This fact sheet explains EU-Russia relations, which have been deeply strained since Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, its invasion and occupation of parts of Ukraine’s Donbas region, destabilisation policies in the wider region, disinformation and interference operations and human rights violations. Russia’s 2022 full-scale, illegal invasion of Ukraine led to all remaining political, cultural and scientific cooperation being suspended and unprecedented EU and international sanctions.
Legal basis
- Treaty on European Union: Title V ‘external action’
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Articles 206-207 (trade) and Articles 216-219 (international agreements);
- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (bilateral relations).
EU-Russia relations
Until the Maidan movement protests in Ukraine in November 2013, the EU and Russia had pursued a strategic partnership based on political dialogue, economic integration, and cooperation in global affairs. Negotiations launched in 2008 sought to conclude a new agreement covering trade, energy, climate action, research, culture and security, while the 2010 Partnership for Modernisation was designed to promote reform, innovation, and closer economic ties. The EU also supported Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), completed in 2012.
This trajectory ended abruptly in 2014, when Russia launched its initial invasion of Ukraine, illegally annexing Crimea and invading parts of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. These acts of aggression fundamentally undermined the basis for partnership and triggered a comprehensive reassessment of EU policy towards Russia.
In response, the EU introduced its first restrictive measures against Russia, including asset freezes and travel bans on Russian officials and proxies involved in undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. EU-Russia summits were suspended, negotiations on a new cooperation agreement were frozen, and Russia’s participation in the G8 was revoked. Broader sectoral sanctions followed targeting trade, finance, energy, and defence.
In 2016, the EU Global Security Strategy defined Russia as ‘a key strategic challenge’, prompting the Council to adopt five guiding principles: (1) implementation of the Minsk agreements on a ceasefire in the conflict in eastern Ukraine as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU’s stance towards Russia; (2) strengthened relations with the EU’s Eastern Partners and other neighbours, including Central Asia; (3) strengthening the resilience of the EU (e.g. energy security, hybrid threats or strategic communication); (4) selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU; (5) the need to engage in people-to-people contacts and support Russian civil society.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked another turning point in EU-Russia relations and triggered a fundamental redefinition of Europe’s security policy. The EU has condemned in the strongest terms Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, its deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and its attempts to annex Ukrainian territory through sham referendums in the occupied areas. It continues to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian forces from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, underlining that Russia bears full responsibility for its flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law. The EU has condemned Russia’s weaponisation of food in the war against Ukraine and the global food security crisis Russia has thereby triggered.
In March 2022, the EU adopted its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, identifying Russia as ‘a long-term and direct threat for European security’. This marked a decisive break from EU-Russia relations since 2016. The NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in June 2022, concurred in calling the Russian Federation ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. Consequently, since 2022 the EU’s approach to Russia has been guided by the following principles: (1) Russia must be isolated internationally and sanctions imposed to prevent it from waging war; (2) the international community must ensure accountability by holding the Russian state, individual perpetrators and accomplices responsible for violations of international law and war crimes committed in Ukraine; (3) the EU’s neighbours must be supported, including through the EU’s enlargement policies, and partners worldwide helped to address the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; (4) close cooperation with NATO and partners worldwide should be supported to defend the rules-based international order; (5) the EU’s resilience must be enhanced, in particular in energy security and critical infrastructure, and Russia’s cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation and interference countered; (6) civil society, human rights defenders and independent media must be supported inside and outside Russia, while addressing threats to security and public order in the EU.
In response to Russia’s invasion, the EU Member States swiftly adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions in close cooperation with partners including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. Since 24 February 2022, the EU has massively expanded the restrictive sectoral measures through 20 successive packages of sanctions against Russia (up to May 2026) and added a significant number of individuals and entities to the sanctions list with the aim of further stepping up the pressure on Russia to end the war. The restrictive measures are intended to weaken Russia’s economic foundations, depriving it of essential technologies and markets and greatly reducing its capacity to wage war.
The rapid succession of 20 packages of EU sanctions against Russia, in what has already been labelled a ‘sanctions revolution’, has resulted in an unparalleled set of measures targeting the key sectors of the Russian economy and the country’s political elites. Each package of sanctions has incrementally amended and broadened the scope of the sanctions regimes adopted from 2014 onwards, with the addition of a new regime banning imports of goods originating in the illegally annexed territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to the EU. The sanctions packages have been intended to be hard-hitting and have wide-ranging effects across the financial, energy, transport and airspace, technology, consulting, broadcasting as well as the metal, luxury and other goods sectors. Export bans affect around 54% of pre-war exports to Russia, while import bans cover 58% of pre-war imports. Moreover, the EU imposed tariffs on agricultural products and fertilisers from Russia and Belarus in March 2025. In the ranking of the EU’s main trading partners, Russia fell from 5th position in 2021 to 15th in 2024. In addition to economic sanctions and sanctions on individuals, subsequent diplomatic sanctions have been imposed, including the suspension of visa facilitation between the EU and Russia. Together with other WTO members, the EU agreed to deny most-favoured-nation treatment for Russian products and services on EU markets. Preparations for the 21st sanctions package are under way. This forthcoming package is expected to further target Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, financial institutions, military-industrial enterprises, and companies involved in the trade in stolen Ukrainian grain.
As of the end of May 2026, the sanctions listings cover more than 2 700 individuals and entities. The sanctioned individuals include the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergey Lavrov, the 351 members of the State Duma who endorsed the recognition of the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, high-ranking officials and military personnel, disinformation actors, those responsible for missile strikes against civilians and critical civilian infrastructure and for the unlawful deportation, forced transfer and illegal adoption of Ukrainian children, as well as their militarisation and ideological indoctrination. Several high-ranking members of the Wagner Group mercenary organisation were included on the sanction list.
Following the death of Russian opposition leader and Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny in a Siberian prison in February 2024, and in response to increasing political repression in Russia, on 27 May 2024 the Council established a new sanctions regime against individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations and abuses, repression of civil society and democratic opposition and undermining democracy and the rule of law in Russia. The new regime complements the EU global human rights sanctions regime, allowing the EU to decide on further Russia-specific measures in response to human rights abuses and internal repression in the country. As of May 2026, 135 individuals and 37 entities have been sanctioned, including judges, prosecutors and members of the judiciary who played a key role in the imprisonment and murder of Alexei Navalny.
On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted a new sanctions regime in response to Russia’s destabilising efforts in the EU and globally to undermine democratic processes, incite or support violent demonstrations, intimidate critics, manipulate information and carry out cyberattacks or sabotage against critical infrastructure.
In May 2025, the Council expanded the scope of its autonomous restrictive measures to cover tangible assets such as vessels, aircraft, real estate and communication-network components, as well as transactions involving financial and crypto-asset service providers. The sanctions list includes 69 individuals and 19 entities.
The EU also stepped up enforcement to prevent circumvention of sanctions via non-EU countries. Measures target the re-export of dual-use goods, critical components and advanced technologies. In addition to the closure of EU airspace to all Russian aircraft and of EU ports to all Russian vessels, specific provisions address Russia’s expanding ‘shadow fleet’ of vessels used to evade sanctions, including bans on port entry, restrictions on service provision, and stricter monitoring of vessel sales to third countries. The total number of sanctioned vessels is over 600.
To bolster enforcement, the Council added the violation of EU sanctions to the list of EU crimes on 9 June 2023. This allowed Member States to harmonise criminal penalties and improve cooperation in investigating and prosecuting sanctions violations,
In September 2022, the EU Member States fully suspended the 2007 EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement. While guidelines on implementing the suspension of visas were issued ensuring the suspension did not affect those in need of protection and people travelling for essential purposes, such as journalists, dissidents and civil society representatives, in November 2025, the Commission adopted stricter rules on visas due to the increased security risks stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the weaponisation of migration, acts of sabotage and the potential misuse of visas.
In retaliation, the Russian Government designated all EU Member States, the UK, the United States and other countries with a sanctions scheme against Russia as ‘unfriendly states’. Counter-measures now restrict a wide range of business and financial transactions with individuals and entities from these nations.
On 31 March 2022, the Russian authorities expanded their ‘stop list’ significantly to encompass ‘the top leadership of the EU, a number of European commissioners and heads of EU military bodies, as well as the overwhelming majority of members of the European Parliament’, denying them the right to enter Russian territory. This list is not officially published, which rules out any possible avenue for a legal appeal, as opposed to the EU’s travel ban. The Russian stop list also includes high-level officials from some EU Member States’ governments and members of national parliaments, as well as public and media figures.
Recognising Russia’s ongoing violation of international law and the UN Charter, the EU continues to support international efforts to ensure accountability for war crimes, other serious crimes committed, including the crime of aggression, as well as for the massive damage caused. The legal foundations for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine were laid down in February 2025 by the Commission, the Council of Europe and Ukraine. The Tribunal, which was formally established on 25 June 2025, will investigate and prosecute Russia’s crimes of aggression against Ukraine, perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies, in particular Belarus. In May 2026, the European Commission also ratified, on behalf of the EU, the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine, which will be responsible for reviewing, assessing and determining claims for compensation for the damage, loss and injury caused by Russia to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. It will also be responsible for determining the amount of compensation due in each case. The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was officially opened on 2 April 2024 for the submission of claims as the first step towards the implementation of the compensation mechanism. Over 140 000 war crime investigations have been opened in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion. Eurojust was given new powers to preserve, analyse and store evidence in order to facilitate the further investigation of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity committed on Ukrainian territory. In 2023, the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) was launched in Eurojust, with the EU Joint Investigation Team.
On 17 March 2023 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, confirming that there are reasonable grounds to believe that they both bear criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. On 5 March 2024 the ICC issued arrest warrants against two high-ranking Russian military commanders.
The EU is also working in close coordination with G7 partners to ensure that revenues from frozen Russian sovereign assets contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and military expenses, in accordance with EU and international law. Of the EUR 260 billion of Russia’s central bank assets worldwide, EUR 210 billion are immobilised within the EU. In May 2024, the Council adopted a legal framework allowing revenues generated from these assets to be used to support Ukraine. In October 2024, G7 countries reached an agreement on the use of the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a USD 50 billion Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan to Ukraine, to which the EU’s contribution will amount to EUR 18.1 billion. In parallel, the complex debate on the legality and related risks on the use of the principal capital continues among Member States. Instead of this, in April 2026, the EU adopted a EUR 90 billion support loan for Ukraine for 2026-2027, which is to be financed through joint borrowing on the capital markets and backed by the EU budget. Ukraine is legally liable to repay the principal of the loan only if war reparations are paid to it by Russia.
Under Vladimir Putin, particularly from 2012 onwards, the space for individual and collective action has diminished gradually but systematically, through legislative restrictions and targeted intimidation of critics. Over the years, the Russian authorities have introduced sweeping legal restrictions on ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable’ and ‘extremist’ organisations, targeting hundreds of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while censorship of the media, the internet and social media has increased significantly. Civil society actors, human rights defenders, academics and independent journalists have been designated as ‘foreign agents’, resulting in them being harassed and imprisoned, while human rights organisations have been shut down and the freedoms of expression, of peaceful assembly and of association have been curtailed. Investigative and data-driven journalism have also been targeted, while the state-controlled media has relentlessly promoted an image of a ‘besieged fortress’ under attack from ‘the collective West’. Academic freedom has also been drastically curtailed.
In addition, the 2016 and 2021 parliamentary elections and the September 2022 regional and local elections were held in a restrictive political and media environment, resulting in a significant victory for Putin’s United Russia party. Election observers (until 2016) and the independent media found that elections continued to fall short of international standards and were marred by fraud, workplace mobilisation, systematic exclusion of the opposition and other irregularities. In September 2023, the Russian Federation held regional elections, including in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which were condemned by the EU and deemed illegal and illegitimate. Election observers at voters’ rights organisations Russian Election Monitor and Golos stated that they were even less fair and free than the previous elections. Russian citizens’ voting rights have deteriorated to the point where these elections can be considered devoid of any genuine democratic principles.
After obtaining his fourth presidential term in 2018, Vladimir Putin orchestrated constitutional amendments in 2020, allowing him to stay in power beyond 2024 (theoretically until 2036). In March 2024, Vladimir Putin won his fifth presidential term, obtaining 87.28% with a turnout of 77.44% of eligible voters, in an election that was deemed undemocratic. These presidential ‘elections’ took place in a highly restricted environment and amid intense propaganda. The EU issued a statement on the Russian presidential elections reiterating that it does not and will never recognise either the holding of these so-called ‘elections’ in the territories of Ukraine or their results. Josep Borrell, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) at the time, declared that the election was based on repressive laws, marked by the absence of any credible competition and independent media, by arbitrary detentions persecution of political opposition leaders, civil society representatives and journalists and was also marked by the sudden death of Alexei Navalny in custody in one of Russia’s harshest penal colonies. Furthermore, the election marked the second consecutive time that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been unable to observe elections in the Russian Federation (following the 2021 parliamentary elections).
After a decade of a shrinking public sphere under Vladimir Putin, a new spiral of domestic political repression commenced after Alexei Navalny’s return to Russia in January 2021, and has increased dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Any dissent or deviation from the official version of events is penalised and critical voices in society have been further criminalised. The EIU Democracy Index 2024 characterises Russia as ‘authoritarian’, ranking 150th out of 167 countries. In the World Press Freedom Index 2026, Russia was ranked 172nd out of 180 countries with almost all independent media having either been banned or subjected to military censorship. The UN Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, highlighted on numerous occasions that the human rights situation in Russia had significantly deteriorated since the invasion of Ukraine, with a pattern of suppression of civil and political rights.
Since 24 February 2022, 20 000 anti-war protestors have been detained in Russia and there are currently over 6 500 political prisoners according to OVD-Info. The EU has condemned the systematic crackdown on NGOs, civil society organisations, human rights defenders and independent journalists both within and outside of Russia and continues to support Russians who have been speaking out or protesting against the war in Ukraine. The EU has repeatedly reaffirmed its solidarity with all Russians who have been prosecuted, imprisoned or intimidated for continuing to fight for human rights and speaking the truth about the regime’s illegal actions.
In 2024-2025, the dismantling of civic freedoms has continued and expanded with new laws allowing for the prosecution of minors as young as 14 for ‘sabotage’ crimes, confiscation of property for anti-war statements, harsher punishments for treason, fabricated criminal cases using torture, threats and provocations, persecution of private expressions, primarily on the internet, prohibition of all ‘foreign agents’ from engaging in any educational activity, including publishing books and lecturing. As of 2026, internet censorship has reached unprecedented levels, with increased state control over internet infrastructure preventing access to global messaging apps and social media platforms, progressively criminalising VPN use, forcing users to use state-controlled applications, as well as enforcing widespread disruption and shutdowns of mobile internet.
Agreements in force
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in June 1994 remains the legal basis for EU-Russia relations. Originally valid for 10 years, it has been renewed annually by tacit agreement. The PCA established a framework for political dialogue and cooperation, including regular consultations on human rights and twice-yearly presidential summits. However, all institutional dialogues under the PCA have been suspended since 2014.
At the 2003 St Petersburg summit, the EU and Russia agreed to deepen their cooperation through the creation of four ‘Common Spaces’ covering: 1) the economy; 2) freedom, security and justice; 3) external security; and 4) research, education and culture. In parallel, the Northern Dimension policy between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland was renewed in 2007, and promoted cross-border cooperation in the Baltic and Barents regions. In 2008, negotiations were launched for a new EU-Russia agreement to include ‘legally binding commitments’ in areas such as political dialogue, justice, liberty, security, economic cooperation, research, education, culture, trade, investment and energy. A ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ was launched in 2010. Negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement were concluded in 2011. However, Russia’s invasion of Crimea led to the suspension of all these talks and processes. In 2014, the European Council suspended cooperation with Russia (except on cross-border cooperation and people-to-people contacts), as well as new EU financing following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Any remaining cooperation was suspended.
Role of the European Parliament
The European Parliament endorsed the PCA in 1997 under the ‘assent procedure’.
Parliament has adopted a series of resolutions on Ukraine condemning Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its role in destabilising eastern Ukraine. In its resolutions of 11 June 2015 on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and of 12 March 2019 on the state of EU-Russia political relations, Parliament backed the EU sanctions and emphasised the need to provide more ambitious EU financial assistance to Russian civil society and promote people-to-people contacts despite difficult relations. The 2019 resolution on the state of EU-Russia political relations expressed great concern over Russia’s international behaviour, particularly in the Eastern Partnership countries. The resolution also criticised the deterioration of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Russia and proposed that Russia no longer be considered a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU. In September 2021, Parliament adopted a recommendation on the direction of EU-Russia political relations requiring the EU to ‘ensure that any further engagement with the Kremlin will depend on the latter’s promise to end its domestic aggression against its own people, to stop systemic repressions of the opposition and ... political prisoners, civil society organisations, to repeal or amend all laws that are incompatible with international standards, such as the ones on “foreign agents”... and to end its external aggression against neighbouring countries’. It calls for the EU to have clearly defined red lines and to refrain from pursuing cooperation with Russia only for the sake of maintaining dialogue channels open. It also calls for a vision and a strategy on the future of EU relations with a free, prosperous, peaceful and democratic Russia.
Before 2014, Parliament had favoured a new comprehensive agreement with Russia based on common values and interests. However, Parliament has repeatedly expressed strong concerns about respect for human rights, the rule of law and the state of democracy in Russia, for example concerning the laws against LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’, decriminalising non-aggravated domestic violence, the crackdown on independent NGOs or those receiving funding from outside Russia, etc. Parliament has particularly condemned the unprecedented levels of human rights abuses perpetrated against residents of Crimea, most notably Crimean Tatars. In 2018, it demanded the release of Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov, who opposed the illegal annexation of Crimea, and awarded him the Sakharov Prize. Sentsov was released in 2019 as part of an exchange of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine. Parliament strongly condemned the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny in 2020.
Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Parliament has adopted numerous resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression and the crimes perpetrated in its wake and expressed its staunch support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.
Over the period following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Parliament has been a staunch supporter of strong and effective EU sanctions as a key instrument against the Russian Federation, Belarus and other allies of the Russian Federation. It has called for the confiscation of Russian assets frozen by the EU and for their use to aid the reconstruction of Ukraine and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression. As regards the cooperation on sanctions across the world, Parliament has called on partners to align with these sanctions and is concerned that several third countries are collaborating with Russia to help it circumvent them.
In its resolution of 23 November 2022, Parliament recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state that uses means of terrorism, calling on the international community to be united in establishing accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. In several resolutions, Parliament has called for President Putin, other Russian leaders and their Belarusian allies to be held accountable for the crime of aggression they have committed. In its resolution of 19 January 2023, Parliament supported the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies, in particular Belarus. It also fully supports the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine and alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Parliament also welcomed the ICC arrest warrants issued for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of Russia, in relation to the unlawful deportations of Ukrainian children to Russian territory. In May 2025, Parliament strongly condemned the ‘genocidal strategy’ carried out by Russia, with the support of Belarus, designed to erase Ukrainian identity, with the forced transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, their illegal adoption, murder and forced Russification and militarisation. In March 2026, the European Parliament condemned Russia’s coercive recruitment of foreign nationals, particularly from Africa, as a serious violation of human rights and international law.
Parliament also condemned the Russian regime’s systematic falsification of history to justify its illegal war against Ukraine, its failure to establish accountability for Soviet crimes, its glorification of Stalinist totalitarianism as well as its deliberate obstruction of historical research, and rejects efforts to undermine Ukraine’s history and identity.
In its recommendation of 8 June 2022 on ‘The EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine’, Parliament urged the then VP/HR Josep Borrell to pursue a holistic approach towards the Russian Federation and abandon any selective engagement with Moscow in the face of the atrocities and war crimes orchestrated by Russian political elites and committed by Russian troops, their proxies and mercenaries in Ukraine and elsewhere.
In its resolution of 16 February 2023, Parliament acknowledged that the Russian war of aggression had fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe, and therefore called for the EU to take bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions and continue the international isolation of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, as Parliament said in its resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, it also believes that the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States should start reflecting on how to engage with Russia in the future and how to help it make a successful transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic country that renounces revisionist and imperialistic policies.
Before the war of aggression began, Parliament had already for years been condemning the Russian regime’s domestic repression and the increasing deterioration of the human rights situation in the country. When Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, Parliament reiterated its strongest condemnation, in particular of the severe restrictions placed on the freedom of opinion and expression, the right to peaceful assembly and association, and the systematic crackdowns on civil society organisations, human rights defenders, the independent media, lawyers and the political opposition. Parliament has also deplored the sweeping repressive Russian legislation, including on ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’, the changes to the Criminal Code and the Mass Media Law, which are being used to engage in judicial harassment against dissenting voices in the country and abroad and to undermine the independent media. It has furthermore denounced the continuous and increasing censorship in Russia.
In particular, Parliament has repeatedly condemned Russia for the sentencing of Alexei Navalny, who was awarded the European Parliament Sakharov Prize in 2021. As more activists were arrested and jailed, Parliament adopted a resolution on 7 April 2022 on the increasing repression in Russia and another resolution on 20 April 2023 condemning the increasing repression in Russia, in particular the cases of Vladimir Kara-Murza and Alexei Navalny. As part of the ‘Free Navalny Campaign’, in June 2023, Parliament installed a full-size replica of the punishment cell (Shizo) where Alexei Navalny was serving his 19-year sentence in front of the Parliament building in Brussels. On 29 February 2024, Parliament adopted a resolution following Alexei Navalny’s sudden death qualifying it as ‘murder’, for which the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin personally bear criminal and political responsibility, and denounced the escalation of human rights violations by the Russian regime.
Parliament has expressed its solidarity with and support for the people in Russia and Belarus protesting against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and has demanded that Member States protect and grant asylum to Russians and Belarusians who are persecuted for speaking out against the war, as well as Russian and Belarusian deserters and conscientious objectors. It has also called for the EU institutions to engage with Russian democratic leaders and civil society and supports the creation of a democracy hub for Russia, hosted by the European Parliament. The President of the European Parliament met with representatives of the Russian opposition in 2022, and the subcommittee on Human Rights is holding regular exchanges of views with Russian independent journalists, civil society and opposition representatives. Individual MEPs also organised a round table on the future of a democratic Russia in June 2023 bringing together representatives of the EU Institutions, MEPs and prominent representatives of all streams of Russia’s free media and political opposition.
On 14 February 2024, the Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group and the European Parliament Delegation on relations with Russia jointly organised a conference inviting representatives of the Russian opposition and human rights lawyers to debate the meaning of the recent presidential elections.
On 25 April 2024, before its recess, Parliament held an important vote concluding that the so-called presidential election in Russia from 15 to 17 March was illegitimate and undemocratic, andit unequivocally condemned the illegal so-called election conducted in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Parliament also urged the EU Member States and the international community not to recognise the outcome of the presidential election as legitimate, as it was neither free nor fair, nor met basic international electoral standards, and thus lacked democratic legitimacy.
Since the start of the 10th legislative term in July 2024, the European Parliament has been reaffirming its continuous support for Ukraine and condemning Russia’s aggression through a number of resolutions.
Relations with Russian legislators mostly took place through the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC), an interparliamentary forum established by the EU-Russia PCA. Between 1997 and 2014, the PCC served as a stable platform for developing cooperation and dialogue between delegations from Parliament and the Russian Federal Assembly. Since March 2014, however, Parliament has discontinued these interparliamentary meetings in accordance with the EU’s restrictive measures taken in response to the Ukrainian crisis. Nevertheless, Parliament’s Delegation to the EU-Russia PCC continues to meet regularly to analyse and hold debates on the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the world and domestically, and in particular on the escalating crackdown on Russian civil society by the Russian authorities. In this context, the Delegation holds regular exchanges of views with representatives of the Russian opposition, human rights defenders, civil society, NGOs and independent journalists, as well as with international experts. In June 2025, the Delegation held a joint meeting with the Foreign Affairs committee with the participation of Yulia Navalnaya and two former political prisoners, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin.
Parliament has not been invited by Russia to observe elections since 1999.
DG EXPO