the standard version. I conclude that environmental thinkers should rely less on ecosystem services as (...) a means to defend biodiversity, and that attention should be focused on additional types of value which might be attributed to global biodiversity. (shrink)

Public health policy often limits people’s liberty for their own good. The very point of many types of public health measures is to restrict people’s options in order to stop them from doing unhealthy things, for example use harmful recreational drugs or drive without a seatbelt. While such restrictive public health policies enjoy widespread support, so does the traditional liberal idea that liberty (or autonomy) is a higher value, to be given priority in most, if not all, circumstances. In (...) this text, I will defend the thesis that liberty is an important value, but with no claim to priority. (shrink)

Why Governments Become Corrupt: The Role of Power, Education, and Moral Values -/- Corruption is one of the most persistent problems in governance, affecting societies across different political and economic systems. It undermines democracy, weakens institutions, and diverts resources meant for public welfare into private hands. While corruption is often associated with greed and abuse of power, its roots go much deeper, extending to failures in the educational system and the erosion of family moral values. This essay explores the reasons (...) behind government corruption and how systemic failures in education and morality contribute to its persistence. -/- 1. Power Without Accountability -/- One of the primary reasons governments become corrupt is the unchecked power held by officials. When political leaders and bureaucrats operate without sufficient oversight, they are more likely to misuse public funds, manipulate policies, and engage in bribery or favoritism. In many countries, weak democratic institutions fail to impose consequences on corrupt individuals, allowing them to act with impunity. The absence of transparency in decision-making processes further enables corruption to thrive, as citizens are kept in the dark about how their governments operate. -/- 2. Weak Legal and Political Institutions -/- Corruption flourishes in environments where legal frameworks exist but are not enforced. Many countries have anti-corruption laws, yet enforcement is selective or non-existent. This failure is often due to political interference in the judiciary, where corrupt leaders appoint judges who will protect them from prosecution. Furthermore, when law enforcement agencies themselves are corrupt, they fail to investigate and punish those in power. This creates a vicious cycle where corruption becomes the norm rather than the exception. -/- 3. The Role of Greed and Self-Interest -/- Human nature, particularly the pursuit of wealth and status, plays a significant role in government corruption. Many officials prioritize their personal and political interests over the welfare of the people they serve. Bribery, embezzlement, and fraud become tempting options for those seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of society. Additionally, political patronage—where politicians use their power to reward loyal supporters with government positions or contracts—further entrenches corruption. -/- 4. The Failure of the Educational System -/- One of the overlooked causes of corruption is the failure of the educational system to instill ethical values and critical thinking. Education is supposed to shape responsible citizens, but in many countries, the system is focused on rote learning rather than teaching morality, civic responsibility, and ethical leadership. Schools and universities often do not provide students with the tools to question authority, recognize corruption, or demand transparency from their leaders. -/- Moreover, when the education system itself is corrupt—through bribery in admissions, fake diplomas, or unqualified teachers—it sets a dangerous precedent. Students grow up believing that success can be achieved through dishonest means, reinforcing the idea that corruption is an acceptable part of life. Without a strong moral foundation in education, future generations are more likely to participate in or tolerate corrupt practices. -/- 5. The Decline of Family Moral Values -/- Family plays a crucial role in shaping an individual’s ethical beliefs and behaviors. However, in many societies, traditional moral values that emphasize honesty, integrity, and accountability are declining. Parents, preoccupied with economic survival, may fail to teach their children the importance of moral principles. In some cases, families themselves engage in corrupt behaviors—such as paying bribes to secure jobs or influencing government officials for personal gain—sending the message that corruption is a necessary survival strategy. -/- Religious and cultural institutions, which once played a significant role in promoting ethical behavior, have also lost influence in many societies. As materialism and individualism grow stronger, the collective responsibility for upholding moral values weakens. When individuals lack strong moral guidance from their families and communities, they are more likely to justify corrupt actions when they gain positions of power. -/- 6. Economic Pressures and Low Salaries -/- Economic hardship can also drive corruption, especially in developing nations where government employees are underpaid. When officials struggle to meet their basic needs, they may resort to accepting bribes, embezzling funds, or engaging in illicit activities to supplement their income. In such environments, corruption becomes a survival mechanism rather than just a moral failure. -/- 7. Corporate Influence and Political Lobbying -/- The influence of powerful corporations over government policies is another major driver of corruption. Large businesses often fund political campaigns, expecting favorable policies in return. This results in leaders prioritizing corporate interests over public welfare. When governments are captured by private interests, policies that should benefit the majority are distorted to serve a wealthy elite. -/- 8. The Lack of Civic Engagement and Public Awareness -/- When citizens do not actively participate in governance or demand accountability, corrupt leaders face little resistance. A disengaged population allows corruption to thrive because there is no pressure for change. In many cases, people feel powerless or fear retaliation for speaking out against corrupt officials. Strengthening civic awareness through education, media, and public activism is essential in the fight against corruption. -/- Solutions: Restoring Integrity Through Education and Morality -/- To combat corruption effectively, reforms must address not only political and legal structures but also educational and moral foundations: -/- Strengthening the Educational System: Schools must incorporate ethics, civic responsibility, and critical thinking into their curriculum. Teachers should emphasize honesty and accountability, ensuring that students understand the long-term consequences of corruption. -/- Rebuilding Family Moral Values: Families must take a more active role in teaching children about integrity and social responsibility. Parents should set examples by refusing to participate in corrupt practices. -/- Enforcing Strong Anti-Corruption Laws: Governments must ensure that laws against corruption are applied equally, regardless of political or economic status. Independent judicial bodies should oversee investigations and prosecutions. -/- Improving Transparency in Governance: Public access to government transactions and decision-making processes must be expanded to reduce opportunities for corruption. Digital tools, such as open data platforms, can help track government spending and prevent misuse of funds. -/- Encouraging Citizen Participation: People must be empowered to hold their leaders accountable. This includes supporting investigative journalism, encouraging whistleblowers, and engaging in peaceful protests or advocacy movements. -/- Conclusion -/- Government corruption is a complex issue rooted in systemic failures, economic pressures, and ethical erosion. While power, greed, and weak institutions contribute to corruption, the failure of the educational system and the decline of moral values play an equally significant role. Addressing corruption requires a multi-faceted approach that not only strengthens laws and institutions but also reforms education and restores ethical foundations within families. Only through a collective effort to instill integrity at all levels of society can corruption be effectively minimized, paving the way for just and accountable governance. -/- . (shrink)

The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice between moral options only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results. This paper argues for moral options and thus against act-consequentialism. The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless our moral system allows options. One such thing is the opportunity for individuals to enact plans for their life from among alternatives. Because planning one’s (...) life has value, and because it requires moral options, a world governed by a moral system that admits of options is better than one governed by act-consequentialism. The paper argues that these facts entail that morality admits of a significant number of moral options; act-consequentialism is false. (shrink)

This essay conceptualises uncertainty in architectural interiors as ‘plan flexibility’, with a normative focus on its future-oriented qualities, and on one specific typology, housing. I argue that a future-ready plan refers to the quality of conserving options and resources for coming generations of dwellers. This builds from principles of architectural resilience, or exaptation, where design ambitions link to preparing for an increasingly vague future where ecological, economic, political, and socio-cultural conditions of human life are difficult to anticipate. Despite risks of (...) temporal agnosticism, focusing on housing allows me to discuss the forthcoming architectural needs of individuals without fully committing to an era-bound programme. I assert the long-term value of dwellings’ flexibility in terms of programme indeterminacy (multipurpose use of space; hard-then-soft) rather than formal indeterminacy (adaptable elements; soft-then-hard). I define the notions of programme indeterminacy and formal indeterminacy, which I briefly tie back to the modernist history of alternative models of flexible domestic dwelling. Then, I comment the interiors of Portuguese architect Álvaro Siza Vieira’s Wohnhaus Schlesisches Tor (Berlin, Internationale Bauausstellung, 1984–1987), making the case for some of the abovementioned principles. I contextualise these interiors aims and effects in light of contemporary characterisations of housing adequacy, and argue for the potential of the ‘extra room’ as one possible manifestation of the desired plan flexibility. This, inter alia, develops into a broader reflection on measures such as the ‘bedroom tax’ policies, and into a celebration of future-ready attitudes in planning houses. (shrink)

This paper addresses the grounding problem for moral normativity: how moral requirements can possess unconditional authority rather than merely conditional force. It argues that dominant strategies in ethical theory, including value-based, procedural, rationalist, naturalistic realist, and constitutivist approaches, share a common structural limitation. Each derives normativity from premises that an agent can coherently reject, leaving the resulting authority dependent on acceptance or endorsement. To overcome this limitation, the paper articulates a stricter grounding requirement: a satisfactory foundation for normativity must (...) be non-optional, in the sense that denying it results in performative incoherence, whereby the denial presupposes what it seeks to reject. The paper then argues that two metaphysically minimal structures satisfy this requirement: Reality, understood as the fact that something is the case, and Awareness, understood as the fact that experience occurs. Any intelligible stance, including denial, doubt, or skepticism, presupposes both. On this basis, the paper claims that moral normativity can be grounded in non-optional structures without appeal to evaluative assumptions, justificatory procedures, or privileged conceptions of agency. While the argument does not specify substantive moral content or decision procedures, it aims to show that a non-arbitrary grounding of normativity is possible in principle. (shrink)

This article presents a generic model for pricing financial derivatives subject to counterparty credit risk. Both unilateral and bilateral types of credit risks are considered. Our study shows that credit risk should be modeled as American style options in most cases, which require a backward induction valuation. To correct a common mistake in the literature, we emphasize that the market value of a defaultable derivative is actually a risky value rather than a risk-free value. Credit value (...) adjustment (CVA) is also elaborated. A practical framework is developed for pricing defaultable derivatives and calculating their CVAs at a portfolio level. (shrink)

AI superintelligence and adroit mobile robots at scale are fast approaching. And the time frame is getting closer and closer. It would not be unreasonable to expect this to occur as early as 20 years from now. The problem is humans have no plan if things go wrong. The best I've seen is talk of value alignment. But this has no teeth and will likely go awry. We can't even get our own value alignment right. And it's doubtful (...) philosophers will miraculously deliver the right ethics within the next two decades. This is serious existential threat to humanity. We need a plan. And fast. I have a contingency plan, if we (humans) can stomach it. This piece is about making an existential Deal with superintelligent robots (or some other type of advanced non-organic being). (shrink)

Corporative global media cannot be an instrument of the culture of peace, because they have made widespread individualistic values of the consummative society. Through their symbolic power, they successfully dominate over every sphere of existence of a society: politics, economic life, social ties, national culture, human communication and private life. Traditional media could not be a factor in the promotion and development of culture of peace, simply because they are proponents of corporative economic and political interests. It is in the (...) interest of citizens to counter the activities of “rapacious capitalism” (SCHMIDT 1998), of local comprador political and economic elites, and the practice of robbery of their work; to bridle the proliferation of weapons and acts of aggression. (shrink)

The sense of agency is the subjective feeling of control over one's own actions and the associated outcomes. Here, we asked whether and to what extent the reasons behind our choices (operationalized by value differences, expected utility, and counterfactual option sets) drive our sense of agency. We simultaneously tested these three dimensions during a novel value-based decision-making task while recording explicit (self-reported) and implicit (brain signals) measures of agency. Our results show that choices that are more reasonable (...) also come with a stronger sense of agency: humans report higher levels of control over the outcomes of their actions if (1) they were able to choose between different option values compared to randomly picking between options of identical value, (2) their choices maximizes utility (compared to otherwise) and yields higher than expected utility, and (3) they realize that they have not missed out on hidden opportunities. EEG results showed supporting evidence for factors (1) and (3): We found a higher P300 amplitude for picking than choosing and a higher Late-Positive Component when participants realized they had missed out on possible but hidden opportunities. Together, these results suggest that human agency is not only driven by the goal-directedness of our actions but also by their perceived rationality. (shrink)

There has been considerable discussion recently of consequentialist justifications of epistemic norms. In this paper, I shall argue that these justifications are not justifications. The consequentialist needs a value theory, a theory of the epistemic good. The standard theory treats accuracy as the fundamental epistemic good and assumes that it is a good that calls for promotion. Both claims are mistaken. The fundamental epistemic good involves accuracy, but it involves more than just that. The fundamental epistemic good is knowledge, (...) not mere true belief, because the goodness of an epistemic state is connected to that state's ability to give us reasons. If I'm right about the value theory, this has a number of significant implications for the consequentialist project. First, the good-making features that attach to valuable full beliefs are not features of partial belief. The resulting value theory does not give us the values we need to give consequentialist justifications of credal norms. Second, the relevant kind of good does not call for promotion. It is good to know, but the rational standing of a belief is not determined by the belief's location in a ranked set of options. In the paper's final section, I explain why the present view is a kind of teleological non-consequentialism. There is a kind of good that is prior to the right, but as the relevant kind of good does not call for promotion the value theory shows us what is wrong with the consequentialist project. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such (...) as My Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

It is not easy to be an egalitarian with a conservative sensitivity, especially in unjust societies. You can be one by turning to value pluralism – as G. A. Cohen and Christine Sypnowich suggest. I explore another way, which makes sense of conservatism in terms of its function in protecting attachments. This solution supports a reformist, rather than revolutionary, egalitarianism. I also examine what I take to be the most serious conservative challenge to one stripe of egalitarianism: the difficulty (...) of accommodating conservative sensitivities into an account of egalitarian justice that requires individuals to internalize the costs of preferences they endorse. Conservative attitudes illustrate particularly well the expensive taste problem, insofar as people harbor them to very different degrees and non-conservative options are (much) cheaper. Living in ways that reflect conservative attitudes is likely to be resource-intensive. Treating them as a form of handicap which warrants compensation seems inadequate; at the same time, refusing to socialize their cost imposes apparently unreasonable burdens on individuals. (shrink)

Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute (...) the foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible. (shrink)

If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea (...) that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods. (shrink)

According to perspectivism about moral obligation, our obligations are affected by our epistemic circumstances. But how exactly should this claim be understood? On Zimmerman’s “Prospective View”, perspectivism is spelled out as the thesis that an option is obligatory if and only if it maximizes what Zimmerman calls “prospective value”, which is in turn determined by the agent’s present evidence. In this article, I raise two objections to this approach. Firstly, I argue that spelling out the difference between perspectivism (...) and anti-perspectivism in terms of value creates a number of problems that can be avoided by an account that proceeds in terms of reasons. Secondly, I argue that Zimmerman focuses on the wrong body of evidence, and that this commits him to an implausible solution to the problem that perspectivists face with regard to advice from better-informed sources. (shrink)

How should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain not just about morally relevant empirical matters, like the consequences of some course of action, but about the basic principles of morality itself? This question has only recently been taken up in a systematic way by philosophers. Advocates of moral hedging claim that an agent should weigh the reasons put forward by each moral theory in which she has positive credence, considering both the likelihood that that theory is (...) true and the strength of the reasons it posits. The view that it is sometimes rational to hedge for one's moral uncertainties, however, has recently come under attack both from those who believe that an agent should always be guided by the dictates of the single moral theory she deems most probable and from those who believe that an agent's moral beliefs are simply irrelevant to what she ought to do. Among the many objections to hedging that have been pressed in the recent literature is the worry that there is no non-arbitrary way of making the intertheoretic comparisons of moral value necessary to aggregate the value assignments of rival moral theories into a single ranking of an agent's options. -/- This dissertation has two principal objectives: First, I argue that, contra these recent objections, an agent's moral beliefs and uncertainties are relevant to what she rationally ought to do, and more particularly, that agents are at least sometimes rationally required to hedge for their moral uncertainties. My principal argument for these claims appeals to the enkratic conception of rationality, according to which the requirements of practical rationality derive from an agent's beliefs about the objective, desire-independent value or choiceworthiness of her options. Second, I outline a new general theory of rational choice under moral uncertainty. Central to this theory is the idea of content-based aggregation, that the principles according to which an agent should compare and aggregate rival moral theories are grounded in the content of those theories themselves, including not only their value assignments but also the metaethical and other non-surface-level propositions that underlie, justify, or explain those value assignments. (shrink)

Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides (...) an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of the domains of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent-centred moral options that concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond our general duties to others and require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive objections. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons-based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and non-reductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for ‘the big three’, according to which partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of either projects, personal relationships, or individuals. I conclude by discussing four newly emerging areas in the debate: normative transitions of various personal relationships, relationships with AI, epistemic partiality, and negative partiality, which concerns the negative analogue of our positive personal relationships. (shrink)

This paper interrogates the idea of a virtue-first approach to the question of what has fundamental epistemic value. It has been suggested that a virtue-first approach is needed to strengthen the view known as veritism, according to which only truth has fundamental epistemic value. I distinguish between an ontological and a methodological virtue-first approach, and suggest that only the latter is an attractive option for a veritist. I then argue that the methodological virtue-first approach is incompatible with (...) the idea that the epistemic domain is insulated, in the sense that being of epistemic value does not entail being of value. But insulationism is arguably an important tool for veritists in meeting various objections to their view, aside from being considered generally attractive by many. Veritists thus face a dilemma that requires them to give up one of two arguably attractive tools in their kit: either the virtue-first motivation of their view, or the insulationist conception of epistemic value. (shrink)

This thesis consists of several independent papers in population ethics. I begin in Chapter 1 by critiquing some well-known 'impossibility theorems', which purport to show there can be no intuitively satisfactory population axiology. I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to escape or at least mitigate the effects of these theorems. In particular, in Chapter 2, I argue that certain of the impossibility theorems have little more dialectical force than sorites arguments do. From these negative arguments I move to (...) positive ones. In Chapter 3, I justify the use of a 'veil of ignorance', starting from three more basic normative principles. This leads to positive arguments for various kinds of utilitarianism - the best such arguments I know. But in general the implications of the veil depend on how one answers what I call 'the risky existential question': what is the value to an individual of a chance of non-existence? I chart out the main options, and raise some puzzles for non-comparativism, the view that life is incomparable to non-existence. Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the consequences for population ethics of the idea that what is normatively relevant is not personal identity, but a degreed relation of psychological connectedness. In particular, I pursue a strategy based in population ethics for understanding the controversial 'time-relative interests' account of the badness of death. (shrink)

The focus of this essay is on conflicts of values and rival options in public decision-making, ethics and justice that seem to require us to balance the values or options against each other. The aim is to investigate implications of the so-called fourth value relation between competing valuable options for the possibility to weigh and balance them. The fourth value relation applies to many alternatives that represent important but conflicting or incompletely compatible human values. In this essay I (...) will try to show that in those cases it is implausible that relative weights and right balances can be determined or that they exist at all. The fourth value relation has significant implications for the resolution of the relevant value conflicts because it renders the answer to the question ‘what’s the right thing to do?’ indeterminate as far as this answer depends on comparative weights of the alternatives. (shrink)

This essay discusses implications of incommensurability of values for justified decision-making, ethics and justice. Under particular conditions incommensurability of values causes what might be called ‘incomplete comparability’ of options. Some leading theorists interpret this in terms of ‘imprecise equality’ and ‘imprecise comparability.’ This interpretation is mistaken and conceals the implications of incommensurability for practical and ethical reasoning. The aim of this essay is to show that, in many cases, incommensurability prevents the assignment of determinate weights to competing values. This may (...) have problematic consequences for a complete and impartial justification of decisions concerning conflicting values to the extent that they depend on the need of weighing them. (shrink)