Southeast Asia
As part of the wider Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia has vital geostrategic importance for the EU and is currently facing relevant geostrategic challenges. The Indo-Pacific is undergoing rapid change, and as home to more than 50% of the world’s population, it is becoming a key geostrategic region. Two thirds of the world’s container trade passes through the Indo-Pacific and its sea lanes are important routes for trade and energy supplies. The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific was adopted in September 2021 to increase the EU’s engagement and build partnerships to address global challenges. The EU is adapting its current instruments to achieve strategic autonomy. Its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, formally approved by the Council in March 2022, promotes an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure maritime routes, capacity-building and an enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
The EU’s strategy priority areas in Southeast Asia are sustainable and inclusive prosperity, the green transition, ocean governance, digital governance, connectivity through the Global Gateway, security, defence and human security.
The EU is forging closer ties with Southeast Asian countries and is promoting regional integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which represents, as a whole, the EU’s third-largest trading partner outside Europe (after China and the US). The region has geostrategic concerns, such as the South China Sea dispute and the Taiwan issue, as well as environmental concerns, especially in the Mekong sub-region. The EU is a strong economic player in Southeast Asia and a major development aid donor, working to foster connectivity, digitalisation, institution-building, democracy, good governance and human rights.
This fact sheet describes the Southeast Asia region. See also the fact sheets on South Asia (5.6.7) and East Asia (5.6.8).
Legal basis
- Title V (EU external action) of the Treaty on European Union;
- Articles 206-207 (trade) and 216-219 (international agreements) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
- Partnership and cooperation agreements (bilateral relations).
A. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The first ASEAN summit, held in Bali in February 1976, brought together Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar joined the association later. ASEAN follows a strict policy of non-interference in its members’ domestic affairs.
ASEAN and the EU have built a strong relationship, mainly in trade and economic relations, and are currently strategic partners. The EU is ASEAN’s third-largest trading partner, accounting for around 10.2% of ASEAN trade. ASEAN is the EU’s third-largest partner outside Europe (after the US and China). The ultimate goal remains the conclusion of an EU-ASEAN region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA).
The 24th EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting in February 2024 made progress in driving trade, with a focus on green initiatives, the digital transition and the establishment of secure supply chains, reviewing regional and global security developments, as well as providing updates on the Global Gateway initiative with due consideration to the EU strategy on connecting Europe and Asia and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. In May 2024, ASEAN and the EU launched the ASEAN-EU Blue Book 2024-2025, highlighting their strategic partnership and new cooperation programmes under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. The EU pledged EUR 10 billion to support green and connectivity initiatives in ASEAN.
The 31st EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting took place in May 2024 in Jakarta. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) outlined its priorities for its year as ASEAN Chair under the theme of connectivity and resilience. The EU underlined key initiatives under the Global Gateway, reaffirming its commitment to democracy and human rights. Both parties committed to strengthening trade, digital economy, green technology and connectivity, including through the EU-ASEAN air transport agreement and digital cooperation initiatives. The two parties reviewed progress on the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, welcoming the plan of action to implement the ASEAN-EU Strategic Partnership (2023-2027).
The ASEAN-EU trade and investment work programme for 2024-2025 provides a framework to guide economic collaboration, addressing issues such as supply chain resilience, digital trade and green technologies.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in November 2020 and effective as of January 2022, is the world’s largest FTA, covering over half of global exports and nearly one third of global GDP. It includes 10 ASEAN countries and five other Asia-Pacific partners, aiming to eliminate tariffs on about 90% of goods, though full reductions may take up to 20 years. Sensitive sectors such as agriculture remain largely exempt. The agreement simplifies trade with common rules of origin, the removal of export quotas and streamlined customs procedures, benefiting key industries.
With the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, the EU aims to continue promoting the parliamentary dimension of relations, such as by supporting more structural exchanges and promoting a joint parliamentary assembly between the European Parliament and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) to provide democratic accountability and a forum for multilateral exchanges to address global issues.
Malaysia holds the AIPA Presidency and ASEAN Chair for 2025, with six core priorities: care and compassion, respect, innovation, prosperity and trust. The ASEAN Summit is scheduled for November 2025, where the prospect of Timor-Leste’s membership will be raised again. The 46th ASEAN AIPA General Assembly is expected to be held in Malaysia in September 2025. Meanwhile the fourth Interregional Dialogue Meeting between Parliament and the AIPA is scheduled to take place during the 46th AIPA General Assembly.
B. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting (ASEP)
ASEM aims to strengthen economic cooperation, political dialogue and the promotion of people-to-people links between the EU and Asia. Bringing together 53 partners from across Europe and Asia, ASEM is the main multilateral platform linking Europe and Asia with significant global weight – ASEM partners represent around 65% of global GDP, 60% of global population, 75% of global tourism and 68% of global trade. The partners highlight the need for effective and swift action on climate change, security cooperation, trade and human rights.
In November 2021, Cambodia assumed the role of host of the 13th ASEM Summit (ASEM13) and the 11th ASEP Meeting (ASEP11). ASEM13 aimed to strengthen multilateralism to share growth, with the emphasis on tackling global challenges, such as climate change, sustainable development and terrorism, as well as improving the multilateral trading system.
The ASEP meeting, as part of the overall Asia-Europe partnership process, continues to serve as a forum for interparliamentary contacts, exchanges and diplomacy. ASEP enhances the parliamentary dimension of the Asian-European political dialogue, seeking to strengthen relations between Europe and Asia.
C. Indonesia
Indonesia is becoming an increasingly key partner for the EU as a member of the G20, the world’s third-largest democracy and its largest Muslim-majority country. EU-Indonesia cooperation is based on the 2014 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The EU-Indonesia Joint Committee meeting held in September 2023 promoted bilateral cooperation, covering the existing EU-Indonesia working groups and dialogues, and possible joint activities to enable the EU-Indonesia partnership to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and worldwide.
In September 2024, the EU and Indonesia held their eighth security dialogue in Semarang. They addressed global and regional security matters, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recent developments in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Both parties assessed their ongoing collaboration and committed to strengthening cooperation in key areas such as counterterrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, peacekeeping and arms control.
The EU-Indonesia Cooperation Publication 2024-2025 was launched in September 2024 as a reference for development actors and stakeholders, highlighting the long-term Indonesia-EU partnership, with innovative programmes and initiatives under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, aiming to address global challenges, including climate change, health, competitiveness and the security of global supply chains.
The EU has allocated EUR 20 million in grant funding to Indonesia through the multiannual indicative programme 2021-2027, with additional benefits from EU regional and thematic programmes such as ‘Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia’ and ‘Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean’. The Climate Resilient and Inclusive Cities project is highlighted as one of the EU’s key cooperation projects in Indonesia in the area of the environment and climate change.
The EU and Indonesia are committed to expediting work on the ongoing negotiations for an Indonesia-EU Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The EU and Indonesia aim to finalise their trade agreement by June 2025, having completed 19 rounds of negotiations – most recently in July 2024. Indonesia’s economy is largely dependent on agriculture and natural resources such as palm oil and nickel, which has created difficulties, particularly due to EU climate policies. The nation grapples with serious environmental problems, such as deforestation caused by palm oil farming, pollution from mining and overfishing. These issues pose risks to biodiversity, climate stability and the well-being of local communities.
In 2023, EU-Indonesia bilateral trade totalled EUR 29.7 billion, with the EU exporting EUR 11.3 billion and importing EUR 18.3 billion. The EU is Indonesia’s fifth-largest trading partner, while Indonesia ranks as the EU’s 33rd-largest trading partner and the fifth-largest in ASEAN.
The trade and investment partnership encompasses strategic planning support initiatives, such as the ARISE+ Indonesia Trade Support Facility, which is crucial for developing investment plans tailored to Indonesia’s evolving needs. The EU provides technical assistance focusing on sustainability and digitalisation.
In June 2021, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued a document on the EU-Indonesia palm oil-based biofuels dispute. Indonesia filed a lawsuit at the WTO against the EU in December 2019 on certain measures concerning palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels, arguing that the EU’s restrictions on palm oil-based biofuels were unfair and discriminatory, and requesting WTO dispute consultations. In January 2025, the WTO confirmed the EU’s ability to take environmental-based action through the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II). However, it highlighted that some aspects of its application were not fully in compliance with WTO regulations. Indonesia contested the EU’s policies, claiming they unfairly targeted palm oil. The EU is preparing to revise the contentious RED II Delegated Act to align it with WTO standards. Other ongoing WTO disputes include the EU Deforestation Regulation and nickel mining in Indonesia.
Indonesia held the Presidency of the G20 in 2022. Much attention was paid to the split between G20 countries over the issue of Russia’s right to have a seat at the G20 table. Russia was invited to the Bali summit in November 2022, as well as Ukraine. However, President Putin did not attend and President Zelenskyy attended by video link. However, Indonesia attempted to limit the G7 leaders’ criticism of Russia. For Indonesia, the G20 was primarily an economic forum, avoiding any other particular issue.
In 2023, Indonesia held the ASEAN Chair and AIPA Presidency. The 42nd ASEAN Summit was held in Labuan Bajo in May 2023 to discuss the post-2025 vision, Timor-Leste’s membership, the Myanmar crisis, human trafficking, migrant workers, fisheries, healthcare, electric vehicles and cross-border payments. Indonesia hosted the ASEAN AIPA General Assembly in Jakarta in August 2023. Parliament’s Delegation for relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN participated as an observer. Indonesia held elections in February 2024. The presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, won with the highest share of votes, amounting to 58%. Indonesia’s newly elected parliament and president were inaugurated in October 2024.
In January 2025, Indonesia became a full member of BRICS. Its membership can be seen as a reaffirmation of its foreign policy principle of inclusivity and openness to all parties.
In October 2019, Parliament adopted a resolution on the proposed criminal code in Indonesia, expressing concerns about its provisions on blasphemy and adultery, as well as worries that the new code would be used against minorities and would allow discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion and sexual orientation.
D. Myanmar
The EU has been an active partner in Myanmar’s democratic transition and at the forefront of the international community’s re-engagement since the country began to re-establish democracy and open up to the world in 2015. There is no formal framework agreement because of decades of international isolation and sanctions.
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution grants its military significant power, including 25% of parliamentary seats and control over key security ministries. The country remains embroiled in a civil war that began in 1948, with a ceasefire agreed in 2015, though not all insurgent groups signed it. After Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won the 2020 elections, she became the country’s leader. However, in February 2021, the military staged a coup, detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders over alleged electoral fraud. General Min Aung Hlaing led the military junta, sparking protests and violent clashes. Aung San Suu Kyi was transferred from prison to house arrest in April 2024.
The military junta’s control over the country has weakened considerably. By late 2024, ethnic armed organisations and resistance groups had gained control over 40% of Myanmar’s territory, in particular at the border regions. The State Administration Council continues to insist on elections as a step towards political transition, and the military has announced elections to take place in December 2025 or January 2026 – the first since the junta took control in a 2021 coup.
Myanmar is currently facing escalating intercommunal tensions and ongoing conflict between the military and ethnic insurgent groups. Divisions persist among ethnic armed organisations such as the People’s Defence Forces and other groups. The military has lost control over large areas, with mass defections weakening its forces. Humanitarian conditions have worsened, with 2.6 million people displaced and one-third of the population in need of aid. The EU has called on all armed groups to grant humanitarian access and warned of the risk of regional instability. It backs ASEAN and the UN in promoting inclusive dialogue, rejects any illegitimate elections and advocates a global arms embargo.
In March 2025, Myanmar suffered a 7.7-magnitude shallow earthquake, claiming thousands of lives. Emergency services were insufficient, with a severe shortage of medical supplies and tents. The military indicated its willingness to allow humanitarian aid into Myanmar, but relief efforts were hampered by delays in visa issuances and a lack of security for aid workers and convoys. The EU pledged EUR 2.5 million in emergency aid and activated its Copernicus satellite service to assess the damage, bringing its total humanitarian assistance to Myanmar in 2025 to over EUR 35 million.
The EU, along with other international actors, has issued numerous statements on Myanmar and imposed sanctions on the junta and entities owned by the military. In February 2021, the Council adopted conclusions condemning the military coup, calling for an end to the state of emergency, the restoration of the legitimate government and the immediate release of those detained or arrested in connection with the coup. In April 2021, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) issued a declaration on the five-point consensus reached at the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held in Indonesia, supporting the ASEAN Special Envoy. However, Myanmar issued a press release rejecting the ASEAN Special Envoy’s request to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. In March, April and June 2021, the Council imposed sanctions on the individuals responsible for the military coup and extended the sanctions to military-controlled companies and entities. In July 2023, the EU imposed its seventh round of sanctions on individuals and companies associated with Myanmar’s military junta.
As a least developed country, Myanmar benefits from the Everything but Arms (EBA) trade initiative under the generalised scheme of preferences (GSP). Despite the military coup, the Commission has so far been reluctant to introduce trade restrictions because of the fallout for Myanmar’s population and the limited impact on the military. In 2024, the Commission allocated over EUR 19 million in humanitarian aid to address the most urgent needs of the population, as conflict continues in most parts of Myanmar. The EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme is based on specific priorities for Myanmar: governance, the rule of law, sustainable growth, assistance to displaced people, the Green Deal and the digital agenda. The 2024 Freedom in the World report by Freedom House ranked Myanmar as ‘not free’, with a global freedom score of 8 out of 100. There are major human rights issues, such as the persecution of the Rohingya people in the Rakhine state. Since August 2017, over 800 000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh to escape persecution in Myanmar. In August 2019, thousands of refugees refused attempts by Bangladesh, Myanmar and the UN to repatriate them on account of security concerns.
Parliament condemned the human rights violations against the Rohingya in its September 2019 resolution. In February 2021, Parliament adopted a resolution strongly condemning the military takeover and abuses of human rights, calling on the junta to restore civilian rule and to immediately release all those detained.
In October 2021, Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the human rights violations, the ongoing discrimination against ethnic minorities and the use of violence by the junta against its citizens, as well as the military attack on medical professionals and facilities. In March 2022, Parliament passed a resolution on Myanmar, reaffirming its position on the country. In May 2023, Parliament adopted a resolution on Myanmar, notably on the dissolution of democratic political parties, calling for their immediate reinstatement and for the release of all political prisoners.
E. The Philippines
The Philippines-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2011 and entered into force in March 2018. The first joint committee met in Brussels in January 2020 and established specialised subcommittees with a view to raising the bilateral relationship to a higher level. Furthermore, in August 2021, the Philippines assumed the role of ASEAN coordinator for dialogue relations with the EU until 2024. The year 2024 also marked 60 years of EU-Philippines diplomatic relations.
The fourth EU-Philippines Joint Committee Meeting took place in December 2024 in Manila to review ongoing bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation under the EU-Philippines PCA and regional security issues, including the South China Sea territorial dispute.
In November 2024, the Philippines and the EU held the fourth Meeting of the Subcommittee on Development Cooperation in Manila to review key ongoing cooperation programmes, focused on the Mindanao peace process, good governance and the green and digital economy. In August 2024, the EU launched the Green Economy Partnership programme for the Philippines under the Global Gateway initiative, aimed at improving waste management, supporting a circular economy, expanding renewable energy and enhancing energy efficiency in the country.
The EU was the Philippines’ fourth-largest trading partner in 2023, while the Philippines held sixth place among the EU’s trading partners in ASEAN. Trade between the two reached EUR 16.2 billion, exceeding pre-pandemic figures, with the Philippines recording a EUR 1.45 billion trade surplus. The EU continues to invest significantly in the country, with foreign direct investment stocks totalling EUR 14 billion in 2022, ranking it among the Philippines’ top three foreign investors.
Negotiations on an EU-Philippines FTA were launched in December 2015. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume FTA negotiations, with trade aspects of public procurement, intellectual property, competition and sustainability at its core. In May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte won the presidential election and adopted controversial measures against drug trafficking with ‘shoot to kill’ orders that led to human rights violations. Duterte changed the direction of the Philippines’ foreign policy, building a new alliance with Russia and China, despite the controversy over the South China Sea, with the Philippines being one of the claimant ASEAN states in this dispute. Presidential elections took place in May 2022, with Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos being elected President and Sara Duterte, the daughter of the outgoing leader, being elected Vice President. Unlike his predecessor, Marcos intends to pursue more balanced diplomacy between Beijing and Washington.
In March 2025, former President Rodrigo Duterte was handed over to the International Criminal Court after being arrested on charges of crimes against humanity in relation to the extrajudicial killings during the war on drugs from 2011 to 2019. Protests organised by Duterte’s allies broke out following his arrest, with claims of sovereignty breaches and betrayal by President Marcos.
At the request of the Philippine Government, the EU sent an election observation mission to monitor the country’s midterm elections in May 2025. The elections are viewed as a contest between the Duterte and Marcos families, following the collapse of their political partnership.
Parliament adopted a resolution in February 2022, strongly condemning the thousands of extrajudicial killings and other serious human rights violations related to President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights also called in February 2022 for the immediate and unconditional release of Filipina Senator Leila de Lima, one of former President Duterte’s staunchest critics.
F. Viet Nam
EU-Viet Nam relations are based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement adopted in 2016.
The EU and Viet Nam signed an EU-Viet Nam FTA and an Investment Protection Agreement in June 2019. Parliament gave its consent to the two agreements in February 2020 and the FTA came into force in August 2020. The FTA involves the immediate elimination of 65% of tariffs on EU exports to Viet Nam and 71% of such duties on imports from Viet Nam. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade follows the implementation of the FTA. As of December 2024, EU-Viet Nam bilateral trade had increased by 36% since the FTA’s ratification. The EU has solidified its position as one of Viet Nam’s largest trading partners and investors, while Viet Nam has become the EU’s main trading partner in Southeast Asia.
In 2023, Viet Nam ranked as the EU’s 17th-largest trade in goods partner and was the EU’s top trading partner in ASEAN. The total trade value between the two regions amounted to EUR 64.2 billion. The EU is one of the top foreign investors in Viet Nam, especially in the industrial processing and manufacturing sector.
In October 2019, the EU and Viet Nam signed a Framework Participation Agreement to set a legal basis for Viet Nam’s participation in EU crisis management operations. The EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme for Viet Nam addresses crucial issues and key areas for the country. In October 2024, Viet Nam and the EU held their fifth Joint Committee meeting in Hanoi, highlighting their growing bilateral ties under the PCA, agreeing to deepen cooperation on the energy transition, connectivity, digital transformation and education. Regarding climate change and sustainable development, the EU supports Viet Nam’s commitment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 through the Just Energy Transition Partnership.
Viet Nam is one of the most successful examples of a country that has transitioned from a failed communist economic system to an open and market-oriented economy. It is one of the fastest growing countries in ASEAN. The overall human rights situation in Viet Nam has been deteriorating, with crackdowns on dissent intensifying and the number of arrests for ‘anti-state’ activities increasing. Viet Nam is a one-party communist state with no political freedom. In May 2021, the country held legislative elections to the 15th National Assembly and the local-level People’s Councils. The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) won the elections, maintaining full control over the media and the electoral process, with no independent agency overseeing the polls. In 2024, Viet Nam ranked 174 out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index. According to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Viet Nam ranked 88 out of 180 countries, with its anti-corruption campaign being marred by the continued restriction of critical voices. In January 2021, Parliament adopted a resolution on Viet Nam calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all human rights defenders and journalists.
G. Thailand
The EU and Thailand completed negotiations for a partnership and cooperation agreement in March 2013, but it was halted following the military coup in 2014. The EU-Thailand PCA was signed in December 2022 in Brussels, with the aim of enhancing the political dialogue and cooperation in areas including the environment, energy, connectivity, climate change, transport, science and technology, trade, employment, social affairs, human rights, education, agriculture, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as migration and culture. The PCA was approved by the Thai Parliament in August 2024 and is expected to boost trade and investment, particularly by expediting negotiations for a Thailand-EU FTA.
The EU-Thailand Cooperation Facility for 2021-2027 will support Thailand’s efforts in sustainable development, environmental and climate action, trade, education, research and innovation. This aligns with the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Global Gateway strategy, emphasising the EU’s commitment to engagement in the region.
In 2023, the total value of trade in goods between the EU and Thailand amounted to EUR 40.2 billion. The EU is Thailand’s fourth-largest trading partner, representing 7.1% of its overall trade, while Thailand is the EU’s 28th-largest trading partner, enjoying a EUR 10 billion bilateral trade surplus. Thailand is a major hub for European investments within ASEAN, with EUR 29.2 billion in outward investment stocks. The EU is Thailand’s third-largest investor, just behind Japan and China.
In March 2023, the EU and Thailand agreed to relaunch negotiations for an ambitious, modern and balanced FTA, with sustainability at its core. The fourth round of talks for an EU-Thailand FTA took place in Bangkok in November 2024, with advancements made on good regulatory practices, transparency, technical barriers to trade, customs, state-owned enterprises and sustainable development. EU-Thailand FTA negotiations are currently entering the market access commitments phase, with the goal of completing the negotiations by the end of 2025.
Since 2014, the military has suppressed opposition through martial law, with reports of human rights abuses. The pro-military party won the 2019 election amid claims of manipulation. Despite the official end of junta rule in July 2019, the military still influences the government. Thai protests against the military government included demands for the reform of the Thai monarchy. In February 2020, the first wave of protests was triggered by the Constitutional Court’s decision to disband the Future Forward Party, an opposition party popular among young people.
Thailand held a general election in May 2023. The reformist Move Forward Party won the most seats, but after negotiations, it was excluded from the government. Many conservative lawmakers blocked then party leader Pita Limjaroenrat from becoming prime minister. Srettha Thavisin, of the Pheu Thai Party, became the new Prime Minister, leading a governing coalition with military-backed parties, the past adversaries of Pheu Thai. Following the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of Srettha Thavisin in August 2024, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, (of Pheu Thai) became the new Prime Minister. In March 2025, Prime Minister Shinawatra won a no-confidence vote in parliament, with 319 out of 488 lawmakers backing her. The outcome of the vote reinforced the stability of her 11-party coalition, reducing the chances of political turmoil in Thailand in the near future. In January 2020 in Kuala Lumpur, Thailand officially launched a peace process with insurgent groups in the southern Muslim-majority provinces. The negotiations were mediated by Malaysia. Despite the declaration of a ceasefire in April 2020, some bombings occurred in 2021 and 2022.
Parliament has adopted several resolutions on human rights, migrant workers and labour rights in Thailand. In September 2021, the Thai Parliament gave its initial approval to a bill on the prevention and suppression of torture and enforced disappearance,having delayed its introduction for 14 years following Thailand’s signature in 2007 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Parliament adopted a resolution in June 2023 on the EU-Thailand PCA, giving its consent to the PCA. Parliament also called for a visa-free regime.
Parliament adopted a resolution in March 2025 on democracy and human rights in Thailand, notably the lese-majesty law and the deportation of Uyghur refugees to China. Parliament also called on the Commission to leverage FTA negotiations to press Thailand to reform repressive laws, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees and ratify all core International Labour Organization conventions.
The 13th EU-Thailand Inter-Parliamentary Meeting was held in Bangkok in February 2025.
H. Cambodia
The EU’s relations with Cambodia date back to the 1997 Cooperation Agreement. In April 2024, the 12th Cambodia-EU Joint Committee Meeting took place in Brussels to strengthen cooperation on sustainability, growth and digitalisation.
The EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme for Cambodia provides for around EUR 500 million in aid for Cambodia to help the country boost its economic development, green initiatives and job opportunities. The EU earmarked EUR 155 million for the 2021-2024 period to bolster Cambodia’s integration into ASEAN.
In February 2020, the Commission decided to withdraw part of the tariff preferences granted to Cambodia under the EBA trade scheme on account of the serious and systematic human rights violations, primarily affecting garment and footwear products, amounting to around one fifth or EUR 1 billion of Cambodia’s yearly exports to the EU. Cambodia’s duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market, under the EBA scheme, became effective again in August 2020, in spite of serious human rights concerns. In 2023, trade between Cambodia and the EU amounted to EUR 3.6 billion. The EU ranked as Cambodia’s fourth-largest trading partner, making up 8% of the country’s overall trade. Approximately 14% of Cambodia’s exports were sent to the EU, while just 2.9% of its imports came from the EU. Years of civil war have left Cambodia impoverished. After adopting its Constitution in 1993, the country transitioned to a multi-party democracy. However, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen, won the 2018 election amid claims of unfairness. The main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, was dissolved in 2017, and its leaders, Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy, faced legal persecution, with Rainsy sentenced in absentia to 25 years in prison in 2021.
General elections were held in Cambodia in July 2023 to the National Assembly. The ruling CPP, affiliated with long-time autocrat Hun Sen, won 120 out of 125 seats in the National Assembly. The only meaningful opposition, the Candlelight Party, was disqualified from the race. The CPP victory paved the way for Prime Minister Hun Sen’s announcement that he would be stepping down and passing the leadership to his son Hun Manet, who became Prime Minister in August 2023.
In September 2017, Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Cambodian Government to end Kem Sokha’s politically motivated prosecution. In September 2018, it adopted a second resolutioncalling for all charges against Kem Sokha to be dropped.
Parliament has adopted several resolutions since 2017 calling on the Cambodian Government to end the politically motivated prosecution of Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy. Parliament passed a resolution in May 2022 on the continuous crackdown of political opposition in Cambodia. In March 2023, Parliament adopted a resolution on Cambodia: the case of opposition leader Kem Sokha, calling for his immediate and unconditional release as well as that of all opposition officials and activists convicted or detained on politically motivated charges.
Parliament adopted a resolution in November 2024 on the shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL.
I. Singapore
The EU and Singapore cooperate very closely on business, science and technology. In February 2019, the EU and Singapore ratified three ‘new generation’ agreements: the EU-Singapore PCA, the EU-Singapore FTA and the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement. The FTA with Singapore entered into force in November 2019. These agreements are designed to boost political, economic and trade ties, and to significantly reduce customs duties. Technical and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods are being removed across a wide range of sectors.
In January 2024, the first EU-Singapore dialogue on the Global Gateway brought a variety of stakeholders together to discuss ways to facilitate green and sustainable investments in Southeast Asia.
As of 2023, Singapore ranked as the EU’s 20th-largest trade in goods partner, with trade valued at EUR 52.6 billion. Additionally, Singapore remains a major hub for European investments in Asia and is the second-largest Asian investor in the EU. In July 2024, the EU and Singapore concluded negotiations for a landmark Digital Trade Agreement, marking the EU’s first-ever agreement of this kind, aimed at establishing global standards for digital trade and cross-border data flows. Both parties agreed to develop projects to enhance the understanding of standards for the digital economy and their impact on the financial sector.
Singapore’s 2020 general elections saw the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) win 83 out of 93 seats, while the Workers’ Party secured a record 10 seats. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had planned to step down before turning 70 in 2022, but his designated successor, Heng Swee Keat, withdrew in 2021. Lawrence Wong later took over as PAP leader and became Prime Minister in May 2024.
In September 2023, Singapore held the first contested presidential election in 12 years, and Tharman Shanmugaratnam was elected as the country’s ninth head of state. Parliament has called for the abolition of the death penalty in Singapore and supports the work of civil society. In October 2021, the Parliament of Singapore passed the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, aiming to tackle foreign meddling in domestic politics.
J. Brunei Darussalam
The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, Hassanal Bolkiah, has ruled the state since 1967, while Prince Billah Bolkiah is taking on responsibilities. Political liberalisation is non-existent. The Sultan retains the post of prime minister, along with the defence, foreign affairs, and finance and economy portfolios. In April 2019, a new penal code was enacted to incorporate a Sharia-based approach, imposing new forms of punishment that include death by stoning for gay sex and adultery, and the amputation of limbs for theft. Following international outcry, Brunei extended a moratorium on the death penalty. The Sultan announced an early reshuffle of ministers in June 2022.
For the first time, a woman was appointed as minister (for education). The EU is actively enhancing its relations with Brunei, but there is no framework agreement. An EU-Brunei PCA is in the process of being negotiated and will cover a range of political and economic areas. Trade between the EU and Brunei is mainly in machinery, motor vehicles and chemicals.
EU-Brunei relations are mainly handled through ASEAN, of which Brunei assumed the role of chair in 2021 with the theme ‘We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper’. In August 2021, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brunei, Erywan Yusof, was appointed ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar to act as a mediator with Myanmar’s junta.
The EU is concerned about existing trade restrictions, and urges Brunei to improve trade facilitation, strengthen support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and further its climate commitments. In February 2023, the EU-Brunei Darussalam Partnership Facility was launched. It held a climate change seminar under the theme ‘Building Regional Capacity for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation’. In November 2024, the EU acknowledged Brunei’s efforts to diversify its economy, but recognised its ongoing dependence on oil and gas.
Tensions between China and the Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea territorial disputes increased in 2022. Although Brunei has been silent so far, it made its first-ever unilateral statement on the South China Sea in July 2022, as a country with competing claims. However, Brunei’s policy avoids a confrontational approach with China over the South China Sea dispute, with fears of damaging bilateral economic ties. In a joint statement in February 2025, China and Brunei reaffirmed their strong diplomatic relationship and dedication to strengthening their Strategic Cooperative Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative. Brunei reiterated its commitment to the ‘One China’ policy. Parliament passed a resolution in April 2019 strongly condemning the entry into force of the Sharia Penal Code. It reiterated its condemnation of the death penalty and underlined that the provisions of the Sharia Penal Code violate Brunei’s obligations under international human rights law.
K. Laos
EU-Laos relations are based on the 1997 Cooperation Agreement. Laos is on track to transition out of least developed country status by 2026, and its ninth National Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2021-2025 aligns with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, aiming to promote sustainable, green and inclusive growth.
During a bilateral meeting between Lao Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone and then European Council President Charles Michel in October 2024, the EU committed to supporting Laos’ socio-economic development, particularly in areas such as integration, connectivity, trade, investment and green growth. EU support for Laos has seen a significant increase, with the Team Europe strategy in the Lao PDR for 2021-2025 allocating EUR 550 million through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI – Global Europe). The EU’s contribution to this strategy stands at EUR 98 million in grant funding.
The partnership between the EU and Laos advanced significantly in March 2024, with the visit of Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen, to enhance collaboration in trade and development, introducing the TICAF programme, a USD 102 million initiative aimed at enhancing sustainable agriculture, forestry and infrastructure. The EU advocates digital education to bolster Laos’ leading e-learning platform.
Despite economic reforms, the country is still poor and dependent on international aid. As a least developed country, it benefits from the EU’s EBA trade scheme. In 2023, trade between the EU and Laos amounted to EUR 550 million, positioning the EU as Laos’ fourth-largest trading partnerafter Thailand, China and Viet Nam, and representing 3% of Laos’ overall trade.
Laos is a one-party state. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), in power since the end of the civil war in 1975, rules the country with an iron grip, allowing no opposition to challenge it. Laos held parliamentary elections in February 2021 for its ninth National Assembly, consisting of 164 seats, of which 158 went to the ruling LPRP and six were claimed by independent candidates. In March 2021, during the opening of the National Assembly, Laos elected its President, Thongloun Sisoulith, the Secretary-General of the ruling LPRP, who had earlier served as Prime Minister from April 2016.
Laos is deepening its relations with China and ASEAN, seeking to attract greater investment. Economic reforms have led to sustained economic growth of over 7% since 2014.
Parliament attaches particular importance to the human rights situation, including the plight of people displaced by huge dam constructions on the Mekong River. Costing nearly one third of Laos’ annual GDP, a new 414-kilometre railway linking China with the capital Vientiane was opened in early December 2021 as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.
At the International Labour Organization Conferences in Geneva, the EU has called on Laos to address the issue of the sexual exploitation of children. In July 2022, the EU raised concerns over the lack of progress on addressing long-standing human rights violations in Laos and urged the authorities to comply with the country’s human rights obligations under the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and its member organisation Lao Movement. The two organisations released a briefing paper providing a summary of human rights developments in Laos. The most recent EU-Laos Human Rights Dialogue was held in July 2024.
Parliament has reiterated its call on the Government of Laos to put an end to the harassment and arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights defenders, independent journalists and social activists, and to respect the rights of freedom of expression and association and the rights of minorities, reminding Laos of its international obligations under the human rights treaties it has ratified.
L. Malaysia
As the culmination of negotiations that began in 2015, the EU and Malaysia signed a PCA in December 2022 during the EU-ASEAN Summit in Brussels. The PCA provides an overarching framework that aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade and investment, finance and energy.
The negotiations on an EU-Malaysia FTA were put on hold at Malaysia’s request in April 2012, after seven rounds. In March 2017, the EU and Malaysia discussed the insertion of new provisions and agreed on them in principle. Two agreements are currently under negotiation, an FTA and a voluntary partnership agreement in relation to Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade. In January 2025, Malaysia and the EU announced the resumption of FTA negotiations during a working visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to Brussels. The renewed talks are intended to address various aspects of trade, including sustainability clauses and procurement policies.
Malaysia’s emerging economy offers the EU attractive opportunities for trade. EU-Malaysia trade is expanding, having grown by over 50% since 2010. The EU is Malaysia’s fourth-largest trading partner (after China, Singapore and the US), accounting for 9.5% of the country’s total trade in goods in 2023. Bilateral trade in goods equalled EUR 44.7 billion in 2023. EU goods imports from Malaysia stood at EUR 29.1 billion, while EU goods exports reached EUR 15.6 billion in 2023. Trade in services amounted to around EUR 11 billion in 2022.
In April 2023, the EU renewed anti-dumping measures on stainless steel fittings from China and Taiwan for another five years, extending the measures to Malaysia as companies in the country were importing the main parts needed to produce stainless steel fittings from China.
The EU plans to phase out the use of palm oil in transport fuel under its Renewable Energy Directive, prompting complaints from Indonesia and Malaysia to the WTO. In 2021, Malaysia was added to the EU’s tax grey list, further complicating trade relations. While palm oil is a key issue in EU-Malaysia FTA talks, it represents less than 5% of EU imports from Malaysia. However, the global edible oil shortage caused by the war in Ukraine may boost Malaysia’s palm oil market share in the EU. In March 2024, the EU scored a victory at the WTO as an adjudicating panel rejected a Malaysian complaint against an EU decision that biodiesel made from palm oil should cease to count as a renewable biofuel.
In June 2022, the Malaysian Government announced that it will abolish its mandatory death penalty. This is step forward and an exemplary decision in the region. The EU has encouraged the country’s authorities to take concrete steps to swiftly pass the agreement into law. In November 2022, Malaysia had general elections, which were won by the coalition led by opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, followed by a coalition including the country’s Islamist party. In January 2024, Sultan Ibrahim was sworn in as Malaysia’s new King for a five-year term, as part of Malaysia’s system of rotational monarchy. Sultan Ibrahim is the Sultan of Malaysia’s Johor state.
Parliament has condemned, in its resolutions, the death penalty, the lack of respect for the rights of LGBTIQA+ people and the silencing of public discontent, as well as the lack of peaceful expression, including public debate.
Parliament passed a resolution in June 2023 on the EU-Malaysia PCA , accompanying its consent to the PCA, stating that it provides a solid legal framework for the promotion of democracy and human rights.
Malaysia holds the ASEAN Chair and AIPA Presidency for 2025.
Jorge Soutullo / Samuel Cantell