Fact Sheets on the European Union
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East Asia

East Asia has vital geostrategic importance for the EU and is facing important geostrategic challenges. The Indo-Pacific is home to more than 50% of the world’s population. Two thirds of the world’s container trade passes through the Indo-Pacific and its sea lanes are the main routes for trade and energy supplies. The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific was adopted in September 2021 to increase the EU’s engagement, build partnerships and reinforce the rules-based international order and address global challenges. The EU is adapting its current instruments to support its strategic autonomy. Its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, formally approved by the Council in March 2022, promotes an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure maritime routes, capacity-building and an enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
The EU’s strategy encompasses seven priority areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, the green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defence, and human security.
East Asia faces security concerns such as the nuclear challenge in North Korea, the maritime disputes in the East and the South China Seas, and the Taiwan issue. The EU is a strong economic player in East Asia and is working to foster fair trade, multilateralism, institution building, democracy, good governance and human rights.

This fact sheet describes the East Asia region. See also the fact sheets on South Asia (5.6.7) and Southeast Asia (5.6.9).

Legal basis

  • Title V (EU external action) of the Treaty on European Union;
  • Articles 206-207 (trade) and Articles 216-219 (international agreements) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
  • Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (bilateral relations).

China (People’s Republic of China)

The EU and China established formal diplomatic ties in 1975. Relations were suspended following the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. The EU only resumed relations in 1994, but its arms embargo imposed in 1989 remains in place. Since there is no detailed common EU definition of an ‘arms embargo’, it is left to individual Member States to interpret the meaning in accordance with their national laws.

Under President Xi Jinping, China’s political situation has changed considerably since 2012. In 2018, a revision of the constitution was adopted allowing Xi Jinping to hold the position indefinitely, with no term limit on the post of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, head of state and of the army. China’s foreign policy has recently taken a more assertive approach, having the world’s largest pool of available active military personnel. China is the world’s second-largest military spender, after the US. In 2024, China’s defence budget was around USD 231 billion, a 7.2% increase from 2023.

China officially launched its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian (named after the province opposite Taiwan), as part of an ongoing effort to build a fully modern force rivalling the US military by 2027. A fourth carrier is also under construction in China, and it is reported that it might be nuclear powered. China’s naval forces are building warships at a faster rate than all other powers combined. China is expanding and multiplying its military presence in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait and in the Strait of Malacca, which is vital for international trade.

Although the joint EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation strengthened links, relations have deteriorated since 2022 due to China’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and due to its assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait. EU-China bilateral relations had already begun to deteriorate in 2021, after China introduced countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights.

EU foreign ministers met in May 2023 and EU leaders met at the European Council in June 2023 and reaffirmed the validity of the EU’s multifaceted approach towards China set out in the March 2019 EU-China strategic outlook: as a partner; as a competitor; and as a systemic rival, while competition and rivalry have gained prominence. EU leaders agree on the need to engage with China when it is in the EU’s interest while, at the same time, seeking to reduce strategic dependencies (‘de-risking, not decoupling’). As of 2025, the EU is concerned about systemic imbalances in the Chinese economy, which include distortive industrial policies and practices that create overcapacity and negatively impact World Trade Organization (WTO) members. European businesses in China still face discrimination and an uneven playing field, with many sectors remaining largely closed to foreign investment.

The EU is concerned about rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and opposes unilateral changes by force, urging China, as a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), to uphold international law. The EU has also expressed concerns over human rights issues in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

The 24th EU-China Summit in December 2023 addressed key geopolitical and economic issues. High-level dialogues were held on the climate, digital policy, economics, strategy and human rights. The EU emphasised three main areas: 1) international relations, including Russia’s war in Ukraine; 2) trade; and 3) the importance of a rules-based international order. China primarily focused on trade and investment. Despite ongoing trade disputes, such as tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and EU claims of Chinese discrimination against European manufacturers, the EU and China are planning their next joint summit in 2025 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of their relations.

Since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road initiative has reached every corner of the globe, promoting globalisation with Chinese characteristics such as non-transparent contracting, Chinese labour standards, and debt policies. China aims to become the world leader in high-tech industries and digital technologies, including artificial intelligence and 5G. In 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a multifaceted strategy that aims to enhance connectivity worldwide and bring together the EU, its Member States, and their financial and development institutions (Team Europe). The Global Gateway is a relevant geopolitical instrument for the EU. It helps to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change to improving health systems and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains. It is a de facto alternative to the Belt and Road initiative and is a very relevant geopolitical instrument for the EU.

The EU and China are major trading partners. In 2024, the EU imported goods from China valued at EUR 517.8 billion, while exporting goods worth EUR 213.3 billion to China, resulting in a trade deficit of EUR 304.5 billion for the EU (trade is imbalanced in China’s favour). EU-China trade represented approximately EUR 1.3 billion worth of imports per day and EUR 600 million worth of exports per day, making trade between the EU and China worth a total of EUR 1.9 billion every day. The economic imbalances and unfair Chinese trading practices pose risks to key EU industries (automotive, green technologies, etc.). As China has demonstrated its readiness to exploit dependencies on critical raw materials, Beijing has been warned that unfair trading practices will increasingly lead to protective measures (such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties).

In October 2024, the Commission concluded its anti-subsidy investigation by imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China for a period of five years. The investigation found that the BEV value chain in China benefits from unfair subsidisation, which could economically harm EU producers of BEVs. The EU has implemented several other trade defence measures targeting Chinese imports, imposing anti-dumping duties to protect its industries from unfair pricing practices, including steel products and biodiesel. There have been several trade retaliations by China and the EU has contested certain Chinese trade practices through the WTO framework. In January 2025, the EU launched a WTO case against China over intellectual property royalties.

Follows escalating US tariffs in April 2025 under President Trump, China has signalled its readiness to collaborate with the EU in countering protectionism and upholding the global trade system. While China encourages the EU to deepen economic ties, the EU remains wary of trade imbalances and limited market access, and is concerned over fair procurement practices.

China’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, maintaining a neutral position, has heightened tensions with Western allies. While not explicitly supporting the war, China has deepened its military ties with Russia, increasing arms sales and joint exercises. It has not joined sanctions against Russia, becoming a key supplier of sensitive technology, with 80% of Russia’s imports coming from China. Chinese companies have also bypassed EU sanctions, leading to their inclusion on the EU’s 13th package of war sanctions list in 2024. In December 2024, the EU imposed further sanctions on six Chinese companies and one Chinese individual for supplying drone and microelectronic components in support of Russia’s war effort.

The EU advocates global governance and multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea dispute, emphasising freedom of navigation and overflight, while urging peaceful, negotiated solutions in accordance with international law and in line with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The region is critical for global trade and resources, with China claiming about 90% under the ‘nine-dash line’. China’s assertive actions, including confrontations with Taiwan and the Philippines, have escalated tensions in the area.

Human rights are arguably the clearest example of systemic rivalry in EU-China relations, as the EU continuously urges China to abide by its obligations under its own constitution and international law, and to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including for Uyghurs, Tibetans and persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and other groups across China. The 39th EU-China Human Rights Dialogue took place in June 2024 in Chongqing. The EU voiced concerns over restrictions on fundamental freedoms, judicial independence and forced labour. It also reaffirmed its opposition to the death penalty and urged China to uphold religious freedom, particularly in relation to the Dalai Lama’s succession.

Parliament has continuously passed resolutions raising human rights concerns about Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang and the situation of the Uyghurs, condemning forced labour and the exploitation of minorities. Parliament has also adopted resolutions on Tibet, more specifically on the situation of religious and ethnic minorities. Recent Parliament resolutions include those of:

Taiwan

The EU is committed to the ‘One-China policy’, referring to Taiwan as a separate customs territory and not as a sovereign state, recognising Taiwan as an economic and commercial entity and supporting Taiwan’s participation in multilateral forums. The EU has developed a well-structured dialogue on economic and trade matters with Taiwan in sectors such as the car industry, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and medical devices.

The EU remains concerned about growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait and opposes any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, in particular by force. In addition to the military coercion around Taiwan, there is an additional concern that underwater infrastructure cables could be damaged.

In 2023, Taiwan was the EU’s 13th largest trading partner, while the EU was Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner, after China, the US and Japan. Taiwan’s total goods trade with the EU reached EUR 77.7 billion in 2023. That same year, EU exports to Taiwan amounted to EUR 30.5 billion and EU imports from Taiwan to EUR 47.8 billion. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is also a top trading partner of Taiwan. In terms of investment, as of 2023, 4 252 EU companies have invested USD 58.17 billion in Taiwan.

The EU and Taiwan also hold annual consultations on various non-trade matters, such as migrant workers’ rights, particularly for domestic workers and in the fishing industry; the death penalty; gender equality and fair treatment for LGBTQIA+ people. The EU and Taiwan conducted their seventh Human Rights Consultations on 5 March 2025 in Taipei, underscoring their dedication to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The EU reaffirmed its opposition to capital punishment, and urged Taiwan to apply a de facto moratorium. Other topics discussed touched on the issues of the protection of the rights of migrant workers, especially in the fishing industry, and those of domestic workers.

Taiwan held general elections in January 2024 and participation reached 71.86%. For the third term, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its candidate William Lai (Lai Ching-te) won the election with 40.1% of votes, managing to retain the presidential seat. The Legislative Yuan, consisting of 113 seats, is divided among three main parties and two independents, creating a situation where the small parliamentary partners can significantly determine Taiwan’s political agenda.

Cross-strait tensions have escalated since the DPP won the elections in 2016. China has taken assertive actions, increasing the frequency and scale of patrols by bombers, fighter jets, and surveillance aircraft around Taiwan. Lai Ching-te has vowed to safeguard the island’s de facto independence from China and further align it with other democracies. Taiwan has developed a unique expertise in fighting cyberattacks, foreign information, manipulation, interference and disinformation, both at governmental level and in civil society organisations.

Parliament has conducted several official missions to Taiwan. The Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes (INGE) visited Taipei in November 2021, in what was Parliament’s first official visit to Taiwan. INGE aimed to study Taiwanese experiences in addressing interference and manipulation campaigns and discussed Taiwan’s innovative system to combat disinformation campaigns and other types of hybrid attacks. The Committee on International Trade paid an official visit to Taipei in December 2022. This visit confirmed how important strengthening the strategic relationship between Taiwan and the EU is to Taiwan and, most concretely, how important ambitious and mutually beneficial comprehensive trade and investment relations are to it. Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) paid an official visit to Taipei in July 2023. The main topic was the global security concerns in the Taiwan Strait.

Parliament has repeatedly encouraged closer bilateral EU-Taiwan cooperation in areas such as trade, research, culture, education, climate change and environmental protection. Parliament adopted a resolution in December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations, calling for progress on an EU investment agreement with Taiwan. Parliament has also supported Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Parliament has also repeatedly urged China to refrain from acts of military provocation towards Taiwan, emphasising that all cross-strait disputes should be settled by peaceful means based on international law.

Parliament has repeatedly called for the inclusion of Taiwan to be a priority in the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and encouraged dialogue and cooperation with Taiwan in all industrial sectors and supply chains, particularly in strategically important industries such as high-tech and semiconductor technologies. Taiwan produces two thirds of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of its high quality semiconductors.

Parliament has criticised China’s military escalation and it rejects China’s economic coercion. In October 2024, Parliament passed a resolution criticising China for misinterpreting UN Resolution 2758 to exclude Taiwan from international organisations and for escalating military provocations in the Taiwan Strait.

Hong Kong

The EU attaches great importance to Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, which must be preserved in line with the Basic Law and international commitments. Democracy and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated dramatically in Hong Kong over the past decade. Beijing has muted political opposition, shattered independent press, and disbanded civil society organisations in its efforts to dismantle the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, in spite of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.

The 2021 Hong Kong Legislative Council elections saw a victory for pro-China candidates, reinforcing Beijing’s influence. The EU criticised the elections, stating that they were contributing to the erosion of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle. In May 2022, John Lee Ka-chiu was elected Chief Executive with 99% of votes from the Election Committee, surpassing his predecessor Carrie Lam’s 66%. The December 2023 district council elections saw a record-low voter turnout of 27.5%, the lowest since Hong Kong’s handover.

Despite growing international criticism, Hong Kong enacted its new National Security Law in March 2024 (known as Article 23 of the Basic Law). The law covers newly defined acts of treason, espionage, theft of state secrets, sedition and foreign interference. Human rights organisations consider it to be a final step in silencing democratic voices in Hong Kong. The EU is deeply concerned about this legislation’s potential impact on rights and freedoms. The first conviction under this law came in September 2024, when a Hong Kong man pleaded guilty to sedition for wearing a shirt with a slogan.

Hong Kong was the EU’s 31st largest trading partner in goods in 2023. The EU is Hong Kong’s third largest trade partner after China and Taiwan. EU imports from Hong Kong are dominated by machinery and transport equipment. EU exports to Hong Kong are dominated by machinery and appliances, transport equipment and chemical products. The EU is the largest foreign business community in Hong Kong, with 1 548 EU companies operating in the city as of 2023 – about half of them using Hong Kong as their regional headquarters or regional offices.

Parliament has passed multiple resolutions on Hong Kong’s political situation, in which it emphasised that respecting the Basic Law was crucial for EU-Hong Kong relations. It has condemned China’s interference, warning that it endangered the ‘one country, two systems’ model. Parliament has denounced China’s national security law as an attack on Hong Kong’s autonomy, the rule of law and freedoms. Parliament has also stressed that China must uphold its commitments under the legally binding joint declaration registered with the UN.

Recent Parliament resolutions include those of:

  • June 2023 on the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong, which condemned China’s suppression of political opposition and pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong, notably mentioning the case of Jimmy Lai;
  • April 2024 on the new National Security Law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John;
  • November 2024 on the decline of freedoms in Hong Kong under the National Security Law, which emphasised the wrongful imprisonment of Jimmy Lai and 45 pro-democracy activists;
  • February 2025 on the diminishing space for civil society in Hong Kong, which pointed to the mounting pressure on the Democratic Party to dissolve and to the suspension of research activities by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

Japan

Having been strategic partners since 2003, the EU and Japan share fundamental values such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as a strong commitment to sustainable development, multilateralism and a rules-based WTO system. Japan is committed to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change and to other multilateral environmental agreements. However, there are some issues that cause concern for the EU: Japan’s application of the death penalty, whaling and parental abductions of EU children in Japan.

The EU and Japan upgraded their bilateral strategic relationship in February 2019 with the provisional implementation of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the entry into force of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). In January 2025, the SPA entered into force, establishing a solid EU-Japan bilateral framework, strengthening political and economic cooperation, and focusing on global issues such as climate action, sustainable development and security. The SPA aims to reinforce the rules-based global order and promote democracy, human rights and free trade, while enhancing coordination in multilateral forums.

The EPA is the most important bilateral trade agreement ever concluded by the EU, as it covers nearly one third of global gross domestic product, almost 40% of world trade and over 600 million people. The EPA also contains commitments on trade in both goods and services, and provides a framework that promotes bilateral investment. It also sets ambitious targets for sustainable development and includes, for the first time, a specific commitment to the Paris climate agreement. The EU and Japan signed an agreement on civil aviation safety in June 2020. Reciprocity of visa-free travel for EU citizens to Japan remains an issue in bilateral relations, as Japanese nationals enjoy visa-free access to the EU.

Since the entry into force of the EPA, trade in goods has gone up 20% and agri-food trade is up 34%. Japan welcomed the EU’s decision on lifting of the import restriction measures on food products from the Fukushima region, taken in the wake of the 2011 Japan earthquake.

Japan ranks as the EU’s second-largest trading partner in Asia, following China, and is the seventh-largest globally for goods trade. From 2019 to 2023, trade between the two in goods and services increased by 9%, reaching EUR 188.6 billion.

The two parties remain committed to enhancing investment relations by concluding a separate investment agreement in the future that would include investor/investment protection standards and a dispute-resolution mechanism. Since the launch of the EU-Japan digital partnership in May 2022, work is ongoing in the strategic areas of semiconductors, high-performance computing and quantum technology, 5G and beyond, and resilient digital connectivity. The EU and Japan are among the largest digital economies in the world. The free flow of data between the EU and Japan is an essential element for businesses and it represents a major deliverable under the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and in the digital partnership with Japan. At the High-Level Economic Dialogue in October 2023, the EU and Japan concluded a deal on cross-border data flows. Once ratified, the agreed provisions will be included in the EU-Japan EPA.

The 29th EU-Japan Summit in July 2023 focused on strong support for Ukraine, condemned North Korea’s nuclear activities and fostered a stable relationship with China. Leaders emphasised cooperation on security, including maritime and cybersecurity, and reiterated their commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050. They also agreed to enhance collaboration on the green transition, including energy efficiency, low-carbon hydrogen and carbon capture technologies.

The first Japan-EU Strategic Dialogue was held in November 2024 at foreign minister level. The EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership was concluded during the meeting in Tokyo. In January 2025, as part of the security partnership, the Japan-EU Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation took place in Brussels.

The second EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue was held in April 2025 and focused on deepening security and defence cooperation in the context of changing geostrategic challenges, including challenges such as cyber issues, maritime security, space security, and the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference.

The EU and Japan are like-minded strategic partners and have similar approaches to the Indo-Pacific, agreeing that enhanced EU engagement in the region, as well as enhanced cooperation with Japan and other allies, would be beneficial. There is mutual interest in advancing cooperation on connectivity, maritime security, environment and climate change, trade and investment, digital issues, promoting multilateralism and upholding the international rules-based order.

Japan and the world were deeply shocked by the murder of the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022 in Nara, where he was campaigning for the 2022 elections, which were held only two days later to elect half of the upper house for six years. The Liberal Democratic Party modestly increased its seats and a new record was set with 28% of seats being won by female candidates.

Japan’s governing coalition, headed by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party and its ally Komeito, lost its majority in the general election held in October 2024. The opposition, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan was the biggest beneficiary, gaining 50 seats to reach a total of 148. The election results reflect widespread dissatisfaction with a funding scandal and with rising inflation, creating uncertainty about the future of Japan’s Government and its economic prospects. Japan will hold a mid-term general election of the House of Councillors in July 2025 to elect half of the seats of the house. As an integral part of the upgrading of the EU-Japan bilateral strategic relationship, Parliament and the Japanese Diet are strengthening their interparliamentary dialogue.

Relevant resolutions include those of:

The 41st EU-Japan Interparliamentary meeting was held in July 2023 in Strasbourg to discuss political, economic and social developments, Russia’s war on Ukraine, security issues in Japan, East and South-East Asia, the EU-Japan Digital Partnership, environment and energy cooperation and trade relations. A joint statement was signed calling for international rules for artificial intelligence.

Parliament’s AFET Committee visited Japan in July 2023. Exchanges were held on global security, cybersecurity and disinformation, as well as on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The Japanese Diet expressed serious concerns about Taiwan’s security situation. The 42nd EU-Japan Interparliamentary meeting is planned for May 2025 in Tokyo and Osaka.

South Korea (Republic of Korea)

EU-South Korea relations date back to the 1997 Agreement on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters. South Korea is one of the EU’s top 10 strategic partners, and the EU-South Korea strategic partnership is built on three main pillars, underpinned by three key agreements:

The 10th EU-Republic of Korea Summit took place in May 2023 in Seoul. Leaders agreed to maintain and increase collective pressure on Russia, particularly through the effective implementation of sanctions. The EU and South Korea called on all UN members to take a united and firm stand against North Korea’s illegal weapons programme. Leaders also discussed fostering collaboration on semiconductors, next generation mobile networks, quantum and high-performance computing, artificial intelligence and digital platforms.

The 20th EU-South Korea Joint Committee meeting was held in Seoul in March 2024. Both sides strongly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, reaffirmed their dedication to denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, and committed to enhancing security and human rights initiatives. The discussions also focused on expanding the EU-South Korea green and digital partnerships, boosting trade and investment, and strengthening collaboration in health, research and cybersecurity. South Korea’s advanced science and technology sector, particularly in robotics and AI, offers opportunities for increased EU cooperation. The country is also strengthening its cybersecurity strategy after major cyberattacks, with North Korea mostly blamed for these incidents.

In November 2024, the EU and South Korea signed a bilateral Security and Defence Partnership, aimed at developing and strengthening dialogue and cooperation on security and defence topics, including maritime security, space defence, cyber issues and nuclear non-proliferation, as well as countering hybrid threats.

The eighth EU-Korea Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was held in Seoul in March 2025 to explore research and innovation strategies. The discussions centred on policy advancements, the forthcoming EU-Korea Association Agreement for Horizon Europe Pillar II, and cooperation in critical fields such as AI, quantum technology, healthcare and carbon neutrality.

The EU and South Korea have successfully completed negotiations on a significant Digital Trade Agreement, reaffirming their dedication to strong digital trade standards. Announced during the 12th Trade Committee meeting in March 2025 under the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the deal aims to boost consumer confidence, provide legal clarity for businesses and facilitate smooth data exchanges, while preventing obstacles to digital trade. Key aspects of the agreement include cross-border data transfers, privacy safeguards, electronic contracts and digital trade in goods and services.

South Korea ranks as the EU’s eighth-largest trading partner for goods, while the EU is South Korea’s third-largest partner. Since the FTA came into effect in 2011, trade between the two has expanded considerably, reaching around EUR 130 billion in 2023, an increase of 106% compared to 2011. However, in some areas, challenges remain and the EU is calling on South Korea to remove persistent obstacles to imports of EU animal products, and for the ratification of the pending International Labour Organization convention on the abolition of forced labour.

South Korea held presidential elections in March 2022, won by conservative Yoon Suk-yeol, following a tightly contested race. Local elections were held in June 2022 and coincided with the by-elections for the vacant seats in the National Assembly. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s governing party won 12 of the 17 races for big-city mayors and provincial governors, further expanding its influence. In April 2024, South Korea held parliamentary elections, considered as a midterm test on the current administration. The liberal opposition Democratic Party, together with smaller opposition parties, jointly won 192 of 300 seats in the National Assembly, a defeat for President Yoon Suk-yeol and his People Power Party.

President Yoon Suk-yeol imposed martial law in December 2024, a decision swiftly overturned by parliament within six hours. Lawmakers, including members of his own party, unanimously voted 190-0 to nullify the order, asserting that he had overstepped his constitutional powers. An impeachment motion has accused Yoon Suk-yeol of rebellion, alleging he misused the military to suppress parliamentary authority. President Yoon Suk-yeol was impeached and veteran technocrat Han Duck-soo was appointed as South Korea’s acting president.

South Korea claims that Japan still owes the country reparations from the Second World War. Relations remain strained despite efforts to restore ties under a treaty in 1965. A particularly contentious issue is that of ‘comfort women’ (women who were sex slaves between 1932 and 1945). South Korea has also raised concerns over Japan’s plans to release contaminated water from its Fukushima power station back into the Pacific Ocean, which will adversely affect marine life and consequently the fishing industry.

Three inter-Korean summits to seek denuclearisation took place between April and September 2018, but dialogue and cooperation stalled following the 2019 US-North Korea Hanoi Summit and worsened again in August 2019 following a joint US-South Korea military drill. Tensions came to a head with North Korea’s launch of short-range missiles in March 2020 and with the explosion in June 2020 at the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong and the death of a South Korean citizen in North Korean territory.

South Korea and the United States resumed their joint military drills in August 2022, following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s decision to boost deterrence. Previously, the United States, South Korea and Japan participated in a ballistic missile defence exercise off Hawaii’s coast in spring 2022, demonstrating the improved relations between Seoul and Tokyo. The United States, South Korea and Japan conducted their biggest-ever combined naval drills in January 2024, in a show of strength against North Korea. The South Korean military stated in January 2024 that there is no longer a no-hostility zone.

Parliament is deeply concerned about inter-Korean relations. The EU supports a diplomatic solution to the Korean nuclear crisis and intends to continue its strategy of critical engagement. Parliament is the only EU institution that has formal relations with North Korea.

In terms of parliamentary dialogue, the most recent interparliamentary meeting took place in 2022 in Seoul. The discussions focused on trade and economic relations, joint efforts in combating climate change and supporting the energy transition, digital policy and the situation of human rights in North Korea.

North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)

The EU’s policy towards North Korea is known as ‘critical engagement’, combining sanctions with open communication. Relations are limited, with no bilateral treaties in effect. EU development cooperation focuses on food security and humanitarian aid, subject to political and UN sanctions. Six EU Member States have embassies in Pyongyang, while others have ambassadors for the whole Korean Peninsula based in Seoul. The closure of North Korea’s borders in 2020 has hindered diplomatic staff rotation.

The EU’s sanctions against North Korea, adopted in response to the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development activities, are the toughest against any country. The EU has implemented all relevant UNSC resolutions and has put its own autonomous sanctions regime in place, which complements and reinforces the UN sanctions. In September 2020, the EU conducted a fourth round of approaches to non-EU countries encouraging them to fully implement the UNSC resolutions. In March 2021, the EU announced human rights-related sanctions on North Korea for the first time under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions regime. The list includes two ministers as well as the Central Public Prosecutor’s Office for aiding repressive activities. In December 2022, the EU adopted new sanctions against eight individuals and four entities because of their involvement in North Korean ballistic and nuclear programmes and in circumventing international sanctions. In May 2024, the EU introduced new sanctions against six individuals and three entities from North Korea for their role in evading sanctions and aiding Russia’s military efforts in the war against Ukraine.

North Korea stepped up its nuclear programme in 2017, heightening tensions with the US and South Korea. Although the US’s policy has been to apply maximum pressure, former South Korean President Moon Jae-in engaged in de-escalation and met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un three times in 2018. However, after the failed 2019 Summit in Hanoi between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, tensions and mistrust increased. Since July 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported increasing nuclear activity at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, with a five-megawatt experimental reactor. Since September 2021, North Korea has conducted tests with new long-range cruise missiles that can fly lower and with very flat trajectories, which makes them difficult to intercept. It conducted its biggest ballistic missile tests in 2022, showing that its intercontinental missiles could reach the US. Tensions were heightened in March 2022 by North Korea’s launching of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-17, its biggest missile to date. Its altitude surpasses that of any previous ICBM tested, reaching 6 000 km. South Korea is strengthening its defensive capabilities and military cooperation with the United States, including by taking part in large-scale joint military exercises and deploying additional US air missile defence systems. North Korea’s strategy is to force the United States to reopen negotiations on sanctions and humanitarian relief.

North Korea’s return to missile tests in 2022, along with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, marks a great challenge to South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol, who is adopting a hard-line approach. North Korea has continued launching ballistic missiles in 2023 and 2024, reaching hypersonic velocities of 5 to 10 times the speed of sound in their terminal phase, enabling them to evade detection and missile defences.

In September 2022, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly passed a law that makes the country’s nuclear status irreversible and allows for pre-emptive nuclear strikes if an imminent attack is detected. In September 2023, North Korea amended its constitution to bolster and expand its nuclear force, with leader Kim Jong-un pointing to the growing cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan as ‘the worst actual threat’ facing the isolated nation.

Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un ordered a change to the North Korean constitution in January 2024, removing the aim of a peaceful unification with South Korea and treating it as a hostile separate country. This takes peaceful unification out of the official policy. This policy shift goes along with renewed support from China and Russia.

In late 2024, there was a reported deployment of North Korean troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine. Approximately 10 000 North Korean soldiers were said to be positioned in Kursk and along Russia’s border with Ukraine, marking a notable escalation in North Korea’s involvement in the conflict.

In January 2025, North Korea conducted a test of a cruise missile system, which was its third display of military power that month. The test, which was supervised by Kim Jong-un, featured sea-to-surface missiles that could possibly be equipped with nuclear warheads. In response to US-South Korean military exercises, North Korea promised a strong reaction and signalled its intention to persist with weapons testing and maintain its confrontational approach, despite President Trump’s efforts to engage Kim Jong-un diplomatically.

The EU has condemned the missile launches, calling on North Korea to comply with its obligations under UNSC resolutions and to refrain from all actions that undermine the environment for the pursuit of diplomacy and dialogue. The EU is committed to denuclearisation. Until North Korea complies with its obligations under UNSC resolutions, the EU will continue to implement sanctions strictly while encouraging the international community to do the same.

The Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula (DKOR) was established in 2004. Since then, DKOR is the only EU institution that has formal relations with North Korea. Interparliamentary meetings with the Supreme People’s Assembly have been infrequent. Although Parliament’s delegation initially tried to keep the channels of communication open, political and military developments in North Korea and particularly its nuclear and ballistic missile tests have made the delegation’s outreach towards North Korea less tenable. DKOR’s regular meetings have focused on inter-Korean relations and on the security situation on the Korean peninsula. DKOR will meet representatives party to the ‘6-Party-Talks’ in order to better understand each party’s position and red lines, and to see whether there is room for negotiations to de-escalate tensions.

Parliament has passed several resolutions condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. Parliament passed a resolution in April 2022 on the human rights situation in North Korea, including the persecution of religious minorities.

 

Jorge Soutullo / Samuel Cantell / Airis Meier / Cristina Stanculescu